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Abstract 
 
Although the contribution of the small enterprise to a nation’s economy, job creation and 
innovation is well known, comparatively little is understood on how small firms behave 
strategically and how the more common patterns of strategic behaviour relate to different 
levels of organizational performance. The following thesis aims at mapping out the 
strategic behaviour of small firms in the small island state of Malta, and in relating the 
evident patterns of strategic behaviour to the performances of these firms.  
The thesis follows on the logic of understanding strategy as a dynamic phenomenon, one 
that can be viewed as pathways between identifiable life cycle states. It also views 
strategy as behaviour, part deliberate and part emergent, thus allowing for the inclusion of 
both external influences and internal decision making. To be able to achieve this dynamic 
viewpoint of strategy a particular research methodology had to be deployed, observing 
both the context and the consequences to a firm’s strategic actions, as well as the very 
actions and interactions themselves. A Grounded Theory method of enquiry was adopted 
for this purpose as it is ideal for observing patterns, the very theme of this thesis.  
The research in question has focused on small firms with up to 49 full time employees, in 
line with the E.U.’s definition of both micro and small firms, and in a broad range of 
industries in Malta.  Results confirmed the predominance of five trajectories, or pathways, 
of small business strategic behaviour, each passing through a sequence of distinct life 
cycle states. For each pathway a unique performance situation was observed, resulting 
from the dynamic coalignment of the owner-manager’s entrepreneurial philosophy, the 
competitive behaviour adopted by the firm, and the competitive environment to the firm. 
Understanding which strategic pathway a small firm belongs to allows for a 
comprehensive insight into the firm’s competitive behaviour, and a prediction of the 
consequences to that behaviour.  The audience to the research consists of government 
entities involved in policy construction, small firm owners and managers, and the 
academic community involved in research and policy design. 
 
 
Keywords: Grounded Theory; Entrepreneur; Strategy; Strategic Behaviour; Orientation; 
Typology; Life Cycle; Small Firm; Business; Trajectory; Pathway; Performance. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Study  
 
The role of the small business is well known in terms of contribution to a nation’s 
economy, job creation and innovation. The National Statistics Office in the E.U. member 
state of Malta has identified no fewer than 30,790 small firms that were operational in the 
latter half of this decade; 96% of these registered up to 9 full-time employees and the 
remaining 4% registered 10 to 49 full-time employees.  These small firms provide over 
65% of employment, 38.7% of the economy’s value added and 17% of investments within 
the private sector in Malta. Little is known, however, on how these small organizations 
behave strategically, and how their strategic behaviour relates to their performance. In fact 
the literature in this area is scarce, and limited empirical research exists (Borsh, Huse and 
Senneseth 1999; Ebben and Johnson 2005).  The research in question looks into the 
strategic behaviour, or orientations, of these small firms in Malta, and how the different 
patterns of behaviour relate to varying levels of performance. The research in question is 
essentially a study of small businesses in a small island state, focusing on limited liability 
companies with below 50 full-time employees (that is, 0 to 49 employees), and operating 
in the retail (38% of the 30,790), manufacturing (10%) and general services (52%) sectors 
in Malta. Thus, the research looks at what the E.U. definition takes as micro firms (0 to 9 
full time employees) and small firms (10 to 49 full time employees). This width of focus 
was a planned decision taken at the start of the research, as it was indeed expected that 
the findings on small business strategy would show firms in movement; changing in size, 
strategic focus, resource configurations, and so on.  
 
On business strategy, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998 p. 8) point out where the 
real problem lies, observing that “there is a terrible bias in today’s management literature 
towards the current, the latest, the hottest”. One only has to see the explosion in the 
literature on entrepreneurial orientation (EO), for example, to appreciate how the general 
academic focus tends to pick up and sustain one particular, and at the time popular, 
direction of interest. On researching the small enterprise, Curran and Blackburn put 
forward a sensible piece of advice, observing that “smaller enterprises are actually more 
difficult to study than larger enterprises” (2001 p. 5), and that “research on the small 
enterprise is about creative, new ways of thinking about the small enterprise that will 
enhance our understanding of how it functions” (2001 p. 30). Understanding small 
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business strategy is now assuming an even greater urgency, given the challenges being 
faced by small firms in an increasingly turbulent competitive landscape. Ebben and 
Johnson (2005 p. 1250) go as far as stating that, for the small firm, “selection of strategy 
is critical for survival given the disadvantages they face”.  However, the common rejoinder 
here is that small firms have no strategy, that the firm simply follows the whims of its 
owner-manager, acting heuristically and basing its decisions on instinct, gut feeling, and 
circumstances. Small firms are “simple” firms (Miller 1983) or “lifestyle” firms (McCarthy 
2003), not worthy of any real academic focus. A number of prominent authors come to the 
defence of the small firm here. Kisfalvi (2002 p. 489) argues that “although entrepreneurs 
seem to engage little in formal planning, strategy in entrepreneurial firms can exhibit 
identifiable patterns over time”. This follows a similar train of thought to that of Hambrick 
(1984 p. 33), who had posited much earlier on that “since strategy is by its essence a 
dynamic phenomenon, it would be fruitful, even essential, for researchers to emphasize 
the classification of strategic pathways”. Possibly the greatest advocate of strategy as a 
pattern in a stream of decisions is the established author Henry Mintzberg himself, who 
maintains that streams of behaviour can be isolated, and strategies identified as patterns 
or consistencies in such streams (Mintzberg 2007; Mintzberg and Waters 1985). This 
approach towards mapping out of patterns of strategic behaviour, and relating these 
patterns to performance, shall be shown to be the central thrust of this research project. 
 
1.2 Originality of Research and Gap within the Literature 
 
Research on organizational strategy has been prominent for large firms (Rauch et al. 
2009; Smith, Guthrie and Chen 1989), as well as for public sector entities (Andrews, 
Boyne and Walker 2006), but has rarely been carried out for small firms (Aragón-Sánchez 
and Sánchez-Marín 2005).  The main reason is that the formal strategic management 
procedures that apply to large organizations are, more often than not, irrelevant to the 
small firm. The owner-manager will have little resource capacity for tasks such as formal 
strategic planning, and will function more on intuition, experience and instinct (McCarthy 
2003). Research on strategic patterns of behaviour for small firms is thus understandably 
limited. Three particular limitations exist within the literature: 
 
1. An excess focus on particular areas of strategic behaviour, that is, particular 
orientations. Research to date often looks towards a select few dimensions of 
strategic behaviour, biasing the research by pre-supposing which parameters are 
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important (McKelvey 1975), and inhibiting the emergence of the true multi-
dimensionality of the construct (Ketchen and Shook 1996). 
2. Cross-sectional deductive research, with predefined patterns and hypothesis 
testing, is the order of the day (e.g.  Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marín 2005). As 
a result, the same patterns of behaviour are always emerging in the research, and 
are not grounded in the data. Little appreciation is given to the organic nature of 
strategy (Farjoun 2002). 
3. A limited quantity of inductive studies have been carried out to date, making 
generalizability of any innovative findings difficult, and validity studies inconclusive. 
 
Notwithstanding this gap in the literature, the importance of small firms to a nation’s 
economy is well known. A contribution to the research in this area would be a significant 
enhancement to the existing academic literature. Further knowledge on how small firms 
apply strategic decision-making to enhance their performance would thus be welcomed by 
management practitioners and academics alike.  
 
1.3 The Purpose Statement 
 
The purpose of this research was to study patterns of strategic behaviour for small firms 
within a wide range of industries, and in a small island state. The aim of the study was to 
explore and understand the various dimensions of small firm strategic behaviour, and how 
the resulting behaviours of the firm relate to organizational performance. A postpositivist, 
constructivist knowledge claim has been adopted in the research. As a strategy of 
enquiry, grounded theory has been applied. This has allowed for an analysis of both 
structure and process, an aspect that is essential when studying dynamic patterns of 
behaviour. Data were gathered through two means; primarily through the in-depth 
interviews of the owner-managers of 67 small firms, and also through quantitative data 
focusing on the financial achievements of these same firms over a number of years. 
MAXqda2007 was used as a tool to integrate, manage and aid in the study the large 
quantity of data obtained. A typology of patterns of strategic behaviour was sought, as 
well as the relationship between the various patterns and the performances of the small 
firms. The audience to the research is four-fold; the academic community, local policy 
makers, private stakeholders, and the small business owner-managers themselves.   
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1.4 The Research Problem, Question and Primary Objectives 
 
It has been empirically proven that strategic typologies successfully explain a significant 
portion of organizational performance (Ketchen et al. 1997; Thomas and Ramaswamy 
1996). However, studies are mainly limited to large organizations and little is known about 
how small firms make common strategic decisions about deployment of resources and 
long-range decisions taken. Typologies based upon dynamic patterns of behaviour are 
even rarer, a noticeable exception being Kotler and Armstrong’s (2008) application of 
product life cycle theory. Typologies, parsimony and strategic behaviour go hand in hand, 
as shall be demonstrated throughout the thesis. The research question that guides the 
study and supporting objectives is the following two-part question:  
 
a) How do small firms behave strategically, and b) how do the evident strategic 
behaviours relate to organizational performance? 
 
Three primary objectives are stated for the research project. These are as follows: 
 
1. To identify and describe the various dimensions that act as antecedents to 
strategic behaviour, for small firms in the small island state of Malta. 
2. To seek common underlying factors and threads that relate these dimensions to 
one another, as well as to the respective industries and competitive conditions. To 
map out these factors/threads in the form of dynamic patterns of strategic 
behaviour. 
3. To seek possible relationships between the more common patterns of strategic 
behaviour and the performances of the small firms in this chosen substantive area 
of enquiry. 
 
1.5 Contribution of Individual Thesis Chapters 
 
Following this introductory chapter, the thesis document proceeds with a literature review 
that is detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, with an outline literature map depicted in 
Figure 2.1. An argument commonly found in qualitative research, no less so in grounded 
theory, is whether to place the literature before or after the findings of the research. This 
argument is really based upon a more fundamental one; whether the literature has been 
used in a deductive fashion to pre-empt a conceptual framework to be confirmed/rejected 
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via quantitative techniques, or if the literature has been kept aside by the researcher, only 
to be used at a later stage to substantiate “untainted” findings. This argument actually 
rages on with a vengeance within the different grounded theory approaches that can be 
taken. Glaser (1978, 1998) will insist on keeping an untainted, unbiased view of the 
phenomenon under observation. Strauss and Corbin will cautiously advocate theoretical 
sensitivity, arguing that “bringing the literature into the writing not only demonstrates 
scholarliness but also allows for extending, validating and refining knowledge in the field” 
(1998 p. 52). More recent authors such as Charmaz (2006, 2008) and Bryant (2002) will 
go a conceptual step further, advocating constructivism, and a complete integration of the 
researcher and the research. Two reasons account for a decision taken to place the 
literature before the research findings in this thesis. Firstly, as shown in the forthcoming 
Chapters 4 and 5, the knowledge claim, and subsequent strategy of enquiry adopted, 
have strongly lent towards a constructivist approach. Secondly, there was less literature 
reading after the research closed off; most of it came before and throughout. Previous 
dissertations carried out on the research topic, and a number of years as a small business 
consultant made impartiality to the phenomenon impossible. Arguments in favour of a 
constructivist approach to the grounded theory method of enquiry adopted shall be made 
in forthcoming chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The literature review is distributed into three main areas. The main thrust of Chapter 2 has 
been to integrate the somewhat scattered literature streams that point towards a dynamic 
coalignment of the firm, the owner-manager, and the competitive environment. A second 
focus of Chapter 2 has been to assimilate the various (and primarily economic) theories 
that support the notion of strategic groups. The reason for this is that the thesis is based 
upon a typological approach; the grouping of firms with similar strategic pathways. This is, 
in itself, strategic group theory. A quick note to be made is that, whilst the word “typology” 
will be used throughout, the research is also a taxonomic exercise. In clearly demarcated 
quantitative studies these are two separate activities; first a conceptual typology is 
devised, and then an empirical taxonomy is created by placing the sample elements into 
the different typology cells. This does not happen in grounded theory. Theoretical 
construction of the typology and empirical population into a taxonomy take place at the 
same time (see Figure 4.3 for a visual explanation). Chapter 3 is a continuation of the 
literature review, with a focus placed here on the various typological approaches that can 
be adopted, and various examples given and strengths/weaknesses discussed. The 
chapter closes with an argument in favour of using a trajectory-based typological 
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approach. This abides by the strategic group theory described in the previous Chapter 2, 
and allows for the application of dynamic coalignment, also the subject of Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 4 details the research methodology adopted for the study. The knowledge claim 
is one of postpositivism, tending towards the right of the continuum visualized in Figure 
4.1. The method of enquiry is grounded theory, applied to study the social reality of small 
business strategizing, as perceived and acted upon by the owner-managers central to the 
business.  In all, 67 small businesses contributed to the research that took place over a 
three-year period from 2007 to early 2010 (excluding thesis writing and such). This is not 
a mixed-methods study, but it did incorporate both qualitative and quantitative data. The 
main source of information was qualitative, through the in-depth interviews of 67 owner-
managers to the businesses, and the inclusion of descriptive memos to further explain the 
many observations that were made. A second source of information was a database 
compiled on the financial achievements of most of the firms in the sample, obtained from 
the audited (and publicly available) financial statements of the firms in question. The 
founders of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967 p. 18), explain this data integration 
very well by arguing that “in many instances, both forms of data are necessary – not 
quantitative used to test qualitative, but both used as supplements, as mutual verification 
and, most important for us, as different forms of data on the same subject...”. The chapter 
in question details the epistemological underpinnings of the grounded theory method of 
enquiry by briefly describing the contributions of various prominent authors. The sampling 
strategy that was adopted is summarized in Figure 4.3, showing a sequence of sampling 
techniques adopted for different purposes.  
 
The methodology chapter goes on to explain the logic of the choice of research settings. 
An intrinsic knowledge of the culture and language of the Island, as well as the wide 
diversity of business types available within a limited geographic area, made the Island an 
ideal choice for the research. Malta, being a small island state, with a population of just 
under half a million, was seen to be highly attractive for the study of small business 
strategy for two additional reasons. Firstly, the ratio of business types, sizes and 
configurations is highly similar to that of larger countries such as the U.S., U.K. and 
Australia. Furthermore, it was expected that the confinements in size and market 
structures would serve to amplify the actions, conditions and consequences that portray 
small firm strategic behaviour. Also, in 2010 the European Innovation Scoreboard 
confirmed Malta to be a ‘moderate innovator’, on par with many other European states. 
The methodology chapter goes on to detail the rigour through which the grounded theory 
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method was applied, such as the coding methodology that was deployed, the application 
of comparative analysis to build a robust set of categories and properties, quality criteria 
that were targeted, the use of MAXqda as a support tool, and ethical considerations that 
were abided by. More specific methodological issues have also been discussed in 
subsequent thesis chapters 5, 6 and 7, as they related more to the particular objectives of 
these dedicated chapters.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 detail the research findings, each focusing on a distinct area of 
research that contributed to the final outcome. The final outcome is summarized into a 
model for small firm strategic behaviour (within the substantive area of enquiry), illustrated 
in Figure 8.1 of the concluding Chapter 8. Five strategic trajectories were observed; a 
retrenchment trajectory, a controlled focus trajectory, a contained growth trajectory, a 
dynamic growth trajectory, and a repositioning trajectory. This typology of strategic 
pathways pictures the firms in question moving in a dynamic fashion between four 
strategic states. Each strategic state is a unique competitive situation, with particular firm–
owner-manager–environment coalignment.  This is also life cycle theory, as applied to the 
small firm.  The logic of the three research findings chapters is thus as follows: In order to 
map out strategic pathways, first, the key junctions or nodes to these pathways must be 
established. These are, in fact, the four strategic states that were observed for the firms in 
question. To be able to observe these strategic states steps must be first taken to choose 
and operationalize the variable set that acts as antecedents to the states. Selection and 
population of this framework of variables was the objective of Chapter 5 of the thesis. 
Chapter 6 focused on establishing the different strategic states.  Chapter 7 proceeded to 
establish a typology of strategic pathways that the firms would generally follow, as they 
moved between the strategic states. Appendix 10 illustrates these pathways. Dynamic 
coalignment was observed as the firms traversed between states, or opted to oscillate 
within a particular strategic state. Performance implications, both subjective and objective, 
showed largely different financial and non-financial achievements being acquired in the 
different states, motivating owner-managers to take on particular trajectories. Final 
observations, conclusions, and limitations are then catered for in Chapter 8 of the thesis. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review. Strategy Relevant to the Small Firm 
 
2.1   Overview of Chapter and Literature Map 
 
The introductory chapter has set the stage for the research by outlining the research 
question and the main objectives. The aim of the research has been defined as a bid to 
map out common patterns of small firm strategic behaviour and relate these to 
organizational performance, within the context of a small island state.   The literature, 
whilst not required for any deductive form of study, is essential to explain the rationale and 
theories that support (or challenge) the present research findings, and to position the 
research within the larger theoretical context. As posited by Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 
52): “Bringing the literature into the writing not only demonstrates scholarliness but also 
allows for extending, validating and refining knowledge in the field”.  The literature map 
shown in the following Figure 2.1 outlines the various literature thrusts that shall be 
discussed in this chapter, and in the next (Chapter 3, that is a continuation of the literature 
review). The map identifies three major literature streams, and various sub-streams, that 
collectively relate to the research theme. 
 
The focus of the present chapter is on two related streams; that of small business strategy 
and of strategic group theory. The main stream, shown to the centre of Figure 2.1, starts 
off with a general perspective of strategy, the various schools, theories, and how small 
business strategy can be understood as a pattern in a stream of actions. Following this 
generic overview that aims to establish the concept of strategy as observable behaviour, 
the remainder of the main stream looks for evidence within the literature of how this can 
be done.  Literature is reviewed that looks at the firm, and then at the owner-manager, as 
separate units of analysis. The objective is to contrast the literature on small business 
strategy that sees the firm to be “the” important strategic unit, with the literature arguing a 
focus on the individual as the important precursor to a small firm’s strategic behaviour. 
The owner-manager’s characteristics, both psychological and behavioural, are given 
prominence. This is followed by a review of the literature arguing the concept of firm – 
owner-manager strategic coalignment. Following this, the competitive environment of the 
small firm is discussed, and a conceptual model integrating the objective and perceived 
environment is established. This model also incorporates the earlier concepts of owner-
manager psychological and behavioural tendencies, as well as the firm’s resource setup 
and behaviour. The dynamics of small firm strategic behaviour are then given greater 
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prominence with a review of the literature on organizational life cycle and its strategic 
implications. This highlights the importance of strategic coalignment in each of the 
different stages of the small firm’s evolvement.  
 
Finally, the literature on small business performance is reviewed, cumulating into a theme 
that different performance criteria are important to the firm at different stages of its being. 
This theme complements the logic of dynamic firm coalignment. The main stream in 
Chapter 2 closes off with an argument in favour of using a typological approach to 
measure the strategic coalignment of firms and their varying levels of performance.  
 
 
Literature
Review
Chapter 2
Small Business Strategy
Chapter 3
A Typological ApproachStrategy
The Wider Perspective
The Firm
As the Unit of Analysis
The Firm & the 
Owner/Manager
An Integration of Both Units
Chapter 2
Strategic Group Theory
The Business 
Environment
And the Small Firm
The Firm’s Life Cycle
And Small Business 
Strategy
Typologies Based on 
Stances
Typologies Based on 
Actions
Combination and 
Integration Typologies
The Trajectory-based 
Typology
Performance
And the Small Firm
Industrial Organization Theory
Organizational Systematics
Resource-based Theory
Strategic Choice - Determinism
The Owner/Manager
As the Unit of Analysis
 
 
Figure 2.1: Literature Map 
 
 
The second literature stream within this chapter (shown to the left of Figure 2.1) provides 
a theoretical foundation for the grouping of firms with similar strategic behaviours. This is 
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the domain of strategic group theory. This strategic grouping approach is based on strong 
economic foundations, well established within the literature. Four schools that collectively 
support strategic group theory are discussed, and an integrated model is put forward as a 
set of propositions. The general logic is that there are different competitive conditions for 
firms within particular groups, as well as between the different groups. 
 
This then sets the stage for the following Chapter 3 that delves into the more practical, 
and empirical, applications of strategic group theory. Chapter 3 discusses different 
typological approaches that can be adopted as a means of mapping out and observing 
similar patterns of business behaviour.  Four approaches to typological studies are 
described: Typologies based on a static picture of ‘content’; Typologies based on dynamic 
business processes; Combination and Integration typologies that attempt to integrate 
process and content; Trajectory-based typologies that are seen to truly incorporate both 
content and process. Chapter 3 concludes with arguments in favour of the trajectory-
based approach, an approach that will allow for mapping of the dynamic stages of small 
business coalignment.  
 
2.2 Strategy: The Wider Perspective  
 
The literature on business strategy takes on a somewhat bewildering series of directions, 
and has been the subject of numerous texts and studies with diverging contexts and 
conceptualizations. A few of the more prominent strategy viewpoints are as follows: 
Strategy from a Contingency, Configurational or Universalist viewpoint (Hambrick 1984, 
2003); Strategy as fit or as congruence (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985); Strategy as a 
unique and valuable position (Porter 1996); Strategy as ‘orientation’ (Fulford and Rizzo 
2009) or as ‘stances’ (Andrews, Boyne and Walker 2006); Strategic types, archetypes or 
typologies (Miles and Snow 1978; Miller and Friesen 1978); Strategy as a ‘map’ (Kaplan 
and Norton 2000). Generic strategies (Porter 1980); Strategy as a formalized plan of 
action (Chandler 1962), of the design and implementation of that plan (Thompson and 
Strickland 1998); Strategy as ‘intent’ (Prahalad and Hamel 1990); Strategy as an outcome 
of unique resource configurations (Aragón-Correa et al. 2008; Barney 1986; Peteraf 
1993); Strategy as a pattern (Mintzberg 2007; Mintzberg and Waters 1985; Hambrick 
1983); Strategy as ‘practice’ (Whittington 1996), and so on.  The various theories diverge 
to such an extent that Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) document no fewer than 
ten strategy schools (such as the design school, the planning school, etc.).  
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The various literatures may serve to define strategy, but are somewhat incomplete in 
prescribing how to understand small business strategy. In a more practical manner, the 
question remains as to how to observe, measure and understand the strategies 
undertaken by small businesses. Various literatures have put forward two arguments; that 
small business strategy is simply an instinctive reaction to a dominant environment, and 
that the entrepreneur and the small business are really one and the same, hence by 
understanding the entrepreneur one also understands the business. However, as argued 
by Curran and Blackburn (2001), a small business does not mean a simple business, and 
complex and subtle actions and interactions will continuously take place within the small 
firm and in its dealings with the environment. Here, Mintzberg (2007) provides a possible 
solution, one that apparently triggered off this author’s acclaimed interest in business 
strategy in the first place. Mintzberg describes his fascination with reading the text of 
Simon (1957), an eminent theorist in the field of management. Mintzberg (2007 p. 1) 
reacts to a passage in Simon’s text by stating that: “I was intrigued. If strategies could be, 
not only implemented after being ‘formulated’, but also be defined by behaviors, as they 
‘form’, we would have a way to study the process empirically”. This is what Mintzberg 
(1978) and Hambrick (1983) term ‘patterns in a stream of decisions, guiding a firm in its 
alignment with the environment, and shaping policy and procedure’. Mintzberg (2007 p. 1) 
observes; “so what better way to study strategies, and the processes by which they 
develop, than to uncover patterns in organizations and investigate their origins”. Mintzberg 
adds a clarification by stating that the approach would not really be one of studying 
streams of decisions but of actions, as these are the traces most clearly left behind by 
organizations, and would also incorporate the deliberate and emergent decision-making 
processes that will have taken place.  
 
The understanding of strategy as a pattern in a stream of actions allows for some 
important solutions. Firstly, it bypasses completely the problem of measuring strategy by 
looking for rigid strategy formulations in the shape of plans, documents or grand schemes. 
Chandler (1962 p. 13) may have been correct in defining strategy as “the determination of 
the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise”, but the author really was 
studying large American organizations (or more correctly, their structures), and not the 
dynamic small firm that acts more on gut, instinct, and in a heuristic manner (McCarthy 
2003). Secondly, it allows strategy to be understood as acting along a deliberate – 
emergent continuum, where “real-world” strategies will be somewhere in between 
(Mintzberg 2007 p. 6), that is, neither fully deliberate nor fully emergent. Patterns 
observed will incorporate both deliberate actions, as well as emerging reactions, allowing 
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for the external environment to be fully incorporated into the picture. Thirdly, the dynamics 
of strategic behaviour can now be taken into consideration. Arguments placed by Miles 
and Snow (1978) and Miller and Friesen (1980) regarding organizational momentum (a 
consistency in strategy implementation and direction) have been repeatedly challenged 
(e.g. Hanks et al. 1993; Zajac and Shortell 1989). Longitudinal studies have shown that 
organizations may, and often will, change their strategic behaviours over time and in 
accordance to necessity (e.g. Mintzberg 1978). This is especially true for the small firm 
where its more limited resource base will allow it to do so more freely. Studying patterns of 
strategic behaviour will allow for changes to be observed, so much so that Hambrick 
(1984, 2003) advocates focusing on strategic pathways or trajectories, and in grouping 
these into common patterns that provide understanding and meaning. Finally, strategy as 
a pattern can incorporate any, or all, of the various strategy schools. Be it an 
entrepreneurial firm, or a firm basing its actions on important political decisions, or a firm 
building competitive advantage through unique resource configurations, observed patterns 
of strategic actions can always be applied to understand the strategic behaviour of that 
firm. In conclusion, the texts of Mintzberg (1978), Burgelman (1983a, 1983b), Hambrick 
(1984, 2003), Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) and Mintzberg (2007) collectively 
contribute to the following set of seven concepts, or propositions, that serve to explain the 
meaning of business strategy: 
 
1. Strategy concerns both the organization and the environment. The organization in 
fact uses strategy to deal with the environment. 
2. Strategy is a conscious set of guidelines that determines decisions into the future.  
3. The substance of strategy is complex, unstructured and non-routine, but can be 
mapped out as patterns in streams of actions as opposed to formal, pre-meditated 
plans. 
4. Strategy and strategic decisions are long-range decisions that affect the well-being 
of the whole organization. 
5. Strategy involves issues of both content (the state of the organization) and process 
(the actions taken and the processes that guide these actions).  
6. Strategies are neither purely deliberate nor purely emergent, and are often 
somewhere in between. 
7. Strategy involves various thought processes, analysis and conceptualizations at 
various levels within the business. Strategy can be induced by top management, 
autonomously developed at lower levels of the firm, or be a combination of top-
down and bottom-up initiatives. 
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2.3 The Firm as the Unit of Analysis 
 
A number of literature streams have evolved over recent years, arguing the case of 
placing a focus on the strategic behaviour of the firm as opposed to that of the owner-
manager (or entrepreneur). The rationale to this logic is that firms are complex bundles of 
resources, and that observable firm behaviour will explain both how the resources are 
being deployed as well as how the antecedents to firm behaviour (such as owner-
manager characteristics) act and interact to influence this behaviour. Various models of 
firm strategic behaviour shall be contrasted in this section, such as entrepreneurial 
orientation, small business orientation, and corporate entrepreneurship. Thus, a first focus 
shall be placed on the firm as a unit of analysis. For example, one of the earliest texts 
analyzing patterns of strategic behaviour in organizations is that of Mintzberg (1973), 
classifying organizations into a three-mode typology consisting of the Entrepreneurial 
mode, the Adaptive mode, and the Planning mode. In the Entrepreneurial mode primarily 
young organizations will look for new opportunities, seek to grow, and attempt to build 
domination, often guided by the vision of a powerful leader. In the Adaptive mode firms 
will struggle with a dominating or uncertain environment, and attempt to survive by 
incrementally making decisions according to internal and external constraints. In the 
Planning mode the environment will be more stable and an organization will set and enact 
goals in conformity with existing resources and well-defined targets. Mintzberg’s theory is 
essentially a situational one; an organization can be any one of the three modes, or can 
oscillate between the modes over time and according to its life cycle or situational factors. 
Furthermore, parts of an organization could subscribe to one mode, whilst other parts to 
another mode.  
 
Miller (1983) builds upon Mintzberg’s (1973) earlier text and that of a number of key 
authors (Khandwalla 1977; Kets de Vries 1977; Miller and Friesen 1978, 1982) to 
establish a multidimensional construct for firm entrepreneurial behaviour. The author 
defines an entrepreneurial firm as “one that engages in product-market innovation, 
undertakes somewhat risky ventures, and is first to come up with ‘proactive’ innovations” 
(1983 p. 771). This is an incremental development of Miller and Friesen’s (1982) 
innovative scale used to distinguish between conservative and entrepreneurial firms, and 
is a theme subsequently used in empirical studies such as that of Covin and Slevin (1989) 
to match firm entrepreneurial behaviour with organizational structure and environmental 
dynamism.  Miller puts forward a strong argument in favour of the firm, and not the 
individual, as the focus of research. The main argument is that firm entrepreneurial 
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behaviour will be influenced by a number of determinants, such as the environment, 
structure, strategy and leader personality. Miller sees the critical factor to be the firm, that 
is, the way the firm acts and reacts to these determinants.  This, in turn, depends upon the 
nature of the organization in question. This argument is substantiated by Miller’s (1983) 
empirically derived taxonomy of firms, classified into a typology of Simple, Planning and 
Organic firms. The objective of the classification is to demonstrate how firms’ 
entrepreneurial behaviour will change with changing competitive and environmental (both 
internal and external) conditions. Simple firms are the smallest, and their entrepreneurial 
behaviour is heavily correlated with leadership traits such as personality, power, 
knowledge, and locus of control. Planning firms are the largest, depend more on stable 
environmental conditions, and operate mechanistically with less leadership control over 
their actions. Organic firms are of medium size, thrive in a dynamic and hostile 
environment, have a diffused power structure, and are good at adaptation and at 
exploiting external challenges. By looking at the behaviour of the firm Miller also 
incorporates the contribution of the determinants, but only as antecedents to the actions 
and behaviours of the firm as the main element of focus. The gist of Miller’s seminal work 
is that entrepreneurship can be stimulated in different ways and for different organization 
types; through leadership style in Simple firms, planning sophistication in Planning firms, 
and organizational structure in Organic firms. One has to note here two assumptions from 
Miller’s (1983) and Mintzberg’s (1973) texts; that small firms are simple firms, and that the 
manager/leader and the simple firm are effectively one and the same (or at best, one 
heavily correlated to the other). In fact, for the small entrepreneurial organization, 
Mintzberg (2007 p. 345) states that “leadership dominates the strategy process... The rest 
of the organization, in contrast, tends to be malleable and responsive to that leader”. 
These two assumptions shall, however, be challenged in later chapters of this thesis.  
 
The focus on ‘firm behaviour’ as opposed to that of the ‘entrepreneur’ takes up further 
momentum with texts such as that of Lumpkin and Dess (1996) and Borch, Huse and 
Senneseth (1999). Resource-based Theory is used to substantiate the argument, as this 
considers the integration of human, physical and organizational resource strengths within 
a firm. In a taxonomic study on the resource configurations of small firms, Borch, Huse 
and Senneseth (1999 p. 66) concede that “we have considered competitive strategies as 
firm behaviour more than isolated characteristics or decisions of the 
entrepreneur/manager”. Lumpkin and Dess use the term entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
to describe firm strategic behaviour as consisting of the processes, practices and 
decision-making that are characterized by five dimensions (as opposed to Miller’s three). 
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These are autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive 
aggressiveness. Lumpkin and Dess build upon Child’s (1972) arguments of strategic 
choice to enact these behaviours, positing that entrepreneurial orientation “reflects the 
organizational processes, methods, and styles that firms use to act entrepreneurially”, 
(1996 p. 139).  Autonomy is described as the ability and motivation to be self-directed in 
the pursuit of business opportunities. Innovativeness involves the firm’s drive to engage in 
new ideas, experimentation, and creative ventures, possibly resulting in new 
product/markets or engineering processes. Risk taking is characterised by a firm that 
makes high and unsecured resource commitments with the intention of reaping above-
average returns. Proactiveness is about taking the initiative and acting opportunistically in 
a bid to shape the competitive environment as opposed to react to it. Competitive 
aggressiveness looks at how the firm directly and intensely challenges its competitors as 
they vie for competitive advantage. Lumpkin and Dess conclude that EO represents the 
process aspect of entrepreneurship and should best be understood as a multidimensional 
construct directly impacting upon performance, with environmental and organizational 
variables acting as no more than moderating factors. 
 
An attempt to assimilate the vast conceptual and empirical literature on EO can be seen in 
Rauch et al.’s (2009) meta analysis of 51 studies on EO, covering some 14,000 
companies. The authors argue that EO has its roots in the strategy–making process 
literature, this strategy making being an organization-wide phenomenon incorporating 
aspects such as decision making, culture and organization mission. The meta analysis is 
based on Miller’s (1983) three dimensions of EO, and seeks to study the dimensionality of 
this construct, its moderators, and relationships to performance. On the various 
arguments on EO dimensionality Rauch et al. (2009 p. 780) conclude that “our findings 
support the idea that EO dimensions (innovation, risk taking and proactiveness) are of 
equal importance in explaining business performance. This would suggest that it is 
reasonable to support the use of a summed index of the three dimensions in future 
studies aiming at explaining performance”. EO was found to moderately influence 
performance (r = 0.242), and this positive relationship was substantially enhanced when 
moderators such as firm size (r increased to 0.345 for businesses with less than 50 
employees) and industry dynamism were included, indicating that the smaller the firm size 
the stronger the EO – performance relationship. The authors posit that this changing 
relationship “tells us something about the direct influence that the CEO has on the 
company” although issues of causality prevail. Kreiser, Marino and Weaver (2002) 
empirically demonstrate, on a sample of small and medium sized firms, that EO does 
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indeed consist of separate but complementary dimensions that can be studied separately 
or collectively. 
 
The literature on EO then takes on a number of different directions, into that of small 
business orientation (SBO) and corporate entrepreneurship (CE).  Runyan, Droge and 
Swinney (2008) argue that EO and SBO are two separate and independent constructs, 
with SBO defining a ‘satisficing’ approach by owner-managers to limit the business to a 
minimum of entrepreneurial activity. The authors observe empirically that for mature firms 
SBO relates positively with performance whilst for younger firms EO relates positively with 
performance. Stewart et al. (2003) look towards the difference between the two, naming 
EO as macroentrepreneurship and SBO as microentrepreneurship. Another differentiation 
comes from Carland et al. (1984), who distinguishes the small business owner as an 
individual who establishes and manages a business for the main purpose of furthering 
personal goals. The business will be the primary source of income and will demand the 
majority of the owner-manager’s time and resources. The owner-manager will perceive 
the firm as an extension of her personality, intrinsically bound with family needs and 
requirements. One question, however, prevails. One has but to look at Schumpeter’s 
(1934) five determinants of entrepreneurial behaviour; introduction of new goods, 
introduction of new methods of production, opening of new markets and of new sources of 
supply, and industrial reorganization. If EO and SBO are two forms of organizational 
behaviour, then a high level of entrepreneurial activities such as those defined by 
Schumpeter would denote an EO state whilst a low level, an SBO state. This begs the 
question to be asked whether EO and SBO are more along one continuum of high – low 
EO, as opposed to two entirely separate constructs. McCarthy (2003) would disagree with 
this, and goes as far as excluding “lifestyle firms” from her empirical study on SME 
strategic behaviour. 
 
It is also pertinent to review how the literature on EO and that of corporate 
entrepreneurship (CE) has taken significantly different directions. The text of Ireland, 
Covin and Kuratko (2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of existing CE frameworks, 
and proposes an integrative model for the construct. Interestingly, the authors find existing 
EO models (such as those of Lumpkin and Dess 1996, and Covin and Slevin 1991) to be 
the most similar to the ensuing CE model. There are, however, significant differences as 
subsequently outlined in the authors’ comparative text. The CE framework is shown to 
employ three levels; the firm, the entrepreneurial management and the organizational 
members. It is a linkage of individual-level entrepreneurial cognitions and organizational-
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level entrepreneurial outcomes. Covin and Miles (1999) contend that CE is an 
entrepreneurial philosophy that permeates an entire organization’s outlook and 
operations. Similarly, Ireland, Covin and Kuratko (2009 p. 37) argue that “CE strategy is 
reflected in three elements: an entrepreneurial strategic vision, a pro-entrepreneurship 
organizational architecture, and entrepreneurial processes and behaviours as exhibited 
throughout the organization”. This means that there must be a consistency of 
entrepreneurial behaviour at all organizational levels, so much so that the authors argue 
that strategy (in general) must be rooted in stability. In a similar position to that of Miles 
and Snow’s (1978) Prospector firms, this CE approach thus has the advantage of 
including entrepreneurial management into the equation, and the disadvantage of 
providing another static model that assumes two things; that of strategic momentum, and 
that the model’s antecedents will all collectively (and similarly) vary along a continuum 
from high CE to low CE.  It is argued that CE has little applicability for the dynamics of the 
small firm, unlike EO as demonstrated by empirical studies such as that of Kreiser, Marino 
and Weaver (2002).  
 
In conclusion, one can look at the text of Covin and Slevin (1991) to come up with two 
important themes relevant to the application of EO to understand small firm strategic 
behaviour. The first concludes upon the concept of the firm as an entrepreneurial ‘being’, 
in the logic that organizations can and should be viewed as entrepreneurial entities. “To 
say that organizations, per se, can be entrepreneurial is not a subversion or 
misapplication of the construct of entrepreneurship. Rather, it is a defensible and 
meaningful assertion based on the fact that organizations, like individuals, can create new 
value for society through the thoughtful and productive assemblage of resources.  Limiting 
discussion of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial process to individuals is unduly 
restricting” (Covin and Slevin 1991 p. 20). Emanating from this argument is another. If 
organizations can behave entrepreneurially then this poses an advantage: “Behaviour is, 
by definition, overt and demonstrable” (Covin and Slevin 1991 p. 8). In other words, it is 
measurable and hence manageable. Two other arguments are pertinent to the concept of 
EO. Firstly, texts arguing the differences between SBO and EO should be regarded with 
caution. Possibly both orientations can coexist at two ends of a continuum. Secondly, the 
literature distinguishing EO and CE must be understood and put into perspective. 
Although similarity exists, they are two different constructs with different conceptual basis 
and placed in different literature streams. EO holds promise in understanding how small 
firms act and react in accordance to internal and external environmental conditions. 
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2.4 The Owner-manager as the Unit of Analysis 
 
The literature has repeatedly argued that small organizations will be dramatically 
influenced by the personalities of their owner-managers. In a small organization “the CEO 
can have an enormous impact – via his power, his face-to-face contacts with virtually all 
employees, his ownership, and the immediate effects of his expressed goals, perceptions 
and preferences” (Miller and Toulouse 1986 p. 1393). The literature, however, takes on a 
number of different directions when trying to understand the behaviour of these owner-
managers, looking at psychological traits, values, cognitive behaviour, heuristics, and 
learning patterns, amongst many others. The following text will attempt to put these 
dimensions into perspective, and to come up with one understanding of how to profile the 
owner-manager. The first focus shall be placed on personality, or psychological, traits. As 
an example, Covin and Slevin (1988) build upon the work of Khandwalla (1977) to form a 
scale to measure the management philosophy of the top management, or dominant 
coalition. The multi-item scale, from a range of 1 to 7, measures owner-manager 
entrepreneurial style ranging from highly conservative to highly entrepreneurial. 
Dimensions such as leadership style, innovativeness and proactiveness are incorporated 
into the scale. A different approach to analyzing personality attributes, or philosophical 
values, is that taken by Kroeger (1974) to map out owner-manager roles in a more 
dynamic fashion. Kroeger merges owner-manager personality traits, personal attributes 
and values into a typology of five possible managerial roles. The author argues that 
different roles are required at different stages of an organization’s life cycle, and that 
managers of small firms can be trained to have qualities that allow them to function 
effectively in the five different roles. However, Kroeger does indicate that it is more 
possible to endow an entrepreneurial manager with functional skills than the other way 
round.  Miller and Dröge (1986) empirically observe the influence of CEO personality, 
measured through a ‘need for achievement’ motivational scale, on the structures that the 
firms ultimately deployed. The smaller and younger the firm, the stronger the relationship 
was observed between need for achievement and organizational structure. Achievement-
oriented CEO’s would, for example, centralize power and employ techniques of 
formalization such as written policies and procedures. The objective was to command 
greater control over the work environment, and thus increasing their chances of personal 
achievement. The usual difficulty found with cross-sectional studies prevails; the issue of 
causality. In other words, does personality determine structure or does structure 
command certain personality traits to be more prominent or sought after?  
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Other studies focus on different traits, albeit in an often-isolated fashion. For example, 
Waldman et al. (2001) measure the influence of CEO leadership characteristics on the 
performance of Fortune 500 firms, characterised by transactional and charismatic 
leadership traits. Findings indicate no significant direct leadership–performance effects but 
did observe a strengthening of the leadership–performance relationship when perceived 
environmental uncertainty was included as a moderating variable. Miller, Kets de Vries 
and Toulouse (1982) posit that there should be an expected relationship between the 
personality of the CEO and the strategies and structures of the firm. The authors highlight 
the influence of the owner-manager’s locus of control as “an individual’s perception of how 
much control he is exerting over the events in his life. An internal person is convinced that 
the outcomes of his behaviour are the results of his own efforts. In contrast, the external 
person believes that the events in his life are beyond his control and should be attributed 
to fate, luck, or destiny. Depending on these perceptions, it is assumed that there will be a 
considerable difference in behaviour” (1982 p. 238). In summary, internals are expected to 
demonstrate more entrepreneurial qualities than externals. In an empirical study on large 
firms the authors observe a strong relationship between locus of control and strategy 
making behaviour and organizational structure, although causality issues remain 
outstanding. Miller and Toulouse (1986) measure the effect of locus of control, need for 
achievement and flexibility on strategy-making, structure and performance for a sample of 
“small” firms (average size at 382 employees although the authors classify these firms as 
small). Significant relationships were noted between various variable sets comprising the 
dependent and independent constructs. As common to cross-sectional studies, causality 
issues prevail. 
 
However, Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007) argue that a mistaken focus is being placed on the 
personality variables of the owner-manager, such as locus of control and need for 
achievement. In fact, Baron and Shane (2007) posit that entrepreneurs’ personalities 
primarily influence their own behaviours and are less likely to be transmitted to other 
members, as compared to personal values that can gradually be embedded into the firm’s 
culture. In comparison between personality traits versus core values, Ling, Zhao and 
Baron (2007 p. 675) observe that “an individual can demonstrate the personality 
characteristic of introversion (being somewhat withdrawn and shy in social contexts) but at 
the same time hold a value suggesting that being friendly and sociable is highly desirable 
(a value)”. The authors empirically evaluate the effect of two values; collectivism (sharing, 
cooperation and group harmony) and novelty (a tendency to value change, the new and 
the different), on the performance of some 92 SME’s. A conclusion is reached that values 
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lead towards competitive advantage, but only if the values are appropriate for the specific 
challenges and ventures being faced by the firm at a particular stage of its existence.  The 
issue immediately arises here regarding how deep-rooted an owner-manager’s values 
are, whether she will be capable of modifying her values if so required, or if professional 
management are to be pulled in with values more in tune with the targeted strategic 
direction of the firm. Churchill and Lewis (1983) in fact argue that small businesses often 
fail when owner-managers refuse to delegate to more professional management as firms 
grow and develop.  
 
This focus on individual values is taken up by Meglino and Ravlin (1998) in a 
comprehensive review of the previous literature on the topic. The authors arrive at a 
number of conclusions not unlike those of Ling, Zhao and Baron: Values are seen to be 
an individual’s personal beliefs about how he or she “should” or “ought” to behave; There 
is a high social act in values (i.e. what is allowed for in the particular context), so much so 
that value congruence has to be included into the equation; Values are relatively 
permanent, although can be changed under certain conditions. Meglino and Ravlin’s 
(1998 p. 366) resulting conceptual model of “values effects” shows values to be influenced 
by genetics and socialization, and to influence in turn outcomes such as perception, 
decisions/behaviour, and performance. There will also be reinforcing feedback and 
moderating variables. Complementing Meglino and Ravlin’s comprehensive literature 
overview is Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) evaluation of how an organization is a reflection 
of its dominant coalition. The authors posit that “if strategic choices have a large 
behavioural component, then to some extent they reflect the idiosyncracies of decision 
makers” (1984 p. 195). Hambrick and Mason propose a model of how individual 
characteristics influence the organization’s implementation of strategic choice, placing the 
psychological traits of cognition and values at the centre of the model. These 
psychological traits would induce a process of selective perception that ultimately directs 
strategic choice.  Also, in similar vein to Meglino and Ravlin, the values and cognitive 
base of the dominant coalition can also directly influence strategic choice, say in situations 
where the values of the owner-manager override a perceived situation or solution of some 
sort. Hambrick and Mason advocate using observable (such as age, experience, 
education) as opposed to psychological traits (values, cognition, locus of control) due to 
the difficulty to measure these latter parameters. A different school of thought that 
complements the ‘core values’ argument is that of Edelson’s (1988) psychodynamic 
approach. This school argues that there is a continuous interaction between an 
individual’s innate emotional dispositions and her social context, starting from early years 
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and gradually shaping the individual’s patterns of response towards the environment.  
Edelson applies the psychological concept of ‘life issues’; issues that have been ingrained 
into the individual’s persona over many years and that tend to remain relatively constant 
over her lifespan. The author uses the theme of ‘multiple determination’, in that “strategy 
will be chosen that eventuates in the gratification of the greatest number of wishes” or 
issues (1988 p. 112). In a fine grained study on a small family firm, Kisfalvi (2002) 
empirically observes this theory in motion by focusing on the owner-manager of the firm, 
and the way in which he made strategic decisions over time. The owner-manager’s life 
issues (survival, achievement and success, born out of a very difficult childhood) were 
observed to directly control his top strategic priorities (such as high involvement, 
opportunity seeking and product innovation), which in turn influenced the firm’s strategic 
patterns over time. Kisfalvi (2002 p. 491) concludes that “the strategies that a particular 
entrepreneur pursues are personally and emotionally meaningful”, consistently influenced 
by a set of emotionally charged life issues. 
 
The issue of cognition and cognitive processes is also one of relevance to the small firm 
owner-manager. Research on entrepreneurship suggests two broad categories of factors 
that influence how individuals discover, and act upon, opportunities: 1) the possession of 
information adequate to identify an opportunity; and 2) the cognitive properties necessary 
to evaluate it (Shane and Venkataraman 2000). The authors argue that the cognitive 
entrepreneurial mindset engages in less counterfactual thinking, is less likely to 
experience regret over failed opportunities, and is less susceptible to inaction inertia. 
Cognitions are described as “all processes by which sensory input is transformed, 
reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered and used” (Mitchell et al. 2002 p. 96). Combe and 
Greenley (2004) carry out a detailed literature review on the various cognitive models 
relating to strategic flexibility, that is, the ability of the firm to respond and adapt to 
environmental change. The authors argue that “cognitive models are thought to be 
responsible for constraining the way decision-makers think, and this we suggest 
influences their consideration of decision-making options, and hence strategic flexibility” 
(2004 p. 1461). Cognitive models identified by the authors are various, and include: The 
rational cognitive model that emphasizes the human brain’s capability to receive, organize 
and interpret information; The developmental cognitive model that focuses on the belief in 
the importance of adapting (new resource configurations) through learning from past 
experiences; The deterministic cognitive model that argues that there is little freedom of 
choice and the direction of decision making is determined by events outside the control of 
management, thus demanding a particular management mindset; The probabilistic 
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cognitive model that argues that strategy is modified by probabilistic interaction with 
environmental factors; and the chaos cognitive model that argues that there is little 
rationality in the business environment and that managers have to learn to address 
complexity and unpredictability. Research on an information-processing (I-P) cognitive 
model by Pech and Cameron (2006) holistically maps out the entrepreneur’s opportunity 
recognition process, showing that entrepreneurs actively seek opportunity-laden 
information in order to satisfy internal motivators such as need for achievement.  
 
The various cognition models converge upon a common theme; psychological and 
sociological characteristics and subsequent decision behaviours play an important part in 
business success. Entrepreneurs actively search for opportunity-laden information (Pech 
and Cameron 2006). Entrepreneurial cognition involves the use of heuristics to piece 
together limited information in situations of decision uncertainty and complexity, allowing 
also for faster learning (Wright, Hoskisson and Busenitz 2000). Mitchell et al. (2002 p. 97) 
define entrepreneurial cognition as the “knowledge structures that people use to make 
assessments, judgements, or decisions involving opportunity evaluation, venture creation, 
and growth”. Manimala (1992) empirically confirms the common use of heuristics in 
decision making by entrepreneurs. Alvarez and Busenitz (2001 p. 758) posit that “recent 
research on cognition indicates that entrepreneurs use heuristics in their decision-making 
more than their managerial counterparts in large organizations. Consequently they often 
make significant leaps in their thinking leading to innovative ideas that are not always very 
linear and factually based”. Heuristics can be described as simplifying strategies used in 
complex and uncertain situations to make decisions, as the process of gaining knowledge 
by intelligent guesswork rather than through a hypothesized formula. This cognition-
heuristics debate may serve to explain an important issue: Empirical research on what 
characteristics make an entrepreneur is scattered and inconsistent. For example, Palich 
and Bagby (1995) observe that entrepreneurs did not vary significantly in their responses 
to a risk propensity scale when compared to non-entrepreneurs, implying that they were 
just as risk-averse. The cognitive-heuristics logic takes a different path to the assumption 
that entrepreneurs are risk-takers, arguing that it is how the data is framed and 
understood that explains the entrepreneurial being. In other words the outcome of the 
entrepreneur’s behaviour may appear risk-oriented, but the rationale for the behaviour is 
really a cognitive mindset that perceives the world in a somewhat different (and more 
positive) perspective. 
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A model that builds upon those of Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Meglino and Ravlin 
(1998) to describe an all-inclusive interaction between personality traits, core values and 
cognitive processes is provided by Busenitz and Lau (1996). The authors provide a 
parsimonious model that describes an all-important link between social and psychological 
contexts, between cognitive structure and cognitive process, and between conditions, 
actions and consequences. The independent variables are three constructs (the simplified 
model does not show inter-linkages and feedback loops); social context, core values 
(taken as Hofstede’s cultural values), and personal variables (such as risk taking, locus of 
control and achievement motivation). In fact, achievement motivation, risk-taking 
propensity and innovativeness are the three psychological factors most associated with 
entrepreneurship (Stewart et al. 2003 p. 29). These independent constructs impact upon 
the entrepreneur’s cognition, identified through a structural perspective (the schema; 
labels, pictures and meanings assigned to persons and events in the social environment) 
and a process perspective (the heuristics; a process by which knowledge is received and 
utilized). The resulting cognitive behaviour will ultimately impact upon the entrepreneur’s 
decision making actions. Busenitz and Lau (1996 p. 30) argue that, due to an often small 
organization size, entrepreneurs have “a very complex decision-making context, a context 
where simplifying biases and heuristics can have great deal of utility in enabling 
entrepreneurs to make decisions in a timely manner”. What the model also argues, 
however, is that the higher (or lower) resulting entrepreneurial behaviour is grounded in 
core values, values that will not change easily. In fact, entrepreneurs will have “higher 
power distance, higher individualism, lower uncertainty avoidance, and higher masculinity” 
(1996 p. 31).  Under this argument it would be very difficult to make an entrepreneur out of 
a non-entrepreneur, an issue strongly supported by Miles and Snow (1978). This would 
imply that the small business owner-manager who does not have entrepreneurial 
characteristics will simply not have the entrepreneurial aptitude required to take hold of 
conceptual, abstract and often tacit information, and to act upon this information. Looking 
at the previous section to this chapter, it becomes more understandable that researchers 
often adopt the polar classification of EO managers versus SBO managers.  
 
Two remaining issues stand out in the debate on entrepreneurial behaviour; those of 
cognitive learning and of group dynamics. Both issues tie down to the dynamic nature of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. For example, Carroll and Mosakowski empirically observe over 
2,000 respondents over a number of years, looking at the fluctuations of entrepreneurial 
behaviour as demonstrated by self-employment initiatives. The authors observe that 
“there has been a strong reliance on the assumption that entrepreneurship is associated 
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with some stable set of individual characteristics. There is little appreciation of the 
possible transitory nature of the entrepreneur’s status” (1987 p. 571). A similar argument 
has been placed by Shane and Venkataraman (2000 p. 217) in that “entrepreneurial 
behaviour is transitory”. By using a life cycle perspective of entrepreneurship (as seen 
through self-employment initiatives) Carroll and Mosakowski gain an image that is far 
different to the usual static cross-sectional perspective. Individuals would show 
entrepreneurial behaviour at various possible points in time, and in accordance to 
historic/background issues, social structures, personal characteristics, changing 
circumstances, and so on. This could explain Mitchell et al.’s (2002 p. 94) observation that 
researchers have been so far unable to identify a unique set of personality traits that 
characterize the entrepreneur; “why are some people and not others able to discover and 
exploit particular entrepreneurial opportunities?”  
 
One possible way of distinguishing entrepreneurial behaviour is by studying how they 
learn and then act upon their learning, an issue of strong debate within the literature. A 
useful comparison is made between single-loop and double-loop learning by Jashapara 
(2003). Single-loop learning results in “doing things better”, by detecting and correcting 
errors leading to a modification of rules within an accepted set of governing variables. 
Alternatively, double-loop learning results in “doing things differently” due to the learner 
challenging the basic assumptions underlying the governing variables. Evidence of this 
concept of doing things differently can be seen in the observation of Alvarez and Busenitz 
(2001 p. 759) that “while the entrepreneur may have specialized knowledge it is the tacit 
generalized knowledge of how to organize specialized knowledge that is the 
entrepreneur’s critical intangible resource”. This double-loop learning is also touched upon 
by Lei, Hitt and Bettis (1996), as a means by which an entrepreneurial firm can achieve a 
core competency by becoming a learning organization, thus solidifying its competitive 
advantage. The authors argue that “organizational learning must be focused on building 
effective, complex problem-defining and problem-solving heuristics that become the basis 
of competitive advantage” (1996 p. 552).  
 
In line with established Resource-based Theory requisites of uncertain inimitability and 
causal ambiguity, this double-loop learning uses difficult-to-imitate heuristics and insights 
for solving highly ambiguous challenges, something that routinised single-loop learning 
does not manage to achieve. The importance of learning is well understood, particularly 
since learning is only achieved where it becomes or leads to some intention to behave in 
a modified way (Sullivan 2000). So the evident challenge to be solved would be to teach 
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non-entrepreneurial owner-managers to adopt a more entrepreneurial posture, assuming 
that this is wanted in the first place. Sullivan (2000) sees this challenge as one of getting 
owner-managers to learn from what teaches them most; experience. It is getting them out 
of single-loop learning and encouraging and facilitating the adoption of double-loop 
learning. This would be akin to adopting, at least for some, a new style of cognitive 
behaviour. However, Busenitz and Lau (1996), Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Meglino 
and Ravlin (1998) would most certainly argue the limitations of this, pointing to the 
influence of established core values (or life issues) on the cognitive mindset of the owner-
manager.  
 
In conclusion, small businesses are often shown to fall into batches of different levels of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, so much so that a simplification is often made when values, 
social backgrounds, psychological traits and cognitive behaviours are meshed together 
into a polar classification of entrepreneurs versus small business owners. Strategic group 
theory can provide for an additional understanding here, and as argued by Panagiotou 
(2006 p. 452); “from a perspective of an individual firm, the fact that managers from the 
same strategic group have perceptions that are relatively similar with each other, and that 
these differ from those managers in firms from another strategic group suggests that over 
time, managers from the same strategic group become more like-minded as a 
consequence of interaction and cross-influencing. Consequently, these managers form a 
‘school of thought’ that subsequently reinforces this frame of mind”. In other words, 
cognitive behaviour emanating from social, value based, psychological, and situational 
variables will be reinforced in conjunction with the behaviours of other like-minded 
individuals that the owner-manager will perceive in her competitive environment. 
Panagiotou (2006) argues that the potential of this like-mindedness has strong 
repercussions because managers may become locked into a similar way of thinking and 
acting. As a result, it may become harder for these owner-managers to see outside the 
confines of these mental boundaries. In such an environment, imitation will become 
common place. With this concluding theme, an argument regarding the drivers of owner-
manager behaviour, as well as their ensuing behaviours, can be proposed: Not all owner-
managers are the same, as established by their core values, social backgrounds/histories, 
and key psychological traits. These antecedents will influence the cognitive mindset of the 
owner-manager, the way the world is seen, and the way in which the owner-manager will 
learn and adapt. Different perceptions of the competitive landscape will be made, and 
then acted upon. Patterns of action will be observed and may induce strategic groups of 
like-minded individuals whose behaviours further reinforce the perceptions, and 
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subsequent actions, of the group. An example of this was often seen in the research in 
question, for example in industrial estates where all carpenters (purposely grouped there) 
would have a single employee (the owner-manager), they would all be sole traders, they 
would all vie for a small niche of consumers with particular tastes, and they would build 
similar resource bases and charge fairly similar rates, and so on.  
 
A concluding comment to this sub-section needs to be made regarding the use of the 
word “entrepreneur”. In an excellent argument by Hornaday (1990), small business 
research has been seriously hampered by the use and misuse of this term, by 
misconceptions that apply, and by inconsistencies in definition and in application. The 
author likens the word “entrepreneur” to the word “warrior”, a term that can mean so many 
things in so many different combat situations. Hornaday advises on labeling the owner-
manager differently, looking into whether he/she is a professional manager, a craft-based 
practitioner, or a wealth seeker. In the following text and research a focus shall be placed 
on the owner-manager (not the entrepreneur), although arguments shall be made 
regarding owner-manager behaviour ranging from highly entrepreneurial to highly 
conservative in nature.  Furthermore, the concept of ‘dominant coalition’ will be used, 
signifying more than one owner-manager working in unison at the top strategic level within 
an organization.  
 
2.5 The Firm and the Owner-manager: An Integration of Both Units 
 
Since “the founding entrepreneur exerts a tremendous personal influence on the strategy 
and structure of his firm” (Miller and Toulouse 1986 p. 1406), then an argument can be put 
forward that the firm and the entrepreneur are essentially one and the same. But just 
where does a divide come in? Where do we stop (or start) looking at the owner-manager 
and the firm as separate units of analysis? Possibly the amalgamation of small firm 
behaviour and owner-manager characteristics starts off as early as 1934, with 
Schumpeter’s (1934 p. 77) descriptions of the entrepreneurial individual: “The 
entrepreneur of earlier times was not only as a rule the capitalist too, he was often – as he 
still is to-day in the case of small concerns – his own technical expert, in so far as a 
professional specialist was not called in for special cases. Likewise he was (and is) often 
his own buying and selling agent, the head of his office, his own personnel manager… 
and it was performing some or all of these functions that regularly filled his days”. An 
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example of this expectation that the individual and the (small) firm are one and the same 
is Carland et al.’s (1984) comparison of the small business venture to the entrepreneurial 
venture. According to the authors, a small business venture, which is void of any true 
innovative behaviour, will likewise be owned/managed by a small business owner whose 
principal objectives are personal and family needs.  An entrepreneurial venture will focus 
upon growth and innovation through an entrepreneur who is characterized by innovative 
behaviour.  
 
An empirical study on SME’s by Sadler-Smith et al. (2003) comes to a similar conclusion. 
Owner-manager entrepreneurial behaviour, firm entrepreneurial style (measured through 
a modified version of Covin and Slevin’s [1988] scale), and firm growth were correlated 
and revealed a positive relationship between certain entrepreneurial behaviours (of the 
owner-manager), firm entrepreneurial state, and growth. Limitations were outlined due to 
the cross-sectional nature of the study. Covin and Slevin (1988) seek to match the 
entrepreneurial behaviour of the top management with the organizational structure of the 
business using a wide sample of 80 organizations from 40 different industries, but biased 
towards large companies (average number of employees at 4320). The study concluded 
that there was strong support for the argument that organically structured firms performed 
better when run by entrepreneurial managers, whilst mechanistically designed firms 
performed better when run by conservative managers. Causality issues remained 
outstanding, such as the question whether performance could influence structure and 
management in return. This study is complemented by another empirical study (Covin and 
Slevin 1989) on ‘small’ firms in hostile and benign environments. The trend is repeated 
and an association is made between firm entrepreneurial behaviour, organic – 
mechanistic structure, and the hostility of the environment. However, the focus here is 
placed on a sample of medium sized firms (average of 73 employees with average sales 
of $8.2 million) not small, and primarily involved in manufacturing.  
 
In an opinion paper focusing on whether firm level analysis has reached its limits, Scott 
and Rosa (1996) argue that much of the recent literature and research has incorrectly 
focused on the firm as a fundamental unit of definition and analysis. The authors argue 
that if one is to continue studying the small firm (as paramount and underlying all other 
key assumptions), then that is all one will ever see. The authors see this firm-centered 
focus as an underlying assumption in recent small business research, one that is rarely 
questioned. Scott and Rosa posit that it is the entrepreneur who, through value-adding 
activities, uses the organization as a means to an end, to accumulate capital and further 
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resource value. The firm is but a mechanism for this process of value adding activities. 
The authors see a real gain in shifting the focus of small firm research away from the 
small firm itself, and onto the entrepreneur operating within the firm (and outside of it for 
that matter). The authors advocate looking at the entrepreneur in her actions and activities 
both within the firm and outside, such as in the multiple ownership of more than one 
business (and the effect of this on decision making within the particular firm). Scott and 
Rosa note that in many research databases, the data on the firms and on the individuals 
‘do not talk with each other’. An example of why the focus should ‘also’ be on the 
entrepreneur is that the entrepreneur may (and will) carry out value adding activities 
outside the firm, with these activities impacting upon the behaviour and performance of 
the firm. Spill-over effects from networks or multiple network ownership will impact upon 
the entrepreneur’s decision making behaviour within the firm. In conclusion, one needs to 
understand the entrepreneur within the firm, such that “if one wishes to understand the 
entrepreneurial process, one must understand the role of the individual in triggering that 
process” (Kisfalvi 2002 p. 491).  
 
However, an opposing problem also exists, that of psychological reductionism. The term 
signifies the action of deriving events occurring at one level of the organization from those 
occurring at another, possibly a more simple and fundamental level. In this context it is 
inferring firm behaviour from the owner-manager behaviour. Kimberly (1979 p. 443) posits 
that “there is considerable controversy among organizational theorists about the 
advisability of attributing organizational outcomes to the particular characteristics of 
particular individuals. Sociologists label such attribution psychological reductionism. They 
argue that organizational analysis is most fruitfully pursued apart from the considerations 
of individual personalities and motivations”. So once again, the argument of alignment and 
of owner-manager – firm integration arises. An interesting argument is put forward by 
Entrialgo (2002) regarding the alignment of the owner-manager with the firm. Entrialgo 
argues that the process by which the owner-manager influences the firm is often 
overlooked, with most existing studies incorrectly assuming that the characteristics of the 
owner-manager will have an independent, direct relationship with organizational strategy 
and performance. The author proposes a tripartite model encompassing three constructs; 
firm strategy, owner-manager characteristics, and performance, positing that “it is the 
coalignment between managerial attributes and organizational strategy that affects 
performance” (2002 p. 262). In an empirical study on SME’s in Spain, the author arrived at 
a conclusion that there is an evident alignment between the more entrepreneurial 
management characteristics, the more entrepreneurial firm strategic actions, and 
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organizational success. This correlation was, however, lost when observing the 
conservative end of the continuum. Entrialgo’s concept of coalignment is far from a new 
one, however, and earlier empirical studies such as that of Thomas, Litschert and 
Ramaswamy (1991) have utilized contingency theory to arrive at similar conclusions. 
Drazin and Van de Ven (1985 p. 520) provide a highly relevant comparison of contingency 
theories, positing that the ‘systems’ approach is highly applicable to measure firm 
strategic fit: “The systems approach has begun to incorporate the general systems theory 
concept of equifinality by interpreting fit as feasible sets of equally effective alternative 
designs, with each design internally consistent in its structural pattern and with each set 
matched to a configurational of contingencies facing the organization”.  
 
Adopting Drazin and Van de Ven’s (1985) ‘systems’ contingency theory, Thomas, 
Litschert and Ramaswamy (1991) empirically map out top executive characteristics, firm 
strategic orientation (using part of Miles and Snow’s [1978] typology; that of Prospectors 
and Defenders) and business performance in a tripartite model aiming to relate 
coalignment with performance. Similarly to the work of Entrialgo (2002), high coalignment 
was found between Prospector firms, entrepreneurial management characteristics, and 
higher performance levels. Of interest is the fact that, also in similar vein to the Entrialgo 
case, the coalignment – performance relationship lost its strength for Defender firms that 
were at the other end of the entrepreneurial – conservative continuum. Whilst Miles and 
Snow’s typology will be discussed in further depth later in the thesis, it is interesting to 
note that these authors do state that entrepreneurial managers can, and will, successfully 
run conservative – style firms. This may confuse or derail the coalignment concept if 
mechanistically applied to the less entrepreneurial firms. Miles and Snow (1978) argue 
that it takes an entrepreneurial manager to run an entrepreneurial firm (high coalignment 
visible here). However, they also argue that an entrepreneurial manager can run a more 
static, conservative firm, or even move a more entrepreneurial firm in a more conservative 
direction (low coalignment will be visible in this case). Thus, coalignment may suffer from 
the same problem seen in the previous CE literature, at least until the conditions for high – 
low coalignment are challenged, or at least, re-defined.  
 
From the diverging literature streams a number of conclusions, or at least observations, 
can be made. Firstly, the firm can be viewed as an entrepreneurial being, with measurable 
behaviour spanning a continuum from highly conservative to highly entrepreneurial in 
nature. Resource-based Theory moves the firm from that of a black box towards that of a 
dynamic entity that creates unique (and possibly dynamic) resource bundles to allow it to 
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build and sustain competitive advantage. EO, or indeed SBO-EO, can be applied to 
understand the strategic behaviour of the firm. CE is too rigid in its coalignment concepts, 
particularly for the dynamic small firm. Secondly, the owner-manager of a small firm will 
have a huge influence on the firm. Behavioural patterns of the owner-manager can best 
be understood through their core values – life issues and key psychological traits, that will 
influence their cognitive – heuristic behaviour and the way the competitive landscape is 
seen and acted upon. Strategic groups can serve to create consistencies or replications of 
strategic behaviour. Finally, the literature has pointed towards coalignment, or strategic fit, 
between the owner-manager and the firm as a means of achieving organizational 
synergies. The fundamental and powerful impact that the owner-manager makes upon the 
firm demands this coalignment. However, a note of caution is sounded here. Existing 
empirical studies that commonly use cross-sectional methodologies will not fully explain 
the dynamics and intricacies of small firm – owner-manager coalignment.  Longitudinal 
studies will, but will not provide the sample sizes needed to make effective comparisons 
between low coalignment firms and high coalignment firms.  A different methodological 
approach is urgently required here, one that both looks at the dynamics of coalignment 
and that gives enough numbers to provide at least a typology of high versus low 
coalignment firms.  
 
2.6 The Business Environment and the Small Firm 
 
Understandably, the business environment external to the firm is one of an interaction of a 
complex medley of variables, so much so that “the external environment, for example, can 
be operationally defined in terms of forces or elements that are too numerous to 
incorporate in a specific sense in a single model” (Covin and Slevin 1991 p. 20). The 
academic literature will place the firm at the centre of a task environment, simplified by 
Porter (1980) to consist of the competing forces of suppliers, substitute products, buyers, 
potential new entrants and rival firms. This simplification of the industry value chain (and 
of Industrial Organization Economics SCP paradigm) camouflages the fact that various 
industries will in fact be involved, and this at each different level of a product or service’s 
value chain. Complicating the picture further is the influence on this industry and 
competitive environment of more general overarching factors, such as population 
demographics, the influence of regulation/legislation, economic influences, technological 
developments/trends, and changing societal values and lifestyles. More so, these 
influences may be local, regional or global, with influences and effects interacting and 
covarying in often-unpredictable manners. To add to the picture, the literature puts 
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forward the arguments of actual versus perceived environment, as well as the influence of 
the actual environment on the decision maker’s perception of the environment. It is no 
wonder that conclusions reached on the environment’s influence on the firm are often 
contradictory and inconsistent. The following text shall review the relevant literature with 
an aim of relating the small firm, and its strategic behaviour, to the external environment 
within which it operates.  
 
Of interest to note is how the various authors frame the external environment. For 
example, Covin and Slevin (1989) define hostile environments as characterized by 
precarious industry settings, intense competition, overwhelming business climates, and a 
relative lack of exploitable opportunities. Non-hostile or benign environments, on the other 
hand, provide a safe setting for business operations due to their overall level of 
munificence and richness in investment and marketing opportunities. Miller and Toulouse 
(1986) define environmental dynamism as containing the components of predictability of 
competitor and consumer behaviour, degree of change in technology, and rate of 
obsolescence of product designs/marketing practices. Mitroff, Mason and Pearson (1994) 
describe the external environment for many companies as being characterized by 
turbulence associated with globalization, deregulation of markets, changing customer 
demands and increasing product-market competition.  
 
A first question that begs an answer regards how firms will behave in the face of adverse 
environmental conditions. The literature here is somewhat contradictory. For example, 
Covin and Slevin (1989) observe a significant but negative relationship between 
environmental hostility and performance for small firms, irrespective of the firms’ 
entrepreneurial orientation or even their structure. Covin and Covin (1990) conclude that 
aggressive firms initiate actions that competitors respond to whilst passive firms typically 
respond to actions that others initiate. Dess, Lumpkin and Covin (1997) observe that firm 
entrepreneurial orientation is most strongly related to performance when combined with 
an appropriate strategy (e.g. Porter’s Differentiation strategy) and a heterogeneous, 
uncertain environment. Similarly, Zahra and Covin’s (1995) longitudinal analysis of the 
effect of EO on organizational performance demonstrates the moderating effect of 
environmental hostility on a firm’s EO-performance relationship, concluding that the 
relationship strengthened with time as well as with increased environmental hostility. In 
somewhat of a contradiction, Miller and Toulouse observe that flexibility appears to be 
more associated with success in stable as opposed to dynamic environments: “No 
convincing explanation for this comes to mind. It may be that the strategic stagnation can 
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occur more frequently in stable settings and that CEO flexibility helps avoid this” (1986 p. 
58). Also in contradiction to common expectation is the finding by Wiklund and Shepherd 
(2005) that the more entrepreneurial firms actually performed better in a stable 
environment and with a low access to capital. Conversely firms with a low entrepreneurial 
orientation appeared to perform best in a dynamic environment with high access to 
capital.  
 
The literature on small firms and their environments is no more conclusive. As argued by 
Miles, Covin and Heeley (2000 p. 64) “relatively little is known about how small firms 
respond to environmental dynamism, both structurally and strategically”. The majority of 
empirical studies on the influence of the environment on the firm have been based on 
samples of medium to large sized organizations. Even the studies citing a focus on small 
businesses often look at firms with below 500 employees, a sizing that in no way relates 
to the E.U. classification of small firms at below 50 employees. From the limited studies 
comparing the different reactions that small versus large firms have on environmental 
dynamism, evidence shows that small firms act and react differently to their large 
counterparts. For example, Dean, Brown and Bamford (1998) empirically observe that 
industries conducive to product differentiation and to niche dynamism were inducements 
to small business, more than large business, formations. Conversely, industry 
concentration was a greater deterrent to large firm formations. These findings are 
understandable, given small firm resource configurations and more flexible behaviours, 
but do not provide answers regarding how small firms proceed to perceive and act upon 
the environment in question. In an empirical study of “small firms” (below 500 employees), 
Miles, Covin and Heeley (2000) observe that the structures of the firms in a dynamic, as 
opposed to stable, environment were significantly more organic, and the firms showed 
significantly more entrepreneurial strategic postures. This result mirrors the earlier 
empirical observations of Covin and Slevin (1989) on small firms (average of 73 
employees per firm). Also, an issue of relevance is the resource base of the small firm, in 
that “small firms generally have more limited resources…  fewer formal systems and 
procedures in place and perform fewer planning activities” (Ebben and Johnson 2005 p. 
1251, p. 1252). This means that the firms will be less “embedded” in their environments, 
with arguments in favour of accumulating resources to counteract environmental 
turbulence (e.g. Jauch and Kraft 1986) no longer holding the same significance. In fact, 
Covin and Slevin (1989 p. 75) argue that “the adverse impact of environmental hostility 
probably presents an even greater threat to small firms due to their limited resource bases 
and relative inabilities to survive the consequences of poor managerial decisions”. 
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Conversely, Pelham (1999) posits that a simpler small firm organizational structure, 
heightened flexibility, and greater speeds may result in a greater ability to respond to 
adverse environmental conditions.  
 
The concept of environmental uncertainty, or perceived environmental uncertainty, may 
provide somewhat of an answer to the diverging literature streams. Factors of 
environmental uncertainty include the degree of predictability of financial and capital 
markets, government regulation and intervention, actions of competitors, actions of 
suppliers, and the general conditions facing the organization (Hrebiniak and Snow 1980). 
Executives’ perceptions of the environment frame their definitions of the issues facing 
their company and the actions it takes (Zahra and Pierce 1990). Yusuf (2002) defines 4 
dimensions relating to this environmental uncertainty construct: Uncertainty from 
government, referring to political, regulatory, economic and legal actions that may impact 
upon an organization; Competitive uncertainty, referring to the aggressiveness of 
competition; Technologic uncertainty, relating to shifting technological trends within 
industry; Uncertainty in access to financial capital. Yusuf empirically establishes that 
environmental uncertainty is significantly related to EO, especially so for the uncertainty 
dimensions of technological development, access to capital and competitive uncertainty. 
Possibly a volatile technological environment and the resulting competitor responses, 
coupled with the difficulty to access capital, require firms to act entrepreneurially in order 
to survive. Verreynne, Scheepers and Meyer (2009) observe that, for small service firms, 
the EO-environmental uncertainty relationship is country specific, meaning that different 
definitions of environmental uncertainty are required for different contexts.  On the 
application of organization design, Miles and Snow (1978) observe that the organizational 
structures established by firms are more an outcome of the management’s perception of 
the environment than a correlation with objective measures of the environment. The 
authors argue that a manager’s perception of the environment is influenced by how he or 
she progresses within the company, his education, knowledge and experiences, and also 
the company’s strengths and weaknesses (in that the environment will be “seen” from a 
company situational viewpoint). Thus, orientation towards the environment is biased 
towards only a limited part of the environment that is perceived as important by the 
manager. Miller and Toulouse (1986 p. 57) argue that environmental dynamism and 
environmental uncertainty are really one and the same, and can be measured through 
three constructs; the predictability of competitor and consumer behaviour, the degree of 
change in technology, and the rate of obsolescence of product designs and marketing 
practices. 
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An interesting finding on the relationship between environmental uncertainty and level of 
planning sophistication was empirically observed by Matthews and Scott (1995) on a 
sample of small firms with an average size of 32 employees. The authors carried out a 
factor analysis on results obtained from a multiple scale of environmental uncertainty, 
concluding that four subsets were prominent; input/output uncertainty (uncertainty on 
suppliers, customers and distributors), government uncertainty, competitor uncertainty, 
and financial market uncertainty. Matthews and Scott observe that under conditions of 
heightened uncertainty instead of engaging in formal strategizing the firms tended to focus 
on “doing” rather than “planning”, with their actions largely based on intuition. In other 
words an inverse relationship was observed; when uncertainty increased, formal 
strategizing was less utilized. The authors also note that the more entrepreneurial firms in 
general tend to carry out more formal planning than the more conservative firms. 
Waldman et al. come up with, and empirically confirm, an interesting hypothesis regarding 
the relationship between leadership traits and environmental uncertainty. The authors 
observe that leadership traits particularly matter under situations of high uncertainty, such 
that “the assurances, confidence, and vision of the leader is a source of psychological 
comfort for the followers, thus reducing their stress by showing how uncertainty can be 
turned into a vision of opportunity and success” (2001 p. 136). Freel (2005) empirically 
observes the engagement of small manufacturing and service firms in innovative 
product/service creation, and concludes that each type will perceive different 
environmental uncertainties; manufacturing firms being more concerned with perceived 
supplier uncertainty whilst service firms concerned with perceived human resource 
uncertainty. A correlation was noted where firms that were being more innovative 
generally tended to perceive less of a hostile environment.  
 
Milliken (1987) expands upon the concept of perceived environmental uncertainty, 
outlining how confusion reigns regarding whether the phenomenon in question relates to 
the actual state of the firm’s environment or a perceptual phenomenon, that is, as seen 
from the eye of the beholder. Jauch and Kraft (1986) term these “objective uncertainty” 
and “perceived uncertainty” respectively. Milliken observes that issues and 
misconceptions have abounded for years, concluding that “research on environmental 
uncertainty reached a peak of popularity in the 1970s and since has fallen off 
dramatically” (1987 p. 135). Three forms of perceived environmental uncertainty are 
discussed by the author; state uncertainty where the organization lacks information on the 
nature of the environment, effect uncertainty where the firm lacks knowledge of how the 
environment will impact upon the firm, and response uncertainty where the firm lacks 
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knowledge regarding the consequences of its reactions towards the environment. All three 
uncertainty scenarios stem from a lack of information and of insights. Milliken argues that 
the three scenarios should be differentiated as they are caused by different 
information/knowledge gaps and elicit different coping responses. In Jauch and Kraft’s 
(1986 p. 785) model for environmental uncertainty, the environment directly impacts upon 
the objective environment and the objective uncertainty of a firm, that will in turn influence 
perceived uncertainty (and resulting strategy making) but will also directly impact upon the 
firm’s performance. Hambrick (1981b p. 253) hints at the objective – subjective 
environmental uncertainty debate in that “organizations are ‘embedded’ in their 
environments, but often loosely so. They have some leeway for 
navigating…Organizations may pursue strategies seemingly at odds with the environment 
because of the values and internal political processes of their dominant coalitions or 
because of their assessments of their relative strengths and weaknesses”. The main 
argument placed is that perceived environmental uncertainty mediates between the 
objective environment and a firm’s strategic response (Matthews and Scott 1995). 
 
The earlier literature on owner-manager cognitive behaviour and the above text on the 
objective versus perceived business environment can be integrated to put forward a 
model for how the small firm may perceive, and react to, the external environment. Based 
on the literature, in particular Jauch and Craft’s (1986) environmental uncertainty model 
and Freel’s (2005) observations on small firms, Figure 2.2 is proposed as a conceptual 
model explaining how the small firm interacts with the external environment. The 
parsimonious model depicts the objective external environment as a sequence of pluses 
and minuses, signifying the positive and negative factors that may impact on the small 
firm in a particular context. This could be compared to Porter’s (1980) environmental 
opportunities and threats, and must be appreciated as a dynamic set of covarying factors. 
In line with the previously described cognitive – heuristic behaviour, owner-managers will 
perceive the objective environment in different ways, depending on their conservative – 
entrepreneurial philosophical mindset. This, in turn, is contingent upon the core values 
and life issues that determine how the owner-manager will perceive (and react to) the 
world around her.  Also, Nadkarni and Barr (2008) put forward an important argument 
about the direct influence that the objective environment has on strategic actions taken by 
top management. This concept of ‘deterministic logics’ is shown as a dashed line in Figure 
2.2, and represents the direct influence of “environments as concrete, hard, measurable 
and determinant” (2008 p. 1398). The authors argue that this deterministic influence on 
strategic actions will be felt outside of, and in inclusion to, the subjective perception of the 
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environment. This means that a particularly negative objective environment could act to 
sway the decisions taken by owner-managers, possibly towards initiatives that now 
appear to have more beneficial opportunity costs. 
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Figure 2.2: Interaction of the Small Firm and the External Environment 
 
 
The objective environment is influenced by external environmental occurrences, and will 
also be capable of directly affecting the firm’s performance outcomes, particularly due to 
the size and resource limitations of the small firm. According to the management 
philosophy, the owner-manager will perceive the objective environment as being more 
aggressive and full of threats, or munificent and full of opportunities. Strategic decisions 
will be made and, in line with the firm’s resource base and its own strengths and 
weaknesses, will influence performance outcomes. The performance outcomes will, in 
turn, impact upon further strategic decisions, upon the owner-manager’s perceptions, and 
even upon the objective environment (say in the case of a firm launching a successful 
new product or service). A spiral of momentum can be envisaged, with the more 
entrepreneurial firms building momentum in perception–action–performance–perception 
towards new products/services/challenges, as would the more conservative firms towards 
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more efficiency-based goals. This is in no way to say that the environment does not 
matter, but that a more optimistic perception of the environment will result in different 
strategic decisions being taken as compared to a more pessimistic view of that same 
environment. Also, there is no attempt to argue that the more entrepreneurial firms are 
generally better off in their behaviour, Miles and Snow (1978) put forward an excellent 
argument here (in line with the concept of equifinality) regarding equally successful 
Prospector firms and Defender firms. 
 
2.7 The Firm’s Life Cycle and Small Business Strategy 
 
It is the expectation that “businesses differ by life cycle stage in what strategies they can 
and should pursue” (Hambrick 1984 p. 32). Hambrick argues the concept of strategy as a 
dynamic phenomenon, one that can be viewed as a pathway between identifiable life 
cycle stages. This logic is mirrored by Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007 p. 674) who posit that 
“organizations move through different stages over time, with each stage posing unique 
challenges to the organization and requiring different management philosophy and 
approaches”. The classical business life cycle is probably best documented in Mintzberg 
and Waters’ (1982) longitudinal study that tracks the strategic changes of a particular 
retail chain over its 60-year life history. The authors mapped out the changing strategic 
behaviour and resulting structures of the chain against changing environmental conditions 
over the years, identifying clear stages of birth, growth, maturity and consolidation. As 
argued by Mintzberg and Waters (1982 p. 491); “in this study are seen the classic stages 
of development cycle as described by a number of management theorists”. Another 
longitudinal study is that of Miller and Friesen (1984), analyzing 36 companies through a 
secondary database spanning over 20 years. The authors identify five life cycle phases 
from the literature (birth, growth, maturity, revival and decline), and assigned the firms to 
these based upon environment, strategy, structure and decision making characteristics. 
Miller and Friesen empirically observe that “as we progress through the first four phases 
of the life cycle, the organization’s situation does tend to become more complex. Firms 
become bigger, and concentration of ownership declines, as does the influence of 
shareholders and board members. Customers, on the other hand, exert more influence. 
Heterogeneity and hostility of the environment increase”.  A different viewpoint, but with 
similar implications to the changing context of the firm, is Dodge and Robbins’ (1992 p. 
33) observation that “seemingly, external environmental problems are more important 
early in the lifecycle, with internal problems becoming more critical as the small business 
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grows and develops”. Kisfalvi (2002) encourages these longitudinal analyses of firm – 
owner-manager strategic behaviour, as they increase one’s understanding of the 
important role played by the individual in triggering the entrepreneurial process within the 
firm. 
A closer look at the literature clarifies the life cycle concept, its meaning, as well as its 
strategic implications. The firm and its progression through a life cycle of evolution have 
been established in the literature as far back as in seminal works such as Chandler’s 
(1962) staged model of organizational evolution, all the way to Mintzberg’s (2007) recent 
tracking of organizational strategies. Various definitions for what constitutes a firm’s life 
cycle exist, with Hanks et al. (1993 p. 7) reviewing the literature to come up with a 
definition of a life cycle stage as constituting “a unique configuration of variables related to 
organization context and structure”. The authors note that the previous literature has 
converged towards five distinct life cycle stages of start-up, expansion, maturity, 
diversification and decline. Observing that a common absence of careful empirical 
analysis has resulted in a multitude of conceptually-based life cycle models, the authors 
proceed to provide an excellent cross-sectional, empirical study on the life cycle stages of 
SME’s. Mapping out complexity (X-axis) against dynamism (Y-axis), four distinct life cycle 
stages are observed (similar to birth-growth-maturity-decline), each with a particular 
configuration of variables such as turnover, employee count, growth rate, structures and 
specialization. Hanks et al. (1993) strongly advocate future longitudinal studies to 
complement and build upon their cross-sectional approach which can only go as far as 
infer development paths from a sequence of static pictures.  
 
An important argument put forward by many authors is, once again, the concept of 
coalignment, or strategic fit, albeit now in a more dynamic manner. This holds particular 
significance in the case of the small firm and its more dynamic behaviour. For example, in 
an observation of management development in small firms, Kroeger (1974 p. 42) 
observes that “each stage of development in the life of a firm has unique characteristics 
that combine traits of the manager, the product, and the customers”. Miller and Friesen 
(1984 p. 1176) also observe this configurational nature of each life cycle stage, stating 
that “there appears to be a cohesiveness or complementarity among the situation, 
strategy, structure and decision-making style variables for each phase”.  In fact, the 
solution to mapping out the dynamic coalignment taking place is precisely through this use 
of the life cycle concept: “The best way to interpret relationships between personal values 
and firm performance across studies is to systematically take organizational life cycle into 
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account” (Ling, Zhao and Baron 2007 p. 689). The authors argue that the better the 
alignment, the more success the venture will ultimately achieve. 
The issue of coalignment is especially important for the small firm when considering the 
fundamental impact that the owner-manager will have on the operations and strategic 
direction of the firm (d’Amboise and Muldowney 1988). Various texts have attempted to 
compare the state of the firm with the values and behaviours of the owner-manager of the 
firm. For example, Smith, Mitchell and Summer (1985 p. 818) observe the ease with which 
managers would change their priorities as their organizations reached different life cycle 
stages. The authors posit that “managers probably need to change their priorities as their 
firms move through different stages. If they cannot, they may inhibit the future 
development of their organizations”. This observation is mirrored by Ling, Zhao and Baron 
(2007 p. 689), in that “different managerial values may matter at different times…although 
some values may matter more when a firm is small and new, others may have greater 
impact when a business is larger and more mature”. This is not a static picture of 
alignment, however, and Dodge and Robbins (1992) point out that the actions and 
decisions taken by management with respect to current problems will propel the transition 
to the next life cycle stage. The authors empirically observe that the particular challenges 
faced by small firm management change and evolve over the life cycle. For example, 
cost-related challenges were more prominent in the mid stages of the life cycle whilst 
organizational design and production challenges were more prominent in later maturity – 
refocus stages. Also, the reactive element of management is not to be overlooked, as the 
stimuli the firm receives will impact upon the owner-manager’s philosophy to induce 
particular forms of behaviour (Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989). Once again, this is the 
dynamic concept of coalignment, as the small firm owner-manager acts and reacts 
according to core values, to the changing business context, and to the consequences of 
previous actions. 
Kroeger (1974) goes on to conclude that if the manager does not have the required skills 
and capabilities for a particular stage, the firm will inevitably fail. This logic is mirrored by 
Masurel and van Montfort (2006) and Dodge and Robbins (1992 p. 33) who argue that 
“the owner-manager has to contend with different problems in the various stages of the 
organization’s life cycle signaling different operational contexts”. Similarly, Kerr (1982) 
refers to the assignment of an entrepreneur in the introductory stage, a sophisticated 
marketing manager in the growth stage, a critical administrator in the maturity stage and 
an opportunistic milker in the decline stage. Herr observes, however, that this is far more 
easily said than done, with difficulties found both in measuring the life cycle stages and in 
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identifying the necessary managerial traits. As in many conceptual texts on life cycle 
progression, Kroeger (1974 p. 42) assumes a sequential path; “if the role is filled and the 
function performed satisfactorily, the life cycle will continue sequentially to the next stage”. 
However, in their exhaustive longitudinal study of a sample of business’s evolvement over 
decades, Miller and Friesen (1984) disagree outright. They observe a wide variety of 
transitional paths open to organizations, in fact, 125 transitions were observed in their 
particular study. The authors posit that whilst the life cycle pattern is generally obeyed, it is 
no more than a very rough central tendency as opposed to a pre-established, sequential 
path. The authors conclude that “while the stages of the life cycle are internally coherent 
and very different from one another they are by no means connected to each other in any 
deterministic sequence” (1984 p. 1177). In conclusion, Miller and Friesen see coalignment 
within the different established life cycle states to be of importance, and not a rigid 
transition in a pre-established sequential fashion.  
In conclusion, one can look towards Hambrick’s (1984) description of strategy as a 
trajectory, or pathway, between the firms’ different life cycle stages. In each stage a 
different configuration of variables, both internal and external to the firm, will demand 
coalignment between these variables. This coalignment has strategic implications, as it 
will impact upon the present performance of the firm as well as its future behaviour. This is 
the concept of strategic fit, but at a dynamic level. It relates to the form of fit defined by 
Venkatraman (1989 p. 432) as “fit as gestalts… feasible sets of internally consistent and 
equally effective configurations”. The traditional description of firm life cycle, as a 
prescribed sequence of birth, growth, maturity and decline stages, has somewhat less 
relevance to the small firm and is more applicable to the large firm and the formal strategy 
– structure debate (e.g. Burgelman 1983a, 1983b). Miller and Friesen’s (1984) 
conceptualization of the business life cycle appears best suited for the small firm. Each 
stage is unique, with unique challenges, influencing variables, behaviours and 
configurations. Firms may take on various paths between the different stages. Finally, 
firms have to successfully achieve a strategic coalignment within each stage to perform 
effectively.  
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2.8 Performance and the Small Firm 
 
Two main issues stand out when it comes to interpreting performance results for the small 
firm. These are the issue of subjective versus objective measures of performance, and the 
concept of unidimensional versus multi-dimensional performance measurement. On the 
first issue, subjective measures of performance are usually obtained via questionnaires or 
interviews with the owner-manager of the firm, as it is expected that the perception of the 
owner-manager is substantially in line with the reality of the firm (Ling, Zhao and Baron 
2007). Subjective dimensions may be as intangible as the firm’s established reputation, 
although financial data can also be obtained subjectively (Yusuf and Saffu 2005). 
Problems to obtain subjective data from small business owner-managers are not 
uncommon though, as “small business owners are busy people, often under considerable 
pressure. Understandably, they may not be too sympathetic to requests from researchers 
for some of their time” (Curran and Blackburn 2001 p. 60). Objective measures, such as 
turnover, profits, return on investment, would mainly be obtained from company records, 
published financial statements or public archives. The debate on which method to adopt 
for the small firm is ongoing, with arguments in favour of subjective measures (Covin and 
Slevin 1989), of objective measures (Ling, Zhao and Baron 2007), or of applying a 
combination of both (Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marín 2005; Rue and Ibrahim 1998; 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994). It has indeed been observed that “small firms are notorious 
for their inability and unwillingness to provide desired information on their performance” 
(Covin and Slevin 1989 p. 80).  
 
Coupled with this first issue is the second; that of the dimensionality of the measurement 
of performance. Studies going for objective measures are predominantly unidimensional, 
looking towards growth in returns and investments (e.g. Ebben and Johnson 2005). This 
may lead to a possible misconception that if the firm is not tangibly doing well, that is, if 
there is no evident growth in sales, assets, employee count and so on, then the firm is 
indeed failing.  A counter-argument to this logic is that factors such as the more tacit 
reputation, public image, employee satisfaction, and goodwill are also important 
performance-related variables for the small firm, where satisficing may be more important 
than maximizing financial gains (Runyan, Droge and Swinney 2008). Even survival may be 
an indicator of good performance in a turbulent environment.  “Thus, a small, privately 
owned firm may regard its continued existence as a satisfactory indicator of high 
performance, even though it cannot claim to have a strong return on assets or growth in 
42 
 
market share. It also may make a conscious decision not to grow beyond a certain size, in 
order to maintain control of the business. Thus, factors such as overall satisfaction and 
nonfinancial goals of the owners may need to be weighted more heavily in evaluating 
performance, especially among privately held firms”  (Lumpkin and Dess 1996 p. 154). 
Similarly, as observed by Curran and Blackburn (2001), studies of real-life small business 
owners show that profit maximization is rarely the prime motivator for how they manage 
their businesses.   
 
One approach towards quantifying small firm performance is to apply multi-dimensional 
measures, and to merge subjective and objective measures. Patton (2002) advocates the 
advantages of “methods” triangulation, where data collected through qualitative methods 
is integrated with data collected through quantitative methods to provide added rigour and 
validity. In a bid to obtain a rich set of performance-related data on a sample of small 
firms, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) apply ten different measures of performance; sales 
growth, revenue growth, growth in the number of employees, net profit, product/service 
innovation, process innovation, adoption of new technology, product/service quality, 
product/service variety, and customer satisfaction. The same authors (Wiklund and 
Shepherd 2005) follow this with an integrated measure of financial indicators (gross 
margin, cash flow and profitability) and growth measures (sales growth and employee 
increases) on a sample of small firms, obtaining a coefficient alpha value of 0.70 for the 
combined scale. The common use of cross-sectional research, however, often results in 
the issue of causality (Covin and Slevin 1991), in that performance may be a result of 
particular contexts and behaviours, but many also act as a condition or precursor for these 
behaviours. There is also the issue of time lag, in that a measurement of today’s 
performance will relate to actions and contexts that have taken place in the past. 
Measuring present-day strategy, structure and performance in a cross-sectional manner 
may provide somewhat of a misleading picture. The usual expectation is that small 
entrepreneurial firms perform best in hostile environments, and by adopting organic and 
competitive stances. Conversely, mechanistic, conservative firms perform better in 
benign, static environments (Covin and Slevin 1989). Empirical results to this effect, 
however, have been inconsistent, as has been discussed in the previous section on EO.  
 
A final issue on small business performance remains; that of its dynamic nature. Runyan, 
Droge and Swinney (2008) touch upon the concept of dynamic expectations towards 
small business performance, with a firm changing its expectations as its situation evolves, 
ownership changes, and its management is reconfigured. Covin and Slevin (1989 p. 84) 
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provide a contribution regarding the coalignment of firm characteristics with performance; 
“performance is, presumably, a function not only of a firm’s organization structure and 
strategic posture, but also of the fit between these variables and the firm’s business 
practices and competitive tactics”. Thus, if performance is dynamic, and results from a 
successful coalignment of organizational and environmental factors, the issue of how to 
monitor changing small business performance still remains. As a solution, Hambrick 
(1984) proposes that high performance and low performance firms should be grouped and 
studied separately (this is essentially the “typological approach”, and is dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 3).  In other words, clustering techniques would be applied separately on 
batches of differently performing firms. This will allow the clusters formed from higher 
performing firms to suggest ideals, best practice strategic orientations.  High performance 
patterns would suggest success patterns whilst low performance patterns would suggest 
pitfalls. Building upon Hambrick’s advice, an integration can be made from the literatures 
on the firm’s life cycle, owner-manager – firm coalignment, and the dynamics of small 
business performance. The life cycle literature has pointed towards states, or stages, of 
small firm development and evolvement.  Each stage is a unique coalignment of internal 
and external variables, where the coalignment of the owner-manager characteristics with 
that of the small firm is of utmost importance. Hambrick’s clustering of performance values 
for different states/stages of small firm evolvement may well indicate different 
performance values (or even criteria) for different life cycle stages. This is no more than a 
logical train of thought; different objectives will be important to the firm (and to its owner-
manager) at different stages of its evolvement. A strong similarity can be made here to the 
marketing theory on the consumer life cycle (Kotler and Armstrong 2008). As a consuming 
family travels through its life cycle, different things matter; like house-building at the 
growth stage or health/leisure at the retirement stage. One problem that becomes 
immediately evident here is the paucity of empirical research on the performance of small 
firms at different life cycle stages. Once again the SBO – EO polarity approach seems to 
win over in the literature, such that SBO firms are lifestyle firms interested in satisficing, 
and EO firms are dynamic firms focused on aggressive growth. It is argued that this is 
somewhat of a simplification of the various life cycle states a small firm can adopt, and 
provides little understanding of the motivations owner-managers will have to move from 
one state to another. Issues such as these shall be the focus of Chapters 5 to 8 of this 
thesis. 
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2.9 Business Strategy and Strategic Group Theory  
 
The literature review has, so far, discussed the concept of small business strategy as a 
transition between strategic stages in the concept of organizational life cycle, and with the 
argument of coalignment at each and every stage of business transition. The argument 
being built is that Configurational theory is not only ideal for looking at coalignment at a 
particular stage, but also for grouping firms with like characteristics into similar stages, 
and observing commonalities within the groupings, and their implications. This 
configurational approach follows on the literature on strategic group theory, a source of 
literature with strong economic foundations. Strategic group theory is commonly used to 
explain the behaviours of like groupings of firms within a particular industry, as well as 
more generic strategies across industries (where the patterns of behaviour are so 
consistent that they span industries).  
 
In all, four schools provide the foundations for strategic group theory. These are: Industrial 
Organization economics and its later developments; Organizational Systematics; Strategic 
Choice–Environmental Determinism; and Resource-based Theory.  Appendix 1 expands 
upon these schools, establishing the key features, as well as the main contributors. The 
following Figure 2.3 integrates the four theoretical thrusts into one set of common 
propositions that collectively explain the rationale of strategic groups. In conclusion, 
organizations have different patterns of behaviour that allow them to respond differently to 
the environment. Configurations can be found for grouping these patterns through 
common underlying factors, explaining how firms compete within groups, as well as 
between groups.  
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Figure 2.3:  Integration of the Literature on Strategic Group Theory 
 
2.10 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
The chapter has followed along two general literature streams, shown to the centre and to 
the left of the literature map depicted in Figure 2.1. The main thrust, following along the 
central stream shown in the literature map, has been to establish how small business 
strategy can be understood. The competing theories on organizational strategy have been 
discussed with a particular focus on the literature that describes a behavioural approach, 
observing small business strategy as a pattern in a stream of actions. The remainder of 
the main literature stream has focused on establishing how this can be done. The 
literature on the firm as the main unit of focus has been contrasted to the literature on the 
Common Components within the Literature:
1. A group consist of organizations that implement 
like strategies, that is; like approaches to 
competing in the same competitive arena.
2. There is homogeneity within a group.
3. There is heterogeneity between groups.
4. Mobility barriers restrict inter-group movement. 
Managerial values, attitudes and resources 
integrate into the organization’s strategy, making 
change difficult.
5. Different groups respond differently to the 
environment and perform differently. The 
external environment is, however, a dominant 
force.
6. An organization will try to enter its most 
desirable group and try to sustain that position.
7. The grouping of organizations can be carried 
out by looking into similar resource bundles, 
competencies, capabilities, knowledge assets, 
etc, as well as the methods applied to compete 
with these assets in the external environment.
8. Strategic group research must be anchored in a 
set of theoretical positions that reflect the 
reasons for the expected grouping.
Contribution of early Industrial 
Organization Theory and later 
developments in concepts such as 
mobility barriers, organizational 
strengths/weaknesses and 
organizational heterogeneity within an 
environment.
Contribution of Organizational 
Systematics Theory that 
classifies organizations as 
members of homogeneous sub-
populations, similar in effect, to 
biological organisms.
Contribution of recent Resource-
Based Theory that explains the 
uniqueness of organizations through 
their resource bundles, and theorizes 
that organizations with similar 
resource bundles will perform and act 
with similar patterns of behaviour.
Contribution of Strategic Choice 
– Environmental Determinism 
Theory that looks towards an 
organization as functioning in an 
open system, purposely adapting 
to, and integrating with the 
environment.
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owner-manager as the main unit of focus. This is followed by the literature on firm – 
owner-manager strategic coalignment, supported by the limited literature on organization 
life cycle. The mains stream is closed off with an overview of the literature on small 
business performance. This approach is deemed necessary, as the strategy literature on 
large, bureaucratic firms will do little to explain the dynamic nature of the small firm. The 
present research findings shall demonstrate the importance of this strategic coalignment, 
at different stages of the small firm’s life cycle. In fact, as posited by Farjoun, strategy can 
be defined as the “coordination of the firm’s major goals and actions, in time and space, 
that continuously co-align the firm with its environment” (2002 p. 570). 
 
The second literature stream within this chapter both supports the earlier discussions and 
paves the way for the following chapter. This second stream is shown to the left of the 
literature map (Figure 2.1), and details the literature on strategic group theory. The logic is 
simple; if patterns of dynamic coalignment are to be sought, then a typological approach 
will have to be adopted to study commonalities in patterns. For a typological approach to 
be adopted, the theories underlying strategy typologies must at least be understood. Four 
theories collectively supporting strategic group theory are visited (detailed in Appendix 1), 
and a common set of propositions put forward (Figure 2.3 on the previous page). These 
outline the implications that firms face when competing strategically within a group, or 
towards other strategic groups. The forthcoming chapter shall take on a more practical 
approach to this strategic group theory, comparing and contrasting the more common 
typology techniques adopted. The final aim is to understand how to best map out the 
dynamic, strategic coalignment of small firms. The following chapter will conclude in 
favour of a trajectory-based approach, after providing various examples for the different 
alternatives at hand. 
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Chapter 3:  The Literature on Strategy Typologies 
 
3.1  The Logic of a Typological Approach towards Understanding 
Business Strategy 
 
The aim of this chapter is to review the practical literature on typological approaches 
commonly used to understanding strategic behaviour. The criteria of importance have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter, such as the need to study small business 
strategy as a dynamic coalignment of characteristics pertinent to the small firm, and in its 
various life cycle stages. What has not been established yet is, on a more practical front, 
exactly how this can be done. This is the topic of the present chapter. 
 
Hair et al. (1998 p. 472) define a typology as a conceptual classification of objects based 
on a number of defined characteristics. Typologies provide the theoretical foundation for 
the creation of a taxonomy, which is a grouping of the actual observations. The focus of 
the research in question is in fact both; developing a theoretical typology and an empirical 
taxonomy, although the application of grounded theory actually merges the two 
developments together as comparative enquiry leads to a simultaneous development of 
conceptual categories and a relation of the cases to the categories.  In comparison, in 
quantitative techniques the stage is first set by the establishing of a typological framework 
based on prior learning, then a taxonomy is created by allocating cases to the framework 
usually by applying cluster analysis techniques.  
 
The literature on the strategic behaviour of organizations is often restricted to two 
particular perspectives. The first perspective is the Universalist school that looks at 
strategy as a fixed set of laws with pre-determined outcomes. The more common 
literature on strategy, including the bulk of strategic management literature and industrial 
organization economic literature, is based upon this school. Building market share, acting 
entrepreneurially, creating barriers of entry, vertically integrating, are all seen to be 
strategic actions that will inevitably lead to some level of success. This school is, however, 
not so relevant to the small firm that bases its actions more on intuition, experience and 
instinct (McCarthy 2003). In fact the owner or top executive of a small firm will have little 
time, and limited resources, for this formal and pre-meditated strategic behaviour. The 
second common perspective is the Contingency school (also called Situational theory). 
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The underlying theory is that small firms will adopt any, or a combination of, a number of 
dimensions of strategic behaviour according to the situation, the industry and the 
management philosophy of the owner-manager. Strategic behaviour will be conditioned by 
a more limited resource base, greater flexibility, faster response times, enhanced 
networking, and a number of other dimensions pertinent to small firms. Contingency 
theory is based on the underlying premise that “there is no one best way to organize, and 
that any one way of organizing is not equally effective under all conditions” (Ginsberg and 
Venkatraman 1985 p. 421). The approach is heavily criticized by Hambrick (2003) who 
sees it to be of little use to managers who want to learn from the successes and failures of 
other firms. It has an added problem that the dimensions of interest can be configured into 
seemingly endless combinations (Hambrick 1984), making prediction and generalizability 
difficult. In fact, both the above schools have been criticized as being inadequate in 
explaining true strategic behaviour. Mintzberg (1994) posits that few organizational 
strategies are purely deliberate (the Universalist school) and few are purely emergent (the 
Contingency school), as one suggests no learning, and the other no control. 
 
The present research looks at strategic behaviour from a third perspective; the 
Configurational school. This school has been described as one that is very much alive 
today and that best describes the true strategic behaviour of an organization (Hambrick 
2003). Configurational theory argues that “there are a handful of basic patterns that 
businesses can select from in order to achieve their aims” (Hambrick 2003 p. 116). 
Typologies are created to map out these basic patterns. It has been empirically proven 
(Ketchen et al. 1997) that strategic typologies successfully explain a significant portion of 
organizational performance. In fact, organizational configurations represent an extension 
of contingency approaches into multivariate combinations that express complex 
interrelationships, providing for more predictive power than bivariate contingency 
relationships (Dess, Lumpkin and Covin 1997). For example, Thomas and Ramaswamy 
(1996) demonstrate that organizational alignment into a typology, coded as a variable and 
regressed against performance, explains far more of the variance in performance than a 
host of other contingency factors. This is in line with common reasoning on the 
significance of typological studies as a means of grouping and studying patterns of 
strategic behaviour. As stated by Meyer, Tsui and Hinings (1993 p. 1181); “Organizational 
structures and management systems are best understood in terms of overall patterns 
rather than in terms of analyses or narrowly drawn sets of organizational properties”. 
These patterns are empirically observed through the creation of taxonomies based upon 
key strategy variables. As posited by Hambrick (1984 p. 40); “taxonomists search for 
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commonly recurring patterns. This would seem an important endeavor in any field, but 
especially in a field such as strategy with its complex and unordered terrain”.  
 
The Configurational school is based upon the concepts of common patterns, of strategic 
fit, and of equifinality. Common patterns, conceptualized into typologies or empirically into 
taxonomies, simplify a vastly complicated business landscape where as many as 500 
variables describe the business organization (Sells 1964). Strategic fit occurs when an 
organization has a number of configurational parameters that are in line with each other 
and the environment. For example, if the management philosophy of an organization’s 
owner-manager is in tune with the structural setup of the organization, the technological 
base, and the strategic stance adopted, then the organization should perform well. 
Equifinality describes how organizations fit into different classifications that can all lead to 
successful levels of performance. In other words there may be various configurations of 
successful fit, and other configurations of unsuccessful fit. Equifinality is defined by 
Venkatraman (1989) as a powerful concept where sets of internally consistent and equally 
effective configurations will be found. Merz and Sauber (1995) proceed to demonstrate 
empirically that equifinality is also prevalent in small firms. The Configurational school 
lends itself well to describing the strategic behaviour of small firms, and empirical research 
in this field is growing (see Table A2.1).  
 
A major issue, however, in typological research on business strategy regards weaknesses 
in the methodological approach that is often adopted. Inconsistencies and contradictions 
abound in the existing empirical research. A key example is the inadequacy of the 
variables that are selected to identify the strategic types within a given environment. If one 
is to go by configuration theory that reasons that organizations whose configurations are 
more aligned to their environment will perform better (Ketchen et al. 1997; Miles and 
Snow 1978), then a serious challenge lies in identifying these configurational variables. 
For example, whilst it has been established that a broad, multi-dimensional set of 
independent variables will better capture the strategic behaviour construct (Conant, 
Mokwa and Varadarajan 1990; Ketchen et al. 1997), many studies apply a limited range of 
single-dimension variables. The approach towards inductive versus deductive selection of 
variables is also an issue of contention. Over two-thirds of strategic typology studies use 
an inductive approach where an array of variables is defined and a theoretical explanation 
is extracted via clustering techniques (Ketchen and Shook 1996). This results in 
taxonomies being ‘forcefully’ created as a result of the influence of pre-selected variables 
(McKelvey 1975). Also, since cluster analysis will inevitably create clusters regardless of 
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the true existence of any structure in the data (Hair et al. 1998 p. 474) then this approach 
often leads to inconsistent and unsubstantiated findings. Use of single-item scales is also 
common, although multi-item measures provide greater discriminatory power and lower 
measurement error (Venkatraman and Grant 1986). There is also the issue of whether the 
variables adopted have been proven within the existing literature to capture the true 
meaning of the construct within the environment under scrutiny. Even in more qualitative 
or in longitudinal studies, typological exercises are often limited by the difficulty in tracking 
how the variables of interest interact and covary over time. Tying to this concept is a 
common lack of inclusion of both strategy process and strategy content variables within 
the ensuing typologies (Boyne and Walker 2004; Ketchen, Thomas and McDaniel 1996). 
Many other methodological issues cloud this area of research, such as the lack of a 
coherent strategy towards testing for reliability and validity of the measures that are 
ultimately applied. 
 
Whilst Miles and Snow’s (1978) strategic typology and Porter’s (1980) generic strategies 
are possibly the most popular classifications, many others exist:  Fouraker and Stopford 
(1968) define Type I, Type II and Type III organizational structures; Miller and Friesen 
(1978) define 10 archetypes of strategy formulation; Miller and Roth (1994) devise a 
taxonomy of manufacturing strategies categorized into Caretakers, Marketeers and 
Innovators; Dess and Beard (1984) list three environmental types of firms named 
Munificence, Complexity and Dynamism; Grover and Saeed (2004) define a cross-
sectional typology of firms as Mature, Risky, Moderate, and Novice; Miller (1983) 
establishes a typology of Simple, Planning and Organic firms. Mintzberg (1973) groups 
firms into an Adaptive Mode, a Planning Mode and an Entrepreneurial Mode and 
subsequently (2007) defines the Entrepreneurial, Machine, Adhocracy and Professional 
firm; and so on. Typologies are constantly used in undergraduate studies to give students 
a better all-round perspective of the topic under study. In marketing, firms are classified as 
having production, product, selling, relationship marketing or societal marketing 
orientations. In business studies, firm behaviour is related to the scientific school, the 
administrative school, or to various neo-classical schools. In economics, firms are 
classified by placing them into one of four typical industry settings; perfect competition, 
monopolistic competition, oligopolistic competition or monopoly settings. And so on. 
Appendix 2 looks at some of the more commonly used strategy typologies, mapping out 
the developments in this area of research application.  
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3.2    Developments in Typological Applications and the Way Ahead 
 
Typologies can be formed to study business strategy at two levels. At the industry level 
strategic groups will consist of clusters of businesses employing similar strategies to 
compete for limited industry resources. At a more generic level strategic typologies will be 
formed that allow for the study of firms with similar strategic behaviours and that are 
generalizable across industries. Parnell and Hershey (2005 p. 19) sees the second to be a 
development of the first, a development that came about when “researchers were 
beginning to categorize similarities within the strategic groups across studies” and across 
industries. It is this concept of generic strategy typologies that is of interest to the small 
business strategy researcher as it allows for the much required description, prediction and 
generalizability. 
 
Typologies are ideal to explain the richness of strategic behaviour, by grouping firms into 
clusters of similar behaviour and defining the unique characteristics of each cluster. As 
argued by McKelvey in his ‘guidelines for the empirical classification of organizations’; “If a 
usable classification existed there would be no need for contingency theory” (1975 p. 
523). Examples of widely utilized typologies have been outlined in Appendix 2, both those 
focusing on a cross-sectional picture of strategy (stances) and those directed towards a 
processual viewpoint of strategy (actions). This difference is no more than the ‘process 
versus content’ debate that has been with strategy researchers for a long time. However, 
as argued by Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 127): “Process and structure are inextricably 
linked, and unless one understands the nature of their relationship (both to each other and 
to the phenomenon in question), it is difficult to truly grasp what is going on”. The 
combination and integration typologies go some way by looking at the integration of 
stances with actions, albeit in a somewhat forced manner. Appendix 2 has put forward an 
argument in favour of using trajectory, or pathway-based typologies as a more complete 
way of integrating static pictures of strategic states with dynamic information of how firms 
move between states. Again, the literature is sparse here and is heavily biased towards 
deductive, cross-sectional techniques. This appears to be limiting the development of 
knowledge in this area, and thus, in truly understanding how small firms behave 
strategically. The following chapters will provide, and apply, a different methodology that is 
well-suited for mapping out patterns (Charmaz 2006), one that is deemed to be a hybrid 
between longitudinal/case studies and survey-based quantitative studies.  
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Chapter 4:  Research Methodology. A Grounded Theory Method 
of Enquiry 
 
4.1 Summary to the Methodology 
 
 
The research method that has been adopted is that of grounded theory research. 
Grounded theory is not a qualitative technique, but is a general method that can be used 
on any kind or mix of data, and is particularly useful with qualitative data (Glaser 1998 p. 
40). A number of requirements set the scene for the choice of method to be made. First of 
all the main objective, as stated in the introduction, was to observe and build a typology of 
the most common patterns of strategic behaviour, for small firms in a small island state. 
Relating the various patterns of behaviour to performance implications was also an 
important parameter. A fundamental requisite was to induce a model of strategic 
behaviour from data pertaining to the substantive area of enquiry (small firm strategic 
behaviour), and not deduce and test a conceptual framework established from prior 
literature. It was felt that this would provide a unique understanding of the phenomenon in 
question, that is, a theoretical model grounded in the data and providing an understanding 
not available in traditional models. The main, salient characteristics of the research 
settings were as follows: Small business owner-managers would often be ready to make 
themselves available for interviewing, provided the interviews were not too long (Curran 
and Blackwell 2001), were non-intrusive, and did not demand confidential details on 
products or services that the firms had some form of competitive advantage on. 
Secondary quantitative data were also available in the form of the firms’ financial 
statements and records, and had to be properly integrated into the study.  The small 
geographical area of the Island made travelling to participants, for all the different industry 
types, a straightforward affair. Most important of all, the method to be chosen had to allow 
for an understanding of the critical competitive actions taken by owner-managers, the 
context to these actions, and the consequences of the actions. This had to include a time 
component, that is, how the actions, context and conditions changed or adapted over 
time, and as the firms evolved. 
 
The intended typological approach excluded the use of longitudinal or case studies (that 
consist of one or a select few cases) as these would not provide sample sizes adequate 
enough for typological groupings. The need to observe the changing business behaviours 
over time, as well as the difficulty to measure the many nuances of small business 
behaviours, made cross-sectional quantitative approaches inadequate. Other qualitative 
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methods of enquiry could have been adopted, but were not considered to be superior to 
the grounded theory approach.  For example, one possible alternative could have been a 
phenomenological analysis, often used in organizational research to develop an 
understanding of complex issues that may not be immediately implicit in surface 
responses. This takes on the form of a direct description of the participants’ experiences, 
without taking into account their psychological origin (Goulding 2006 p. 22). The basic 
assumption is that a person’s life is a socially constructed totality, in which experiences 
interrelate coherently and meaningfully. The method, however, does not allow for due 
appreciation of the often-complex psychological and behavioural characteristics that 
condition the behaviours of small firm owner-managers. Also, it was felt that the use of 
purposeful sampling that the methodology demands (focusing on the participant who has 
‘lived’ the phenomenon) would not be suitable for the expected situation where owner-
managers may individually only see part of a complex, multidimensional picture.  In fact, 
the forthcoming Figure 4.3 shall demonstrate that three different sampling techniques 
were adopted in the resulting sampling strategy. Another alternative considered was that 
of ethnographic enquiry, often used to study culture, power, conflict and management 
styles within organizations. The outcome of an ethnographic study is a dense, fluid and 
readable narrative, built through the prolonged direct contact with the members of the 
organization under study. It is this use of participant observation that makes the approach 
inadequate for small business research, as strong resistance would be put up by small 
firm owner-managers to this level of intrusion. Grounded theory essentially has three 
advantages not found in other methods of enquiry: Its emphasis is on theory development 
and building, not just description; It is strong in the concept of verification through the 
tireless process of comparative analysis, coding, and category saturation; Finally, it aims 
at building a parsimonious model within the substantive area of enquiry, and not solely a 
dense description of a phenomenon. This will be shown to be a vital requirement, if 
applicability of the research findings is to be achieved. 
 
Different schools exist within grounded theory, boasting different knowledge claims, 
different strategies of enquiries, and alternative methodological implementations (Bryant 
2002; Morse et al. 2008). The knowledge claim relevant to this research is one of 
postpositivism, or as Curran and Blackburn (2001 p. 41) would call it, a non-positivist 
approach. This claim brings with it a number of assertions: That completely value-free 
inquiry is impossible but that objectivity can be maximized through rigour, impartiality and 
consistency (Patton 2002); That the researcher’s unfolding interests shape the content of 
the research but not the method (Denzin and Lincoln 2008); That the resulting theory is an 
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interpretation of a complex world, a rendering of reality as seen through the eyes of the 
informed researcher (Charmaz 2006). The knowledge claim also accepts that all methods 
are imperfect, and that by including both quantitative and qualitative data into the method 
a greater understanding of the phenomenon in question can be achieved (Patton 2002). 
The strategy of enquiry that has been adopted is thus the systematic application of 
grounded theory, acquiring (and analysing) data through mainly qualitative (in-depth 
interviews) but also quantitative techniques (to triangulate for one particular construct; 
performance). Grounded theory is described as both a method of enquiry and the product 
of enquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 2008). It is used to generate both conceptual categories 
and theoretical hypotheses from data obtained through interviews, observations, reports 
and qualitative analysis. These categories and hypotheses integrate to form a model, 
framework or theory, aiming at explaining a phenomenon under study. Grounded theory is 
thus applied to develop theories from research grounded in data (Birks and Mills 2011), 
rather than deducting testable hypotheses from existing theories.  
 
Strauss and Corbin’s (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Corbin and Strauss 2008) approach of 
building categories and memos through constant comparison of (primarily) interview-
based data has been adopted in this research. Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin’s coding 
paradigm of the Conditional and Consequential Matrix has been adopted, as this related 
very well with the data and emerging themes. Charmaz’s (2006) philosophy towards a 
constructivist grounded theory has also seen to be highly relevant to the approach that 
was ultimately implemented. Arguments shall be placed in this chapter, and in those 
following, of how a constructivist philosophy has been adopted in the implementation of 
the research. Mir and Watson (2001) argue the benefits of applying a constructivist 
approach in strategy research. The research method mainly focused on analyzing data 
obtained through expert, in-depth interviews with the owner-managers of 67 small 
businesses. Three different sampling approaches were adopted; convenience, purposeful 
and ultimately theoretical sampling. Secondary, quantitative data were also included into 
the grounded theory method, obtained via the audited financial statements of the small 
businesses in question.  
 
The first part of this methodological chapter shall look at the important epistemological 
and philosophical developments in the grounded theory method over the years. This is 
necessary as it shall be argued that the method adopted within the present research 
project applies different contributions and strengths of the various proponents to the 
method of enquiry. As argued by Bryant (2002), the researcher is obliged to clarify her 
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philosophical stance and to develop methods that accord with her orientations. Later 
sections in this chapter shall describe the application of grounded theory, the research 
context in question, and the operational and conceptual challenges that had to be 
overcome. The concept of constant comparison; carefully coding and analysing interview 
after interview, was applied as the basis of the grounded research, serving two purposes 
not unlike reliability and validity techniques used in quantitative research. The systematic 
coding of transcribed interviews allowed for the building of categories that were based on 
the codes, and that reflected the repeated emergence of core concepts in the data. 
Further research served to validate the categories, as these would constantly emerge as 
significant, and research was only deemed to be complete when theoretical saturation 
was evident. Memos were compiled throughout the research to explain the inter-
relationships of the various categories, as well as their corresponding themes. A model 
thus gradually emerged, one that was rigorously grounded in the data.  Researcher 
involvement in the process served to provide a contribution to the richness of the model, 
as well as the strength of analysis and interpretation into the research process.  
 
4.2 Epistemological and Philosophical Underpinnings 
 
The developments of grounded theory can be traced back to a number of key authors. 
Understanding the theoretical basis and application of grounded theory demands a clear 
insight into the varying and sometimes conflicting epistemological viewpoints of these key 
authors, and how the method of enquiry took on additional form over the years. This is 
even more important, given that the method ultimately adopted in this research applied 
strengths and contributions of various authors. Particularly Glaser (1998) and Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), followed by Corbin and Strauss (2008), Charmaz (2006) and other authors 
such as Locke (2001), Bryant (2002) and Clarke (2005), led the field in the development 
and application of grounded theory. The initialization of grounded theory can be traced to 
the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss, when the two researchers first published their 
work, Awareness of Dying in 1965, followed by their publication of The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory in 1967.  
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Figure 4.1: Development and Divergence of Grounded Theory 
 
The two researchers worked closely together for a number of years, complementing each 
others’ expertise, having come from largely different theoretical orientations and 
backgrounds. It was these differing viewpoints that may have caused the creators of 
grounded theory to separate and take the method of enquiry into somewhat different 
directions, possibly with some resulting animosity (or ‘acrimoniously’, as Bryant would put 
it). Glaser was trained in quantitative research and methodology and theory generation at 
Columbia University, a source of strong positivistic roots. Key authors influencing Glaser 
were Merton and Lazarsfeld. Lazarsfeld himself came from a train of thought that there is 
no qualitative hypothesis or concept that could not have a mathematical formula 
developed for it (Glaser 1998). Glaser credits Lazarsfeld for establishing a number of 
quantitative analysis techniques that found their way into grounded theory. A key example 
is Glaser’s adoption of Lasarsfeld’s work on latent structural patterns, where core indexes 
would be correlated against all other data in a set, and a consistent pattern of 
relationships would repeatedly emerge. Glaser credits this consistency analysis to be the 
foundation of the concept of a core category that emerges through the constant 
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comparison concept with qualitative data. The rigorous integration of the effects of 
variables (or categories in this case) on other variables would cumulate into an integrated 
set of hypothesis, amounting to a theory in effect. In Glaser’s view, the concepts of 
constant comparison, emergence of a core category, and an induced set of hypothetical 
relationships have very strong quantitative, mathematical roots.  
  
Merton taught Glaser logical theory construction through the application of theoretical 
coding. His emphasis was on social structural theory, and the parsimony, scope and 
depth of theorising. Glaser capitalized on this powerful coding methodology, while 
circumnavigating Merton’s weakness of often forcing pre-conceived theory onto the data.  
Glaser’s view was that data had to be trusted to divulge the theory lurking within, this still 
being a strongly positivist approach. Thus, Glaser’s own grounding and academic 
upbringing resulted in an approach towards grounded theory that was based on a number 
of premises: The researcher and the data are separate, and theoretical sensitivity should 
be avoided to limit any tainting of the theory emulating from the data by the researcher 
and his preconceptions; The approach towards gathering and analyzing the data is highly 
procedural, logical and systematic. It shall be shown that important components of the 
Glaserian approach, particularly the rigour of coding and of building main categories, have 
been applied in the research in question. 
 
Strauss started his contribution to grounded theory as co-author with Glaser in the initial 
research (Awareness of Dying, 1965) and the publication that launched the theory (The 
Discovery of Grounded Theory, 1967). Both authors later went their separate ways, and 
Anselm Strauss ultimately teamed up with student Juliet Corbin (e.g. Strauss and Corbin 
1998; Corbin and Strauss 2008) in later years to promote grounded theory from a 
somewhat different theoretical and operational perspective to that of Glaser. Strauss was 
from a different academic background to Glaser, receiving his advanced degrees from the 
University of Chicago, an institution with strong traditional qualitative roots. He was 
influenced by authors such as Dewey, Mead and Blumer; authors with strong pragmatic 
and symbolic interactionist epistemological underpinnings. George Mead was a social 
psychologist and a founder of symbolic interactionism; an interactionist social theory. For 
Mead, the key to understanding was not simply by understanding human action, but rather 
social action. His theory (Mead 1972) was of how the mind and being emerge from the 
social process of communication by signs and visible interaction. Mead’s symbolic 
interactionism was strongly rooted in pragmatism, in that the meaning of an idea or a 
proposition lies in its observable practical consequences. Mead’s orientation can be 
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argued to take on an antipositivistic stance, in that positivism is too restricted to the logic 
of phenomena that can be contained within an analytic and verifiable framework, and that 
there is a line between the observer and the research subject. Herbert Blumer was a 
student of Mead, and coined the term ‘Symbolic Interactionism’. Blumer (1969) described 
the theory as a perspective in which people act towards things based on the meaning 
those things have for them, these meanings derived from social interaction and modified 
through interpretation. To perceive food is to perceive eating, to perceive a lodging is to 
perceive shelter. This logic also applies to the interaction between researcher and subject, 
and to the meaning derived by the researcher from the interaction. One notes the 
deviation here from Glaser’s positivistic approach. 
 
John Dewey was a founder of the earlier philosophy of pragmatism, deemed by Corbin 
and Strauss to be the framework to their own methodology (Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
Dewey (1922) proposed two concepts that are arguably the cornerstones to Strauss and 
Corbin’s subsequent methodology. The first of these relates to the interaction of context, 
decision making and consequences. In Dewey’s logic,  “the test of ideas, of thinking 
generally, is found in the consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead, that is in the 
new arrangement of things which are brought into existence” (Dewey 1929 p.  136). One 
can see this logic clearly applied years later in Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) Conditional 
and Consequential Matrix, a tool that was used in this research. The second concept is 
Dewey’s emphasis on the concept of process, this tying down to the process of decision 
making. According to Dewey (1929 p. 40), “we live in a world in process, the future, 
although continuous with the past is not its bare repetition”.  This focus on process 
becomes paramount in the Strauss and Corbin methodology, and the authors state that 
“process and structure are inexplicably linked, and unless one understands the nature of 
their relationship (both to each other and to the phenomenon in question), it is difficult to 
truly grasp what is going on” (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 127). Strauss argued that the 
usual means-end analysis schemes were inadequate in explaining and understanding 
action and interaction (Strauss 1993). Human conduct was simply too complex to be 
understood without integrating these content dimensions with that of process. As will be 
shown, process shall feature extensively in the forthcoming chapters that detail the 
research outcomes. 
 
Following his contributions to the joint research and publications with Glaser, Strauss later 
on teamed up with Juliet Corbin (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
Corbin was a student and confidant to Strauss, working closely with him in various 
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research projects and publications, and initially subscribing more strongly to the same 
symbolic interactionist views. Three particular concepts emerged in greater prominence 
from the Strauss and Corbin partnership. The first concept regards the core category, and 
its significance within grounded theory. Glaser’s earlier positivist approach saw the core 
category taking on a near mathematical meaning, in line with Lasarsfeld’s logic on latent 
structural patterns. For Glaser, the core category was central because of its frequency of 
relationships with other categories. Corbin and Strauss (2008 p. 104) do not argue this, 
but identify the core category more from its explanatory relevance and potential for linking 
the other categories together. Again one sees here a movement away from positivism and 
towards pragmatism.  
 
A second development accredited to the Strauss and Corbin methodology is a move 
towards what the authors term ‘hypothetico-deduction’. Whilst Glaser advocated a 
completely free and unbiased mind, Strauss and Corbin argue theoretical sensitivity and 
pre-formulating of initial hypothesis or research questions that will form some sort of initial 
guidance for the researcher. This hypothetico-deduction was not a static affair, but a 
continuously evolving process within the research, fed through the activities of continued 
sampling and constant comparison. One notes the researcher now taking on a more 
central role within the grounded theory method of enquiry. Reichertz (2007) and Kelle 
(2005) reason that the argument between Glaser and Strauss regarding prior theoretical 
insight is really an argument between induction and abduction. Reichertz posits that 
Glaser’s induction from the data (with zero theoretical contamination) can lead to sterile or 
boring studies. Alternatively, abduction, more to the logic of Strauss, is a means of 
knowledge-extending but in a logical (rule based and scientific) manner.  
 
A third outcome of the Strauss and Corbin approach is that of validation. Strauss and 
Corbin argue that this validation should take place at various levels and at different stages 
within the research. For example, validation of initial hypothetical relationships between 
categories should be carried out by further data collection and further comparisons of data 
incident to incident. Furthermore, validation of the final emerging theory, as a hypothetical 
sequence of category relationships, should be carried out once again by comparison, that 
is, by now comparing the emerging theory to the raw data. In this way the researcher will 
be testing the emerging theory in a form of high-level comparative analysis (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998 p. 159). One sees here a different form of induction-deduction to the Glaser 
logic. The induction here regards the emergence of conceptual categories and 
hypothetical relationships from the research. The deduction process is seen to be in the 
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interpretive stage, where the researcher is deriving hypotheses from the data. The 
following chapters shall demonstrate that validation, indeed, did take place continuously, 
and at the various levels of theory generation and confirmation. 
 
As indicated in Figure 4.1, a further evolvement of grounded theory can be seen in the 
recent writings of Corbin, and with even more emphasis by authors such as Charmaz, 
Bryant and Locke. This is not to say modern users of grounded theory have to subscribe 
to the latest developments, one could just as easily adopt Glaser’s positivistic stance or 
Strauss and Corbin’s philosophy of symbolic interactionism. Corbin attributes the later 
evolvement to the advent of the postmodern era (Corbin and Strauss 2008) whilst 
Charmaz utilizes a different terminology; that of constructivism (Charmaz 2006). Corbin, in 
later years (Corbin and Strauss 2008), expresses her initial exasperation with the way 
modern qualitative paradigms were moving away from the rigidity of qualitative enquiry, 
and towards the ‘deconstruction’ and ‘re-construction’ of meaning within the data. 
Everything was relative, multiple perspectives were allowed, and the modern philosophies 
were moving further away from objectivity and into subjectivity. Corbin admits to a struggle 
between wanting to hold onto Strauss’s more objective methodological ‘vision’ and to 
subscribing to the more modern philosophical assumptions. She finally admits to settling 
down most comfortably with both; an enhanced level of interpretation together with the 
Strauss basis of complex storytelling of a theory emerging from the data. Corbin refers to 
the constructivist writings of Clarke (2005) and Charmaz (2006), and their influence on her 
philosophical approach towards interpretation and interaction with both the data and the 
research subjects. A final note on Corbin’s later writings is her inclusion of modern 
software interpretation tools within the methodology (similarly to this research, Corbin 
utilizes MAXqda).  
 
Kathy Charmaz and other authors such as Karen Locke (2001), Antony Bryant (2002) and 
Adele Clarke (2005) have served to ingrain the concept of researcher interaction more 
rigorously within the modern grounded theory method of enquiry. Charmaz takes on a 
constructivist grounded theory philosophy; that of giving closer attention to empirical 
realities and to the researcher’s rendering of them (Charmaz 2008). Here it is the 
researcher who brings in past interactions and current interests into the research, 
interacting with the data and its emerging themes. Data are not passively observed and 
compiled, but actively acted upon by the researcher and the direct environment 
influencing that same researcher. Theorising is seen to be an activity, each stage of 
inquiry being constructed through social processes driven by the researcher, and the 
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research problem and researcher’s unfolding interests shape the content of this activity. 
Charmaz sees constructivism to be a healthy development to the Chicago School’s 
pragmatist foundations (Charmaz 2006). There is still the pragmatist philosophy of 
meanings emerging through practical actions to resolve problems, of people learning 
about the world through actions and reactions. Constructivists, however, acknowledge 
that their interpretation of the studied phenomenon is, in itself, a construction. Reality is 
made and not observed, and the researcher constructs the realities within which she 
participates. The researcher will enter the phenomenon with pre-established, albeit fluid, 
mental constructs, gaining multiple views of the phenomenon, and locating it in its web of 
connections and constraints.  
 
4.3 Philosophical and Methodological Approach Adopted 
 
The grounded theory method of enquiry that has been adopted can be related more to the 
later philosophical viewpoints visualized in Figure 4.1; that is those of pragmatism, 
interpretivism and, more so, of constructivism. Glaser’s foundations of coding, of constant 
comparison, and of theory emerging from the data as a series of hypothetical relationships 
between categories, have lost none of their importance in the strategy of enquiry that has 
been adopted. Neither has Strauss and Corbin’s additional emphasis on process, on 
hypothetico-deduction, and on concepts such as theoretical saturation and theory 
verification. These basic grounded theory properties were indeed applied (as they are 
really the core components to the method), but it was clear from an early stage that the 
constructivist approach was dominating the emerging philosophy. A total of 67 small 
businesses were researched over a three year period (2007-2009), and in-depth 
interviews, observation and use of secondary data were gathered and transcribed. A 
sampling strategy (Figure 4.3) was adopted to allow for selection of cases and of 
materials that were rich in variety and in descriptive power. Constant comparison was 
applied throughout, supported and strengthened by a coding and categorization strategy. 
Emerging theory was validated by revisiting the data and testing out the developing 
propositions or hypotheses. And so on. The main epistemological underpinnings and 
methodological requisites of Glaser’s inductivism and Strauss’s symbolic interactionism 
were, in no way, bypassed by the strategy of enquiry that was adopted. However, as the 
research unfolded, it became more and more important to appreciate the interpretive and 
constructivist nature of the emerging research.  
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A constructivist approach must come with it an understanding of the researcher’s 
theoretical sensitivities, of her biases, of the questions and hypothesis lurking in her mind, 
of the interactive nature of herself within the research and towards the research subjects, 
the raw data, and the emerging theory. “Researchers carry into their research the 
sensitizing possibilities of their training, reading, and research experience, as well as the 
implicit theories that might be useful if played against systematically gathered data, in 
conjunction with theories emerging from analysis of these data” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994 
p. 277).  It was no less so in this research process. Possibly the biggest challenge in a 
constructivist grounded theory approach is in understanding one’s strengths and in not 
allowing these same strengths to become a weakness through bias, whilst allowing for 
new conceptualizations that allow the researcher to learn and adapt, and to investigate 
further. The present researcher’s own academic and professional background became an 
important part of the emerging methodology. Being an engineer, coming from over 15 
years of work in the engineering sector, allowed for a better view of the processual nature 
of strategic behaviour, and of how firms built upon value-adding activities and created (or 
lost) distinctive capabilities. The engineering stance, ignored by most of the literature on 
small businesses, emerged as an important consequential category (see Figure 5.2). 
Later work as an academic, lecturing in business and strategy for some seven years, gave 
a greater exposure to the many schools of thought of strategy, and variants to their 
interpretation. Examples of these are theories such as Resource-based Theory and 
Industrial Organization economics, that offered a better understanding of the actions 
businesses would take to build resource bundles that were difficult for competitors to 
imitate or substitute.  
Furthermore, exposure to small businesses as a consultant for a number of years resulted 
in a better perception and understanding of the actions and interactions that small firms 
would take at various stages of their evolvement. The present research indeed identified 
different stages of small business development over time, this forming a processual 
category within the developing framework for small firm strategic behaviour (to be 
described in the forthcoming chapters). And so on.  Again the challenge was always there: 
Use one’s knowledge to see more and to induce more depth into what was being 
observed, whilst not being oblivious to other important conceptualizations that emerged, 
and not being conditioned into bias by what was already known. Other viewpoints 
emphasized by Charmaz were both enlightening and somewhat reassuring. A case in 
point is her divergence from the concept and rigour of a dominant core category, as no 
such category was evident in the present research (other to the phenomenon under 
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scrutiny, if one wishes to call that a core category).  The argument being put forward here 
is that the ensuing framework for small business strategy (Figure 5.2) and the resulting 
trajectory-based typology (Figure 8.1) were stronger and more conceptually dense as a 
result of the researcher’s prior, as well as his emerging knowledge, and not in spite of it. 
Hopefully this is what constructivist grounded theory aims to achieve. On the use of 
grounded theory for the analysis of organizational behaviour, Turner (1983) notes that the 
quality of the final product is more directly dependent upon the quality of the researcher’s 
understanding of the phenomena under observation than is the case with many other 
approaches to research. Charmaz (2006) argues that theoretical saturation will take more 
time to achieve for the knowledgeable researcher, but will be all the more rich as a 
consequence. 
 
4.4 General Description of the Research Method Applied 
 
There are various arguments for and against the different methodological approaches to 
research business strategy. Venkatraman (1989) provides an excellent review of the 
many methodological possibilities available, and advocates a multivariate, quantitative 
approach that allows for the identification of strategy as a set of gestalts that are defined 
in accordance to common patterns of internally consistent attributes. Dess, Lumpkin and 
Covin (1997) call for research into more fine grained methodologies, such as case 
studies, to better understand strategic processes. Harrigan (1983) alternatively proposes 
a hybrid methodology that is neither coarse grained (purely quantitative) nor fine grained 
(qualitative, case studies), but somewhere between the two as shown in the following 
Figure 4.2. This hybrid design allows the researcher to capture much of the depth and 
complexities available through fine grained methodologies whilst still gaining a strong 
element of generalizability and prediction available through the more coarse grained 
methodologies. Grounded theory fits into this category of a hybrid methodology (not to be 
confused with mixed methods).  
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Figure 4.2:  The Continuum of Methodologies Available for Research on Business Strategy 
 
The research was focused on small businesses in the Island of Malta, an E.U. member 
state with a population of just under a half million inhabitants. As shown in the following 
Figure 4.3, a total of 67 businesses with less than 50 full-time employees (from 0 to 49) 
were researched over a three year period. This would include both micro enterprises (0 to 
9 employees) and small enterprises (10 to 49 employees) if the E.U. and U.K. Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) classifications are applied. The initial aim was to focus solely 
on limited liability companies to allow for a form of cut-off point regarding formality, 
availability of financial records, and such. This is a common decision that is made when 
researching SME’s (McMahon 2001), and, as Freedman and Godwin (1994 p. 234) would 
argue; “the limited liability company is of more interest to the small business research 
community than are unincorporated firms... limited liability companies and 
entrepreneurship have become equated, or at least associated”.  
 
In the final picture though, 64 of the firms are small limited liabilities, 2 firms are small in 
size but are legal partnerships, and 1 firm had made the transition from limited liability to 
sole trader within the research period. This mix allowed for the main focus to remain on 
small limited liabilities whilst allowing for an element of comparison to the strategic 
behaviours of alternative business types and sizes. Three generic industries within the 
state of Malta were studied; that of manufacturing (constituting 10% of the 39,000 or so 
small businesses in Malta), retail (38%), and general services (52%). Malta is classified as 
a country that is making a gradual transition from an investment-driven economy to an 
innovation-driven economy; ranking 52nd out of 133 countries measured in the year 2009-
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10 Global Competitiveness Index (World Economic Forum). In 2010 the European 
Innovation Scoreboard confirmed that Malta was a ‘moderate innovator’, with an above-
average rate of improvement in innovativeness (6% compared to an average 2%), but still 
below the EU average (placing 20th of the 27 EU States). The country’s economic 
strengths were identified as being in the areas of the availability of finance with which to 
carry out innovations, and the economic rewards of innovation in terms of employment, 
export and sales. A main driver in the improvement in Malta’s innovation performance has 
been from intellectual property rights generated as a throughput in the innovation process. 
Innovation weaknesses include a lack of highly skilled, educated workers, entrepreneurial 
efforts and collaboration between firms, and the actual take up of innovation among 
companies in Malta. Small firms in Malta provide over 38% of the economy’s value added, 
and 65% of private sector employment in Malta.  
 
An intrinsic knowledge of the culture and language of the Island, as well as the wide 
diversity of business types available within a limited geographic area, made the Island a 
choice selection for the research. Malta, being a small island state with a population of just 
under half a million, is seen to be highly attractive for the study of small business strategy 
for two additional reasons. Firstly, the ratio of business types, sizes and configurations is 
highly similar to that of larger countries such as the U.S., U.K. and Australia. The only 
difference is that this rich variety is accessible within a geographic area of solely 316 
square kilometres. The second reason is that the confinements in size and market 
structure serve to amplify the actions, conditions and consequences that portray small firm 
strategic behaviour. In other words the research uncovers more vivid patterns of strategic 
behaviour that are more easily discernible, whilst still being generalizable to larger 
competitive settings. The major setback to the choice of research setting, as discussed in 
Chapter 8, is that the ensuing typology may be specific to the behaviour of small firms 
operating in a constrained geographical region.  
 
Data were collected through three complementary methods, with interviewing being by far 
the predominant method. In line with the constructionist grounded theory philosophy, 
interviewing is an ideal data acquisition method as it is a flexible, emergent technique. 
Ideas and issues emerge during the interview, and the researcher can immediately pursue 
these leads (Charmaz 2006). A knowledgeable researcher can extract better quality data 
and assist in focusing the interviewee on the phenomenon under scrutiny (Curran and 
Blackburn 2001). Goulding’s (2006 p. 59) interviewing approach was largely adopted, 
relating to accessing and adapting to the setting, building a rapport of trust, and 
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structuring the interview. Rubin and Rubin’s (2005) logic on how to prepare, conduct and 
converse within the interview was also largely utilized. Flick’s (2006) model for 
interviewing was adopted, whereby the interviews, all face-to-face, started off in an 
unstructured manner (largely open ended), and were increased in structure as the 
interview progressed. The initial lack of structure would allow the interviewee to truly 
express her thoughts, whilst the increased structure would be used to expand upon a 
certain concept mentioned, to open up dialogue on further themes, or simply to control for 
repetition. Curran and Blackburn’s (2001 p. 73) concept of merging unstructured 
questioning with structured support was also utilized to avoid the substantial difficulties of 
conducting purely unstructured interviews. A prompt sheet (Appendix 4) was always at 
hand to ensure that the interviews would proceed in a smooth manner, without any stalling 
or excessively prolonged silences. 
In initial interviews more open ended questions were utilized than ones carried out at later 
stages of the research, at which point a shift in focus would have taken place from the 
identification of conceptual categories to their subsequent saturation. An issue arose 
practically immediately in the start of the research regarding to what extent should the pre-
prepared prompts and research questions be utilized. This issue was quickly resolved, not 
by the researcher but by the interviewees themselves. Few small business participants 
would have the time for truly lengthy interviews (Curran and Blackburn 2001 p. 60), but 
would gladly provide the information if allowed to speak freely. Open ended questions 
regarding the evolvement of the firm, competitive moves being taken, external influences 
and issues being encountered, and such, would be reacted to by interviewees with vigour 
and in adequate depth. More specific prompts were only utilized when additional focus 
was needed, such as to concentrate on a category that still required saturation. 
Nevertheless, the prompt sheet was kept handy at all times, and also evolved as the 
research progressed and more was learned of the phenomenon in question. 
In-depth interviews were carried out on the owner-managers of the 67 small businesses 
ranging in size from 1 to 49 full-time employees. As shown in the following Figure 4.3, a 
sequence of different sampling methods was adopted to allow for increasing converge on 
the core themes and their inter-relationships. The interviews on the chosen firms took 
place over a three year period. Either the owner/primary shareholder of the firm was 
interviewed, or alternatively the most senior manager, who would be expected to reflect 
the true strategic nature of the firm (Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marín 2005; Wiklund 
and Shepherd 2005). The in-depth interviews were digitally taped and ultimately 
transcribed, without exception, by the researcher. This truly arduous task did, however, 
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pay dividends. The lengthy transcribing involved repeatedly listening to the recording, as 
spooling in transcribing is inevitable. Meanings became clearer, emergence of themes 
took place, and areas of focus were clarified. The transcribing in fact turned up to be a 
vital initial stage of theory generation as this was where many category relationships 
became initially evident. 
Apart from the interviews and the corresponding direct observation, a limited number of 
interviewees provided business plans and other documentation to support their 
statements. The audited financial records of most of the firms were purchased from 
governmental archives (the Maltese financial regulator) to allow for methods triangulation 
(Patton 2002) with subjective data obtained in the interviews on one particular construct; 
firm performance. This was an important inclusion within the research method, as shall be 
shown in forthcoming Chapter 7. The grounded theory research technique allows for the 
coding, and thus inclusion, of this secondary data, as in the words of Glaser (1998 p. 8); 
“all is data”.  Where the research subjects allowed for it, interviews were followed by 
informal discussions with the interviewee, and a tour of the business premises. Similarly to 
the findings of Corbin (Corbin and Strauss 2008 p. 28) some very interesting data were 
offered as soon as the tape recorder would be turned off.  A knowledge into engineering 
provided an additional benefit as this allowed for an open up of discussions with 
interviewees on the workings of the firm, and the value adding activities being deployed. 
Discussions such as these would further relax the owner-manager, and additional insight 
into the workings of the firm would be provided. 
 
4.5 Research  Method: Data Collection 
 
Data were collected using two methods; those of obtaining and analyzing primary data as 
well as of secondary data. All data collected formed part of the grounded theory strategy 
of enquiry. Primary data were extracted from face-to-face, in-depth interviews with the 
owner-managers of the 67 small businesses that were researched. The average duration 
of these interviews was one hour, of which the main proportion was taped and 
subsequently transcribed and analyzed. Discussions and tours of the premises outside 
the ‘formal’ taped period allowed for the compilation of memos that were subsequently 
integrated into the study. Great difficulty was found in getting business owner-managers to 
surrender more of their time, and indeed “small business owners are busy people, often 
under considerable pressure. Understandably, they may not be too sympathetic to 
requests from researchers for some of their time... experience indicates that roughly 50 
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minutes is the maximum length of a face-to-face interview before respondent resistance is 
likely among small business owners” (Curran and Blackburn 2001 p. 60, p. 74). This time 
limitation factor may have influenced the amount of interviews required to achieve 
theoretical saturation, as often saturation is obtained with between 20 and 30 in-depth 
interviews (e.g. McCarthy 2003). This may ultimately have served as an advantage, 
however, as the final typological patterns that were observed were more clearly defined as 
a result of the larger sample size.  Secondary data were collected from two sources, the 
main source being the historic financial records of the firms obtained from official records 
held by the local financial regulator. Secondary data were also obtained from 
documentation provided by interviewees, such as business plans, company reports, and 
company web-sites, although these other sources provided only a limited additional 
source of innovative data. The objectives of gathering secondary data were twofold: The 
first objective was as a means of triangulation with primary data, particularly for the 
performance construct; The second objective was to allow for an integration of any 
additional knowledge on the firm’s strategic behaviour into the grounded theory study 
through use of descriptive memos. Within grounded theory the methods of sampling, data 
collection, coding, constant comparative analysis and further sampling take place as an 
integrated, interactive process with blurred boundaries and evolving objectives (Elliott and 
Lazenbatt 2005). Having said this, the following descriptions shall attempt to break down 
the applied methodology into a number of discrete components, without hopefully losing 
sight of the thread that integrates these components together. 
 
4.5.1 Primary Data Collection 
 
The primary data were obtained by interviewing the owner-manager of the business, and 
by observing the business itself through tours through the premises when this was 
allowed. The term owner-manager is being used to signify the person within the firm who 
was essentially at the very helm of the firm and in the foremost of strategic direction 
setting. In most cases the owner-manager was the major shareholder of the firm whilst in 
others, a salaried employee. Again, in some cases the businesses were family businesses 
coming from a number of family successions, whilst in others the businesses had been set 
up by an entrepreneurial individual who was often still involved in the organization’s 
management. In all cases, the interviewee was the most senior manager within the 
organization, and the one expected to be the most knowledgeable to the overall strategic 
direction of the company (Hambrick 1981). An example of this is Miller’s (1983) analysis of 
patterns of strategic behaviour on 52 firms, in more than 67% of the cases interviewing 
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more than one respondent per firm. Inter-rater reliability was high (scores of raters 
correlated beyond p=0.001), in only 8% of the scores was there some divergence in 
responses within a firm. These points argue that the owner-manager should be a reliable 
and adequate source of information on the strategic behaviour of the firm. 
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Figure 4.3: The Grounded Theory Process as Applied to the Research 
 
Figure 4.3 above depicts the application of the grounded theory method of enquiry. 
Indeed, as argued by Elliott and Lazanbatt (2005) and Morse (2007), the process was 
very much emergent, with each completed stage adding a piece to the developing picture, 
clarifying what needed to be done next and what sources of data to be utilized next. Data 
analysis took place in parallel with the data collection, and provided for an emerging 
picture that dictated the direction required for further data collection. As put by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967 p. 45), sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory 
whereby the researcher jointly collects, codes and analyses her data and decides what 
data to collect next and from where, in order to develop an emerging theory. Elliott and 
Lazanbatt (2005) posit that the sampling strategy cannot be pre-designed before the 
grounded theory research begins, but can emerge only from the data analysis. Whilst the 
sampling strategy was indeed emergent, it was nevertheless largely based upon a set of 
three principles advocated by Morse (2007). The first principle is well honed research 
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skills; the more targeted the content of the interviews, the better the data and the fewer 
the interviews are necessary. Flick’s (2006) technique of adding increasing structure to an 
emerging interview, directing the participant towards areas of interest, was effectively 
utilized here. The second principle is that it is necessary to locate excellent participants to 
obtain excellent data. Participants must be sought who are knowledgeable about the 
phenomenon under investigation, they must be willing to participate, and must be 
reflective and capable of articulating and expanding upon the phenomenon. Interviewees 
are selected whose viewpoints reflect different, even contradictory perspectives (Rubin 
and Rubin 2005). Here one notes the complete divergence from random sampling, of 
inferring out a picture to a wider audience. This leads to the third principle; the sampling 
strategy must be targeted and efficient. The samples must be the best cases accessible, 
and not a random representation. Collecting too much data results in a situation of 
conceptual blindness for the researcher.  In grounded theory research the data are 
inherently biased, deliberately sought and purposely selected. By selecting cases rich in 
data, such as the best cases and the worst cases, the phenomenon emerges more 
quickly. It is clearer, conceptually more dense and better delineated. Morse (2007) likens 
sampling to a normal distribution. With random sampling one will have most of the data 
around the mean, overloading the model with the most common events and inadequate 
data about the less common, possibly going as far as removing the outliers. Variety and 
difference are thus much sought after characteristics in a grounded theory sampling 
strategy. 
 
The sampling strategy that ultimately emerged is shown in Figure 4.3 to have undergone 
three general, if somewhat overlapping, stages. Initially there was no idea, no knowledge 
of the amount of cases that would have to be analyzed before saturation would be 
reached. Bryant and Charmaz (2007 p. 13) avoid giving a sample size, but do refer to 
emerging theory as being given shape by the differing views of a large number of 
participants. Stern (2007 p. 117) argues that, from experience, theoretical saturation is 
usually reached with some 20 to 30 interviews, at which point theoretical saturation of 
categories is reached and no new data emerges. Whilst almost all other grounded theory 
protagonists will avoid quoting sample sizes and argue saturation as a state in which no 
new insights emerge, Charmaz (2006 p. 114) comes up with an interesting, if somewhat 
different insight. Saturation can be reached, even early on into the research, but this is not 
necessarily a good thing. If the prompts, the questions utilized by the researcher to guide 
the participants are of inadequate depth and do not solicit, in return, conceptually deep 
responses, then saturation of a limited number of common, trivial categories may result. 
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The research will grind to a halt in its early stages, with little theoretical depth and no 
viable contribution to knowledge. Kelle (2007 p. 208) also argues this case, and looks at 
the role of sensitizing concepts applied by the researcher in the form of open-ended or 
unstructured prompts to guide the interviewees towards providing quality data. 
 
The first stage of the sampling strategy (see Figure 4.3) consisted of a limited set of 
convenience samples, totaling five in all. The five business owner-managers were all well 
known to the researcher, were highly knowledgeable of their respective businesses and 
industries, had very good communication and conceptualization abilities, and were 
enthusiastic about participating in the research. These first interviews served a number of 
purposes. One outcome was the provision of five in-depth interviews that were instructive, 
informative and of excellent quality. A second outcome was a fine tuning of an initial 
prompt sheet (final version shown in Appendix 4) and a refining of the interview 
mechanisms and tactics. A third outcome was the opportunity to trial out different 
approaches towards the level of structuring of the prompts utilized. Starting off with open 
ended, unstructured questions and then converging, through prompts, towards areas of 
interest was seen to be a very effective approach.  Data management techniques and 
tools were tested. And so on. A final outcome of importance was that the 5 interviews 
made up a part of an important first stage of analysis; that of in vivo coding which will be 
described later on. The spread of business characteristics for the five initial samples was 
also of importance. Two businesses were service firms, two were in retail and the fifth was 
a manufacturing firm (see Firms numbered 1 to 5 in Appendix 3). Firm sizes here ranged 
from 6 to 47 full time employees. All the five businesses came from different industries 
with largely different competitive and environmental conditions. The interviews, which 
included discussions outside the taped period and tours of the business premises, each 
took between one to two hours in length. A main objective of these first interviews was to 
attempt to maximize on two important parameters; width and depth. Conceptual width was 
required to try to touch on as many potential categories as possible, depth was required to 
gain an initial insight into the properties and dimensions of these categories. 
 
Following the initial set of five convenience samples, a second batch of interviews was 
carried out in what Hood (2007) would define to be purposeful sampling. The objective of 
this second batch of around 25 participants was somewhat different to that of the initial 
convenience sample. The aim was to further extend the range of categories that had 
already emerged until a point in which no new categories were emerging, that is, 
saturation of the category set.  Purposeful sampling has an objective different to that of 
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theoretical sampling (Charmaz 2006) in that it looks towards fixed dimensions, fixed 
quotas and not theoretical concerns. Locke (2001 p. 80) advocates the use of purposeful 
sampling at the initial research stages to gather data that are rich and varied. This 
richness and variety is, in itself a result of sampling a rich and varied set of participants. 
Whilst the main aim was a saturation of the category set, it was also expected that the 
purposeful sampling stage would go a long way towards populating the categories with 
respective properties, and in establishing initial hypothetical relationships between the 
categories. It was not expected that the approach would allow for full theoretical 
saturation, as the purposeful sampling has one significant limitation, it is not directional 
and hence does not really allow a focus on particular categories, themes, relationships, 
etc. This would then be taken care of by the third phase, that of theoretical sampling, 
although in reality this sequential strategy was far more emergent than intended.  
 
The sampling frame for this second wave of research was obtained from the ‘International 
Business Directory of Products and Services’, years 2006 and 2007, published by Malta 
Enterprise.  Malta Enterprise is the Maltese Government’s agency responsible for the 
promotion of industrial development in Malta, and is particularly focused on small 
business management and support. The directory in question provided detailed 
information for small businesses on the Island, including size, type of business, age of 
establishment, contact details, and main value adding activities. The strategy for selection 
of cases was fairly straightforward; samples were selected based upon a maximum 
spread of business characteristics as possible. The aim was to include within the set a 
large range of types, sizes and operations of small businesses. The list in Appendix 3 
shows the final list to contain a plethora of business types and sizes, such as a car park, 
aqua bio-marine, architectural services, quality sorting, electrical installations, stainless 
steel manufacture, PC retail, upholstery, carpentry, perfumery, a supermarket, and so on. 
Business sizes ranged from 1 full-time employee to 49 employees. The list is not 
exhaustive, but did achieve the objective of covering a wide diversity of small business 
types and sizes. The pre-selection of cases was far from a straight-forward affair, and the 
forthcoming chapter on Data Management will detail how, on average, one in every five 
participants identified was ultimately researched.  
 
The third phase of interviews covered some 37 participants (as again, the boundary for 
where purposeful sampling ended and the third sampling strategy commenced was far 
from clear), and was based upon a theoretical sampling strategy. In theoretical sampling 
one looks for participants who know about particular parts of a problem, and then piece 
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together what they collectively know (Rubin and Rubin 2005 p. 64). Hood (2007) defines 
theoretical sampling as an approach towards choosing respondents that will allow 
categories to become saturated, and allow the theory to be complete. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967 p. 45) describe theoretical sampling as “the process of data collection for 
generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and 
decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as 
it emerges”. More explicitly, Morse (2007) compares theoretical sampling to the work of a 
detective; looking for clues, sifting and sorting, and filtering out the irrelevant data to 
ultimately create a plausible case. The researcher seeks participants who have particular 
experiences and knowledge of the concepts under investigation.  
 
The sampling frame for this third wave of research was once again obtained from the 
‘International Business Directory of Products and Services’ published by Malta Enterprise, 
this time for years 2007 and 2008. A more careful scrutiny of the value adding activities of 
the candidate firms was carried out, together with any other attributes that could identify 
the firms as potential providers of information relating to a range of categories that had 
unclear relationships or under-developed properties. Businesses were thus sought that 
appeared to have a portfolio of products, experiences or other attributes relating to the 
areas requiring additional development. Again, this was far from an exact science. The 
success rate in targeting participants was again some one in five, meaning that a lot of 
effort had to be put into every participant that ultimately formed part of the final sample. 
The interview structures were somewhat more structured than those of the earlier 
purposeful sampling. The interviews still started off with open ended questions, aimed at 
assessing whether the participant could enhance a targeted category or concept, or if not, 
some other category or relationship that was still under-developed. As soon as was 
feasibly possible, additional structuring was used to focus the participant towards a choice 
area or concept. This technique couldn’t have been more like Morse’s (2007) sifting and 
groping for clues, as respondents often failed to provide data pertaining to a sought 
concept but instead provided a wealth of data in another, equally under-developed area.  
 
Saturation of the categories and their inter-relations was achieved after roughly 30 of 
these 37 final interviews. Towards the conclusion of the 30 interviews, less and less 
innovative data were coming in, and fewer enhancements were being made to the 
emerging model. Continuing the research further still allowed for a confirmation that 
saturation was achieved, as nothing but repetition emerged. The further interviews did 
serve another purpose, that of validating the model that had emerged (more on this in 
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Chapters 5 to 7). As posited by Rubin and Rubin (2005 p. 67); “As you continue to 
interview people from each of the relevant categories, each new conversation should add 
less and less to what you already know, until all you start hearing are the same matters 
over and over again. At that point, you have reached what Glaser and Strauss term the 
Saturation Point”. One observation that also poses a question is whether the three-staged 
sampling strategy was the most effective means of acquiring the quality data required, in 
line with Morse’s (2007) third principle of adopting an efficient, focused sample targeting 
strategy. A total of 67 small businesses were ultimately researched, substantially more 
than the 20 to 30 argued by Stern (2007). The counter argument placed here relates to 
Charmaz’s (2006) concept of premature saturation. The purposeful sampling exposed a 
framework for small business strategic behaviour (Figure 5.2) that is rich in dimensionality 
and detail. Moving straight into theoretical coding may possibly have achieved the 
objective of theoretical saturation without fully extending the boundaries and limitations of 
the model. A quicker conclusion may have been achieved, but not necessarily a more 
complete one. As posited by Morse (2007), a good sampling strategy will change during 
the course of the research, allowing the researcher to complete the study as efficiently as 
possible. 
 
Throughout all three phases of the sampling strategy, observation was included as an 
additional benefit stemming from the face-to-face encounters. As argued by Boyatzis 
(1998 p. 1); “Observation precedes understanding. Recognizing an important moment 
(seeing) precedes encoding it (seeing it as something), which in turn precedes 
interpretation”. Whilst only a limited amount of participants offered a tour of the premises, 
in nearly all cases it was possible to assess the surroundings to the interview, 
manufacturing processes taking place nearby, samples and posters that were on 
demonstration, achievement awards hung on the wall, and various other items. This gave 
a helping hand in the informal discussions with the participants outside that of the taped 
interview. Interviewees would indeed speak somewhat more freely once the digital tape 
recorder was switched off. The researcher’s engineering and business consultancy 
background proved immensely useful, as there was nothing that a participant likes most 
than to discuss the value adding processes of the business, be they technological or 
knowledge based. Owner-manager perspectives were clarified, business processes made 
more understandable, the culture of the organization made more evident. Field notes were 
taken for each case, and translated into memos when doing the analysis. Through use of 
these memos the observed data were included into the grounded theory method and into 
the model that was developing. 
75 
 
4.5.2 Secondary Data Collection 
 
Secondary data were collected as a support measure to the main interviewing method, 
and as a means of triangulation with one of the categories, that of performance. This 
application of triangulation is seen to be an effective way of increasing both reliability and 
validity in qualitative research (Kisfalvi 2002). Collection of secondary data was carried out 
through two means, both aiming to support and integrate into the grounded theory method 
through the application of memos. The more basic means was the acquisition of any 
documents of strategic value that the participants would have at their disposition, or 
obtainable from the company’s web site. This turned out to have certain limitations, as 
strategic documents such as business plans, strategic plans or annual reports, were 
nearly non-existent. The few businesses that did have a business plan usually would have 
had it compiled by Malta Enterprise advisors, and would have little knowledge of its 
content. The scant information of strategic value was read through, and where beneficial, 
integrated into the grounded theory study via memoing. The main source of secondary 
data was abridged company financial statements, obtained through licence from the 
Maltese financial regulator. These financial records are accessible for business or 
academic users that are given a license by the authority, once the applicant’s personal 
details would have been verified. This is one of the benefits of researching limited liability 
companies; the availability of audited financial statements, albeit abridged versions. Data 
files were downloaded and accessed in PDF mode from the regulator’s web site.  
 
The abridged financial records obtained from the Malta regulator were available for most 
of the 67 businesses with a few exceptions, mainly where it was impossible to identify the 
business with certainty from the records or where a full data set was unavailable. An 
example of this, that was resolved, was one company that had the date of inception as 
part of its registered trade name whilst on all public records this date was omitted. There 
were two limitations with the available financial records that curtailed their use.  The first 
was a time lag of one to two years, for example records downloaded towards the end of 
2009 usually contained financial statements for 2008. A second limitation was in the detail 
of the statements, providing only a summarized picture of the business’s audited financial 
accounts. The following financial information was usually available for the individual 
businesses: 
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1. The share capital, both authorised and issued. 
2. Abridged balance sheets for two consecutive years (mainly for end of 2008 and 
2007) 
3. Statements of changes in equity. 
4. A fixed assets schedule. 
5. Notes to the abridged financial statements showing information such as changes 
in reserves. 
 
The data, albeit limited, does allow one to draw important comparisons into the financial 
performance of the firms and how they progresses from one year to the next. Again, data 
were integrated into the developing grounded theory method through the application of 
memos, and explained through graphical interpretations as shall be demonstrated in the 
forthcoming Chapter 7. 
 
4.6 Research Method: Data Management 
 
The quantity and depth of data ensuing from a grounded theory method of enquiry 
demands a data management strategy that is supported by the correct methods, tools and 
techniques. The method is far different from a quantitative method of enquiry where the 
research instrument is developed and launched in line with pre-established multivariate 
techniques, with validity and reliability criteria well embedded in the design. In a grounded 
theory strategy some components of data management may be emergent, others well 
thought in advance to the collection of the first data set. The researcher is the research 
tool (Goulding 2006 p. 18). Whilst in much of the qualitative research the researcher 
learns by doing and develops a customized approach (Creswell 1998 p. 142), the data 
management component must leave little to chance, and this for many reasons not least 
of all efficiency and ethical considerations. Whilst no manual will be found that dictates 
how qualitative data should be managed, a previous M.Phil research project had prepared 
the researcher for a disciplined approach towards the data management. In particular, 
three guidelines were established from the start of the research, and rigorously 
maintained throughout. These are listed below: 
 
1   Data management had to be robust, structured, disciplined and traceable. All 
data had to be processed as soon as possible after gathered, and 
compartmentalized in an easily accessible, usable, yet secure format. Backups 
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would be regularly created, but these too had to abide by the above criteria.  
Nothing would be left to chance, and order would be of paramount importance. 
Large volumes of data were expected and had to be properly processed from 
the very start. 
2   Data had to be accessible for interpretation from the beginning. This meant that 
all data acquired through the method would need to be subject to the same 
processes, no matter when they were gathered. This would allow for constant 
comparison to take place straight away. 
3   The tools and methods adopted for the research would have to be flexible and 
adaptable to the inclusion of additional data, as well as to inclusion of data from 
different sources. One method, and the supporting tools, had to be devised that 
would allow the integration of the primary and secondary data that would be 
gathered. 
 
 
4.6.1 Tools and Techniques 
 
Four factors had to be catered for in the data management; collection, capture, storage, 
and access. Collection refers to the methods and tools required to gather the data, 
particularly the main interview-based data. Against Glaser’s (1998) advice but in line with 
more contemporary authors (Charmaz 2006;  Locke 2001), it was planned from the start 
to digitally record all interviews and benefit from the wealth and depth of data that ensued. 
This would also allow for more time to take additional notes in the interviews, and for 
focusing, and reacting to, the discussions at hand. In fact, on small business research, 
Curran and Blackwell (2001 p. 85) argue that “in practice, all face-to-face interviews 
should be taped. Not only does this provide a record of the interview but enables 
interviewer performance to be monitored…”  A digital tape recorder was utilized for this 
purpose.  Participants were informed in advance that the interview would be recorded 
(see Covering Letter in Appendix 5), and were informed of the conditions that would be 
applied in and after the interview (particularly their and their organization’s guaranteed 
anonymity). A lot of care was taken to make participants feel as comfortable as possible in 
the interview, and not to feel dominated or intimidated in any way. Rubin and Rubin’s 
(2005) method of responsive interviewing was adopted, consisting of the following five 
underlying principles: The interview is about obtaining interviewee’s interpretation of the 
world around them, it is their rendition of the phenomenon that matters; The personality, 
style, and beliefs of the interviewer matter, as interviewing is an exchange with 
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constructionist implications; The personal relationship, and position of trust that results 
between the interviewer and interviewee carries with it important ethical implications; The 
interviewer must not impose and must understand and control for her biases; Finally, the 
interviewing design must be flexible and adaptive. 
 
Data capture followed every act of data collection. Digitally taped interview audio files 
were uploaded into a program called F4, used purposely for transcription work. Using this 
F4, a foot pedal and headphones the interview recordings were transcribed into text files 
in rich text format. This was an immensely time consuming task, as it was planned from 
the start that the researcher would personally transcribe each and every interview. The 
value to be gained by listening and typing, listening again and checking, was simply too 
much to lose. Interviewees would speak in both English and Maltese, often switching 
between the two intermittently. However, as the researcher was fluent in both languages, 
this was not a problem.  Data management and storage, as well as subsequent analysis, 
took place using MAXqda software (MAX Qualitative Data Analysis), particularly 
MAXqda2007 and MAXmaps, for which a user license was purchased. MAXqda is one of 
a range of qualitative data management tools that are designed for the coding activities 
related to grounded theory. Other options available are Atlas, NUDist, n-vivo, and such. 
The choice of MAXqda was made after a detailed internet review that indicated the 
growing popularity of the software, and texts such as Flick (2006 p. 351) that highlighted 
the software’s qualities and benefits. Of interest to note is Corbin and Strauss’s (2008) 
use of MAXqda as their preferred choice. Three main advantages are to be found in the 
chosen software. First of all it is relatively easy to use, with four interactive screens that 
allow the user to simultaneously view a document list, a coding hierarchy, the text under 
analysis, and the text of a chosen category for a chosen participant (see the following 
Figure 4.4 for an example, as well as a coding example in Appendix 7). MAXqda will allow 
for importation of all of the texts under study into one single project file, for the easy 
toggling between these texts, and for comparison of codes between one text and another. 
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Figure 4.4:  Screen Shot of MAXqda2007 in Use in the Research 
 
A second advantage is the dimensionality of the coding configuration, allowing up to 10 
coding layers, as well as easy interaction between codes and linking of codes to memos. 
A third advantage of the tool is in its thematic capabilities, making the rigorous task of 
constant comparison more easily applicable. Thematic applications available consist of a 
mapping function (MAXmaps), a code matrix browser, a code relations browser and a text 
comparison chart. The advantages of thematic mapping should not be underestimated, 
particularly in view of its contribution towards the analysis stage. The map is an interactive 
tool, with links to all the text and to the categories, their properties, the codes relating to 
the categories, and the memos that describe and link the categories. By simply clicking on 
an icon on the thematic map, one can choose to analyze all the codes and memos that 
relate to that icon. This can be carried out for one particular text extract or alternatively for 
all the transcribed interviews in sequence. On software systems, Kelle (2005) in fact 
argues that computer-assisted categorization, archiving and structuring of qualitative data 
is necessary, as it allows for the systematic searching for empirical evidence to further 
ground theoretical concepts.  
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4.6.2    Data Management Strategy 
 
In line with the tools and techniques that were adopted, the sequence for data collection 
and management followed four steps for each and every case researched. The first step 
was the importation of the transcribed interview text into a MAXqda project file (that was 
constantly growing with new text inclusions and their analysis). The tool allows for a 
practically unlimited amount of textual data to be imported, and structures these data files 
in a ‘Document System’ window. A second step was the processing of the textual data by 
implementing a coding exercise that would link each and every concept mentioned in the 
transcription to a corresponding category within a hierarchy of categories (see Section 4.7 
on Data Analysis for a more detailed explanation). The third step was the compilation of 
memos and linking of these to corresponding categories. Memos would be compiled from 
simple observations, from the field notes taken, or from the secondary data such as the 
financial records of a business. The following Figure 4.5 depicts a sample screen shot of a 
memo and its relationship to the text and to conceptual categories. A memo coding 
scheme was utilized, in which memos were classified into four types and identified by a 
basic colour scheme. Memos with a large red T were theoretical memos, summarizing the 
main strategic characteristics of the business, and key linkages to theoretical categories. 
Memos with a top left red corner were relational memos, describing linkages between 
different categories and arguing the logic behind these linkages. Memos with a top left 
blue corner were descriptive memos, used for descriptions, observations and conclusions 
on a particular category, or property of a category. Finally, memos with a green corner 
were used for generic observations and descriptions targeted for the point in the text 
where the memo was placed. 
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Figure 4.5:  Screen Shot Depicting a Theoretical Memo and Related Categories 
 
The fourth and final stage would be the application of MAXqda’s textual and thematic tools 
to analyze and compare the new data (within itself and to other, existing data), and to 
enhance the emerging thematic maps accordingly.  Particularly, the MAXqda Text 
Retrieved Segments was an excellent text analysis tool. These four stages were repeated 
for each data inclusion relating to a business that had been interviewed. One single 
MAXqda project file ensued and contained the ever-increasing data, meaning that there 
was no need to import or export any other data when carrying out analysis. A scheme for 
regular data backup was also implemented.   
 
4.7 Research Method: Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis took place at three levels of increasing theoretical abstraction. A 
simplification of this analytic process is visualized in Figure 4.6 below, and described in 
detail in the forthcoming sections. Goulding summarizes this hierarchy of theorizing very 
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succinctly: “As the researcher proceeds with a piece of work, he/she should pass through 
a number of stages, each of which, in principle, should add to and refine the theory. In the 
early stages of data collection, interpretation may consist of, for example, interview 
transcripts and descriptions of events occurring within the data. As patterns are noted and 
relationships tentatively identified, the next stage is one of abstraction, through to 
conceptual identification, and finally theorizing” (2006 p. 44).  The triangles in Figure 4.6 
visualize the convergence from an initially wide coding scheme to a final, limited set of 
integrated theoretical concepts that provide a parsimonious model for the phenomenon 
under observation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6:  Visualization of the Analytic Process 
 
 
The general approach adopted has been a sequence of coding of the transcribed data 
(analytic level 1), creating theoretical categories from the codes (analytic level 2), and 
then building up further depth of theory within the categories by developing their 
properties and using memos to further explain the theoretical relationships within and 
between the categories (analytic level 3). Constant comparison will be shown to have 
taken place in a number of distinct stages of the research. As Glaser (1998) argues, 
constant comparison can add to the model being developed at any point in time. The 
researcher can latch onto her developing research and add new categories and 
hypothesis, refining and further developing her work and the theory ensuing.  
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Before detailing the three levels of analysis mentioned above, it is appropriate to discuss 
just what is meant by ‘theory’ in grounded theory research. Denzin and Lincoln (1994, 
2008) describe grounded theory as a set of systematic statements of plausible 
relationships proposed amongst concepts and amongst sets of concepts. They argue that 
most grounded theory studies have been directed at developing substantive theory, more 
because of the researchers’ substantive interests than due to the nature of the 
methodology itself. If one is to adopt the logic of Glaser (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the 
approach being adopted within this research is that of substantive grounded theory, as 
opposed to formal grounded theory. The researcher is expected to focus clearly on one, 
and only one, of these two levels of research. Substantive grounded theory analyses data 
from one particular substantive (i.e. empirical) area, such as the strategic behaviour of 
small firms. Constant comparison of data within this area allows for building a theory 
based upon core category/ies derived within that particular area. Formal grounded theory 
takes on a further level of abstraction. It looks now towards studying several substantive 
areas, meaning more multivariate conceptual complexity. Sampling is done more widely, 
and in other substantive areas, and additional constant comparison made with the aim of 
conceptualizing the general implications. The result, a formal grounded theory such as 
‘strategic behaviour’ in general. This goes beyond the objectives of this research.  
 
4.7.1 Level 1: Identification of Conceptual Categories 
 
The first level of theoretical abstraction may not have been the most exhaustive but was 
arguably the most important of all the stages of analysis. If one is to look at the category 
schema detailed in Appendix 6 as well as to the bottom left of the MAXqda screen shot in 
Figure 4.4, one sees an established list of conceptual categories, sub-categories and 
relating properties. A coding exercise would consist of ‘dragging’ text extracts from the 
text document (top right of Figure 4.4), and into the category that conceptualizes the 
theme behind the text extract (bottom left of Figure 4.4). There are different arguments 
regarding this process. At one extreme Glaser (1998) will advocate coding each and every 
line, whilst constructionists such as Charmaz (2006) and Locke (2001) will advise the 
researcher to be more practical and code incidents, themes and concepts, and not simply 
batches of words. Whatever the approach taken, a very important hurdle has to be 
overcome at this stage. Coding is the compartmentalization of themes into boxes, or 
drawers (Strauss and Corbin 1998) with one objective; facilitating, as well as inducing, 
constant comparison. In this means comparison of concepts will take place instead of 
comparison of text. However, to put a text code into a compartment, the compartment has 
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to be formulated in the first place. On the other hand, for a compartment to be formulated, 
one must first know that there is a grouping of codes that fits into that particular 
compartment. This is somewhat of a chicken and egg situation regarding which comes 
first. 
 
Kelle (2007 p. 196) argues that when constant comparison is applied, it will reveal two 
different kinds of theoretical properties; possible sub-categories to a given category, and 
relations to other categories. But the decisive question put forward by Kelle is this; 
according to which criteria do the incidents vary? Likewise, Hambrick (1984 p. 40) posits 
that strategy taxonomists have a responsibility to theoretically ground their efforts through 
the choice of variables (categories, in this case). In McKelvey’s guidelines for the 
empirical classification of organizations, taxonomic studies are seen to be the process of 
arranging phenomena into categories, making the classification approach underpinning 
grounded research ideal for strategy research. “The classificatory type concept is the most 
useful one for the scientific activity of inducing theories about certain phenomena and 
deducing testable hypotheses. It provides the basis for explanation, prediction and 
scientific understanding by identifying uniformities in the phenomena about which laws 
and principles may be formed” (McKelvey 1975 p. 510). To conclude the argument, the 
first abstraction stage of identifying the category set that best captures the many themes 
and concepts, was indeed both a delicate and important task. 
 
The approach adopted towards this initial categorization scheme was that of in vivo 
coding, applied to the first 15 research cases. In vivo coding is a practical approach to 
coding whereby even the smallest of themes, incidents, ideas and acts are looked for in 
the text, and selected to allow an emerging category name to be the highlighted code 
segment itself (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 105). For example, looking at Figure 4.4, the 
emerging code system (bottom left of screen shot) would not be a final category set but a 
long list of text extracts that relate to all of the evident themes and conceptual incidents. 
For each research case the list would be unique and exhaustive, with hundreds of 
emerging in vivo codes. This in vivo coding can be seen to be the first phase of constant 
comparison, and was carried out in two sequential stages. In the first stage, the first five 
research cases (that is, those of the convenience sample) were in vivo coded. This 
provided five long lists of phrases that related to the incidents, themes and concepts of 
importance in the texts. MAXqda provided the tool to list out these in vivo codes for easy 
viewing. The five lists were carefully compared, and a frequency table was drawn up that 
demonstrated the repetition in the codes. This critical exercise gave a first indication of 
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emerging conceptual categories; some in vivo codes were already latching into 
conceptual groupings more readily than others.  
 
The second sequential stage was the in vivo coding of a second batch of 10 data sets 
(that is, 10 of the second set of 25 purposeful samples). Again, this produced an 
exhaustive set of 10 lists of in vivo texts. This second data set were compared and 
contrasted to the codes in the initial frequency table. This can be described as an exercise 
in both confirming, in enhancing and in eliminating codes that were either showing 
repeated emergence of concepts or appearing to be inconsequential. This frequency-
based exercise was thus a category development stage, where the process of comparison 
was allowing for categories to be developed from the coding exercise. A category could 
now be observed to be a code that depicted a key concept, or a particular emerging 
theme. These categories would ultimately form the main dimensions and corresponding 
sub-dimensions of a model for small firm strategic behaviour. This comparison stage was 
halted after these additional 10 in vivo coding exercises, as a fairly robust category list 
had emerged (final list shown in Appendix 6), one that now required additional but gradual 
enhancement, and validation. An initial framework for small business strategic behaviour 
had now been formed. Categories were given names corresponding to their conceptual 
meaning, and set out in an operational list as shown to the bottom left of Figure 4.4. A 
colour scheme was applied to differentiate the categories, as well as the codes that 
related to the categories. A more detailed coding example is shown in Appendix 7. 
 
4.7.2    Level 2: Coding Methodology 
 
Whilst Analysis Levels 2 and 3 are at different levels of theoretical abstraction, they both 
took place simultaneously. The ‘Level 2’ coding methodology was an exercise to code the 
texts relating to the remaining cases, that is the 67 cases including the 15 cases that had 
already been in vivo coded. The exercise had a two-fold objective; verification of the 
category scheme that had emerged, and further enhancement of the conceptual depth of 
the categories through development of the properties and dimensions of the various 
categories. Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 117) describe properties as the general or 
specific attributes of a category, whilst the dimensions represent the strength of each 
property along a range, or continuum. Charmaz (2006) sees properties as having analytic 
power in the way they break down categories into distinctive theoretical components. 
From a more operational viewpoint, the Level 2 exercise consisted of coding the 
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remaining texts into the draft category scheme by highlighting and dragging each visible 
theme, concept or incident into its relevant category. As soon as a theme would be 
highlighted and dragged into a category (always using MAXqda) the highlighted text would 
automatically be marked by MAXqda as a code, one that related to the conceptual 
category it had been tagged to and identifiable by the same colour scheme as that 
category (see example in Appendix 7). This coding activity was an important second stage 
of constant comparison, and sometimes a very challenging one. Every text extract that 
demanded coding had to be carefully matched to the category scheme, and related to the 
correct category or property. Conceptual overlaps between categories and between 
properties had to be resolved, and as a result, the category scheme was further 
developed and refined. As more and more of this comparison work took place, less fine 
tuning to the category scheme was necessary. Saturation was being approached. 
 
Three coding techniques were used, generally in line with Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) 
and Charmaz’s (2006) coding paradigm of open, focused and axial coding. Open coding 
(initial coding in Charmaz 2006) is the rigorous process of breaking down, examining, 
comparing and conceptualizing the data, and then categorizing into suitable category 
compartments. Open coding thus groups common concepts into a coding structure that 
reflects themes of similar characteristics and meaning. Each category and sub-category 
has its own properties and dimensions. It is most difficult to say where the open coding 
ended and focused coding started, but, generally speaking, the first few cases that were 
coded following the in vivo coding abided by the open coding technique. This operation 
was a rigorous exercise in constant comparison, and served to refine the category set as 
well as build upon category properties and dimensions.  
 
Charmaz describes focused coding as a subsequent major phase consisting of a more 
directional, selective, and conceptual coding exercise. “Focused coding means using the 
most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data” 
(Charmaz 2006 p. 57).  This was precisely the objective at this emerging stage, and now 
more meaning and interaction was looked for as opposed to detail. The conceptual 
category scheme was already in place, but the meaning and relationships between the 
concepts demanded further study. Focused coding will generally result in larger code 
segments than open coding, but serves the important stage of grounding the model in 
more conceptual depth, often visible through the memos that accompany this coding 
stage. The third and final coding technique utilized was that of axial coding. Strauss and 
Corbin (1998 p. 124) describe axial coding as the process of relating categories to 
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subcategories along the lines of their properties and dimensions. Categories are 
phenomena, sub-categories answer questions about the phenomena (such as when, why, 
how, with what consequence), giving the concept greater explanatory power. Towards the 
later part of the coding exercise, axial coding was used to build a category – subcategory 
relationship and to clarify the relationships between the different categories. However, the 
conceptualization required for axial coding takes us into Level 3; that of building a ’coding 
paradigm’.  
 
4.7.3    Level 3: Application of a Coding Paradigm 
 
Axial coding consists of putting data back together in new ways after open/focused 
coding, this by isolating categories, relating isolated categories to each other, and building 
even further upon the sub-categories and properties of these main categories. For this to 
take place, categories are placed within a coding paradigm. Both Glaser and 
Strauss/Corbin come up with different coding paradigms, and different arguments in 
favour and against. Of interest are Glaser’s arguments against the Strauss and Corbin 
paradigm as an attempt to force the data.  Whilst Glaser attacks Strauss’s approach of 
advocating theoretical sensitivity and the use of a pre-established coding paradigm (as 
forcing the data), Glaser himself adopts the use of theoretical codes as a requirement in 
adopting a particular focus towards the research. Kelle (2005) argues that both 
approaches are a proactive way of pre-establishing a certain frame of mind within the 
researcher, hence Glaser’s criticism can be seen to be largely unfounded. Kelle compares 
both approaches, observing that Glaser’s (1998) coding theories actually draw from a 
large array of coding families, each with its own established theoretical basis. On the other 
hand, Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) coding paradigm is linked to a school of thought based 
upon symbolic interactionism, and adopts a perspective on social phenomena prevalent in 
micro-sociology and emphasizing the role of human action in social life. Kelle posits that 
Glaser’s critique of the Strauss and Corbin approach is “overdrawn”, as the general 
Strauss and Corbin framework looks towards a general understanding of social actions 
and interactions, an approach that is compatible with a wide variety of social theories. The 
advice proposed by Kelle is that the researcher should draw upon existing theoretical 
knowledge when establishing theoretical concepts, but should not approach the research 
with pre-established hypotheses.  
 
88 
 
The approach that has been adopted in this research has been to apply the Strauss and 
Corbin coding paradigm, what they call the ‘Conditional and Consequential Matrix’ (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The reason for this is simple; the paradigm 
fit very well to the category schema that was developing. The Conditional/Consequential 
Matrix consists of a relationship between content and process through the identification of 
three conceptual pillars; conditions, actions and interactions, and consequences. Kelle 
(2005) argues that Strauss and Corbin drew upon one general model of action in this 
matrix, rooted in pragmatism and symbolic interactionism, in order to build a skeleton or 
axis for developing grounded theories. This focuses on the analysis and modeling of the 
action/interaction strategies of the actors, and the context within which these actions were 
played. In a way this is the argument of grand theory versus substantive theory, the matrix 
being the grand theory that would be adopted by researchers to create substantive theory. 
Bryant and Charmaz (2007 p. 9) argue that Strauss and Corbin’s 
Conditional/Consequential Matrix can be applied, but not mechanically: “In an analogous 
way that extant theory concepts should earn their way into a grounded theory analysis, so 
too should using preconceived methodological tools. Such use should only occur after 
researchers carefully assess whether a given technique has earned its way into their 
respective methodological repertoires for their specific research problems”.  This was, in 
fact, the outcome of the research in question, and the matrix was adopted only when it 
was convincingly apparent that the main axis of context, actions and consequences 
explained very well the conceptual orientations of the emerging category scheme. 
 
In line with Strauss and Corbin’s Conditional/Consequential Matrix, categories were re-
classified into three main constructs; those of context/conditions, strategic 
actions/interactions, and consequences/outcomes (Figure 5.2 and Appendix 6 
demonstrate this). The final stages of theoretical sampling and coding that took place 
utilized axial coding, that is, coding around the three main categories (the following 
Chapter 5 describes this activity in detail). New text being coded fit far more neatly into the 
category framework that was now in line with the Conditional/Consequential Matrix. Inter-
relations between the categories became more apparent, conceptual arguments in 
memos more robust, and an all-important relationship between content and process better 
established. Theoretical saturation was established at this final stage. This follows Strauss 
and Corbin’s logic that “if one studies structure only, then one learns why but not how 
certain events occur. If one studies process only, then one understands how persons 
act/interact but not why. One must study both structure and process to capture the 
dynamic and evolving nature of events” (1998 p. 127).  Figures 5.1 and 5.2 in Chapter 5 
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depict the final framework for small firm strategic behaviour, showing the contextual and 
processual constructs and how they relate. Chapters 5 and 6 explain the logic behind the 
constructs, and their interaction, in more depth. 
 
4.8    Ensuring Quality Research 
 
Whilst quality in quantitative research is focused towards reliability and validity criteria, in 
qualitative research various quality criteria are stipulated by the different authors. Patton 
(2002 p. 93) advocates a plausibility of findings, credibility, impartiality and independence 
of judgment, and comfirmability, consistency and dependability of data. Chiovitti (2003 p. 
427) argues that grounded theory research should be based on the underlying concepts 
of credibility, auditability and fittingness. Authors such as Bryant (2002) and Suddaby 
(2006) posit that the quality of grounded theory research is more directly dependent upon 
the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon under observation than most other 
methods, meaning that an informed researcher is required for a quality outcome to be 
achieved. Douglas (2004 p. 63) provides a detailed list of quality criteria for grounded 
research studies, consisting of generalizability (transferability) to diverse situations within 
the substantive area, consistency of findings, credibility based on richness of data and the 
analytic abilities of the researcher, neutrality in acting without judgment and undue bias, 
confirmability by leaving an audit trail back to the raw data, and dependability through the 
use of multiple researchers. Glaser (1978) is more generic, observing that when a 
grounded theory works it means that the theory must explain what has happened, predict 
what will happen, and interpret what is happening in the particular area of substantive 
enquiry. A quick overview of the salient quality-related issues that have been discussed so 
far is thus in order. The forthcoming three thesis chapters that detail the outcomes of this 
research shall also serve to substantiate the following summary. In all, four main quality 
criteria are deemed to be of particular importance, and have been given prominence in the 
application of the methodology. 
 
Criterion 1: Quality data. Various factors tie down to this issue. Respondents were 
sought that could provide data rich in content and variety. This was complemented by an 
emergent sampling strategy of convenience, purposeful and then theoretical sampling. A 
gradual structuring of interviews (increasing in structure as interviews progressed) was 
aimed at maximizing the quality of data gathered. Methods triangulation sought to 
integrate qualitative and quantitative data (always within the same grounded theory 
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method of enquiry). The cyclic process of data collection-coding-constant comparison-
further sampling allowed for a dynamic approach towards gradual category saturation. 
The grounded theory approach also allowed for a control over error due to respondents’ 
use of retrospective accounts, as this is seen to be a problem in strategy research 
(Golden 1992).  Individual, unrelated business respondents were used to saturate 
common categories, confirming and reasserting one another’s submissions without an 
incentive towards bias. Small business owners also had no incentive to cast past 
decisions in more or less favourable light. The more direct, personal involvement of 
owner-managers allowed for better recall of historic events. Triangulation with quantitative 
performance data strengthened the research and its subsequent findings.  
 
Criterion 2: Quality management of the data.  All the primary data collected were 
treated in the same, rigorous and consistent manner. All interviews were conducted by the 
researcher and transcribed by the researcher.  Digital recordings were transcribed into 
text files that were immediately integrated into a single MAXqda project file. Secure 
backups were kept, as was a secure data base of respondent details. The MAXqda 
project file allowed for additional data to be integrated with existing data, and for data 
analysis to take place at any stage of the research. This was most important, as the 
transcribed interviews provided over 290,000 words of transcribed text. Secondary 
financial data were managed in a separate data base, securely kept and carefully 
archived, and integrated into the MAXqda project file through use of memos. 
 
Criterion 3: Quality analysis and interpretation of the data. This took place in 
conjunction with the gathering and management of the data. In vivo coding of the first 15 
interviews allowed for an initial category schema to be constructed that was a direct 
reflection of the respondent’s thoughts and beliefs. A rigorous application of open, focused 
and axial coding then served to consolidate the category schema. Categories were 
strengthened or eliminated, and relationships between categories became clearer. 
Numerous memos were included to provide further explanations, description and 
propositions on the phenomenon in question. Forthcoming Chapters 6 and 7 will be 
supported with various references to the respondents and their transcribed texts. An audit 
trail has been incorporated, as advocated by Birks and Mills (2011). Whenever a 
reference to an interview passage is made, it is either done so by quoting the passage a 
verbatim (whilst also making reference to the relative interview code) or by describing the 
gist of the passage but also providing the interview number and the relevant category. 
This second option can easily be audited by applying MAXqda’s Text Retrieved Segments 
91 
 
and filtering for the interview code and the category being analyzed. For example, if an 
assertion is made that Firm 14 stated ‘such and such’ about a certain issue or concept, by 
using the Text Retrieved Segments function and filtering for Firm 14 and the relevant 
conceptual category, one can immediately view exactly what was said by the firm in 
relation to the concept. The MAXqda’s project file could be accessed by the auditing party 
through use of a freely available MAXqda reader (MAXQDA 10 Reader is presently 
available).  
 
Criterion 4: Researcher contribution. In the logic of the constructivist philosophy, the 
researcher provides more than just a professional, but clinical, contribution to the study. 
Adequate research skills and professionalism are required for the complexities of the 
project to be properly handled. However, more than this, the researcher will be part of the 
research, and will integrate his/her own insights and knowledge with the emerging themes 
from the data. To do so, the researcher must already have good, relevant insights into 
themes that relate to the phenomenon. The more the researcher can contribute, the richer 
the research. Other to this, Charmaz’s (2006) concept of premature saturation will take 
place. Two prior dissertations on the research topic, as well as professional and academic 
exposure to the area of enquiry, allowed the present researcher to be better positioned to 
carry out the research in question. 
 
4.9    Ethical Considerations 
 
The participants to the research were the owner-managers of small businesses. What this 
really means is that they were either the owners of the business that were also acting as 
the senior most manager, or they were employees professionally hired to run the 
business. In both cases the ethical considerations are similar. With the possible exception 
to the first five research cases (the convenience sample), the remaining cases all involved 
managers who had politely accepted to be interviewed, and who were ready to dedicate 
some of their hard pressed work time. They would be participating in the research as a 
gesture of goodwill towards the researcher. In all cases the interviewees gave consent to 
being interviewed in line with the ‘Letter of Request’ outlined in Appendix 5, and sent to 
them when making contact. A copy of this letter was also handed to the interviewee at the 
start of the interview, and conditions of anonymity were carefully explained. The purpose 
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of the research and the interviewee’s role within the research was explained. Ethical 
considerations do not stop there however, and have deeper ramifications.  
 
Two ethical issues stand out that are particular to small firm strategic research and to the 
interaction between the owner-manager and the firm. The first issue regards the personal 
role, beliefs and values of the owner-manager, as these would emerge in the interview. 
The second issue regards the competitiveness of the business, as the research would 
demonstrate how each firm was building and using core competencies to build 
competitive advantage. In an island as small as Malta, exposing this personal and 
competitive information could negatively impact upon both the individual and the business 
in question. A key principle of research ethics is that the study does not harm the 
participants in any way (Flick 2006 p. 45), in this case, “participants” meaning both the 
individual and the organization. In order to ensure that participants (as well as their 
organizations) did not suffer any negative effects from the research, the Social Research 
Association (UK) research ethics guidelines (2003) were applied throughout. Particularly, 
the following four ethical considerations were taken throughout. 
 
Consideration 1: Obtaining informed consent and avoiding undue intrusion. 
 
Consent of the participants had to be freely given, and based as far as possible on an 
understanding of the objectives and implications of the research. The approach adopted 
for all participants was to introduce the research through an email which explained the 
research and allowed uninterested parties to decline participation. Following this 
correspondence a telephone call would be made to the participant, once again explaining 
the research objectives and mechanisms, and seeking informed consent. Some 20% of 
the respondents were found willing to participate, and an appointment made at a time and 
location of their preference. Prior to the start of the interview the participant would again 
be given a copy of the Introductory Letter (Appendix 5), and an explanation of the 
research implications. Particularly, the participant would be asked if she accepted to be 
taped, in line with the research methodology adopted. A refusal by the participant at any 
stage would result in a graceful termination of the interview, and an exclusion of the 
participant from the research.  
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Consideration 2: Protecting the interests of subjects. 
 
The researcher is obliged to protect the participant against potentially harmful effects of 
participating. This relates to the two points mentioned earlier on; avoiding disclosure of the 
patterns of behaviour, both of the individual and of the organization. For this to be done 
the research had to go through a ‘generalization’ process. All descriptions relating to 
individual or organizational behaviours were generalized by relating the cases to a 
generalized typology. In other words, the detailed strategic behaviours of the individual 
firms were generalized into one parsimonious typology of generic strategic behaviours. 
The individual nuances of behaviour were thus camouflaged in this manner. The concept 
of equifinality applied in that all classifications in the typology could relate to positive 
business performance. Five trajectory-based patterns were uncovered, and each business 
would fall into one of these general patterns.  
 
Consideration 3: Maintaining confidentiality of records. 
 
Data records should be stored safely, with restricted access and securely archived. The 
data management strategy described previously ensured a robust management of the 
data gathered, together with controlled access and storage. No copies of the data were 
given to third parties, and data management only took place on one computer, the 
personal PC of the researcher. This was not accessible to third parties. 
 
Consideration 4: Preventing disclosure of identities. 
 
Researchers should take appropriate measures to prevent their data from being published 
or otherwise released in a form that would allow the subject’s identity to be disclosed or 
inferred. In line with Consideration 2, numbers were assigned to names (Creswell 1998 p. 
132) as a means of guaranteeing anonymity. In other words, Firm XYZ, say, was renamed 
Firm 2, and all references were made to Firm 2 and not Firm XYZ. Whilst the research 
was based on the study and evaluation of the strategic patterns of behaviour of the firms, 
no detailed descriptions of the individual firms were provided that could be used to identify 
the firms in question. Financial data were camouflaged by standardizing each firm’s 
values, resulting in NAV values ranging around the figure of 1.  The objective of all this 
was to reach an acceptable balance between the descriptive wealth of the research with 
the secure anonymity of the research participants. 
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Chapter 5:  A Framework for Small Firm Strategic Behaviour 
 
5.1    Overview and Objectives of Chapter 
 
This chapter establishes a variable set that is the basis for a forthcoming study on the 
trajectories of small firm strategic behaviour. Three objectives have been set for this 
important stage that establishes a framework for small firm strategic behaviour, and 
effectively sets the groundwork for subsequent typological studies (the subject of 
forthcoming Chapters 6 and 7). The Chapter aims to demonstrate that the selection and 
configuration of a framework of strategy variables is a vital first step in the mapping out of 
small business strategy. The three objectives of this chapter are outlined below: 
The first objective to the Chapter is to establish a framework of variables that can be 
adopted in subsequent typological studies on small firm strategic behaviour. The Chapter 
shall demonstrate that the identification and even the configuration of the variables that 
underlie a strategy typology are of paramount importance. A number of issues shall be 
addressed, two of which stand out. Firstly, there is the task of choosing a variable set, 
usually based on a deductive or inductive approach. The deductive approach is by far the 
most commonly found within the literature, where prior theory is used to pre-define a 
variable set that is then applied to a particular audience. Arguably, little truly innovative 
learning is gained from this approach. A purely inductive approach allows for emergence 
of the variables from the empirical research, but suffers the problem of limited 
generalizability. The following text shall instead demonstrate an abductive approach, 
applying the constructivist grounded theory method of enquiry described in Chapter 4. The 
logic of this abductive approach shall be further explained. The second issue regards the 
structuring of the variables that emerged from the research. The Strauss and Corbin 
(1998) Conditional and Consequential Matrix has been adopted for this aim.  The Matrix is 
little more than an outline framework identifying contextual, consequential and process-
based parameters. It is defined by Kelle (2005) to be a heuristic framework of low 
empirical content, this lack of empirical content giving the framework a flexibility that 
allows a variety of empirical phenomena to be portrayed though it. It does, however, bias 
the researcher into focusing upon the areas of context-actions-consequences and coding 
data around them. This focus is a result of the micro-sociological theory underlying the 
Matrix. 
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The second chapter objective is to populate the variable framework with a conceptually 
dense description of the framework components, their interaction and their strategic 
significance. The following text (with detailed descriptions provided in Appendix 8) shall 
describe a variable set consisting of 3 categories, 14 sub-categories, and 47 distinct 
properties. Owner-managers provided detailed descriptions of the competitive situations 
they were competing in, actions being taken, conditions being faced, and so on. 
Categories and properties were populated with conceptually rich information, and 
memoing allowed for additional description of category/property meaning and also of their 
interactions. Constant comparison allowed for the identification of the 
categories/properties, their verification, and their description.  
The third chapter objective is to briefly explain how two particular typological exercises 
shall follow from the variable framework that is the subject of this chapter. Examples shall 
be given of how, within the literature, existing strategy typologies have been built on 
variable frameworks of different designs and configurations. Objectives for these 
typologies were congruent with the thought behind the variable selection that pre-empted 
the typology construction. These serve as an example of how typological studies 
invariably follow a process of variable selection and application. It is no less so in this 
research project. This is no different to the advice given by Hambrick (1984 p. 40) that 
“taxonomists have a responsibility to theoretically ground their efforts through the choice 
of the variables”. Following the variable selection, interaction and description that is the 
focus of this chapter, two subsequent chapters follow. Chapter 6 shall focus on devising a 
cross-sectional typology of strategic “states” for small firm behaviour, from the framework 
outlined in this chapter. This provides a life cycle of important stages that small firms can 
transcend. Chapter 7 shall go one step further and map the longitudinal patterns of 
behaviour that were described by participants, to develop a trajectory-based typology that 
utilizes the life cycle states compiled in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2 The Method of Abduction as Applied to the Research 
 
Recalling the methodological approach adopted in this research will help clarify the 
induction-deduction debate that is central to this chapter. In the Methodology Chapter 
(Chapter 4), arguments were placed in favour of applying a constructivist approach to the 
grounded theory method, thus moving somewhat away from its earlier positivist roots. In 
the constructivist approach the researcher uses prior knowledge to put initial questions to 
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the research and conceptual hypothesis to be tested. Prior learning is used to generate 
intelligent questions and prompts that can then be put to the research and gear it towards 
higher conceptual levels. Theoretical sensitivity is allowed for, with the researcher being 
located within the research with an interpretive frame of mind. The researcher acts and 
reacts with the data, enhancing its depth whilst avoiding undue biases. If Glaser (1998) 
deems his strategy of enquiry to be inductive, and Strauss and Corbin (1998) deem theirs 
to be hypothetico-deductive, Charmaz (2006) and Kelle (2005) define their constructivist 
philosophy to utilize an ‘abductive’ approach. It is this abductive strategy of enquiry that 
has been applied. Reichertz (2010) and Kelle (2005), key authors on the use of abductive 
philosophy within grounded theory, relate the concept to the early works of the pragmatist 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. These authors argue that abduction inferences must 
lead to a satisfactory explanation of the observed phenomenon, but must also be related 
to the previous knowledge of the researcher. New insights into the phenomenon are a 
combination of what the researcher already knew, albeit in sometimes entirely new and 
unexpected combinations.  
The process of abduction is thus a process of modifying and combining various elements 
of previous knowledge into new and insightful configurations, guided and enhanced by the 
empirical data. The final picture is a new theory, a new understanding of the phenomenon, 
but one that has been created through a constructivist, abductive strategy of enquiry. 
Kelle (2005) argues that the abductive approach is far less of a novelty than it appears, as 
scientific discovery has always required the integration of previous knowledge with new 
empirical observations. The process of variable construction that took place is an example 
of the abduction approach. Researcher influence is evident in the identification of 
variables, such as the engineering stance, the resource-based stance and the 
organizational life cycle construct. Prior researcher knowledge and understanding has 
contributed to most, if not all, of the variables that resulted in the Framework. However, 
the meaning, configuration, interaction and depth has been guided, conditioned and 
controlled by the empirical data and the constructivist grounded theory method of enquiry 
that was adopted. On the application of a constructivist approach towards strategy 
research, Mir and Watson (2001) apply an interesting ‘flash-light in the dark’ metaphor. 
Flashing the light in a dark room will illuminate parts of the room whilst throwing other 
parts into the shadows. Knowledge of what to look for, and where to look, will provide a 
picture that is more complete. Knowledgeable reactions to what is being seen will result in 
more accurate, and more beneficial, use of the flash-light as a complete picture is 
gradually being built. 
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5.3    Variable Formulation Relating to a Typological Approach 
 
Strategizing in the small firm is far from the rational, cooperative and structured process to 
be found in large firms, where planning, communicating and operationalizing a business-
level strategy may take on a paramount importance. “Small organizations tend to have 
inexplicit, intuitively derived strategies that reside mainly in the mind of the CEO. Time 
horizons may be very short as executives of small, simple firms react in unplanned and 
piecemeal fashion to conditions” (Miller and Toulouse 1986). A further issue is the 
dynamic nature of small business strategic behaviour. Organizational momentum in larger 
firms has been shown to move in the same strategic direction, with the firms more often 
consolidating and enhancing existing strategies than altering into a different direction 
(Christensen 1997; Miller and Friesen 1980). The investment in time, people, money and 
other resources required to develop the distinctive competencies, technologies, structures 
and management processes needed to pursue a chosen strategy is large (Dess and 
Davis 1984; Snow and Hambrick 1980). This is not so for small businesses however, and 
studies on small firm strategic momentum (e.g.  Wiklund 1999) have shown that strategy 
adapts and alters as time unfolds.  A static picture of small business strategy is 
insufficient, as far more than a snap-shot will be required to understand the true dynamic 
nature of small firm strategic behaviour.  
 
As argued in Chapter 3 (the second part of the literature review), small business strategy 
can be understood from a typological approach that looks at common groupings of small 
firm strategic behaviour, and attempts to understand the rationale, characteristics and 
implications of these groupings. This typological approach places two challenges on the 
small business strategy researcher; the task of devising a framework, or variable set, that 
can be used as a basis for mapping out small firm strategic behaviour, and the ability of 
this framework to cater for the dynamic nature of small business strategy. As argued by 
Thomas and Venkatraman (1988 p. 552); “the strategy taxonomist faces an enormous 
challenge just in deciding exactly what should be classified (i.e. which dimensions best 
operationalize the strategy construct). Our position is that the development of strategic 
groups using a narrow conceptualization of strategy is unlikely to capture the complexity 
of the strategy construct, thus limiting the usefulness of strategic groups for both 
descriptive and predictive purposes.”  The literature has repeatedly shown that this 
variable identification and structuring will be strongly influenced by the objectives of the 
researcher, as well as the research settings and methodology adopted. For example, 
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Porter’s (1980) generic strategies were mapped out on two axis; product characteristics 
(low cost versus differentiation) and market share. Porter’s objective was to correlate 
strategic advantage (product characteristics) against a strategic target (market share) in a 
bid to map out the various sustainable positions that a firm could adopt within an industry. 
Miles and Snow (1978) adopt a totally different approach and set of dimensions, looking 
more within the firm as it acts and reacts to industry and environment conditions. Their 
typology of Prospectors, Analyzers, Reactors and Defenders is based upon what they call 
the ‘adaptive cycle’, as firms act and react strategically to the environment in accordance 
to entrepreneurial, engineering and administrative criteria. One notices a completely 
different approach towards the dimensions of interest between the above two typologies, 
with Porter utilizing two variables and a matrix configuration, and Miles and Snow applying 
three variables and a typology resulting from four possible combinations of the variables. 
Whilst the objectives for typological studies are varied, the method utilized is invariably the 
same, and consists of the following two conceptual levels: 
 
Level l: Variable Identification. 
 
The literature review has shown that variable selection underlying a typological study is 
often fraught with errors and inconsistencies. A common error is the adoption of existing 
variable sets that have simply been created for another purpose. Examples abound here 
such as the use of the Miles and Snow (1978) adaptive cycle dimensions to map out small 
business strategies (e.g. Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marín 2005; Gimenez 2000; 
O’Regan and Ghobadian 2006), where an underlying assumption of the adaptive cycle is 
organizational momentum, an aspect that Mintzberg and Waters (1985 p. 261) have 
argued strongly against in the case of small firms. A second error is in the methodological 
approach commonly taken by researchers to extract variables from the research data. 
Quantitative techniques, such as factor analysis followed by cluster analysis, are often 
used to ‘induce’ the variables from the data. Over two-thirds of strategic group studies use 
this approach (Ketchen and Shook 1996) that has an added disadvantage (to that of using 
pre-defined variables), in that clusters or groupings will inevitably be created regardless of 
the true existence of any structure in the data (Hair et al. 1998). The challenge in the 
present research is thus to induce a variable set from the data (or more accurately, 
interplay between researcher knowledge and the data) that is rich in content and concept, 
that relates to the particularities of small firm strategic behaviour, and that can be 
generalized to different settings. Only then can typological work commence. 
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Level 2: Variable Configuration. 
 
The various examples of existing strategic typologies have demonstrated that the 
configuration of the strategy variables is also of importance. Most taxonomic studies 
applied through a quantitative methodology depict strategic groups by using a ‘strategic 
group mapping’ approach. Porter (1980 p. 129) was the first to promote this concept, 
stating that “a strategic group is the group of firms in an industry following the same or a 
similar strategy along the strategy dimensions”. Porter provided a number of sample maps 
to demonstrate strategic groups mapped out against various strategic variables placed on 
both axes to the map. Many of the previously mentioned typologies apply this more direct 
variable configuration approach that utilizes two variables. However, the more 
conceptually dense typologies often have more than two variables, and cannot readily be 
mapped out onto a two-dimensional matrix. Examples of these are Chandler’s typology, 
Miles and Snow’s typology, and Mintzberg and Water’s (1985) typology that were 
developed through more fine grained research methods. Often the explanation of these 
typologies is descriptive, void of mapping due to the difficulty in visualizing the complex 
interaction of variables that underlie the typology. Another particular problem identified by 
various authors (e.g. Boyne and Walker 2004; Jemison 1981; Ketchen Thomas and 
McDaniel 1996) is the inability of many studies to incorporate variables on both strategy 
content and strategy process into the picture. Thus the variable configuration theme takes 
on two particular challenges; establishing a pattern of interaction between the variables, 
and incorporating both content and process as a means of truly understanding the 
phenomenon of small firm strategic behaviour. 
 
5.4   Delineating the Categories, Properties and Dimensions of the 
Framework 
 
Grounded theory research on the 67 small businesses in Malta provided a model, or 
framework, for small firm strategic behaviour that consisted of three main categories and 
fourteen sub-categories. These categories, sub-categories, and their hypothesised 
relationships are demonstrated in Figure 5.1 (and in more detail in Figure 5.2), with two 
sub-categories given particular prominence. Each sub-category is in fact multi-
dimensional in nature, and the grounded research provided a number of properties and 
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relating dimensions for each sub-category. Strauss and Corbin’s (1998) definition of 
categories, properties and dimensions is being adopted to avoid confusion of terms, 
where “properties are the general or specific characteristics or attributes of a category, 
dimensions represent the location of a property along a continuum or range” (Strauss and 
Corbin 1998 p. 117). This is similar to Charmaz’s (2006) and Locke’s (2001) use of 
analytic properties to define and delimit the boundaries and content of a category. Strauss 
and Corbin (1998 p. 101) define a sub-category as a distinct concept that pertains to a 
category, giving it further clarification and specification. 
 
Context and Conditions
Historic Start-Up Situation
Relevant Industry
Local Environment
Global Environment
Strategic Actions and Reactions
Initial Behaviour
Forming Behaviour
Mature Behaviour
Decline or Refocus Behaviour
Loop-within-a-Loop Behaviour
Consequences and Outcomes
Organizational Performance
The Engineering Stance
The Resource-Based Stance
The Business 
Stance
Owner/Manager  
Characteristics
 
Figure 5.1:  A Framework for Small Firm Strategic Orientation 
 
An issue of contention, and one of subjectivity, regards just where a category ends and a 
property begins. In other words is a key theme a conceptual category in its own right, or is 
it the property to a higher level category? Glaser (1998 p. 136) wisely observes this 
potential dilemma, and posits that “some categories can be considered properties of other 
categories. It is a conceptual levels phenomenon that relates to how the analyst is 
formulating the integration of the theory. Or, put another way, conceptual levels are 
architected by the integration of the theory as it emerges through coding, memoing and 
sorting”.  In other words the data, and the rendering of the data, should ultimately guide 
the category-property-dimension hierarchy. Corbin and Strauss (2008 p. 130) realize the 
researcher’s possible confusion with the terms and go as far as giving clear and simple 
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examples, such as ‘pain experience’ being a conceptual category, with ‘intensity’, 
‘duration’ and ‘location’ being respective properties. The corresponding dimensions for 
‘intensity’ would possibly be from very low to very high, or very focused to very generic. 
 
Strategic Actions and Reactions
Initial Behaviour
Forming Behaviour
Mature Behaviour
Decline or Refocus Behaviour
Loop-within-a-Loop Behaviour
Consequences and Outcomes
Organizational Performance
The Engineering Stance
The Resource-Based Stance
The Business Stance
Changing Management Responsibilities
Planning and Scanning
Actions Regarding Products and Services
Strategic Moves and Positions Adopted
Competencies
Stakeholder Satisfaction
Brand Name/Growth
Efficiency/Costs
Quality Standards Achieved
Targets and KPI’s Achieved
Employee Count
Revenues/Profits/Sales
Mode of Operation
Technology/Rationale
Permutations and Product Details
Routineness and Innovativeness
Human Resource Base
Physical Resource Base
Organizational Resource Base
Risk Propensity
Innovative Behaviour
Proactive/Aggressive Stand
Context and Conditions
Historic Start-Up Situation
Relevant Industry
Local Environment
Global Environment
Owner/Manager Characteristics
Particular Attributes
Labour Market
Seasonality
Technical Trends/Changes
Industry Attraction/Competition
The Client and the Market
Temporal Events
The Customer
Sources of Finance
Government Actions/Interventions
Local Trends and Attributes
Local Economy and Stability
Technological/Environmental Trends
Foreign Competition
Global Economy and Stability
Foreign Investments/Markets
Cost of Energy and Materials
Owner/Manager Task
Knowledge of Industry
Work/Life Experience
Qualifications and Skills
Philosophy, Values and Behaviour
Resource Advantage
Positional Advantage
Combined Resource/Positional
 
Figure 5.2:  The Framework’s Categories, Sub-categories and Properties 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the resulting framework for small firm strategic behaviour, consisting 
of three components of context, actions and consequences that are exemplified in the 
Strauss and Corbin (1998) Conditional and Consequential Matrix.  Appendix 8 details the 
descriptions of the various categories and properties, as provided by the respondents. 
Figure 5.2 expands upon Figure 5.1 to provide a more detailed, variable-based view of the 
Framework (the word ‘dimension’ may have been more appropriate to that of ‘variable’, 
but has a different connotation in grounded theory). Whilst Figure 5.1 simplifies the 
complex interaction between context and process, Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 183) 
acknowledge that “the relationship between conditions and consequences and 
subsequent actions/interactions rarely follows a linear path”.  Also, whilst advanced 
MAXqda tools have been used in the research (e.g. Code Matrix Browser, Code Relations 
Browser) a more simple frequency count tool has allowed for a tally of references to be 
made for each category and its properties. Depicting the number of references made to a 
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category/property does not give conclusive information, but it does demonstrate the 
importance of the concept to the research subjects. For this reason, ‘X’ references is 
repeatedly used in the descriptions shown in Appendix 8 to denote the importance of a 
category or its properties, as perceived by the respondents.  
 
5.5   Integrating the Categories into a Multi-Dimensional Model and 
Discussion of Implications 
 
In accordance with the chapter objectives established in Section 5.1, the discussions and 
descriptions provided in Appendix 8 have served to outline the categories, subcategories 
and properties of a framework for small business strategic behaviour. Figure 5.1 outlines 
the main components of this Framework, Figure 5.2 highlights the categories, sub-
categories and properties of the Framework, and Figure A8.1 in Appendix 8 shows a time-
based conceptualization of the same Framework.  In summary, three multidimensional 
constructs of context, actions and consequences have been discussed. The logic of the 
Framework is that the consequences (arguably a dependent construct) are the result of 
strategic actions (an independent process-based construct) taken according to the 
particular context (an independent content-based construct). The issue of inter-
relationships, covariance and causality within the model must be given some attention. It 
is expected that reverse causality will exist between the constructs. For example, 
structures deployed will be a result of previous actions and context, but will subsequently 
influence future actions. As another example, actions and consequences may lead to a 
change in owner-manager, thus influencing the context. The complexity of the model, 
evident in the wide range of possible permutations, makes it more important than ever for 
one to adopt a typological approach towards strategic behaviour. Any attempt to deploy 
the Framework to understand strategy from a contingency perspective would result in 
innumerable combinations and permutations of the variables in play, making the approach 
unrealizable. A configurational approach allows for the classification of strategic behaviour 
into the most commonly observable and conceptually dense patterns of behaviour that are 
based on the strategy variables adopted. This has been empirically shown to provide a 
stronger relationship to performance than a contingency approach (Wiklund and Shepherd 
2005).   It is this issue that will be addressed next in the forthcoming thesis chapters. 
 
The issue of structure versus process also needs to be given special attention. Strauss 
and Corbin (1998 p. 168) argue that “by relating process to structure, one is, in fact, 
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connecting categories”. However, when re-visiting the Framework in Figure 5.1 all that is 
apparent is a configuration of categories, and a basic inter-relationship between these. 
These categories, sub-categories and properties form the final coding hierarchy adopted 
in MAXqda, an example of which is shown in Figure 4.4 of the Methodology Chapter and 
in Appendix 6. That means that as more and more transcripts were coded, the respective 
codes were matched to the conceptual categories/properties in a manner not unlike 
placing pieces of information in corresponding drawers that are reaching saturation. The 
drawer is the category or property, the name of the drawer is the name given to that 
category/property (for example, the engineering stance). This practical application of 
grounded theory has an important advantage, and for this to be understood reference is 
made to Figure A8.1 in Appendix 8.  
 
Owner-managers would describe context-actions-outcome situations, providing a wealth 
of information on the various categories/dimensions and their relationships. However, 
examples and details given would regard the present competitiveness of the firm, past 
competitive scenarios, and even future potential situations. A possible way to depict this is 
to imagine the arrow and spiral in Figure A8.1 to be un-shaded, with shading only taking 
place when the owner-manager would have provided information of context, actions, and 
outcomes for a particular segment of the sketch. In other words, context and 
consequences would be described for different life cycle stages of the firm, from past to 
present, and sometimes even into the projected. No interview was complete enough to 
have a fully shaded sketch, but most interviews would provide enough information to 
picture a trajectory of the firm. This is the reason why Hanks et al. (1993 p. 24) argue that 
“there is the need for rich qualitative studies which capture the nuances of change within 
individual organizations”. The following Figure 5.3 illustrates what would be seen if a 
cross-section of the sketch were taken, say at the present-day stage of a firm’s existence. 
Evident would be the context-actions-consequences pertaining to this point in time. Cross 
sections could be taken at earlier stages, showing the firm’s strategic situations at other 
particular stages. The amount of information is somewhat constrained by the limitations 
placed when deciding to batch the Strategic Actions and Interactions category into a 
limited number of stages; those of birth, growth, maturity and decline. The implications of 
this wealth of information, made available through the grounded theory approach of 
mapping process against structure, are twofold. Firstly, an analysis of the present-day 
context-actions-consequences of the 67 firms researched can be carried out. 
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Gradually evolving CONTEXT and 
CONSEQUENCES to the business
Strategic  ACTIONS and REACTIONS taken by the firm
Time
 
Figure 5.3: A Cross-Section of the Trajectory of Strategic Behaviour  
 
This would provide a picture of the present strategic situation and strategic orientation of 
the firms (these shall be called “strategic states” in future chapters), based on the 
categories/dimensions of the Framework. Obviously this present-day posture would be an 
outcome of past context and past actions, but this would not detract from the wealth of the 
picture. As argued earlier, a configurational approach will provide more descriptive power 
and would be more realistically applicable than a contingency approach. A typology of 
present-day strategic states would emerge. The variables underlying the typology have 
been described in detail in this Chapter (supported by Appendix 8), and are the 
categories, sub-categories and properties of the Framework. Firms would fit into a limited 
number of identifiable patterns that would explain the context, actions and consequences 
particular to the state that the firm identifies with. This typological approach is the subject 
of the following Chapter 6. 
 
The second implication of having process and structure-based information on the firm’s 
strategic behaviour is that a second form of behavioural mapping exercise can be carried 
out. This mapping is based on an important, but realistic assumption; that the typology of 
states described above can also be used to map out a trajectory of the strategic behaviour 
of a small firm. In the typological exercise described above (that is the subject of the 
following chapter) a number of states will thus emerge, pictures of the various patterns of 
strategic behaviour of the different firms. These strategic states should encompass all the 
possible behavioural patterns that a small firm can adopt. If this is the case, then one can 
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look beyond (or more rather behind) a firm’s present state and see what state or states 
the firm had adopted in the past, and even how and why it moved between states. Thus, if 
the states are a true reflection of all possible variants of behaviour, then firms should be 
seen to move from one state to another, or at least remain in the same state over time. 
More simply put, a trajectory of behaviour can be mapped by seeing how a firm changes 
states with time, moving from one form of strategic posture to another. As argued by 
Hambrick (1984), pathways and trajectories can be classified into a typology just as 
readily as states. A typology of trajectories can thus be created, using the set of states 
described above as a basis, and this will have, in turn, used the Framework as a basis. 
The small firm trajectory-based typology is the subject of Chapter 7 of this thesis.  A simile 
may help describe the interaction of these three themes. The present chapter can be 
likened to the establishing of variables that describe the shape of stepping stones used to 
cross a stream. Chapter 6 shall outline a typology of stepping stones of different 
configurations, with firms invariably fitting into one configuration or another (these are the 
strategic states). Chapter 7 shall map out a set of common patterns by which the stepping 
stones are traversed. This shall form a trajectory-based typology exemplifying the 
dynamic nature of small firm strategic behaviour. Arguments shall be made in favour of 
understanding small business performance from this trajectory-based perspective. 
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Chapter 6:  Strategic States and the Life Cycle Concept 
 
6.1 Overview and Objectives of Chapter 
 
The previous Chapter 5 has described a framework of variables that have been compiled 
from grounded theory research on 67 small businesses. The Framework is specific, that 
is, specific to the small business competitive scenario. It allows for the mapping out of 
both structure and process, an issue of cardinal importance for the small firm due to its 
dynamic nature. From the process perspective, actions and reactions have been mapped 
out for the present, the past and even future planned actions. From the context 
perspective, variables have been included in the framework that are of particular 
significance to the small firm, such as the historic start-up situation and the owner-
manager characteristics. From the consequential perspective, the adoption of stances has 
been used to allow for a picture to be built regarding the visible resulting behaviour of the 
small firm. Three stances, together with organizational performance, were established 
here. These three stances are essentially three adopted forms of behaviour, looking at the 
firm’s visible behaviour from three viewpoints. If the phenomenon is firm strategic 
behaviour, then the three stances are looking at strategic behaviour from three angles, 
that is, from three perspectives. A description of the phenomenon will be complete when 
its context, the actions and behaviours acting within that context, and the outcomes to 
these actions, are integrated into one description. This is the objective of the forthcoming 
typological exercise. The logic is simple; description, using a typology of strategic states, 
will provide a better explanation of Framework variable actions and interactions, than 
could a contingency approach. This exercise in establishing a number of “strategic states” 
is not complete in itself, and the following chapter (Chapter 7) shall demonstrate that a 
study of the movements within and between states will provide for additional learning into 
the true dynamic behaviour of small firms. The two objectives for this present chapter are 
thus as follows: 
 
1) To establish the characteristics for a classification scheme that provides a typology 
of strategic states for the small business, and that allows for an in-depth analysis of 
the interplay between the variables set out in the earlier Framework. 
2) To build a taxonomy that distributes the 67 firms within the various cells of this 
classification scheme. To analyze the implications of this taxonomy. 
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6. 2   Analytic Techniques Utilized 
 
The main approach adopted in the forthcoming typological exercise was aimed at building 
a classification scheme based upon a set of common characteristics. The following text 
shall be focused on analyzing and describing the characteristics associated with the four 
different behaviours established in the previous chapter. These were the small business 
orientation, the functional efficiency orientation, the related diversification orientation, and 
the unrelated diversification orientation (see Appendix 8.3.4). In other words, for firms 
adopting a small business orientation, what engineering stance would be adopted? What 
form of resource base would commonly be used? What actions and what conditions would 
be most dominant? And so on.  
 
The analytic instrument utilized in this stage was MAXqda2007 and two of its main tools. 
The first MAXqda tool is the Code Matrix Browser, that has allowed for an important 
thematic mapping exercise to be carried out. Figure 6.1 (and subsequent figures) 
demonstrates this mapping exercise by mapping out active texts against active codes. On 
the Y-axis, all the codes pertaining to the Framework (detailed in Chapter 5) would have 
been activated, whilst on the X-axis the texts of chosen business cases have been 
activated. By selecting these particular businesses and cross-referencing with the 
Framework category schema, the browser will highlight areas of code concentrations. 
These have been highlighted with red ellipses that pinpoint the main areas of respondent 
focus. For example, six areas have been highlighted in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 where the 
thirteen respondents had placed a particular focus towards certain conceptual categories 
(and their properties). The browser indicates how many times a code has been given by a 
particular respondent, with the smallest blue boxes indicating one code, and the largest 
red box indicating six codes (i.e. a high coding intensity).  
 
The second tool that was utilized extensively was that of Text Retrieved Segments.  This 
function can be described as a more detailed version of the Code Matrix Browser, and 
was used as a lens to highlight and view code segments for any text and categories (or 
properties) that would be activated. This is an in-depth form of cross-tabulation that allows 
for the isolation and analysis of any or all text segments that relate to the combination of 
codes and of business cases chosen. All the patterns shown in the Code Matrix Browser 
could be studied in detail in this way, either separately for one single coded segment for a 
chosen text – code activation, or collectively for a number of texts and codes.  
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6.3 Firms in a Small Business Orientation State 
 
Thirteen firms were identified (Chapter 5, detailed in Appendix 8.3.4) as having a small 
business orientation. What this essentially means is that these 13 firms all demonstrated 
low levels of innovative and proactive behaviour and were observed to be acting largely in 
a risk-averse manner. Figures 6.1 and 6.2, screen shots from the MAXqda Code Matrix 
Browser, demonstrate 6 areas of high coding intensity (highlighted with red ellipses) 
where the 13 respondents collectively placed a repetitive focus on particular conceptual 
categories and their properties.  
 
 
Figure 6.1:  A Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Small Business Orientation  
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Figure 6.2:  A Second Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Small Business 
Orientation 
 
The yellow highlighted rows in each screen shot show which category has been 
minimized, and thus excluded from analysis for that particular screen shot. The 13 
businesses were a mixed variety of manufacturing, service and retail firms. Two separate 
stages shall be adopted when analyzing businesses of this orientation, with a similar 
approach to be taken for the forthcoming three other business orientations. The first stage 
shall look at the causes and conditions relating to the business stance adopted by the 13 
firms. In other words what context, and indeed what strategic actions induced the firms to 
adopt a small business orientation? The second stage shall compare the various stances 
and outcomes for these 13 firms. The question here is what particular engineering and 
resource-based stances will these particular firms adopt, and how will their behaviours 
relate to performance? The six areas highlighted in the Code Matrix Browser screen shots 
shown above (the red ellipses) will serve to focus this analysis, which would otherwise be 
lost in the excessive detail on all the categories/properties of the Framework. 
 
The first ellipse in Figure 6.1 shows a focus by the firms in question on environment and 
competitive issues outside those of the direct industry environment. From a global 
perspective foreign competition was seen to be an issue. From a local perspective 
governmental interventions (or lack of), local trends and the local economy were the target 
of focus. (Methodology Note: These properties pertaining to the Context/Conditions 
category were highlighted by the Text Retrieved Segments function within MAXqda, 
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together with the 13 business cases in question. This cross-tabulation served to provide 
all the corresponding text segments for the forthcoming detailed analysis. This method 
shall be repeated throughout the chapter). A trend was immediately apparent, although 
conditions varied considerably between the firms. Increasingly adverse competitive 
conditions were often being felt, little governmental support was to be found, foreign 
competitiveness was on the increase, industry supply was exceeding demand, and so on. 
The economic downturn was being felt strongly by these small business orientation (to be 
called SBO from now on) firms. One advisory firm (Firm 57) described how customer 
queries had shrunk by some 80% over recent periods as the industry became more 
saturated. Another firm (Firm 38) operating in the real estate business described how an 
over-supply of low quality property had practically killed the market. A carpentry business 
(Firm 19) detailed how a reduction of levies and ease of import of low cost - low quality 
furniture had impacted substantially on the competitiveness of the particular industry. 
Many firms complained that government focus had shifted away from their industries and 
towards other, more lucrative sectors. 
 
The second ellipse in Figure 6.1 relates to two particular industry and competitive 
properties; the local industry attractiveness, and the client or market. A varied range of 
industry factors were identified, such as ease of import, size of importers, changing 
industry concentration ratios, changing competitive behaviours, and so on. A company 
making aluminium fixtures and fittings (Firm 43) detailed how they had lost an early 
competitive advantage of importing and wholesaling aluminium as now some half dozen 
large importers had overrun the industry. A local coffee manufacturing firm (Firm 50) 
described how importation and retail of pre-packaged coffee was a major threat to them, 
and severely affected profitability. Client and market issues were also of major concern to 
the SBO firms, such as changing consumer trends and behaviours, as well as the 
economic impact on consumer spending.  A shoe manufacturing firm (Firm 47) detailed 
how few consumers were ready nowadays to buy made-to-fit shoes, and preferred to 
invest in a larger range of lower cost import shoes. A company manufacturing candles 
(Firm 65) complained that increasingly price had become an overriding factor in consumer 
selection criteria. Even if the cheaper, imported candles being bought by consumers were 
not adequately designed for the local weather conditions (and hence burnt inefficiently), 
this still would not stop consumers from going for this cheaper alternatives. A mushroom 
grower (Firm 35) outlined how large commercial customers were developing a trend for 
effecting late payments, creating cash-flow problems within the industry concerned. 
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The third ellipse shown in Figure 6.1 refers to three properties relating to the owner-
manager characteristics sub-category. These are work/life experiences, qualifications and 
skills, and the philosophy and values of the owner-manager. An interesting picture 
emerged here, as there was often a mismatch between the low entrepreneurial behaviour 
of the SBU firms and the entrepreneurial philosophy of the owner-managers. There were 
substantial skills and qualifications differences between the 13 SBO owner-managers, 
with qualifications/skills ranged widely from individuals with no academic qualifications to 
others with multiple degrees. In all the cases, without exception, the owner-managers 
were seasoned and experienced employees, well exposed and hardened to the business 
world. In many of the cases the owner-managers were at retirement stage and showed a 
certain tiredness, with little entrepreneurial behaviour. However, this was not always the 
case, as there were some owner-managers who demonstrated high levels of risk 
propensity, innovative and proactive behaviour. There seemed to be a conditional 
situation here, with these owner-managers either unable or unwilling to alter the 
conditions restricting their firms to an SBO status. One example of this was an auditor 
(Firm 57) who had recently gone through a bomb threat, and had temporarily shrunk the 
size of the firm as if trying to lie low for a while. Another example was a highly 
entrepreneurial and energetic senior engineer (Firm 33) who was running a German-
owned company, where the owners were in retirement stage and unwilling to see any 
major company developments. As a result, the engineer’s management philosophy had 
only a limited impact on the business’s behaviour. Of interest is the fact that, of the 13 
SBO firms, not one was a new start-up firm. One may argue that even a small start-up 
would be expected to demonstrate adequately high levels of entrepreneurial behaviour, 
making it a poor candidate for the small business orientation. 
 
The forth ellipse shows repeated owner-manager reference to two life cycle stages; the 
mature stage and the decline/refocus stage. These two sub-categories relate to the 
‘process’ category; that of Strategic Actions and Reactions. As argued by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), understanding process should provide a better picture of what is really 
going on, helping to describe the particular phenomenon under scrutiny. The fact that the 
SBO firms were predominantly in late maturity or decline is understandable, and relates 
well to the mature ages of most of the owner-managers. Strategic moves described were 
both short-term tactical moves, as well as long-range strategic actions and reactions. 
Also, owner-managers described past, present, and even planned strategic moves and 
actions. Descriptions were rich and varied, regarding the design of products, investment 
decisions, actions taken towards employees, resource deployments, competitive moves, 
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new markets/products being accessed, stocking decisions, marketing decisions being 
taken, and so on.  
 
The various strategic moves being taken complemented largely the small business 
orientation, and provided various insights into how the owner-managers were going about 
enacting this particular orientation. One business that manufactured horse saddles (Firm 
23) described how the firm was taking various actions to limit the negative effects of 
increasing labour costs and spiraling transportation costs. A real estate agent (Firm 38) 
outlined how they were counteracting a shrinking market by downsizing, transferring their 
telephone system onto Skype, and had begun outsourcing work to their accountant every 
three months instead of every month. An importer and retailer of confectionary goods 
(Firm 34) described how the company was reducing prices to match lower market prices, 
and was also reducing stock levels due to a lowering of local consumption levels. 
Strategic moves were directed towards retrenchment, towards efficiency maximization, 
and towards cost reduction and control. The strategic actions and reactions being taken 
by the 13 firms could be likened to a stream of decisions flowing in a certain direction; that 
of directing the firms towards the SBO orientation.   
 
Together with the four ellipses described above, there was also a very strong focus by 
SBO firms on two particular Consequences and Outcomes sub-categories, highlighted by 
the ellipses in Figure 6.2. The first of these regards two properties relating to the resource-
based stance; the physical resources and, with even more focus, the human resources of 
the SBO firms. Owner-managers outlined in detail the resource bundles that the firms 
would have subsequently acquired, and were most vivid in their interpretations of how 
these resources contributed to the organization’s competitiveness. An interesting factor 
that emerged regarded the opportunity costs of the resources, particularly those of the 
physical resources. A number of firms described how they were now in a situation where 
their opportunity costs were higher than the benefits presently being accrued by the 
resources, meaning that the business would be better off closing down. An example of 
this is was an aluminium manufacturer (Firm 43) who had initially purchased the 
business’s property on what was now the side of a busy bypass, with a present property 
value now far exceeding the dwindling revenues of the firm.  
 
The final ellipse shown in Figure 6.2 relates to the engineering stance, and consists of a 
large quantity of coded segments evident by the sizeable cluster of coloured boxes.  All of 
the engineering stance properties were given prominence to by the SBU owner-
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managers, that is; the mode of operations, the rationale, the product permutations, and 
the level of routinization. The descriptions provided by owner-managers towards the 
engineering stance were intense, sometimes even personal. The value adding activities 
were described in detail, complemented by the actions previously detailed when 
discussing the Strategic Actions/Reactions category. For example, a mushroom grower 
(Firm 35) would proudly describe how his unique knowledge of compost manufacture 
showed his true expertise within the industry, and elevated him to a status above that of 
the competition. An electronics manufacturer (Firm 33) described how the most complex 
stages of a particular component manufacture, that of design and calibration, were carried 
out by his company and not by the German mother-company. An importer and wholesaler 
of woods (Firm 44) gave a detailed rendition of how his expertise at selecting quality 
woods, and in establishing a lasting network of trustworthy suppliers, had allowed him to 
compete for many years within his particular industry. In many cases the face of the 
industry had gradually changed, consumer wants and demands had been altered, and the 
owner-manager’s skills at a particular process were no longer enough to keep the 
company adequately competitive. However as described before, there were some 
instances where the firm appeared to be in a form of hibernation, with the owner-manager 
holding onto the firm for a later possible resuscitation. These were the instances where 
the firm’s small business orientation did not match the entrepreneurial spirit of the owner-
manager. 
 
SBO firm size, measured by full-time employee count, was at a mean of just above 7. This 
puts the SBO firms as the smallest of the four classifications, when compared to the other 
three orientations. This small size is understandable, as the context, behaviours and 
consequences described above have all converged into one theme; a firm in contraction. 
This is not to say that the SBO firm is a failed model of business behaviour. In some 
cases the owner-managers were purposely maintaining a small, cost-efficient and focused 
firm size, often earning these type of firms the name “lifestyle firms” (McCarthy 2003 p. 
157). In other cases the environmental conditions had pushed the firm in that particular 
direction. Performance thrusts were mainly focused towards turnover targets, owner-
manager satisfaction, and even very survival itself. Owner-managers showed little interest 
in growth or in diversification, and appeared far more interested in perpetuating the status 
quo they were in. Performance implications will be discussed in more depth in the 
forthcoming Chapter 7. 
114 
 
6.4 Firms in a Functional Efficiency Orientation State 
 
The Code Matrix Browser screen shots in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show 10 highlighted areas 
of focus for the 34 firms that were identified as having a functional efficiency orientation 
(FEO) disposition.  
 
  
Figure 6.3:  A Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Functional Efficiency Orientation 
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Figure 6.4:  A Second Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Functional Efficiency 
Orientation  
 
The first 6 areas of focus relate to the Context and Strategic Actions categories, whilst the 
last four relate to the Consequences category. As summarized in Chapter 5, the FEO 
firms appeared to demonstrate risk acceptance, innovative and proactive behaviour that 
was cautiously channeled into narrow and controlled areas of operation. Expanding on the 
10 areas of owner-manager focus highlighted in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 will help understand 
and describe this orientation. As in the SBO discussion, the context and strategic actions 
relating to the FEO firms will first be discussed, followed by a review of the consequences 
and outcomes faced by the FEO firms. 
 
The first area of owner-manager focus (first red ellipse, Figure 6.3) looks at the local 
environment, particularly three properties; sources of finance, government actions, and 
particular local trends. A pattern was evident here, with most references being made 
either directly or indirectly to what the local government was doing (or was not doing) to 
help the particular industries compete more effectively. Observations were made on the 
spiraling cost of electricity, labour market problems, local tax initiatives, access to capital 
financing, different forms of tax evasion, implications of new regulations, and various 
government-assisted incentives. The main argument placed regarded whether the owner-
manager felt that he/she was being given a level playing field in which to compete. 
116 
 
Observations were varied due to the large quantity of FEO firms and the many different 
owner-manager perceptions. Anger and frustration were often shown where owner-
managers felt that they were not being given the right competitive conditions to allow them 
to go about their focused task. Acceptance and appreciation was evident when this was 
not the case. An entrepreneurial accountant (Firm 37) was furious that a scheme he had 
invested in to tap into geo-thermal energy was halted by the local government. A 
laboratory firm (Firm 36) complained that the local government was allowing unqualified 
competitors to compete in what should be a highly regulated market. Conversely, a PC 
leasing company (Firm 27) positively described how government leasing contracts had 
buoyed up their particular business. 
 
Owner-managers also placed a strong focus on the particular attributes faced within their 
industry, highlighted by the second ellipse in Figure 6.3.  Local trends towards use of 
materials and technologies, barriers to entry in particular industries, access to raw 
materials, market trends, networking trends, particular standards and regulations enforced 
by the local government, were discussed among others. These local trends served to 
moderate the competitiveness of the various industries. Another area of owner-manager 
focus, relating to the same relevant industry sub-category, was that of the industry 
attractiveness and client/market behaviour (ellipse 3). This looks somewhat more closely 
within the industries in question, and at what particular competitive scenarios prevailed. 
Various local competitive conditions were discussed, such as industry concentration, 
barriers of entry, cost and overhead criteria within the industry, local geographic and 
weather conditions favouring or disadvantaging the industry, black market trends 
impacting upon profitability, and so on. Client and market trends were varied, such as 
payment behaviour patterns, consumer quality and cost expectations, and changing 
consumer trends and preferences. Owner-managers invariably knew their industries and 
their markets very well. Many firms demonstrated a strong loyalty to their customer base 
and went to great lengths to provide and even exceed consumer quality expectations. 
Markets were often niche markets, and FEO firms invariably preferred to have a strong 
hold on a contained market segment. One translation firm (Firm 62) described how their 
approach was to provide a well-priced, top quality service and combine this with public 
relations activities to give a product that was somewhat differentiated to that of 
international competitors. A ship servicing company (Firm 60) outlined how the firm was 
not large enough to compete in the lucrative cruise liner industry, but did have the 
necessary economies of scale and scope to be a local leader in smaller vessel service 
provision. 
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As evident from Figure 6.3, the 34 FEO firms placed a huge emphasis on the owner-
manager characteristics (4th ellipse), particularly work and life experiences, qualifications 
and skills, and owner-manager philosophy, values and behaviours. What the owner-
manager did, what she knew how to do, and what she believed in where deemed to be of 
cardinal importance. Whilst there was an expected spectrum of individual behaviours, 
beliefs and cultures, certain trends and correlations between the 34 owner-managers did 
appear. From the qualifications and skills perspective these varied widely, although 
invariably owner-managers had acquired a range of competencies that allowed them to 
excel in what they did. Work and life experiences often showed a strong grounding in the 
industry in question, with many years of experience in the same industry or a 
complementary one. Values and beliefs were repeatedly and consistently emphasized 
upon, such as discipline, a belief in quality, customer satisfaction and value for money, 
maintaining core family values, keeping an open door policy, fair and flexible human 
resource management, dedication, hard work, the value of experience, and a solid 
knowledge background.  An interesting issue again emerged regarding the 
entrepreneurial aptitude of the owner-managers, not dissimilar to the case seen for SBO 
firms. Whilst there was little conservative behaviour evident, owner-managers 
demonstrated entrepreneurial philosophies that were on par, or sometimes in excess of, 
the FEO states of the firms. This was not in line with the mechanistic management 
philosophy one would automatically expect from a FEO firm. For example, the owner-
manager of a cigar manufacturing firm (Firm 31) described how he did not believe in 
depending on one line in business, and very much believed in diversification. This firm’s 
FEO state was however understandable; the owner-manager was inducting one of his 
children, an engineer, into the business, and appeared willing to strengthen the cigar 
manufacturing side in the meantime. Another example is that of a software manufacturing 
company (Firm 55) that had just invested substantially in developing a computerized 
maintenance management system, and was cautiously containing the creative flair of the 
organization whilst software sales tentatively took off. Many other owner-manager 
behaviours were, however, more mechanistic to this, and seemed better matched to the 
FEO behaviour of the firms. 
 
Two other ellipses are highlighted in Figure 6.3, showing a coding intensity relating to 
various different life cycle stages. In particular, strategic moves for the growth stage, 
maturity stage, decline/refocus stage and even the loop-within-the-loop situation were 
main areas of respondent focus. A study of the text segments reveals a number of issues. 
More prominent to that of the SBO case is the fact that FEO respondents more freely 
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described strategic actions taken at various stages of their company’s evolvement. This 
meant that past actions were described, together with present moves being made and 
even future projected actions that were planned. Care was taken to focus on present 
strategic actions, in line with the typological objectives of this research stage. Having said 
this, analyzing all text segments (past, present and future) provided by the Text Retrieved 
Segments function did allow for a greater understanding into the meaning of the firms’ 
present actions. There was no evidence in the text that FEO firms were primarily in 
growth, maturity or decline stage. Strategic actions encompassed a wide spectrum of 
moves, such as work to complete key contracts, investment activities, resourcing actions, 
shareholder moves, moves to acquire customers and penetrate markets, competitive 
actions, stock management actions, and moves to acquire or strengthen networks and 
partnerships. Whatever the strategic actions taken, the focus would always be on 
strengthening an FEO posture, even if this was not the preferred owner-manager option.  
In some cases the FEO state was a pre-meditated and much desired orientation, such in 
the case of a tax advisory service (Firm 42) that wanted to focus on a limited number of 
large foreign clients. In other cases, FEO was an outcome of circumstances, such as for 
an engineering firm (Firm 17) that was now operating in a mature and saturated 
telecommunications market, this conditioning their strategic behaviour accordingly. 
 
Four other areas of coding intensity are shown in Figure 6.4, and relate to the 
Consequences and Outcomes category and its sub-categories and properties.  The 
second ellipse shows an FEO focus on the functional efficiency property, which is to be 
expected for these FEO firms and will not be discussed further. The first ellipse shows a 
strong respondent focus on the resource-based stance, particularly the physical and 
human resources. The relationship between this stance and the FEO state was made 
most clear by the descriptions and discussions provided by respondents. The resource 
base clearly allowed the FEO firms to create the structures and mechanisms with which to 
enact the business orientation. Human resourcing was focused on skilling and obtaining 
adequately qualified staff, appropriately sizing and structuring the organization, deploying 
students and part-timers in a flexible firm concept, and in building adequate working 
relations between owners and staff. Physical resourcing focused on efficiency 
enhancements through automation, investing in machinery and equipment, in sizing the 
company in accordance to investment decisions and size economies, in acquiring central 
and accessible headquarters, and in deploying adequate software and ICT systems. For 
example, a tooling company working in the marine industry (Firm 45) described how the 
firm had halved the amount of employees over the years, and now rigorously trained their 
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existing employees to allow them to compete in a very aggressive industry. A laboratory 
company (Firm 36) also reduced the employee count from four to two upon being faced 
with a situation of highly qualified yet incompetent staff, meaning that the remaining staff 
had to centralize and mechanize the work they were taking on. A ship registration firm 
(Firm 58) explained how their central location in the hub of the Maltese capital allowed 
them to have quick access to the various entities that they were required to interact with, 
allowing them to standardize and simplify operations. And so on. 
 
Together with the resource-based stance, the engineering stance is shown in Figure 6.4 
to be an area of very high coding intensity.  As shown, all of the engineering stance 
properties were given prominence by the FEO owner-managers. An analysis of the 
relevant texts shows an evident trend towards professional workmanship, mainly going 
into two directions. Firms were all highly focused on a limited range of products or 
services. Some of the firms were highly routinised, and had focused their core activities on 
carrying out a standardized process where repetition and efficiency were key success 
factors. Other firms had focused on higher end products/services, creating a limited 
portfolio of goods or services that were more differentiated, that demanded key skills and 
knowledge, and that were difficult for competitors to emulate. Whether high or low value 
added, the firms were invariably highly focused on a limited range of activities and had 
attempted to establish the best competitive conditions possible to carry out these 
activities. High client focus was also most evident throughout.  
 
For example, a firm manufacturing steel garage doors (Firm 53) described how they had 
established a reputation for door construction and installation by focusing solely on this 
trade, and by only using quality metals and fittings imported directly for this purpose. 
Similarly, a larger company manufacturing steel vessels (Firm 24) detailed how they had 
implemented a strategy of first procuring the brand name of an international steel 
manufacturing firm, then obtained the necessary ISO certification, and had now built a 
solid local reputation for carrying out turn-key projects including design, construction, 
testing and certification stages for steel structures of a large variety of configurations. 
Another company manufacturing drainage devices (Firm 21) outlined how they had 
penetrated the international market and managed to brand their product, this by having a 
range of models and sizes that served to fill up product space and boost competitiveness. 
A company carrying out sorting activities on O-rings (Firm 9) expanded upon how their 
core activity of quality testing for manufacturing defects was a highly standardized one, 
and one that demanded routinised but highly focused manual operations. 
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The final ellipse in Figure 6.4 shows a high coding intensity directed towards revenues, 
profits and sales, a property of the organizational performance sub-category. This differs 
from the SBO situation where businesses were more reluctant to make direct references 
to performance related criteria. Of the various performance criteria shown in Figure 5.2, 
FEO owner-managers deemed financial criteria such as profits, increase in sales, and 
asset value to be the most important. FEO firms were at various profitability levels; some 
fighting to survive while others reporting a satisfactory performance. There appears here 
to be a link between the FEO state and the focus on financial performance. One 
hypothesis is that for this particular orientation, due to the levels of routinization, financial 
performance is both easier to interpret and a more just measure of the firm’s true 
achievements. A second reason may be that FEO owner-managers are intrinsically more 
financially motivated, and direct their firms towards activities that can clearly relate to 
profitability achievements. FEO firms had a mean firm size of 15 full-time employees. This 
is more than double the size of SBO firms, although smaller than the forthcoming RDO 
and UDO firm sizes. Over half the firms were service oriented, although this is not far 
different from the ratio of service firms to the whole population of firms researched (28 of 
the 67).  
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6.5 Firms in a Related Diversification Orientation State 
 
Fourteen businesses were identified as having adopted a related diversification orientation 
(RDO) state, showing higher levels of entrepreneurial orientation as evident in their risk 
taking, innovative and proactive behaviours. As described in Chapter 5, this appeared to 
be a guarded, or contained stance, with a predominant focus on controlled diversification 
into areas of existing expertise. A review of the main areas of coding intensity for these 
RDO firms will serve to expand upon this theme. 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 6.5:  A Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Related Diversification Orientation 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6:  A Second Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in a Related Diversification 
Orientation  
 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 indicate seven areas of high coding intensity. The first ellipse shows a 
focus on the local environment, particularly governmental actions and interventions. 
Application of MAXqda’s Text Retrieved Segments function provided a detailed insight 
into this property. RDO firms showed a distinct proactiveness in behaviour, sometimes 
bordering on aggressiveness, towards the local government’s involvements. Two main 
areas of governmental involvement were evident; a more generic strategic mindset and 
direction from the Government in power and, as an outcome, the actions and interventions 
being implemented (or being omitted) by the Government. Various areas of importance 
were highlighted, such as governmental assistance in funding and other assistance 
schemes, high level political decisions being made and resulting legislations, and control 
mechanisms being deployed (or not being deployed adequately) to regulate the various 
industries. Most of the RDO firm reactions to government were negative, showing 
impatience at slow moving decisions and indecisiveness, and the lack of vision and 
control. These were evidently firms ready to act, but often felt that the bureaucracy around 
them was stifling their initiatives. A few contributions were more positive, where firms felt 
that the local government had given them the opportunities to grow. One example is a 
company manufacturing seamless flooring systems (Firm 56) that described how a 
governmental decision to enforce seamless floors on certain establishments, for health 
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reasons, had opened up a whole new market for them. Conversely a point-of-sales 
software company (Firm 54) expressed extreme frustration at being made to repeatedly 
apply for assistance funds from government, and having the terms and conditions of his 
application changing each time making the task practically impossible to finalize. A 
company that hand-manufactured local souvenirs at the national crafts village (Firm 52) 
showed extreme criticism towards government for their lack of vision and consequent 
incapacity to rejuvenate and invest in the area. Whether positive or negative, the 
contributions made by the RDO firms all showed an energy towards evolving their 
businesses further, with the expectation that the Government should assist them in this 
regard. 
 
A second area of coding intensity is highlighted by the second ellipse in Figure 6.5, and 
shows a strong RDO owner-manager focus on the relevant industry and competitive 
factors. Particularly, the industry attractiveness and the client – market conditions are 
given prominence. RDO firms were seen to be operating in industries of varying levels of 
competitiveness and concentration. Industries ranged from mature and highly saturated, 
to younger, more dynamic industries with greater potential for growth. The industry 
conditions described referred to more than just the competitors, but also to various value 
chain factors such as upstream suppliers, downstream customers, new entrants, and so 
on. One could definitely not say that RDO owner-managers purposely chose to operate in 
an industry that provided the best opportunities for growth. Similarly, a wide spectrum of 
consumer trends and market fluctuations could be noticed. Consumer markets were in 
various stages of growth, maturity and decline. International markets had often been 
tapped into, changing the competitive scenario substantially for the firms concerned. 
Whilst there was no clear pattern regarding the industries and markets, there was in the 
case of interactions of owner-managers with their respective industries/markets. Owner-
managers were seen to be careful not to enter into industries alien to their direct areas of 
expertise, but did show strong entrepreneurial behaviour within their particular areas. For 
example, a company specialized at organizing events (Firm 59) went to great pains to 
market the island internationally, seeking to build Malta as a hub for international 
conferencing. The firm’s planned strategy was to provide this growing market with a range 
of complementary services including film sets, set designs, sound provision, and 
advertising support.  A small architectural firm (Firm 32) lamented that the large local 
architectural consortiums had made the local market unattractive, and was rigorously 
working to expand operations abroad. The firm saw internationalization as the only way 
forward, and had increased its skills base to four complementary areas of expertise to be 
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able to succeed in the larger foreign markets. These skills were architecture and design, 
synergy and structural engineering, master planning and planning work, and 
environmental impact assessment work. Another firm specializing in the boat construction 
industry (Firm 63) had decided to concentrate on the local market, but was gradually 
capturing more and more market share by combining a range of boat manufacturing, 
importing, and servicing activities with a focus on high-level client commitment. Whether 
restricting themselves to the local market or not, whether in a dynamic or munificent 
industry, RDO owner-managers invariably applied a formula of diversifying their value 
adding activities in a controlled but determined manner.  
 
The third ellipse in Figure 6.5 shows a coding intensity focusing on the owner-manager 
characteristics, particularly qualifications and skills, the particular philosophy, values and 
behaviour. The skills levels of owner-managers were once again varied, ranging from 
vocational skills to various levels of academic qualifications. There was, however, a strong 
drive towards additional skilling and continuous professional development, with few 
owner-managers appearing content with their present levels of knowledge. Attributes 
highlighted were high levels of determination and drive, a strong sense of control, 
decisiveness, a clear and focused vision, strong ethical standards, an intrinsic knowledge 
and understanding of the industry, and an innovative, proactive mindset. Owner-managers 
placed a strong emphasis on customer service, quality of service, price competitiveness, 
and sincerity towards the client. There was even less conservative owner-manager 
behaviour evident than in the previous two orientations, but again, levels of 
entrepreneurial behaviour were varied. Some owner-managers simply showed more risk 
acceptance, innovative and proactive behaviour than others. The question that begs to be 
asked here is; why would the more entrepreneurial owner-managers limit their firms to an 
RDO state? In other words, why not diversify further and invest in totally new industries 
and markets, given a higher entrepreneurial orientation? Whilst it could be that the more 
entrepreneurial owner-managers were faced with more competitive industries, from the 
previous discussions this does not seem to be the case. However, from the various 
explanations given by the owner-managers two alternative reasons could account for this 
situation. Both reasons relate to inertia, but for different conditions. One form of inertia 
was inertia due to organizational momentum, where the organization would have been 
built around a certain core area of expertise, and it was very difficult for the owner-
manager to move the firm in an entirely new direction. A second form of inertia that could 
also be contributing to the RDO state was that of the owner-manager’s own area of 
expertise. Notwithstanding a high entrepreneurial philosophy, some owner-managers 
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appeared too strongly bound by their area of specialization, too strongly attached to the 
skills they had acquired over their working life. One example of this was an electrical 
engineer who had built one of the first local computer firms (Firm 20). Notwithstanding a 
vast knowledge of electronics and information systems, as well as a high entrepreneurial 
drive, the engineer preferred to direct his energy to diversifying into related computer-
oriented areas.  
 
The fourth and fifth ellipses in Figure 6.5 show a high coding intensity focusing on the 
strategic moves taken by RDO firms in growth as well as in maturity life cycle stages. 
Again, texts highlighted by the Text Retrieved Segments function indicated past, present 
and even projected strategic actions being taken by the respective owner-managers. 
Actions taken by owner-managers could be categorized into two areas; tactical short-
range actions, and more strategic long-range moves. The more tactical actions were 
taken to resolve particular competitive situations, to acquire a certain resource, to market 
a product, or to control for organizational issues. Longer range strategic actions focused 
on building competencies, on new or strengthened networks, access to new markets, 
acquiring new skills, building particular barriers to entry, and in enhancing the 
characteristics of the main products/services on offer. As expected, the moves and 
actions related to the attempts by the firms to build or sustain their RDO status. One 
sorting company that carried out quality control tests (Firm 18) described how steps were 
being taken to open up a company in China with the aim of carrying out similar quality 
assurance activities. The owner-manager lamented that he was late in the day for this 
investment, but could not carry it out earlier because of the initial growth challenges that 
the local company had faced. A point-of-sales software company owner (Firm 54) 
described how he had taken steps to eliminate a third party software system and develop 
a customized system better designed for the local market. By gradually integrating various 
other user-requested applications and functions into the new software system he was now 
in a position to offer a highly differentiated yet affordable product. A further advantage was 
that he could also now go into other areas of business automation and control, expanding 
from this initial area of focus. The owner-manager of a small computer firm (Firm 14) 
described how the business was thriving by expanding in the restricted local market, into 
complementary areas of ICT project implementations, UPS sales and maintenance, PC 
sales and repairs, and printer/cartridge services.  
 
Two other areas of high coding intensity are highlighted by ellipses in Figure 6.6. The first 
ellipse makes reference to two areas; the resource-based stance and the business 
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stance, particularly the related diversification property. As RDO behaviour is already under 
discussion, a focus shall be placed on the resource-based stance. Physical and human 
resource properties are shown in Figure 6.6 to be an area of high owner-manager focus. 
A large range of HR tactics and initiatives were being deployed by the 14 RDO firms. The 
Text Retrieved Segments tool highlighted varied working conditions, different 
organizational structure designs, skills and training schemes, motivational strategies, 
multiskilling, multitasking and flexitime schemes, cost control mechanisms and so on. 
Invariably, for the RDO firms, two issues repeatedly stood out. These were control and 
quality.  Control was strongly exercised by owner-managers in many areas, such as cost 
control, control over employee performance, direct and often detailed involvement in the 
employee task, and directly being involved in motivational schemes. Owner-managers 
also went to great lengths to be knowledgeable on the value adding tasks that employees 
were responsible for, often to a greater extent than the employees themselves. This micro 
management may have a negative; that of not allowing the owner-managers the time to 
look into new areas of business development. This issue may correlate with the theme 
discussed earlier on organizational momentum, an owner-manager being divided between 
two loyalties; an entrepreneurial drive on one hand and a feeling of necessity to micro 
manage on the other. Physical properties referred to were choice of location, types of 
facilities, levels of automation and technologies deployed. The RDO firms were a varied 
sort, from stone decorators to conference organizers to glass blowers, boat makers, PC 
retailers, and so on. Physical resources thus varied greatly, both in type and in cost. 
 
The final ellipse in Figure 6.6 looks towards the engineering stance deployed by the RDO 
firms. Most engineering stance properties were deemed important, such as the mode of 
operations, technology adopted and the various permutations deployed. An evident 
pattern was apparent here, and can be described by viewing the firms’ engineering 
process as a two-staged affair. The first stage would be the grounding that the firms would 
have gone through to build a core process, that is, a core value adding activity. The 
second stage would be the launching of related additional value adding activities (and 
resulting products/services) as off-shoots to the first. Reasons for this related 
diversification were varied, and have already been discussed in the previous industry and 
competitive factors. In some cases the businesses were aiming at filling in product space 
so that they would gain dominance in the various complementary areas relating to a local 
industry. In other cases the businesses saw diversifying and specializing as supporting 
activities; specialization in one area could be used to diversify into a complementary area, 
whilst diversifying into the new area would be an impetus for further specialization in the 
127 
 
initial area/s. One company specializing in flooring (Firm 56) described how the business 
had gradually diversified into two related areas; waterproofing and industrial flooring. The 
owner-manager admitted that the move from the first area and into the second had been a 
natural outcome of the expertise gained, and insight into the seamless processes 
common to both areas. Another company making wiring and other metal products (Firm 
40) saw no need to go outside the industry and existing local market, and gradually 
increased the range of machinery and skills to specialize in a wider range of wiring, 
fencing, and metal goods. The owner-manager achieved a balance of expanding and 
investing in related metal-works areas with being heavily involved in the company’s 
manufacturing processes, to the extent that he admitted to knowing how to dismantle 
each and every machine that the company had acquired. 
 
The RDO firms were slightly larger than FEO firms, and substantially larger than the SBO 
firms. The average firm size is slightly over 18 full-time employees, compared to 15 for 
FEO firms and 7 for SBO firms. Performance was somewhat more difficult to measure for 
the RDO firms, with owner-managers referring to a wider variety of performance 
measures and achievements than seen in the case of the FEO firms. Achieving a sizeable 
customer portfolio, increases in turnover and profits and return on investment were mainly 
referred to. Many RDO owner-managers resisted directly discussing firm performance, but 
would give plenty of indication indirectly in the ongoing discussions. RDO firms were a 
mixed blend of manufacturing, service and retail firms, with no bias towards any particular 
type.  
 
6.6 Firms in an Unrelated Diversification Orientation State 
 
Six firms were classified as having adopted an unrelated diversification orientation (UDO) 
state. The levels of risk acceptance, innovativeness and proactiveness for these six firms 
were the highest, with behaviours evidently exceeding the entrepreneurial boundaries of 
the earlier SBO, FEO and RDO firms. The general trend was for these firms to accept risk 
relating to entrance into new industries and markets, to proactively compete within these 
diversified industries, and to be more innovative in their value-creation activities within and 
outside the organization. In more detail, the Code Matrix Browser screen shots for these 
six firms are shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 to have seven areas of high coding intensity. 
These will be scrutinized to learn more about the UDO firms’ particular behaviours.  
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Figure 6.7:  A Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in Unrelated Diversification Orientation 
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Figure 6.8:  A Second Code Matrix Browser Screen for Firms in Unrelated Diversification 
Orientation 
 
 
The first ellipse in Figure 6.7 shows a high coding intensity placed on two local 
environment properties; government actions and interventions, and local trends and 
attributes. It is first important to note that the six firms were a widely varied range of 
businesses, from retail to manufacture to various service industries. Also, markets being 
accessed were a mix, with some firms only servicing the local market, others accessing 
both the local market and also exporting, and yet others focusing predominantly on export. 
Whilst this blend placed a divergence of needs and requirements on the environments to 
the firms, the coding relating to the first ellipse showed a clear owner-manager emphasis 
on one particular theme. All six firms could be seen to be working in the margin, that is, 
being truly innovative in building value added activities outside the initial areas of business 
focus. Whilst more will be said on this when describing the business’s engineering stance, 
it was observed at this stage that the owner-managers were invariably seen to be 
struggling in an environment that was simply not on par with their entrepreneurial efforts. 
Particularly, they were dealing with a government and even a consumer that was 
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unaware, uninformed, and even uncaring of their genuine attempts to create new 
business. It was as if the businesses came from a different cultural background to that of 
the national culture within which they had to operate (particularly Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance dimension). One owner-manager that had opened up a most innovative aqua-
biotechnology firm (Firm 6) lamented how he would soon have to move the company 
outside the Island as there was simply not enough governmental assistance in vital areas 
of research and development. Another business going into various local and export 
activities relating to paint manufacture and varnish import (Firm 66) described how local 
port monopolies and charges eroded his competitiveness, making further expansion 
difficult. A waste recycling firm that was one of the first on the Island (Firm 41) explained 
how the business had to go through excessive hurdles with the local environmental 
regulator, before finally managing to establish a viable operation. 
 
The second and third ellipses depicted in Figure 6.7 highlight an owner-manager 
emphasis on three properties relating to the relevant industry sub-category. These are the 
industry’s particular attributes, its attractiveness, and the particularities of the client and 
market. Once again, a central theme was evident, tying down to the issue of 
competitiveness within a small island state such as Malta. The six UDO firms all appeared 
to be building successful barriers of entry, with the knowledge that industry 
competitiveness would pick up once competitors understood the firms’ sources of 
competitive advantage and attempted to emulate these. These UDO firms were, however, 
even more proactive in their attempts to build sustainable competitive advantage, and this 
through a variety of means. Cross-functional knowledge was Firm 6’s strategy, being 
applied by specializing in a number of high-technology areas that contributed to an 
integrative level of knowledge not easily imitated. Firm 15 used a different strategy; 
building up resource configurations in different areas of business that were not easy to 
replicate. One of these was the purchase of a number of pharmacies that guaranteed a 
client base for pharmaceuticals being imported by the firm. Firm 29 utilized its R&D 
capabilities, as well as its international branding, to diversify into a product line that related 
to the water industry and not to their core battery sensor industry. Firm 41 managed to 
acquire a strategically placed tract of land next to the national landfill site, allowing it to 
have a sustainable advantage in waste separation and disposal. The logic of these firms 
was similar, even if the industries varied tremendously. Whilst, as shall be shown, the 
firms were all predominantly in growth stage, the growth was being carefully channeled 
towards building competitive strengths through product/process diversification and 
corresponding resource acquisition. The synergies and spill-overs being acquired were 
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seen to be a prelude to heightened levels of competitiveness that would appear when the 
industries reached further stages of maturity.  
 
The forth ellipse shows a high coding intensity placed on the owner-manager 
characteristics, particularly the philosophy, values and behaviour of the owner-manager.  
Owner-managers freely discussed their values and beliefs, in fact, with less reservation 
than those of the previous three orientations. Whilst once again qualifications and skills 
varied, this category of owner-managers was the most professionally or academically 
qualified of all, with four of the six owner-managers holding a first degree and two of these 
having post-graduate qualifications. There was a very distinct common element in the 
values and beliefs shared. Owner-managers were more aggressive, determined, 
competitive and innovative in their behaviour. A high level of drive and self-motivation was 
invariably shown in the arguments and descriptions provided. One particular trait that was 
evident was the approach owner-managers adopted towards risk. There was a high level 
of risk acceptance, but it was far from a blind acceptance of risky endeavors. Owner-
managers carefully applied strategies to mitigate the perceived risks that they were being 
faced with. An example of this is the approach adopted by Firm 66, where two brothers 
were managing a company specializing in paints (import, and both generic and 
specialized application) and coordinated risk between them, with the more entrepreneurial 
brother coming up with the innovative ideas and the more risk averse brother applying the 
brakes where necessary. Another trait that stood out was a determination not to be 
indebted, that is, not to be compromised in any way. This was seen in owner-managers’ 
behaviour towards employees as well as towards suppliers, customers and governmental 
agencies. One owner-manager described how the firm (Firm 29) had adopted a policy of 
never relying on bank financing, using solely equity provided by shareholders to avoid 
being conditioned into how to use the finance, once obtained. Another firm (Firm 41) 
explained how they had preferred to wait a number of years for the local planning 
authority to grant them a development permit, and had avoided with determination any 
attempts to cut corners or to ask for favours. This same dogged determination was shown 
towards employees, where for example one owner-manager (Firm 29) asked an employee 
who he thought would be held responsible if that same employee failed to acquire a 
sizeable EU grant. A high level of thriftiness was often evident in the comments made by 
owner-managers, once again demonstrating a determination to succeed by also 
eliminating undue wastage. 
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The final ellipse in Figure 6.7 highlights an owner-manager emphasis on strategic moves 
taken by the UDO firms in their growth stage. Although the company’s ages ranged 
widely, that is from a few years to over 30 years, the firms were predominantly in a stage 
of growth, as opposed to birth, maturity or decline. Also, the growth described could be 
deemed to be organic, very much alive and flexible to the directions set out by the owner-
managers. The coded texts indicated two forms of strategic moves taken by owner-
managers; tactical short-range actions and the more integrative long-range strategic 
actions. Whether tactical or strategic, the actions taken were either knowledge-based or 
resource-based, and invariably showed firms re-inventing themselves and acting outside 
the limitations of the existing organization. Tactical actions included works to complete an 
important contract, actions to consolidate various internal ventures, advertising actions 
being taken, financing activities, projects underway, and significant problems being 
solved. These actions fuelled the more strategic moves such as research and innovation 
activities, new ventures embarked upon, licenses acquired, expansion and 
internationalization efforts, networks established, and steps to diversify into a new 
product/market area. One example of how businesses would use tactical moves to arrive 
at a strategic objective was that of a company dealing in import/resale of pharmaceuticals 
(Firm 15). The firm owned over a dozen pharmacies on the Island, making it one of the 
largest local pharmacy owners. Notwithstanding the guaranteed (if somewhat low) 
revenues from these pharmacies, the firm had established an exit-strategy whereby they 
would sell off pharmacies as soon as the time was opportune, allowing them to finance 
other totally different areas of operation (such as a call centre and a totally separate 
freeport activity). Another example was that of an engineering firm (Firm 66) that had 
established, amongst other operations, paints as a core business area. The firm bought 
out a local paint importation firm, and complemented this acquisition by going into an 
innovative service of painting and treating hotel bath tubs, something no other competitor 
was doing at such a large scale. An aqua bio-marine business (Firm 6) described how it 
had complemented its international marine consultancy operations by setting up a local 
research and development wing, working in parallel with the ongoing operations. 
 
Two final ellipses that are shown in Figure 6.8 highlight areas of high coding intensity that 
focus on sub-categories/properties relating to the Consequences and Outcomes category. 
The first shows, apart from the expected references to the unrelated diversification 
orientation, a strong focus by owner-managers on the physical and human resource 
properties of the resource-based stance. UDO firms had a wide variety of physical 
resource configurations, depending largely on the type of the firms’ value adding activities. 
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The one manufacturing firm (Firm 29) was in a state of plant expansion, requiring 
substantial extensions to the footprint of the firm and to its equipment/machinery base. 
Retail firms (e.g. Firms 13, 66) were similarly in a state of premises expansion. Service 
firms were less demanding on physical resources, and showed a greater capability for 
acting as a flexible firm with resources often dispersed around the globe. Human resource 
configurations of the UDO firms demonstrated high technological levels of expertise and 
skills, flatter structures but with a centralized base, and more complex and challenging 
motivational and loyalty scenarios. In fact, of the six firms, four could be deemed to be 
highly technological (Firms 6, 15, 29 and 41) and two to be moderate to highly 
technological (Firms 13 and 66). By technological what is meant here is that many of the 
internal value adding activities, as well as the external value chain interactions, were 
technology driven. Examples of this were the adoption of modern injection molding 
machinery (Firm 29), the implementation of innovative geographical information systems 
(Firm 6) and the introduction of advanced waste management methodologies (Firm 41). 
 
The second ellipse in Figure 6.8 shows a consistently high coding intensity focusing on 
three of the four properties of the engineering stance, these being; the mode of 
operations, the product details and permutations, and the technology/rationale of the core 
value adding processes. These value adding activities ranged from research to 
manufacture to various service-related activities. Owner-managers described in detail how 
they were achieving, and then maintaining, expertise in the various areas of activity of 
their organization. This appeared to be highly challenging, and owner-managers were 
heavily involved in both the creation and the sustaining of these diversified value adding 
activities. This ultimately meant that the diversification activities were directly dependent 
on the innovativeness, knowledge basis, entrepreneurial flair, and sheer hard work of the 
owner-managers themselves. This has, in fact, already been seen earlier on in the 
discussion on the UDO owner-manager characteristics. The high level of technology being 
applied, the innovative practices and processes, and the management of particularly 
dynamic organizations had to be carefully coordinated by the dominant coalition. An 
interesting point on this concept of ‘dominant coalition’ emerged, one that was not evident 
for the SBO orientation, and to a lesser extent for the FEO and RDO orientations. In all six 
UDO cases, the dominant coalition was more than a one-person affair. Firm 6 had a small 
team of highly qualified and geographically dispersed senior managers. Firm 13 was run 
by a small board of family members. Firm 15 was managed by two close colleagues. Firm 
29 was jointly managed by a CEO and a trust-holder. Firm 41 was managed by two 
sisters, and Firm 66 by two brothers. In all cases it appeared evident that the firm’s 
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management was delegated between these coalition members and not hijacked by some 
one member. A question of causality arises here; is the large (relatively speaking) and 
dynamic UDO firm a consequence of the well-synchronized efforts of highly 
entrepreneurial partners, or does a growing UDO firm necessitate (and hence be a 
prelude to) these particular dominant coalition characteristics? The forthcoming Chapter 7 
shall look towards a trajectory-based study to attempt to answer this question. 
 
Once again, UDO firms were spread between different business types without any 
particular bias. What was immediately apparent, however, was the large average firm 
size, at 34 full-time employees when compared to 18 for RDO firms, 15 for FEO firms, and 
7 for SBO firms. That is, nearly double the size of RDO and FEO firms. This large average 
size is understandable, given the prime objective of this orientation to grow via unrelated 
diversification. In summary, the UDO firms were fewest in quantity (6 compared to 13, 14 
and 34), the most diversified in activities, industries and client/market bases, and with the 
highest synchronization between the entrepreneurial behaviour of the firm and that of its 
owner-managers. This last point is an important one, as we see here a divergence from 
the SBO, FEO and RDO situations where owner-managers did not always appear fully 
compatible with the level of entrepreneurial behaviour of the organization. In these 
previous three orientations there appeared to be a ‘lower limit’, such that owner-managers 
had to be at least as entrepreneurial as the firm, but could in fact be much more so. In a 
UDO firm there had to be full convergence between the owner-manager’s entrepreneurial 
behaviour and that of the firm. This argument leads to another point that will be amplified 
upon in Section 6.7 and coincides with the “coalignment” argument seen in the literature; 
the need to understand two strategic behaviours, that of the firm and that of the owner-
manager of the firm.  
 
Performance proved somewhat of an elusive measurement to obtain. This was particularly 
so because, in this case, the owner-manager was being asked to give a single 
interpretation of a multi-faceted phenomenon. With different areas of business at different 
levels of performance, this is understandable. It must be appreciated that the grounded 
theory method does allow for more than one mechanism for measuring performance. The 
direct references to performance by UDO owner-managers looked towards two 
complementary measures; growth in revenues, size and profits, and the achievement of 
competencies/resources that would subsequently allow them further growth. Indirectly 
however, these two measures, and their importance, were also made evident by the 
detailed renditions provided by the owner-managers when describing the strategic actions 
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being taken, stances being adopted, and environmental challenges being faced. In other 
words, it was normally possible to establish what owner-managers perceived to be 
important performance criteria, and whether they were achieving these criteria, even 
without directly questioning the topic.  This would serve to add confidence to the 
interpretations directly provided by the owner-managers on the firm’s performance. 
 
6.7 Characteristics of the Typology and the Link between Owner-
manager Philosophy and the Firm’s Strategic Orientation 
 
The Framework (Figure 5.2) has allowed for the separation of the behaviour of the firm 
(operationalized primarily through the three stances in the Consequences and Outcomes 
category) from the behaviour and situation of the owner-manager of the firm 
(operationalized through the Actions/Reactions and Context/Conditions categories). When 
describing the characteristics of the four strategic types (or more correctly, states), it has 
been argued that owner-manager behaviour and firm behaviour may have somewhat 
differing entrepreneurial orientations.  The highest congruence would be found in UDO 
firms, then RDO firms, followed by FEO firms, and the least in SBO firms. This is not a 
new phenomenon in the literature, and authors have highlighted the divergence before 
(e.g. Kroeger 1974). In their seminal work, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) argue that, for a 
small business, the firm’s realized strategy will not be the owner-manager’s deliberate 
strategy, but will emerge at a tangent resulting from the influence of environmental factors. 
Thus, owner-manager strategy and firm strategy differ, as will their evident behaviours. A 
more direct comparison is made by Miles and Snow (1978 p. 126) in their argument that 
“the relationship between management and type of organization appears to be 
constrained in one direction”. The authors posit that this unidirectional concept is logical; 
managers with a creative, inclusive and dynamic philosophy can successfully manage a 
‘defender type’ firm, whilst managers with a conservative, reactive philosophy cannot 
manage a ‘prospector type’ firm. Miles and Snow (1978 p. 129) conclude with a warning 
that “no form of organization can be operated effectively unless it has an appropriate 
accompanying managerial theory”.  
 
The following Figure 6.9 attempts to map out this strategy – management philosophy 
alignment. A number of integrating concepts are shown. First, the top graph depicts the 
small business strategy typology of SBO, FEO, RDO and UDO firms that has been the 
subject of this chapter. The 67 firms have been mapped out against two axis; firm 
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entrepreneurial behaviour on the X-axis and propensity for growth on the Y-axis. Sadler-
Smith et al. (2003) posit that intention to grow and an innovation/change orientation are 
characteristics of firm entrepreneurial behaviour. In fact, the choice of X-axis is supported 
by the literature, such that “firms with conservative strategic postures are risk averse, non-
innovative, and reactive. Firms with entrepreneurial strategic postures are risk taking, 
innovative, and proactive… Notably, this characterization of strategic posture along the 
conservative-to-entrepreneurial dimension has been well accepted in the strategic 
management and small firm management literatures” (Miles, Covin and Heeley 2000 p. 
65). In consistency with Porter’s strategic group mapping techniques, the resulting 
taxonomy is shown by the sizes and the positioning of the different ovals. To the bottom of 
Figure 6.9 the owner-manager philosophy is also mapped out, ranging in a continuum 
from conservative to entrepreneurial in nature. This polarity in entrepreneurial behaviour 
has been frequently referred to in the literature review, a similar example can be found in 
McCarthy’s (2003 p. 158) charismatic versus pragmatic entrepreneurs. The coalignment 
of the owner-manager philosophy with the firm strategic behaviour is visualized as being 
modified by a ‘conditional lens’, a concept that will be described in further depth towards 
the end of this chapter. 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
 
Figure 6.9: Strategy Typology, Management Philosophy and the Conditional Lens 
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Table 6.1, on the following page, provides a summary of the typology’s main 
characteristics.  Whilst the descriptions simplify the more complex set of interactions 
described throughout the chapter, they do aid to highlight a number of interesting issues. 
First it is pertinent to say what the comparison does not do, that is, what its weaknesses 
are. The first weakness regards the approach adopted in the table, and in the whole 
chapter for that regard. The approach adopted has been a comparative one, highlighting 
the characteristics that are particular to the four different classifications in the typology of 
states. Characteristics that are common to the four orientations have been somewhat 
neglected in this approach, even though they are important contributors to the strategic 
behaviour of small businesses. One example of this is the historic start-up situation of the 
firm, shown in the various Code Matrix Browser screens to be a constant area of owner-
manager focus. Another example is the global environment, again impacting upon the 
different orientations in much the same way.  
 
A second weakness is that the typological exercise has only partially utilized the wealth of 
information provided by owner-managers in the interviews carried out. Once again, 
reference is made to Figure 5.3 and the subsequent arguments in Chapter 5 regarding the 
strategic trajectories of small firms. Table 6.1 provides a cross-sectional picture of a 
dynamic situation, one that has been described in detail by the various owner-managers. 
That is not to say that the picture is inaccurate, but neither is it complete. Integrating 
structure and process within the methodology has allowed for detailed knowledge to be 
acquired on the strategic actions and context of the small firm throughout the various 
stages of its existence. These have cumulated into present states of ‘being’, these present 
states summarized in Table 6.1.  But, put in simple terms, had a UDO firm always been a 
UDO firm? Will previous behavioural patterns provide further understanding to the 
resulting typology that is shown? The literature review has argued that small firms do not 
suffer the same organizational momentum common to larger, and often more bureaucratic 
organizations. Understanding the strategic trajectories of the firms will add to the 
knowledge provided by the typology built so far, and complement the understanding it 
provides. This will be the focus of the forthcoming Chapter 7. 
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Characteristics SBO State FEO State RDO State UDO State 
Number of Firms 13 34 14 6 
Local Industry 
Conditions 
Increasing industry 
competitiveness. 
Supply exceeding 
demand. 
Increasingly adverse 
conditions. 
Changing consumer 
patterns and behaviours. 
A strong owner-manager 
awareness and knowledge 
of the particular industry 
conditions.  
Often niche markets. 
Strong customer 
focus/loyalty. 
Industries ranging from 
mature and highly 
saturated, to younger and 
with potential for growth. 
Owner-managers careful 
not to enter into industries 
alien to their expertise, but 
showing strong 
entrepreneurial behaviour 
when within their areas. 
Industry not yet matching 
the firms’ competitive 
strides. Firms 
predominantly in growth 
stage, channeled towards 
building competitive 
strength through product, 
process diversification and 
resource acquisition. 
Local Environmental 
Conditions 
Little governmental 
support. 
Economic downturn 
increasingly being felt. 
Unfavourable legislation 
and government 
directives. 
A heightened awareness 
and preoccupation 
towards government’s 
contribution to the 
particular industry, 
whether adequately 
competitive conditions 
were being provided. 
A high energy towards 
evolving the business 
further, with the 
expectation that local 
government should assist 
far more. 
All firms working in the 
margin but struggling in an 
environment not on par 
with their entrepreneurial 
efforts. Government and 
consumer unaware and 
uncaring of firms’ attempts 
at creating new business. 
Global Influences Increase in foreign 
competitiveness. 
A dispersed focus on 
various global factors such 
as changing technologies 
and increasing foreign 
competitiveness. 
A dispersed focus on 
various global factors such 
as changing technologies 
and increasing foreign 
competitiveness. 
Increase in foreign 
competitiveness. 
Economic challenges. 
Owner-manager 
Configuration 
Usually one person. 
(Mean 1.23) 
Predominantly one or two 
persons. 
(Mean 1.5) 
Predominantly one or two 
persons. 
(Mean 1.43) 
Two or more persons. 
(Mean 2.33) 
Owner-manager 
Philosophy 
Ranging from highly 
conservative to 
entrepreneurial. 
Ranging from conservative 
to entrepreneurial. 
Ranging from 
entrepreneurial to highly 
entrepreneurial. 
Highly entrepreneurial. 
Owner-manager 
Attributes, Skills, 
Expertise and 
Qualifications 
Wide range of skills and 
qualifications evident. 
Highly seasoned and 
experienced owner-
managers. 
Many owner-managers 
near retirement age. 
Strong grounding in the 
particular industry. 
Competencies acquired 
allow owner-managers to 
excel in what they do.  
Very strong and 
determined values, beliefs. 
Various ages. 
Wide range of skills, 
experiences, 
qualifications. Strong drive 
towards additional skilling 
and CPD. High 
determination and drive, 
sense of control, 
decisiveness, vision. 
Innovative, proactive 
mindsets. 
Most professional and 
academically qualified of 
all orientations. More 
aggressive, determined, 
competitive and innovative 
in behaviour. High drive 
and self motivation 
evident. 
Focus of Strategic 
Actions 
Mature and 
decline/refocus stages. 
Actions towards 
retrenchment, efficiency 
maximization, cost 
reduction and control. 
No predominant life cycle 
stage, meaning that firms 
could be in growth, 
maturity or decline. 
Strategic actions taken by 
firms mainly aimed at 
strengthening their FEO 
posture. 
Mainly in growth and 
maturity. Strategic actions 
focused on building 
competencies, networks, 
access to new markets, 
building barriers to entry, 
enhancing characteristics 
of main product/service. 
Firms in growth stage. 
Organic growth with 
knowledge and resource 
based actions showing 
firms reinventing 
themselves and acting 
outside the boundaries of 
the firm. 
Business Stance 
Adopted by Firm 
 Low risk propensity. 
Low levels of 
innovativeness. 
Little proactive behaviour. 
One main area of focus. 
Often a refuge or 
hibernation scenario. 
An efficiency or 
productivity-oriented 
philosophy. 
Innovativeness and 
proactiveness drives 
limited towards a narrow 
product range. 
Cautious diversification 
into technologies and 
product markets that are 
related to the core areas of 
business operation. 
Unrelated diversification 
into new avenues, areas of 
expertise, industries and 
markets. High 
innovativeness and 
proactiveness. 
Engineering Stance 
Adopted by Firm 
Intrinsic owner-manager 
knowledge of core 
processes. 
Threat of technology 
obsolescence.  
Highly focused towards a 
limited range of 
products/services. 
Either highly routinised or 
highly specialized. 
Two staged approach of 
grounding the firm in a 
core engineering process 
and then launching 
additional, related 
activities as off-shoots. 
Synergies sought. 
Owner-managers heavily 
involved in creating and 
sustaining diversified value 
adding activities that are 
dependent on their 
innovativeness, 
knowledge, 
entrepreneurial flair.  
Resource-Based 
Stance Adopted by 
Firm 
Dedicated but limited 
resource base. 
Often high opportunity 
costs of operations. 
Strong focus on skilling 
and HR structuring, 
allowing firm to specialize 
in its core activities. 
Physical resources 
dedicated to efficiency 
enhancements. 
Physical resources varied 
greatly in type, cost. 
Control strongly exercised 
by owner-managers on 
costs, employee skilling, 
employee performance 
and the direct employee 
task. 
Moderate to high 
technology firms with a 
wide configuration of 
physical resources. HR 
with high technological 
levels of expertise, skills. 
Flatter structures, 
centralized. 
Organizational 
Performance 
Turnover. 
Survival. 
Personal satisfaction. 
Financial criteria such as 
increase in sales, profits 
and increase in asset 
value. 
Wider variety of measures. 
Achieving a sizeable 
customer portfolio, 
turnover, profits, ROI. 
Most elusive. Two main 
complementary measures: 
growth in revenues/profits 
and in the achievement of 
further competencies. 
Firm Size (Average 
Employee Count) 7.2 15.3 18.3 34.3 
 
Table 6.1: Predominant Characteristics of the Typology of Strategic States 
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Table 6.1 highlights some important patterns and differences between the four 
orientations that shall form the basis for the forthcoming discussion.   Most evident is the 
bias of firms towards a functional efficiency orientation, with half of the 67 firms adopting 
this focused orientation. Two statistics immediately stand out when comparing the four 
orientations; that of firm size, and of the owner-manager configuration. If the four 
orientations are taken at a continuum, as visualized in Figure 6.9, one sees a consistency 
in values. Firm size, measured by full-time employee count, ranges from 7.2 to 15.3 to 
18.3 to 34.3 when looking at the SBO-FEO-RDO-UDO sequence. Also, members forming 
the dominant coalition average 1.23 to 1.5 to 1.43 to 2.33 for the same sequence of 
orientations (to be referred to as the SBO-UDO continuum from now on). Thus the closer 
to SBO orientation the smaller the firm, and the less people controlling the firm. The more 
complex orientations appear to demand more owner-managers that are directly involved 
within a dominant coalition. Whilst this may not appear surprising as larger firms have 
more managerial challenges, it does not necessarily reflect the general reality of business 
management. Large organizations, even multinational firms, have often been seen to be 
managed by small top management structures, where the chairman and CEO are 
sometimes one and the same in order to maximize control over the organization (even if 
this does go against good corporate governance). When relating this theme to the other 
typology characteristics, however, an explanation emerges that is particular to the small 
firm. 
 
Firstly, reference is made to the two stances that complement the business stance 
adopted by the firm; the engineering stance and the resource-based stance. The 
engineering stance shows an expected trend for the SBO-UDO continuum, supported by 
the resource configurations adopted by the different orientations. At the SBO end of the 
continuum one sees a focus on a core process, with firms working conservatively within 
the boundaries and confines established over time. At the UDO end firms are heavily 
involved in creating value where no value exists, that is, working outside the existing firm 
boundaries. Also, as expected, owner-managers were generally more conservative 
towards the SBO orientation and more entrepreneurial in behaviour towards the UDO 
orientation. However, few signs of professional delegation were to be seen as the firms 
grew in size, in fact the UDO firms showed owner-managers heavily involved in creating, 
applying and managing the new value adding activities that the firms were diversifying 
into. Their skills, knowledge and experiences were seen to be vital for this to succeed. A 
high level of centralization in management was apparent at a strategic level. However, 
owner-managers were not only making the strategic decisions, but were also being 
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directly involved in coordinating their implementation. Higher levels of technology at the 
UDO end of the spectrum required owner-managers with better professional 
qualifications, and with higher levels of drive and self-motivation. These issues now better 
explain the larger owner-manager configurations; more diversified firms were spreading 
the substantial, centralized challenges onto a larger dominant coalition. As opposed to 
delegating to a lower management level the firms preferred to utilize two or maybe three 
trusted and skilled partners who were knowledgeable, reliable and had the same 
aggressive drive for business creation. This behaviour may be a result of cultural factors. 
Malta is often classified as having an ‘Anglo’ culture, after its deep historic ties with Britain. 
The ‘Anglo’ culture is low on uncertainty avoidance and high on individualism (Hofstede 
2001), traits very visible in the orientations discussed above. 
 
When looking at industry and environmental considerations once again a pattern is 
noticed, one that relates well to the discussion so far.  Care had to be taken here not to 
get lost in the excessive detail provided by owner-managers when describing the large 
variety of industry types, conditions and corresponding environmental situations.  The 
research has delved into many industries available to the small business, only excluding 
the larger industries such as the heavy engineering industry of transportation, 
telecommunications, water and energy. Appendix 3 lists the various industries relating to 
the 67 business cases. Generalizing on industry and competitive conditions was simply 
not possible. However, a more general comparison could be made regarding the 
perceived industry/environment dynamism or munificence, that is, from the perception of 
the owner-managers. This concept of perceived environmental uncertainty is a common 
one within the literature on strategy and organizational behaviour (e.g. Hendrick 2003; 
Jauch and Kraft 1986; Yasai-Ardekani and Haug 1997). The logic is that it is not the 
environmental conditions that count, but how they are perceived and acted upon by the 
organization. This perceived uncertainty ultimately impacts upon the organization’s design 
and its very actions. Firms that are more towards the SBO end of the SBO-UDO 
continuum perceived mainly negative environmental conditions and industry settings. 
Industry competitiveness was increasing, markets saturating, and the government 
uncaring in its legislative and business support. Firms more towards the UDO end still saw 
a challenging environmental setting, but also perceived business opportunities within 
these same settings. The difficulties and challenges were translated by entrepreneurial 
owner-managers into potential growth through diversification. If one industry was indeed 
saturated and disadvantaged, they would work to move into another less aggressive 
industry. This is in agreement with Kisfalvi’s (2002 p. 492) observation that “the subjective 
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ways that strategists in general obtain and interpret information about their firm and its 
environment are crucial for strategy formation”. The concept of environment perception 
was observed by McCarthy when researching small firms; “the charismatic entrepreneurs 
were visionary in the sense that they were able to predict market trends and visualize new 
product opportunities… In contrast to the charismatic entrepreneur, the pragmatic 
entrepreneur seemed to make a more realistic assessment of the marketplace: the goal 
was to set up a business that would have a good chance of succeeding” (2003 p.161, p. 
163). An important link is made here between owner-manager philosophy, perceived 
environmental uncertainty, and the goals of the business. Thus, to the left of the SBO-
UDO continuum we see a perceived environmental determinism, to the right we see 
various perceived opportunities to diversify and grow. This is highly in conformity with the 
conceptual model set out in Figure 2.2 of the Literature Review. 
 
Two other comparisons can be made when looking at the characteristics in Table 6.1. The 
first regards the organizational life cycle and the strategic actions being taken by the 
differently oriented firms. UDO firms were mainly in growth, RDO firms in growth or 
maturity, FEO firms at any life cycle stage, and SBO firms mainly in late maturity or in 
decline/refocus. Strategic actions and moves being made corresponded to these life cycle 
stages. UDO firm actions focused on growth-related criteria, both in resource acquisition 
and in competency building. RDO firms were focused on more limited 
competency/resource accumulation, but more on strengthening barriers to entry for 
competitors. FEO firms were mainly acting to build efficiencies and competencies in key 
areas of focus. SBO firms mainly worked to retrench, minimize costs, and prolong 
efficiency levels. These actions complemented the owner-manager philosophy and 
industry/environment conditions described above. They also allow for a better 
understanding of the second comparison to be made, this regarding organizational 
performance.   SBO owner-managers sought revenue, survival, and the satisfaction given 
by the business. FEO firms were more revenue-focused. RDO firms had a wide variety of 
measures relating to a more diversified focus. UDO firms were even more elusive in 
performance measurement, but did generally work towards financial and competency 
growth.  
 
A final question that remains to be answered regards the congruence (or lack of) between 
the owner-manager philosophy and the business orientation.  A question still remains to 
be answered; why would owner-managers with more entrepreneurial management 
philosophies also end up managing more conservative, reactive organizations? This issue 
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is visualized in Figure 6.9, with the direction of arrows to the bottom of the sketch showing 
this unidirectional orientation. The descriptions provided by owner-managers indicate two 
reasons; by choice or by situation. Choice was the less common of the two reasons, and 
occurred mainly when an owner-manager decided to forego his own potential and allow 
the firm to retract.  This was sometimes the case where the firm was in waiting for a new 
recruit or family member to join the dominant coalition. In other cases the owner-manager 
was purposely allowing the firm to operate on par with his or her present life status, such 
as that of near retirement. The following chapter will expand upon this theme, and the 
influence of opportunity costs on the owner-manager. ‘Situation’ was a different matter; 
industry and environmental conditions, both internal and external to the firm, had induced 
a mismatch between the owner-manager philosophy and the business orientation. The 
term mismatch may be the wrong one, as it has already been argued that an 
entrepreneurial manager can effectively manage a more conservative organization. This 
‘conditioning’ of the owner-manager philosophy has been depicted in Figure 6.9 as a 
conditional lens, redirecting or aligning the owner-manager philosophy with the strategic 
orientation of the firm. Whilst obviously a simplification, the concept of the conditional lens 
has been used to visualize the redirecting of the bottom arrows in the direction of 
corresponding strategic orientations. For example, a highly entrepreneurial owner-
manager would be conditioned, due to a variety of possible factors, to manage a SBO 
firm. A somewhat less entrepreneurial owner-manager could be conditioned to manage a 
FEO firm. A conservative owner-manager would not be suited to manage a UDO firm. And 
so on. 
 
In conclusion, a closer look at the philosophy of the owner-manager may help explain its 
link to the orientation of the small business. As argued by Mintzberg and Waters (1982), a 
change in the strategic direction of the organization will only follow a change in the 
management philosophy of the dominant coalition. However the literature on this area is 
fragmented, particularly the literature matching owner-manager characteristics with firm 
strategic behaviour. Miles and Snow (1978) are a clear exception, and delve deep into 
management theory to describe defender-style behaviour (Type I behaviour, relating to 
the Scientific School) as opposed to prospector-style behaviour (Type III behaviour, 
relating to the Human Relations School). However, even these authors admit that more 
modern business configurations require newer, updated management theories. Various 
other authors (Covin and Slevin 1991; Entrialgo 2002; Ling, Zhao and Baron 2007; 
McCarthy 2003; Miller and Toulouse 1986) have sought to match owner-manager 
characteristics with firm strategic behaviour. 
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When referring to the UDO firm’s dominant coalition, two traits were evident, traits that 
appeared to be particular to the different coalition members. There was a visible 
component of professional management, not unlike the human relations philosophy one 
would expect. This involved strong organizational, delegation and motivational skills, and 
professional management with skilled leadership traits. There was also, however, a more 
heuristic form of management behaviour particular to that owner-manager who was less 
risk averse, more aggressive and proactive in his or her behaviour. This balancing act was 
commonly noticed in the more UDO oriented firms, where one coalition member would be 
the visionary, leading the firm in new and relatively unexplored directions, and the other 
member/s would work to ensure that the firm adopted the new business ventures in a 
structured and sustainable manner. This hypothesis can be extended towards the SBO 
end of the continuum if one were to argue that as the coalition reduced in size from two to 
one members, missing was the more entrepreneurial component of the team, or arguably 
less heuristic behaviour in the sole team member. Chapter 7 of the thesis will revisit this 
theme in more depth. 
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Chapter 7: The Dynamics of Small Firm Strategic Behaviour. A 
Trajectory-based Perspective 
 
7.1    Background and Overview of Chapter 
 
The preceding Chapter 6 has provided for an explanation of how the variables to the 
Framework (see Figure 5.2) established in Chapter 5 act and interact to explain the 
strategic postures adopted by small businesses. A typology-based approach was used to 
describe four different states of small firm behaviour; the small business orientation 
(SBO), the functional efficiency orientation (FEO), the related diversification orientation 
(RDO), and the unrelated diversification orientation (UDO). Firms invariably fell into one of 
these four classifications, with a focus placed on the firms’ present behavioural patterns. 
The firm’s contextual conditions, the strategic actions/reactions taken, and consequential 
stances adopted have defined which orientation the firm would relate to. However, both 
the strategy literature and the empirical data obtained in this research agree on an 
important point; small firm strategy is dynamic, and will change and evolve over time. This 
means that the four orientations defined earlier do not close the chapter on small business 
strategy. The grounded theory method of enquiry has allowed for detailed descriptions to 
be gathered on how the various firms adapted their behaviours over time, in reaction to 
competitive conditions and strengths/weaknesses acquired, to arrive at their present-state 
orientation. Explanations so far have emphasized the firm’s present form of behaviour, 
whilst using earlier contexts and actions to provide the impetus for this present behaviour. 
The trajectory of the firm’s changing behaviours over time has been somewhat ignored, as 
has the knowledge that can be gained from studying it. Corbin and Strauss (2008) in fact 
argue that it is most difficult for a researcher to keep track of such complex sets of 
relationships that shift and evolve over time.  
 
The previous chapter has argued that small firms, in the local context at least, can only 
have one of the four orientations (in other words, there are no others). Logically, a 
trajectory of firm strategic behaviour should be identifiable that shows firms evolving, or 
adapting, from one orientation to another. This is essentially looking at the orientations 
identified in Chapter 6, but also looking beyond (or more accurately, behind) these 
orientations to see what paths the firms adopted to ultimately arrive at these orientations. 
Hanks et al. (1993 p. 13) in fact reason that “if organizations evolve through a sequence of 
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stages, as theorized, then in a cross section of organizations, several stages should be 
represented”. In one of the few empirical studies on SME strategic trajectories it is this 
exact approach of using established clusters of firm behaviour “as markers or signposts 
for the pathways” (McMahon 2001 p. 202) to be mapped out. A similar argument is placed 
by Smith, Mitchell and Summer (1985 p. 801) in that “there are regularities in 
organizational development and that these regularities occur in such a way that the 
organization’s developmental process lend themselves to segmentation into stages”. It is 
this concept of strategic trajectories that shall be addressed in this chapter, once again 
using a typological approach, but this time to map out common trajectory patterns of the 
firms. Corbin and Strauss in fact attempt to explain this concept of shifting patterns of 
actions/interactions over time: “Conditions and consequences usually exist in clusters and 
can associate or covary in different ways, both to each other and to the related 
inter/action. Furthermore, with time and the advent of contingencies, the clusters of 
conditions and consequences can either change or rearrange themselves so that the 
nature of relationships or associations that exist between them and the inter/actions also 
changes” (2008 p. 92).  
 
The approach to be adopted shall follow two interacting and complementary themes. 
Firstly, the four strategic orientations defined so far shall be used as a basis for structuring 
and guiding the trajectory-based study. Again, four states of strategic behaviour were 
evident; small business orientation, functional efficiency orientation, related diversification 
orientation, and unrelated diversification orientation. The logic is simple; since no other 
form of strategic behaviour was uncovered, then the expectation is that the firms would 
always act (at a particular time) in line with one of the four orientations. Firms may change 
strategic states over time (i.e. evolving from one orientation state to another), but would 
not be expected to deviate from these established states into some new form of 
behaviour. Secondly, in line with the Strauss and Corbin (1998) strategy of constant 
comparison and ensuing validation, as the trajectory of each firm is mapped out, the 
analysis will assess whether the firms’ evolving behaviours can accurately be explained 
by using the four orientations as a basis.  
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Figure 7.1: The Four Strategic Orientations as a Mapping Tool 
 
Two questions thus need to be answered for this final analysis stage: 
 
1) What previous conditions influenced firms to arrive at their present orientation? 
Conditions here referring to contexts, actions and the influence of earlier 
consequences. 
2) What additional learning does an analysis of the trajectories provide towards the 
strategic behaviour of the small firms? 
 
7.2    Analytic Method Adopted 
 
The following analytic method consists of three sequential, but inter-related stages. The 
first stage has been aimed at mapping out the trajectories of the strategic behaviours of 
the 67 small businesses. Patterns in the strategic actions of the small firms were sought 
for, in line with evolving contextual conditions and consequential stances. This is truly 
Mintzberg (1978, 2007) and Hambrick’s (1983, 2003) concept of strategy as a pattern in a 
stream of actions, guiding an organization in its alignment with the environment and 
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shaping policy and procedure. The method adopted was somewhat of a laborious one, in 
which each of the individual firms was studied separately. Using the MAXqda Code Matrix 
Browser each individual firm (that is, the transcript of the owner-manager to that firm) was 
activated, together with the entire category schema. This highlighted a number of areas of 
high coding intensity for that particular firm. These areas were then reviewed through the 
Text Retrieved Segments function to gain a clear insight into the strategic behaviour of the 
firm over its various life cycle stages. This was immediately followed by a sketching 
exercise, where the strategic behaviour of the firm was mapped out by mapping the 
movements of the firm as it changed strategic posture over time. In the preceding chapter 
it had already been argued that four strategic orientations were evident, the present 
mapping exercise taking this one step further by sketching out the movement of the firms 
as they voyaged over time to arrive at their present-day orientation (that is, the SBO, FEO, 
RDO or UDO state). 
 
The resulting mapping exercise for all 67 firms is shown in Appendix 9.  For each firm a 
movement of the firm over time was mapped by a series of arrows, and a brief 
commentary that summarized the strategic behaviour of the firm was included. Also 
shown in Appendix 9 is a form of comparison between the entrepreneurial behaviour of 
the firm, the conditional lens, and the management philosophy of the owner-manager, 
depicted through vertical lines interacting between the themes. This shall be expanded 
upon in greater depth in this chapter.  Once the trajectories of all of the 67 firms were 
mapped out in this fashion a visual grouping exercise was carried out, aiming to collect 
the trajectories into common categories of similar patterns. Firms fell into one of five 
classifications.  This mental mapping process is advocated in the literature, and indeed it 
is argued that the alternative use of multivariate analysis to create taxonomies “were not 
substitutes for the mental inductive process” (McKelvey 1975 p. 511). The five 
classifications were named in line with their evident meaning, this now forming the basis 
of a trajectory-based typology. Appendix 9.1 shows the first classification of firms, named 
controlled focus.  Firms here were seen to have moved into a functional efficiency mode 
of behaviour, and were somewhat locked into this behaviour. Fifteen firms fell into this 
category. Appendix 9.2 shows the second classification of firms in what has been named 
contained growth. Thirteen firms fell into this category that mapped firms moving from a 
focused business posture to one of limited diversification. The third classification, shown 
in Appendix 9.3, depicts nineteen firms that had gone through a process of expansion and 
subsequent contraction. This category has been named repositioning. Appendix 9.4 
highlights six firms that had gradually expanded and went on to diversify into unrelated 
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industries. This category has been named dynamic growth. Finally, Appendix 9.5 shows 
fourteen firms that had contracted and retracted all the way back into a small business 
orientation, this category was named retrenchment.   
 
The table in Appendix 3 goes on to match out the five trajectory-based groups against the 
SBO-FEO-RDO-UDO cross-sectional typology that was the focus of Chapter 6.   A most 
interesting observation was evident here, one with important ramifications. Reference is 
made to the following Figure 7.2 that summarizes the comparison shown in Appendix 3. 
The similarities, and also the differences, are immediately apparent. For three of the four 
orientations identified in the preceding chapter, that is for SBO, RDO and UDO states, the 
trajectory-based classifications and the cross-sectional classifications hold a strong 
match. In other words, firms that had followed a retrenchment strategy all ended up in a 
SBO state (with one exception; firm 16, that closed down as opposed to entering an SBO 
state). Firms that had followed a contained growth strategy all ended up in a RDO state. 
Firms that had followed a dynamic growth strategy all ended up in a UDO state. 
Implications for this will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
However, Appendix 3 and Figure 7.2 highlight an important difference between the cross-
sectional and trajectory-based typologies, this difference pertaining to the cluster of firms 
identified earlier on as operating in a functional efficiency orientation (FEO) state. This 
cluster had been the largest by far, for which 34 of the 67 small businesses were identified 
with. Figure 7.2 illustrates that these FEO firms came from two distinct trajectories; 15 
firms following a controlled focus strategy and 19 firms following a repositioning strategy. 
The rational and implications of this shall be discussed in the following sections. It is, 
however, pertinent to observe that the trajectory-based typology provides a better spread 
of small business orientations than the cross-sectional states (as visible in Figure 7.2), 
enhancing its descriptive capability. Furthermore, none of the learning applicable to the 
cross-sectional typology (summarized in Table 6.1) has been lost, as the four orientations 
will be shown to be no more than life cycle states, with firms moving from one state to 
another in a set of common, observable patterns.  
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Figure 7.2: Comparison of Cross-sectional Typology to the Trajectory-based Typology 
 
It was previously mentioned that the analytic method adopted in this chapter covers three 
sequential stages. The first stage; that of mapping the small firm trajectories and placing 
into a typology, has been described above, summarized in Appendix 3, and depicted in 
Appendix 9. A second analytic stage followed this first one, and served to analyze in more 
detail the five categories found within the trajectory-based typology. The following sections 
shall proceed to discuss the rationale, actions and behaviours of the firms found within the 
different trajectory-based clusters. MAXqda, particularly the Code Matrix Browser and the 
Text Retrieved Segments functions were used to assist in this exercise. In particular, three 
conceptual categories were analyzed in greater depth for the five different cohorts of 
firms. These were: a) most importantly, the firm’s strategic actions and reactions taken 
over time; b) the historic start-up situation; c) the owner-manager characteristics.  
 
The third analytic stage has utilized the financial records of the small firms that were made 
available from the office of the local financial regulator. For this purpose a ‘registered user’ 
permit was obtained from the regulator, giving access to the database of limited liability 
companies registered in Malta. For each firm (that is for those firms that had accessible 
records) two sets of records were purchased. These consisted of the latest financial 
statements available (usually for financial years 2008 or 2009) and the statements for the 
financial year that was five years prior to the final financial year. The regulator’s financial 
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records went as far back as 1998 for some of the firms, but a decision was taken to look 
back to 5 years in order to acquire data on as many firms as possible. Notwithstanding 
this, complete data (going back 5 years) were only available for 48 of the 67 small 
businesses. Reasons for inaccessibility of the remaining firms were as follows; a failure of 
the firm to register its financial statements (4 firms; firms 23, 57, 61, 63), a failure to locate 
the firm in the regulator’s database (2 firms; firms 14, 16), businesses not limited liabilities 
(3 firms; firms 8, 19, 22), and firms not having a full five years of financial data (10 firms; 
firms 6, 9, 18, 27, 32, 36, 42, 46, 55, 62).  
 
Analysis of the financial records provided a range of ratios, such as the liquidity ratio, the 
capital structure ratio, return on equity deployed, net asset value and net asset value 
(NAV) fluctuations. After an in-depth analysis of the various ratios it was decided to focus 
primarily on two key indicators; the firm’s final net asset value and its NAV fluctuations. 
The net asset value provided an indicator of the size of the firm, and was a useful 
comparator to the full-time employee count used earlier on to measure firm size. NAV 
fluctuations gave a clear indication of the growth pattern of the firm, incorporating both 
investor equity and retained earnings. Three NAV figures were used here for the 48 firms 
that had a complete data set. These were for the final year (say 2009), the preceding year 
(2008), and a value that allowing for a 5-year comparison (2005). Values were normalized 
by dividing all three values by the final-year value. This gave three indicators, with the final 
indicator being the value of 1 that all the firms in a cluster would converge to. Graphical 
analysis highlighted variances in the patterns that were evident for the different typology 
clusters. This shall be discussed in more depth in the following sections. This financial 
analysis was imported into MAXqda as, in the words of Glaser (1998), all is data.   
 
7.3    Small Firm Strategic Behaviour: A Controlled Focus Trajectory 
 
As shown in Appendix 9.1, a total of fifteen small businesses displayed a strategy of 
controlled focus. In general this meant that these fifteen firms had never really gone 
beyond a functional efficiency orientation, having worked their way into, and being 
somewhat locked within, this form of strategic behaviour. The following Figure 7.3 
illustrates the trajectory observed for firms with this behaviour. Firms would start off in a 
FEO state or move into the state from an earlier SBO state. Firm size would fluctuate 
within this functional efficiency orientation, with the businesses’ engineering stance 
heavily focused on one core product or activity. 
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Figure 7.3: Controlled Focus Strategic Trajectory 
 
A quick look at the statistics for this group of firms is in order (summarized in Table 7.1 
below). Average coalition size was at 1.53, meaning usually one or two owner-managers. 
The firms were the smallest, asset size, and second smallest when considering employee 
count. An interesting picture emerged regarding the average age of the firms in question, 
highlighted in Figure 7.4 further on. These firms were, on average, the youngest of all, 
with an average age of 14 years. This provides somewhat of an explanation for the lowest 
net asset value (NAV), as the NAV of a firm would normally grow over the years as 
retained earnings cumulate into a final value. 
 
 
Trajectory 
Type
Final 
Orientation
Number 
of Firms
Average 
Employee 
Count
Average 
Members in 
Dominant 
Coalition
Average 
Firm Age
Average Net 
Asset Value 
(Final Year € )
Average 
Liquidity
Average 
Gearing 
(Outliers 
Removed )
Controlled 
Focus FEO 15 12.00 1.53 14 173,423 139.0% -9.3%
Contained 
Growth RDO 13 18.15 1.38 21 583,505 166.3% 23.0%
Repositioning FEO 19 18.58 1.53 28 656,508 383.5% 49.9%
Dynamic 
Growth UDO 6 34.33 2.33 18 1,368,630 132.0% 33.2%
Retrenchment SBO 14 7.21 1.21 27 307,773 314.6% 32.1%
 
 
Table 7.1: Summarized Statistics for the Trajectory-based Typology 
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Average liquidity shows firms that had no significant cash-flow problems, whilst the 
gearing ratio (capital structure ratio) indicates firms that were not prone to growth through 
long-term debt. Both the age and the financial records of the 15 firms appear to indicate 
fairly young firms that had purposely chosen to target and specialize within one core area 
of operation. This viewpoint is complemented by the FEO characteristics that had been 
summarized in the earlier Table 6.1, and also corroborated by an analysis of the NAV 
fluctuations for the firms in question over the years. Figure 7.5 shows a graphical analysis 
of the firms’ NAV fluctuations over the most recent 5-year period. Figure 7.5b is an edited 
version of Figure 7.5a in which the visible outlier, Firm 12, has been removed to enhance 
the comparison (this approach will be repeated for the remaining trajectories). The trends 
show firms that are slowing down in growth, and even contracting towards the final year, a 
picture that is supported by the firms’ unwillingness to go for high gearing. The firms’ 
historic start-up situation (analyzed through MAXqda’s Text Retrieved Segments 
function) revealed firms that had been built upon the previous experiences and 
backgrounds of the founders, who were now the owner-managers. An example of this is a 
quote provided by a company manufacturing and retailing paints (Firm 64):  
 
There were three, three directors. They met and opened up the business between 
them”. (Did they have a knowledge of the particular industry)? “Well, two were on 
construction and finishes, and the other used to work with one of them”. (So as 
such it was a new industry for them), “they extended somewhat from construction 
and painting, so they redirected towards paint.  
 
A second example (Firm 9) comes from an engineer who had spent his life working for a 
manufacturing company within the quality control department. His knowledge of the 
industry, the processes, and an understanding of the market pushed him to open up a 
company focused solely on quality testing, and actually providing a service to the 
company that had employed him in the beginning: 
 
Towards of my work experience I used to work at (name of a firm mentioned), and 
at that place there was certain work that was being sent to Germany for work 
inspection to be carried out, because the German customers wanted it that way. I 
had gone up to Germany to see what they were doing over there, and I was of the 
opinion that there was nothing that we couldn't do in Malta.    
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Figure 7.4: Average Firm Age for the Trajectory-based Typology 
 
 
Owner managers perceived the existence of a market, very often a niche market that they 
could serve given the skills they had and their love of the job. In fact, there was an evident 
pride on part of the owner-managers to have created a firm based upon what they knew 
how to do, and evidently enjoyed doing. The following quote, to this effect, comes from the 
owner-manager of a software development firm (Firm 55): 
 
I have been in computers since 1980, to be precise 1978. Before 1978 I used to 
take an interest, I was still at school those days. Myself and my friend started, I 
think, the first singe board computer in Malta. We are proud of this. I remember, by 
today’s standards it was insignificant. And I remember we had taken it to an 
exhibition, and everyone had been amazed with this computer. And computers 
were always something that I loved.  
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Figure 7.5a: NAV Fluctuations for the 
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Following the review of the historic start-up situation, MAXqda’s Text Retrieve Segments 
was directed towards the strategic actions/reactions that the 15 firms had taken over 
the years. Evident was the fact that the owner-managers had perceived a less competitive 
environment in the induction years. Knowledge of the value adding processes that the 
industry demanded, together with previous experience in operating within the markets 
concerned, had allowed the owner-managers to effectively carve out niche markets 
required to provide them with a client base for their companies. The firms in question were 
predominantly service oriented (11 of the 15, as summarized in Appendix 3), with a far 
stronger focus on local markets than foreign markets. With less than a half million 
inhabitants this automatically suggested market limitations, either earlier in the firm’s life 
cycle or later on as industries matured. An interesting issue was the fact that the firms 
were in various stages of their life cycle, some in growth, others in late maturity. This may 
be more understandable when looking at the ages of the firms (Appendix 3), as some 
firms were less than five years old whilst others were over thirty years old. One question 
needs to be asked, however; why were there no controlled focus firms that were more 
than 35 years old?  Three possible answers are apparent; the sample size did not allow 
for a sufficient variety in age, or with such a controlled focus in a limited market firms 
cannot survive for long stretches of time, or the firms would evolve into a different 
trajectory over time and in the right circumstances. More will be said about this later on. 
 
Also, the standard life cycle concept was less applicable to the small firms in question 
than to their larger counterparts. Some of the firms appeared to be within what has been 
called the loop-within-a-loop life cycle, expanding and contracting as projects came in or 
major clients were serviced. When asked directly whether he felt that his firm was in 
growth, maturity or decline, the owner-manager of a systems provider firm (Firm 7) had 
the following to say: 
 
We offer different products, so each product has its own life cycle. And each 
product makes a difference for our company. If you have an Lm100, 000 turnover 
and you had to make a Lm100, 000 project, that's, on its own, a year's turnover. 
So really and truly, from my experience when you're analyzing a small company 
like mine, the stages are very misleading.  
 
 
The strategic actions/reactions category revealed a number of aspects regarding the 
actions taken by the firms to compete over the years. The engineering stance adopted by 
the firms was always specialized, and even more fine tuned to be so over the years. The 
main objectives appeared to be efficiency and expertise. For the operations-based 
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businesses (firms 9, 10, 12, 30, 36, 53, 55, 64) this was carried out through building 
dedicated resources, skilled expertise, and somewhat mechanistic engineering functions. 
In some cases high levels of automation were applied to achieve this aim, whilst in others 
routine manual operations were adopted, such as in the manual sorting of O-rings to test 
for quality (Firm 9). Organizational structures tended to be fairly flat, thus reducing excess 
bureaucracy and enhancing the owner-managers’ span of control. For the more project-
oriented businesses (firms 1, 7, 8, 22, 42, 45, 62) this was carried out through a number of 
integrated means; through standardization, by building a template for operations, by 
refining and improving upon this template over the years, and by adapting the template to 
the project/s at hand at the time. This does not mean that the firms were inflexible, rather 
that the flexibility was bounded in favour of efficiency of implementation. Two quotes are 
given below, the first for a more project-oriented translation service firm (Firm 62) and the 
second for a more operations-based garage door manufacturer (Firm 53): 
 
(Question: The fact that you are proof reading is an additional expense. Does the 
customer appreciate that?) Good question, good question.  I think, OK it all 
depends on the client, but very often I find, as standard because we have a lot of 
international clients. So, our prices are still very competitive, but obviously there is 
that extra cost. I am very open about it. And it is standard. We are very, very 
inflexible about it. It’s very, very rarely that we even think of not proof reading, 
especially if it’s a language that we are not sure of. 
 
 (Question: Is there a high element of expertise to make the door, high skills?) Not 
so much, no.  This is because the machines we have are all computerized, thus if 
the employee has, say, basic literacy, he knows what a control is, if he can take 
measurements, if he is of basic intelligence, he will be able to take on the job. But 
you have to be careful, if you have a measurement, say 3 metres, you do not go 
for 2 ½. A bit of attention is needed. (So the employee really needs to be 
dedicated and focused on the job?). Other to that, by time he will adapt, say two 
months.  
 
Irrespective of the type of activity, owner-managers seemed to understand their customer 
needs all too well, and essentially built their operations to revolve around these needs. 
Building brand identity and maintaining this identity was continuously high on the agenda. 
In most cases, the older firms in the cohort were experiencing increasingly competitive 
scenarios as industries became more saturated, earlier competitive advantages were 
eroded, and the competitive landscape evolved. This enhanced competitiveness and 
more dynamic industry conditions was being counteracted by the firms with renewed 
efforts to excel in a particular product or service, in an attempt to sustain the barriers of 
entry that had been created earlier on. The owner-manager of Firm 62, specializing in 
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translation services, explained how the firm had adopted a policy of rigorously proof-
reading translated works in a bid to provide an unparalleled level of service to customers. 
The owner-manager of Firm 45 (engineering services) described how the firm was 
increasingly being faced with less work, and how they had decided to specialize 
predominantly on the marine industry, supporting this by cutting costs and by stocking in 
key materials not readily available to competitors. The owner-managers of Firm 53 that 
manufactured and installed garage doors explained how they only used top quality metals 
and fixtures to try and retain their market share in an industry that was increasingly being 
tapped into by operators working without a business permit and under-cutting the market. 
The following quote was provided by the firm: 
 
Well. Understand me. Anything that can affect the purchasing power of clients will 
affect you.  This is because, if I am making a door at, say 2.5 metres by 2.5 
metres, and I am making it at a price of, for example, 100 pounds, and he can go 
to someone else who gives it to him at say 95, he will say ‘I have a door, I have 
closed off my garage’, and that’s it. Now, sometimes they will not take notice of the 
fact that the door is thicker from behind, or has slightly thicker material. It is as long 
as they have saved that something. Now, everything that affects the price will 
affect our sales. (If you have a consumer with less purchasing power, will material 
cost be decreasing?). Metals are increasing a lot in price. (So price if iron is going 
up, clients are trying to cut down, does this not create quite a difficult situation?). 
Yes. In fact it is a very difficult situation. At the moment it is very difficult. Very 
difficult.  
 
This leads to the first of three propositions that will be stated for this particular form of 
strategic behaviour: 
 
Proposition 1: Younger, smaller firms often adopt a controlled focus strategy that looks 
towards competency building in one core activity/process, a strong owner-manager 
knowledge of the industry and skills in the firm’s key engineering processes, and a strong 
client dedication within a limited consumer market. 
 
Delving into the owner-manager characteristics category one sees firms that are being 
managed by persons of strong values, determination and drive.  Integrity in actions and 
responsibility towards stakeholders, both within the company and outside, were deemed 
to be important criteria. Also repeatedly mentioned was a financial focus, that is, a focus 
towards company revenues. This is not in conflict with the integrity drive mentioned 
before, and in fact helps to explain the focused management philosophy of the owner-
manager. Two quotes are provided below that demonstrate this owner-manager integrity, 
one for an engineering firm (Firm 45) and the second for a printing house (Firm 30): 
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The price will not be put down in order to do a bad job. Better not do it at all. (but 
wouldn’t others skimp on the price in order to get the job?). let them have it! it is an 
advantage to us, because the client will come to us afterwards.  
 
I believe in three values; integrity, quality, and discipline.  And apart from that I 
believe in perfection.  Unfortunately I am a perfectionist (laugh), so it adds on to 
the quality we expect. (Does it pay off ultimately?). It might pay off to the client, but 
it will not pay off with me.  Because I worry a lot.  But yes, at the end it pays off 
with the client. 
 
It had been queried earlier on why firms following a controlled focus trajectory did not 
appear to reach the older ages seen in the other categories. The owner-manager 
characteristics may provide an important clue here. Appendix 9.1 shows the strategic fit 
between the firm entrepreneurial behaviour and the owner-manager entrepreneurial – 
conservative stance, moderated by the conditional lens. Taking the oldest group of 
controlled focus firms, those having exceeded 30 years of operation (Firms 8, 45 and 53); 
one notes that there is an evident strategic fit between the entrepreneurial behaviour of 
the firm and the owner-manager management philosophy. This can be seen by the 
horizontal lines matching the firms’ orientation with the owner-managers’ management 
philosophy. In other words, for these three firms there is no initiative by the owner-
managers to drive the firms into more entrepreneurial behaviour, such as into 
diversification. The owner-managers moderately conservative stance suited the static 
engineering stance adopted by the firm. Two quotes that demonstrate this less assertive 
and less risk-oriented philosophy come from the owner-managers of Firm 45 and 53: 
 
You have your wage. Do your work as you are supposed to. I will do my work as 
supposed to. 
 
First of all I am not alone here.  So I cannot enforce my beliefs. I can have my say, 
let me put it that way, but I cannot say… I cannot enforce something, there must 
be a certain discussion. 
 
Younger firms had different levels of match (or mismatch) between the firm 
entrepreneurial behaviour and the owner-manager philosophy. Whilst some firms 
appeared to be managed by more conservative owner-managers (i.e. firms 1, 9, 22, 30, 
42, 62 and 64), others were being led by owner-managers with visibly stronger 
entrepreneurial tendencies (i.e. firms 7, 10, 12, 36 and 55). Quotes from the owner-
managers of firms 10 and 12 indicate this more entrepreneurial behaviour. 
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I think you have to be very passionate to work in this business because it's a very 
fast business, that's how the name came about...   
 
 
You must be a bit of a risk taker as well in business.  As you might have noticed I 
am involved in many businesses, not just here.  This is my base.  To be successful 
in a number of businesses obviously you need to have certain business acumen... 
you need that without fail.  
 
This concept of convergence of firm age with management philosophy could well mean 
that as firms matured those firms with an existing match between the firm behaviour and 
the owner-manager philosophy would grow old as controlled focus firms, whilst those with 
a mismatch (owner-managers more entrepreneurial) would either die out or evolve into a 
more growth-oriented trajectory (soon to be analyzed). The conditional lens would 
determine the success or failure of these more entrepreneurial owner-managers to adapt 
their firms to a different strategic orientation. An example is a laboratory firm (Firm 36) that 
was strongly focused on one core activity, but with the owner-manager aware that the 
local market was too small to sustain the firm in this way. The owner-manager was 
attempting to overcome his own limitations (and was reading for a degree in business) as 
well as the industry limitations by diversifying into related areas of expertise but in entirely 
new markets: 
 
We have tried (to diversify). But we do not yet know what competition is coming. 
We are considering going into (a new business line mentioned). But we are not yet 
sure of the market. We need to see if it is worth it or not. (Would you approach this 
in a cautious manner?). Well, once you have made your decision then you go for 
it. You get going because it is always the same, it is a major investment. We 
cannot invest piece meal, you need to build the capacity at one go… once you 
have decided. It will involve a large amount of capital.  
 
In conclusion this means that the controlled focus trajectory is either a means to itself for 
firms that remain focused on a core activity/process, or solely a temporary state for firms 
that ultimately adopt a more entrepreneurial form of behaviour. Implications are various, 
not least of all from a profitability perspective, as shall be shown when the NAV growth 
that is depicted in Figure 7.5 is compared to that of other trajectories. However, 
performance and profitability for small firms are two entirely different matters. The more 
conservative owner-managers may be more than happy to follow a controlled focus 
trajectory, allowing them to achieve from the firm what they consider to be true 
performance. This leads to two further propositions for the controlled focus trajectory: 
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Proposition 2: Firms that adopt a controlled focus trajectory view performance in terms of 
increase in financial criteria, such as achieving stable revenues, and non-financial criteria 
particularly customer satisfaction and quality of service provided. These firms will have a 
very low growth and the lowest net asset value of all.    
 
Proposition 3: More entrepreneurial owner-managers will adopt the controlled focus 
strategy as a temporary state whilst more conservative owner-managers will permanently 
adopt a controlled focus strategy. 
 
 
7.4    Small Firm Strategic Behaviour: A Contained Growth Trajectory 
 
Appendix 9.2 depicts a total of 13 firms that demonstrated a strategy of contained growth. 
What this means is that the firms in question had evolved from an earlier, more focused 
stance into a behaviour of controlled growth and expansion. These firms would all have 
ultimately entered and settled into a related diversification orientation (RDO) state (as 
shown in earlier Figure 7.2), meaning that there was a cautious diversification into 
technologies and product markets that were somewhat related to the earlier core areas of 
operation. Table 6.1 in the preceding chapter summarizes the RDO state, with the focus in 
this section being placed more on the trajectories of the firms in order to avoid repetition. 
The following Figure 7.6 summarizes Appendix 9.2 to show a mapping of the general 
trajectory of these 13 firms. 
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Figure 7.6: Contained Growth Strategic Trajectory 
 
A quick review of the essential characteristics of these firms is in order, as summarized in 
Table 6.1 in the preceding chapter. Owner-managers will have entered into industries in 
which they are adequately knowledgeable, industries that ranged from young and 
munificent to more dynamic and competitive. The owner-managers invariably boasted a 
wide range of skills, experiences and qualifications. The businesses were mainly in growth 
or early maturity, with a diversity of ages ranging from 3 years to 50 years. The owner-
managers were seen to be deploying a two-staged strategy of first grounding the firm in a 
core engineering process, and then launching additional, related activities that were 
complementary to this core process. There was a wide variety of physical resource 
deployment within various business settings, and owner-managers were seen to exercise 
a strong direct control on costs, employee skilling, employee performance, and employee 
task.  
 
An overview of the statistics of these 13 firms gives some insight into their strategic 
behaviour. The earlier Table 7.1 shows that the firms are averagely sized, both in 
employee count and in net asset value. The size of the dominant coalition is on average 
1.38, meaning between one to two members (more often one than two). The average firm 
age is 21 years, with the older firms exceeding 40 and even 50 years of age. Only one 
firm was less than 10 years old. Financial ratios showed a healthy liquidity and a 
moderate gearing. 
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Figure 7.7a: NAV Fluctuations for the 
Contained Growth Trajectory 
  Figure 7.7b: Edited NAV Fluctuations for 
the Contained Growth Trajectory 
 
 
Figure 7.7 above looks at the NAV fluctuations of these contained growth firms over the 
years. The firms are evidently in growth, even though the gradients are leveling out 
somewhat towards the final years. Nevertheless, the NAV growth for these firms over the 
last year was at nearly +8%, compared to a -7.5% for the controlled focus firms described 
earlier on. The individual firm analysis shown in Appendix 9.2 depicts an owner-manager 
entrepreneurial philosophy on par with, or in excess to, the moderately entrepreneurial 
behaviour of the firm. As in the previous section three categories shall be analyzed in 
further depth, aiming to provide a further understanding into the trajectories of these firms. 
These are once again the historic start-up situation, the strategic actions/reactions taken 
by the firms over time, and the owner-manager characteristics.  
 
The firms’ historic start-up situation showed firms that had start-up criteria not unlike 
those of the controlled focus firms. Owner-managers would have either been inducted into 
the business at an early age, or would have used their skills and knowledge of the 
industry to craft a company at later stages in life. The skills, experience and qualifications 
of the owner-managers were apparent, more so than for those of owner-managers of 
controlled focus firms. Again, industries were less saturated in the start-off years. A quote 
to this effect comes from the owner-manager of Firm 63, a business that started off 
specializing in the manufacture of leisure sea craft:  
 
(And in 1983, was there a reason for that industry, that sideline, maybe the 
experience?). Well, basically, there was the demand for fiberglass products those 
days. They were not imported at all. Even boats, for example, it was not feasible to 
import boats from abroad those days. So there was a larger market for that type of 
production. That was the main aim.  
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The firms mainly started off from a FEO, as opposed to an SBO, stage. This means that 
the businesses were professionally created from the start, and not as some form of part-
time venture (one exception to the case is that of Firm 56 where the business did indeed 
start off as a part-time venture). A strong business focus, tied down with qualifications and 
expertise, characterize the start-off state. Two quotes are provided below showing these 
traits, the first from the owner-manager of a stone masonry firm (Firm 39) and the second 
from the owner-manager of a firm providing IT equipment and services (Firm 14): 
 
(How long has the company been in existence?) As a company we have been 
since 1995, but before that we were partners and had commenced in 1981. Before 
we used to be stone masons with my father. I spent 8 years working in the 
construction industry. And that is the advantage that we have. We have the 
mason’s license. We have worked and experienced stone, concrete constructions, 
structures… we have 8 years experience. Then we switched over to this work… so 
when the builder comes we know, from scratch, what they want. Even if we are 
talking to an architect, the knowledge of the technology is there.  
It was a company owned by my father. Then myself and my brother started off, we 
are both engineers, electrical engineers. First I started off because I had graduated 
in 1992.  In the meantime my brother had assisted, he then graduated in 1997, 
and then we started off on this work 
 
The strategic actions/reactions category identified a number of actions being taken by 
the 13 firms over the years in a bid to build and sustain competitive advantage.  None of 
the firms appeared to be in decline, predominantly being in growth or in early maturity. As 
mentioned before, the general competitive approach of the firms was to first build 
expertise in one core activity or process, and then develop competencies in related areas 
but in different markets. As competencies grew and synergies gave the firms a 
competitive edge some of the firms became somewhat more selective in the customer 
base they chose to serve, going for a higher end, better paying customer. Examples of 
this specialization – controlled diversification approach are various. Firm 3 started off 
solely in agriculture but then diversified into the heavy engineering industry, particular the 
water sector in which they already held some expertise. Firm 14 initially started off in PC 
repair and retail, but then diversified into industrial uninterrupted power supplies, 
printer/toners, CCTV, and security systems. A quote from the owner-manager of Firm 14 
shows this approach towards a somewhat cautious, related diversification: 
Nowadays we are not just on IT, we have now developed into other branches, 
because we carried out a certain amount of diversification.  We always remained 
focused on electronics, but nowadays we are also focused on security, not just on 
IT.   
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Often owner-managers were seen to be quite innovative in their approaches towards 
developing new lines of expertise and in penetrating new markets. An example of this is 
Firm 56 managed by a husband-wife team, where the husband took care of operations 
and technical product development whilst the wife managed the more administrative side 
of the business. Initially the firm had started off by building an expertise in commissioning 
seamless flooring, mainly focusing on large commercial and industrial clients. The firm 
went on to develop a material that was an off-shoot to the flooring compounds used, and 
was particularly applicable as a water-proofing membrane ideal for the local climate. The 
following quote by the owner-managers expands upon this theme: 
 
Eventually… it is myself and my husband who work as directors in the company. 
Through his entrepreneurial skills he got to know things, and we eventually moved 
on. It started from one of the glues that we used to use on the (name of product 
mentioned). We developed a product, and said ‘this is really good for 
waterproofing’, and we developed it for the Maltese market.  
 
The actions taken by the firms to widen their competency basis were well thought out, 
allowing the firms to build competitive advantages that were difficult to emulate. Resource 
deployments were applied that were often inimitable and unsubstitutable, allowing for 
what Dierickx and Cool (1989) would call a ‘privileged asset position’. In fact, these 
contained growth firms were doing no more than what has been advocated within 
resource-based theory for a long while. As Wernerfelt (1984 p. 175) aptly argues; “firms 
need to find those resources which can sustain a resource position barrier, but in which no 
one currently has one, and where they have a good chance of being among the few who 
succeed in building one. They have to look at resources which combine well with what 
they already have and in which they are likely to face only a few competitive acquirers”.  
One example is Firm 54 that initially boasted one core activity; stock control point-of-sale 
systems. The expertise of the owner, coupled with his experience and knowledge of the 
industry, subsequently allowed him to carefully diversify into the industrial PC market, 
equipment recycling, point-of-sale equipment, and different IT-related applications. 
Another example is that of Firm 48 where the owner-manager gradually enhanced existing 
product lines with additional services and products, such as commissioning and 
calibration. Of interest to note is that this equipment importer/retailer firm was still adding 
product lines and related service activities after 15 years of operation, and saw his firm to 
be positively affected by the existing economic situation as weaker companies floundered 
and their customers were distributed amongst the survivors. The following quote by Firm 
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63 shows how this particular firm intelligently tapped into different levels of the industry’s 
value chain in a bid to build and sustain competitive advantage: 
 
We basically go into sports boats, powerboats, and sport rafts. What we do not go 
into is sailing boats. This is because it is not our line, and we do not have the 
facility to go into that work. Plus there is a big competition from yachting yards. I do 
this work only and they do not do our work, so… we do not go into it. And we try to 
be as much as possible vertically integrated, because if we say ‘let us do this job’, 
we also try to get our own supplies. We source them out ourselves, as much as 
possible being vertically integrated, such that we say ‘I have a piece from here, a 
piece from here, a piece from here’. Put the whole picture basically, and you get 
your returns, decent returns.  
 
The issue of whether to enter foreign markets was a common one, obviously high on the 
agenda of many owner-managers as they perceived local markets to be very much of a 
zero-sum game. Not unlike the earlier controlled focus firms the focus of the contained 
growth firms was primarily on local markets. Many of the firms had an export function or 
were carrying out work abroad, but this rarely contributed to more than a minor 
percentage of total sales. There were healthy spill-offs though, as the exposure allowed 
the firms to develop additional competencies, both technical and in support areas such as 
in marketing and servicing. The additional sales also acted as a buffer in times of low local 
demand. Many of the firms had tried some form of internationalization, with varied, but 
usually limited, degrees of success. Firm 3 tried, and failed, to gain a foothold in North 
Africa when it attempted to tap into the construction industry there. The owner-manager of 
Firm 32 did not perceive establishing a base in foreign markets to be one of choice, but of 
necessity. The perception of the highly qualified and experienced owner-manager of this 
architectural firm was that the local market had become excessively saturated. His firm, 
although having diversified into four related architectural activities, was losing ground to 
low cost one-man architectural start-ups. Although earlier attempts at internationalization 
had failed, the owner-manager said this about the company’s future prospects: 
 
The concept (growth) has been there since 1995.  It might have its setbacks. I 
have had setbacks… in Libya it was a setback. Probably because I wasn’t 
managing the company myself, I was a technical director. And I would have done 
things a lot differently to the way they were done... I believe the only way for 
growth in our sphere is basically to go overseas. So unless one gears up for that… 
one will not survive.  
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As described in Chapter 6, organizational structures deployed by these contained growth 
firms were generally flat but were still predominantly mechanistic and centralized in 
operation. Strong controls were exerted by owner-managers on employees, backed by the 
owner-managers’ intrinsic knowledge on the firms’ engineering processes. The factors 
described until now allow for a first of three propositions (numbered 4, 5 and 6) to be 
made for these contained growth firms: 
 
Proposition 4:  More professional firms often enter a contained growth strategy that 
consists of a two-staged approach of first specializing in a core competency and then 
diversifying into moderately related activities and markets. This allows for the creation of 
differentiated products/services and a more select consumer base. Owner-managers are 
multi-skilled and exert strong control over the firms’ resources. 
 
Performance criteria of importance described by respondents seemed to tie down to three 
integrated concepts. Firstly there was a strong focus on sustaining and growing relative 
market share, of enhancing the customer portfolio either quality or quantity-wise. The 
second performance criterion regarded providing a differentiated product/service, high 
quality standards and an ensuing brand identity that would allow the firms to win and 
retain customers. In other words it was important for the firms to build a viable customer 
base (first criterion) and also important to know how to retain and grow this base (second 
criterion). The third criterion was more of measurement, that is, what measures were 
important to the owner-managers to allow them to make intelligent strategic decisions. 
Measures mentioned were predominantly financial, such as turnover, expenditure, profit, 
and return on equity. The financial analysis carried out earlier shows firms in gradual but 
stable growth, with average net asset values increasing by 33% over a five year period. 
This leads to a second proposition: 
 
Proposition 5:  Firms following a controlled growth strategy will look towards three 
performance criteria: enhancing the client portfolio; sustaining a strong customer base 
through a differentiated product and strong brand identity; and a varied range of financial 
measurements. Firms here have a moderately large net asset value and stable NAV 
growth.  
 
Finally, the level of strategic fit between the entrepreneurial behaviour of the firm and the 
management philosophy of the owner-manager shall be discussed. Appendix 9.2 
illustrates this concept for the 13 individual firms in the contained growth category. Already 
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argued is the issue that the firms invariably demonstrated a moderate level of 
entrepreneurial behaviour by following the contained growth trajectory. However, once 
again, there was no automatic match between the behaviour of the firm and the 
management philosophy of the owner-manager. Whilst firms 20, 48, 54, 56, 63 
demonstrated strong congruency between the orientation of the firm and the philosophy of 
the owner-manager, for the remaining 8 firms the entrepreneurial spirit of the owner-
managers was observed to go beyond that of the firms. Understanding the logic of this 
situation is important as it could explain, for one, whether the firms would stop at an RDO 
state or possibly develop further into a UDO state. Particularly, the concept of the 
conditional lens shall be used again to attempt to understand the apparent mismatch. 
Looking at the 8 cases individually it appears that two particular factors, one 
organizational and the other individual, act within the conditional lens to limit any higher 
levels of entrepreneurial behaviour by the firms. Four of the 8 firms (3, 18, 32 and 61) 
appeared to be conditioned by organization–environment limitations. The firms in question 
had built a certain momentum, certain resource configurations, that made it difficult to 
move out of the dynamic and sometimes aggressive environmental conditions that the 
firms were operating within. The firms would have to build new and somewhat unique 
resource configurations, and time, finance, additional knowledge and a redirected focus 
would be required for this to happen. This may be one reason why UDO firms were seen 
to have a larger dominant coalition with stronger academic qualifications. The following 
quote by Firm 3’s owner-manager demonstrates this difficulty in finding a way out of a 
highly competitive situation: 
In our case a simple push-fit plumbing system there are at least twenty competitive 
brands for one product line, and that goes to show that typically everyone has a 
five percent market share. And with a five percent market share you cannot really 
invest in middle management.   
 
Possibly more difficult to overcome than the organizational limitations would be the 
second conditional factor; owner-manager limitations due to specialization and an 
expertise in the existing industries and related competencies. Owner-managers of the 
additional 4 firms (14, 39, 40 and 59) were seen to fall into this category. Specialization 
would inevitably result in owner-managers channeling their entrepreneurial energy into 
their existing areas of expertise, even if there was a willingness to diverge. Owner-
managers would need assistance to overcome this limitation, possibly by training, skilling 
or once again by increasing the size and skills of the dominant coalition. The following 
quote by owner-manager of Firm 59 belies a highly entrepreneurial individual who has 
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placed all his life’s focus on building up a conference industry on the Island, with little time 
and energy to diversify further: 
 
In 1978 I began seeing what we call today ‘the conference industry’ on the horizon. 
So when in 1978 no one was talking conferences, I was already seeing the 
possibility of getting into Malta a company…. I have (now in 2009) been saying for 
a long time, in our circles here in Malta, that we haven’t yet scraped at the iceberg 
called conferences.   
 
In conclusion, a third proposition summarizes the issue of firm – owner-manager 
congruence: 
 
Proposition 6:  More entrepreneurial owner-managers will adopt the contained growth 
strategy as a temporary state whilst more conservative owner-managers will permanently 
adopt a contained growth strategy. 
 
 
7.5   Small Firm Strategic Behaviour: A Repositioning Trajectory 
 
Appendix 9.3 shows 19 firms that have been identified as following a repositioning 
strategy. The word ‘repositioning’ has been adopted due to the common behaviour of the 
firms in first energetically diversifying and going into new product/markets, but 
subsequently contracting back into a functional efficiency mode of operation. As illustrated 
in the earlier Figure 7.2, this is the second batch of firms that finally settle into an FEO 
state. The following Figure 7.8 illustrates the general trajectory for the 19 firms. The figure 
shows that although the firms’ final orientation is FEO, similarly to that of controlled focus 
firms, the trajectory is very different indeed. 
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Figure 7.8: Repositioning Strategic Trajectory 
 
 
Reference is once again made to the summary of the firms’ essential characteristics, 
shown in Table 7.1. The firms are the second largest in size, both by way of employee 
count (average of 18.6) and with respect to the firms’ net asset values (average of 
€656,508). The dominant coalition was also the second largest, with an average size of 
1.53. These were the oldest firms of all (Figure 7.4), in fact on average double the age of 
the controlled focus firms (that had also settled into a similar FEO state). The firms had 
the highest liquidity of all, and were also the most heavily geared with an average capital 
structure ratio of 50%. A look at NAV fluctuations over the years (Figure 7.9 further on) 
shows a diffracted picture. As opposed to the four other trajectories (visually compared in 
Figure 7.15 later on), no one particular pattern could be discerned from the individual 
trajectories of the firms. Some firms had a substantial increase in NAV, others a significant 
reduction, others still had minimum variation. The implications of this will be discussed 
further on.  As for the other trajectories, the database in Appendix 3 summarizes these 
firms’ characteristics. 
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Figure 7.9a: NAV Fluctuations for the 
Repositioning Trajectory 
     Figure 7.9b: Edited NAV Fluctuations for 
the Repositioning Trajectory 
 
As the firms’ final form of behaviour has already been summarized in Table 6.1 (under the 
FEO state) the focus here is more on the firms’ trajectories, and their meaning. The firms’ 
historic start-up situation was the first category to be analyzed, as usual using 
MAXqda’s Text Retrieved Segments. The picture that emerged showed two generic start-
up scenarios, one for ‘established’ firms and the other for more recently set up firms. The 
‘established’ firms were generally over 20 years old, many over 30 years old (firms 5, 11, 
52, 58) and some even exceeding 60 years in age (firms 4, 60, 67). The word 
‘established’ is being adopted here as the firms had a historic track record on the island, 
the company brand names were well known, and the firms often related to a respected 
business family. These businesses were often pioneers, having created an enterprise 
from virtually nothing, but also having had the advantage of starting off in a munificent 
industry with little competition. An example comes from the owner-manager of Firm 11, a 
company that went on to diversify into some three totally independent areas of business 
operation: 
My grandfather began... he was in Malta from Italy in 1885. And he formed his own 
small business, all on his own. Those times he was a craftsman, and he used to 
make gloves and handbags. Then he pulled in his son, and his son opened up a 
shop, and then my father opened up a shop. Then in the 60's, late 60's he (my 
father) began his own business or early 70's. 
  
Another example comes from the quote of professionally employed manager of Firm 21, a 
company manufacturing wastewater-related products. The start-up of this firm goes a long 
way in explaining the resulting strategic behaviour of the firm. The conception of the firm 
was based the logic of an international company requiring a marketing base to fuel its 
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expansion within the Mediterranean. The marketing base was set up, and was supported 
by the local company also commencing manufacture of the product. As costs at the 
mother company’s other plants increased, sales fell, and the local firm showed more and 
more manufacturing expertise, the picture changed. The local company was refocused on 
high-end manufacture and innovation creation to fuel future product design.  Within years 
the firm took over all the manufacturing requirements of the mother company. 
 
The company has existed for 10 years.  I can tell you from what I have learnt and 
from what I have heard.  (Name of company mentioned) which is the mother 
company, has been founded for some 40 years, they have vast experience in the 
sector.  The company in Malta started off in 1998, some 10 years ago.  And it 
started off with the objective of being a marketing office in the region of the 
Mediterranean.  It would tap the local market, the North African countries, Libya 
and Tunis, Dubai, Qatar, Oman, Greece and Cyprus.  In other words countries in 
the Mediterranean, and where there would be the market for this type of product.  
In time, obviously, the company developed into the manufacturing arm of the 
group. 
 
As mentioned earlier it was not only ‘established’ firms that followed a repositioning 
strategy, as there was evidence that even more recent firms with a shorter life cycle would 
adopt this strategic trajectory. Firms such as firm 2, 25, 26, 37, 46 and 51 are an example 
of this, often having started off part-time or with minimal resources to support the business 
in its early days. Once again, the historic start-up situation provided some insight into the 
strategic behaviour of the firms.  A moderate to high level of entrepreneurial owner-
manager behaviour was always evident, as the owner-managers strove to create a 
business from little more than their skills and experiences. An example of this comes from 
the quotation shown below from the owner-manager of Firm 51. Of interest to note is the 
trajectory of this firm shown in Appendix 9.3. The owner-manager had always displayed 
somewhat of a conservative management philosophy, as evident in the gradual induction 
into the business. The business had gone on to diversify and grow, but with limited 
success. The owner-manager ultimately chose to reposition the firm to focus solely on 
audit related activities.  
 
I had started off the business on a part-time basis… it was difficult to leave a full 
time job, and having the pay of a financial controller which was quite good. So to 
leave the post of financial controller from an established company, to leave and 
start off on your own… it is not easy.  
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The strategic actions and reactions of the 19 firms in the cohort were carefully analyzed 
to learn more about the behaviours and competitive conditions of the firms over time. 
From the multitude of actions and reactions it appeared that there were three distinct 
repositioning scenarios that the firms could face. Although the situational factors were 
different in each case, the resulting trajectories of strategic behaviour were largely the 
same.  If one reviews the two main questions of interest in the research; ‘what is 
happening and why?’ the first question has already been addressed in the study of the 
firms functional efficiency orientation (FEO) in Chapter 6. The firms were adopting an 
efficiency or productivity-oriented philosophy. They were highly focused towards a limited 
range of products or services, either highly routinised or highly specialized. Strategic 
actions being taken by the firms were mainly aimed at strengthening their FEO posture. It 
is the question why that significantly distinguishes these repositioning firms from their 
controlled focus counterparts, bearing in mind that both groups ultimately adopt a similar 
functional efficiency (FEO) state. A look at the three repositioning scenarios is in order, 
and for this to be done the owner-manager characteristics also have to be taken into 
consideration.  The first repositioning scenario is in the minority with only two firms falling 
into this sub-category; firms 46 and 51. This appeared to be a situation where the firms 
had diversified and grown beyond the entrepreneurial philosophy of the owner-manager. 
The following quotation by the owner-manager of Firm 46, a one-man recording studio, 
refers: 
 
I have always gone to the client and have learnt the principle of doing things one 
piece at a time. There is no need to run, no need to hurry. If today I can afford to 
buy that object, I will buy that object, and I take the maximum that I can from it. If I 
cannot go there, I will not try. (Cautious?) Very much so. That is me. That is my 
ethic. 
 
Of interest to note is that the firm in question had started off with two owner-managers, 
and diversifying into video editing, a different industry with a different market. This was 
unsuccessful and the business was refocused on running a recording studio, this time with 
one person as the second owner-manager had died and was not replaced. Appendix 9.3 
in fact shows the owner-manager’s conservative philosophy to be the limiting factor in the 
firm’s behaviour. A similar situation is that of Firm 51 where the owner-manager 
repositioned his firm in the core initial area of audit work after failing to pull in a partner 
and expand into other finance-related activities. An identical mismatch of conservative 
management philosophy with more entrepreneurial firm behaviour can be seen in this 
second case. One may possibly argue that the two isolated firms in question actually fit 
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more into a controlled focus strategic trajectory. In fact, there is somewhat of a fine line 
between a controlled focus strategy of oscillating around one core product/service and a 
repositioning strategy of moderately diversifying and then retreating. The remaining 17 
cases are, however, more clear in their demarcation, as shall be shown. 
 
A second repositioning scenario exists for firms 2, 4, 5, 11, 17, 31, 37, 52 and 67, 
although again the final focused outcome is the same. A look at the firms’ trajectories in 
Appendix 9.3 quickly identifies these firms as having a clear business – owner-manager 
philosophy mismatch. In all cases the management philosophy of the owner-manager is 
substantially more entrepreneurially inclined than the evident business orientation. This 
mismatch does not mean that the business is doomed to failure, as indeed an argument 
has been placed in Chapter 6 that entrepreneurial managers can adapt to a more 
conservative line of behaviour more in tune with the operational conditions of the firm. An 
example of this more entrepreneurial philosophy, owner-manager of Firm 11 had the 
following to say about how the firm was made to adapt to changing competitive conditions: 
 
We are very, very flexible, and if something is not working... we call a spade a 
spade and... change. 
 
The question why once again surfaces here; why did these firms ultimately reposition into 
the more conservative functional efficiency orientation after having initially taken on such a 
different and more entrepreneurial diversification strategy? For example, Firm 2 chose to 
close down its various subcontracting activities and focus instead on one high-end 
electronic product. Firm 5 had initially branched into a number of electrical and electronics 
industries but was increasingly repositioning itself within the home/office control market. 
Firm 11 had opened up many years ago into three different business lines of home décor, 
baby goods and textiles, but was now moving out of textiles and consolidating its business 
of household goods. Firm 31 had initially branched into cigar manufacture, refrigeration, 
blending/epoxy paint manufacture and tampo-printing, but was now selectively targeting 
cigar manufacture and moving out of the other lines of business. And so on. It is not to say 
that all the businesses in this group eliminated all but one line of business, some 
repositioned themselves within more than one of the business lines adopted initially. 
However, even in these cases the business orientation within the individual lines was one 
of a functional efficiency orientation, that is, a highly focused and efficiency–cost directed 
stance.  The answer to the question why appears to lie in the conditional lens, particularly 
in the limitations placed upon the business by the competitive environment. A review of 
the competitive landscape for these firms reveals a changing business environment, one 
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that has put severe pressures on the firms’ operations and even their very survival.  An 
example is a quote from a cigar manufacturing company (Firm 31) that had been forced 
by global labour trends to outsource much of the cigar manufacture activity: 
 
Today things are still the same, but instead of in Malta, there are other countries; 
Sri Lanka, Indonesia (so you do part of the process). So here, since we have 
entered the E.U., we are working in the same way that they used to work in 
Belgium before, but automated. So we do not even prepare the tobacco over here. 
I buy the source of my material from Sri Lanka. Why? Because I am going to buy it 
from there in a ready cut fashion, not cutting it myself. Low labor cost, with top 
quality tobacco. 
 
Another example comes from the owner-manager of Firm 4, a business manufacturing 
and installing apertures on a commercial scale. The local industry conditions had become 
so competitive and saturated that this more established firm was finding it difficult to justify 
the prices it charged for the higher end services that it provided: 
 
A different situation… another hotel. We were around Lm10, 000 higher in a bid of 
Lm120, 000, around 7, 8% more expensive. The client did not want to give us the 
contract and told us that the other offer was cheaper. We told him that those prices 
were impossible for us to meet. So he gave the work to someone else. Half-way 
through the supplier failed! But the client is only seeing costs, unfortunately. 
 
 
Again and again the quotes from the owner-managers showed environmental conditions 
that were negatively affecting the competitive advantages held earlier by these older firms 
(keeping in mind that these are the oldest firms of all, see Figure 7.4). Repositioning 
seemed the logical thing to do, allowing the firms to re-establish themselves in what they 
did best. Environmental forces impacting upon the firms came from various sources; the 
direct industry, the local environmental – competitive conditions, and also the global 
environment. The changing competitive landscape is summarized in the following quote 
from the owner-manager of Firm 2: 
 
Hence our business is getting tougher and tougher. You will, however, always find 
a niche, that is someone who has specific needs that you are equipped better for. 
 
Earlier on it was mentioned that three repositioning scenarios were apparent, two of which 
have been described so far. The third scenario relates to firms 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 58 
and 60. There is a small but important difference between this group and the one 
discussed before; a better strategic fit between the management philosophy and the firm’s 
entrepreneurial behaviour. In general the managers of this group were more conservative 
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in behaviour, and with a reason; they appeared to have been purposely inducted into the 
business with the aim of taking the business towards a particular strategic direction. In 
fact, none of the managers were owners of the businesses in question and all, without fail, 
had been professionally employed for the task. A clarification is in order here, a 
conservative nature does in no way imply a manager who adopts a paternalistic or totally 
democratic philosophy. The managers in question were skilled, focused and consistent in 
their visible behaviour, but did not demonstrate the traits necessary for the creation of new 
business, of new product/markets. This appears to be fully in line with the focused 
demands of the owners of the businesses, these persons often being the earlier owner-
managers themselves and the ones that had created the businesses in the first place. 
This situation is described by Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007 p.679) as one where “the focus 
for older firms shifts from growth to stability”. An example comes from the manager of 
Firm 60, who explained how the Directors had first created the particular business and 
then subsequently employed him to manage it. Very evident was the loyal but 
conservative nature of the manager as he took the business in the direction that the 
Directors wanted. The overall strategy is well mapped out by the trajectory; grow the firm 
into a number of businesses, then get loyal employees to run these is a focused fashion: 
 
The group is always looking towards new investments to expand and grow. As a 
family they have always preferred to leave the profits within the company, and 
invest them.... A case in point, I have been with the company for 13 years. I came 
in as an accounts clerk. Today I am a senior manager in the firm, I have certain 
responsibilities, I am responsible for 40 people in one of the subsidiaries… Yes, 
yes, and the directors keep very much in touch. The management also has a very 
good relationship.  
 
Another example of the consistent yet conservative nature of these employed managers 
comes from Firm 21. Once again these were not the owners of the firms, but managers 
employed to run the firms. Even the motivational styles being adopted betray a focus 
towards continuity and a lack of energy towards business creation. The following quote 
comes from the professional manager of Firm 21, similarly employed to manage one of a 
number of businesses created by a well-known local entrepreneur: 
 
But, as a person I like to be a bit flexible.  So, for example, not necessarily if I am 
thinking in a certain manner, I will expect others to behave exactly in that manner. I 
feel that I am flexible, for example if I say I think that this should be done this way, 
and you say no, that should be done that way, I am not too proud to say yes.   I 
prefer to give the person enough leeway to work the way he wants to…  I also feel 
that everyone should feel important... Possibly one of my defects is that I am not 
always tough enough with people. 
   
175 
 
Possibly the best example is that of five of the firms in this group; that is, five limited 
liability companies owned by a single, large business family. The family purposely 
employed a well-known local CEO, who was known for his success in cost cutting, to take 
over the management of the five small businesses. The CEO had the following to say 
about his role in taking the businesses in the direction that the shareholders wanted: 
 
I think that we have gone through a lot of changes here these last few years.  I 
think that at the moment it is survival.  That is the key, survival and controlling 
debtors.  You might say what is a value in debtor, but at the end of the day it is 
what counts.  So, rescuing the company, and get it to at least break even this year, 
surviving, and trying to get debtors under control because they are not under 
control.  
 
Whilst the business environment may have induced the owners of these firms to employ 
particular traits of management, one still has to acknowledge the strategy of achieving a 
match between the firm behaviour and the management philosophy in a bid to follow a 
targeted repositioning trajectory.  In summary, the first of three further propositions (7, 8 
and 9) describes this trajectory: 
 
Proposition 7:  Firms will follow a repositioning trajectory when either organizational – 
environmental or individual conditioning factors will no longer allow the firms to compete in 
a more entrepreneurial, diversified fashion and instead force the firms to consolidate and 
refocus on core areas of business operation and niche markets.  
 
Another important parameter is, as usual, the performance of firms following this particular 
trajectory of strategic behaviour. The most evident measure of performance that is 
intrinsic to the nature of these firms is the success by which they manage to reposition 
themselves into a stable, functional efficiency orientation. As has been seen, firms may do 
so either out of choice or are induced by the competitive environment. In fact Covin and 
Slevin (1991 p. 21) argue that “in certain contexts, a conservative strategic orientation will 
be preferable to a highly entrepreneurial posture”. As seen in Table 7.1 and Figure 7.4, 
these are the oldest and second largest cohort of firms, both by way of net asset value 
and employee count. Earlier on the diffracted nature of the firms’ NAV growth was 
demonstrated (Figure 7.9b). The two main groups of repositioning firms (those influenced 
by the environment and those by the choice of manager) were then analyzed separately, 
as shown in the following Figure 7.10: 
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Figure 7.10a: NAV Fluctuations for 
Repositioning Firms with 
‘Organizational’ Influences 
   Figure 7.10b: NAV Fluctuations for 
Repositioning Firms with ‘Individual’ 
Influences 
 
 
The graphs above go some way in explaining the scattered nature of the earlier Figure 
7.9. Growth measured by NAV fluctuations was more consistent, and more gradual, for 
the firms induced to reposition due to organizational – environmental conditions. The 
mean NAV growth over 5 years was at 34%. For the firms that had had a purposeful 
management change the NAV growth was more scattered and more steep; at a mean of 
nearly 50% over 5 years. One possible reason for this could be that the owners of the 
firms had purposely brought in professional management to induce stability into the firms, 
whilst at the same time obtaining the loyalties and benefits desired. Looking at the 
subjective descriptions for performance (MAXqda’s Text Retrieved Segments), a number 
of performance criteria surface repeatedly. Two inter-linked criteria seemed to be the main 
focus for the firms. These were a) stability measured by sales/turnover, efficiency in 
operations, and effectiveness in launching projects, and b) profits at the end of the day, 
again as a measure of revenues against cost efficiencies. In summary, two further 
propositions are put forward for firms following this repositioning trajectory: 
 
Proposition 8: Firms following a repositioning strategic trajectory will look towards 
building stability in revenues and sales, and in achieving adequate profits in line with 
shareholders’ expectations. Firms here have a large net asset value but fragmented net 
asset value growth. 
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Proposition 9: More entrepreneurial owner-managers will be forced to follow a 
repositioning trajectory due to an increasingly adverse business environment whilst more 
conservative managers will be employed by owners of the business to follow the trajectory 
purposely.  
 
7.6    Small Firm Strategic Behaviour: A Dynamic Growth Trajectory 
 
 A total of 6 firms displayed a trajectory of dynamic growth, as shown in Appendix 9.4 for 
firms 6, 13, 15, 29, 41 and 66. The individual firm trajectories indicate that most firms 
started off in a more contained functional efficiency orientation, with only one firm (Firm 6) 
appearing to have started the trajectory from a more diversified base. As demonstrated in 
Figure 7.2 and Table 7.1, all the firms following this dynamic trajectory ended up in an 
unrelated diversification orientation (UDO) state. The following Figure 7.11 illustrates the 
trajectory for the firms in question. As Chapter 6 has already discussed in depth the UDO 
state, the focus here shall be placed upon the logic and context of the trajectories of these 
6 firms and any new insights that this will bring.  Appendix 3 summarizes the statistics of 
these firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
 
Figure 7.11: Dynamic Growth Strategic Trajectory 
 
 
A look at the statistics of these 6 firms reveals an interesting picture. The earlier Table 7.1 
shows the firms to be the largest of all, in fact almost double in size (from all aspects) to 
the second largest group; the repositioning group. What makes this interesting is that this 
group is in fact one of the youngest, as illustrated in the earlier Figure 7.4. Average 
employee count is at 34, there are on average 2.33 members in the dominant coalition, 
and the average net asset value is at €1.37 million. The following Figure 7.12 shows the 
NAV fluctuations of the firms in question, excluding Firm 6 that had not been in existence 
for the five-year duration. The general growth pattern is the steepest of all groups, with 
firms on average doubling their net asset value over the five-year period. This can be 
seen clearly in the comparison of patterns shown further on in Figure 7.15. In other words 
one has here a fairly young group of firms that have adopted an aggressive growth 
trajectory. Table 7.1 also shows a strong liquidity and a healthy gearing ratio. 
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Figure 7.12:  NAV Fluctuations for the Dynamic Growth Trajectory 
 
A quick review of the general characteristics of these firms, discussed in Chapter 6 and 
summarized in Table 6.1 (for the UDO state), is in order. These were moderate to high 
technology firms with a wide array of physical resources. HR consisted of high 
technological levels of expertise and skills, and flat but centralized structures were mainly 
being deployed. The owner-managers were heavily involved in both creating and 
sustaining diversified value adding activities, going into new industries and new markets to 
that originally started out on. The high professional and academic levels of the owner-
managers allowed for this diversification, allowing them to add products/services that were 
dependent on their innovativeness, knowledge and entrepreneurial aptitude. Firms were 
seen to be reinventing themselves and often working in the margin. Chapter 6 has also 
argued the case of perceived environmental uncertainty, in the case of these firms this 
being particularly low. What this implies is not that the competitive landscapes were 
munificent, but that the particular characteristics of the owner-managers allowed them to 
perceive (and then act upon) opportunities to diversify and grow. 
Two other observations can be made from the trajectories shown in Appendix 9.4 and the 
descriptions provided earlier in Chapter 6. Firstly there is the strongest strategic fit of all 
firms between these firms’ entrepreneurial behaviour and the management philosophies 
of the owner-managers. In fact this cannot be any other way when one considers the 
earlier argument that management philosophy is unidirectional; entrepreneurial managers 
can manage a ‘static’ firm whilst conservative managers cannot manage a ‘dynamic’ firm. 
Hence the entrepreneurial nature of the firm demanded a similar management philosophy 
from the dominant coalition. This also hints at another observation; does this mean that 
firm – owner-manager strategic fit is directly related to organizational performance? 
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Arguably retrenchment firms (to be discussed next) would be on the other end of a 
contraction – growth continuum, and in fact had the lowest financial performance of all. 
They also had the largest firm – owner-manager strategic mismatch of all. Interesting 
though this is it is somewhat of a simplification of the true nature of small firm 
performance, as has and shall be argued. Another point to be mentioned regards the roles 
of the different members of the dominant coalitions, particularly when it came to taking 
strategic decisions. It was observed that the entrepreneurial behaviour of the coalition 
would often be a teamwork-based approach, with one member acting more 
entrepreneurially and other members acting more mechanistically. High risk, proactive 
behaviour was very often seen, but it was often bounded by limitations placed by different 
coalition members. A clear example of this is in the following quote coming from the more 
conservative of two owner-managers of Firm 66: 
 
My brother is insisting that we add a section over here, and that, and the other. 
The existing showroom is small. True, but how feasible is it that you have another 
showroom and you put a few additional things. Why? All right, it’s available today, 
it may not be available tomorrow. So if we say we want to expand a bit, what do 
we do? Do we lose it? what do we do?... Today you need money, wages today… 
You have to take all these things into consideration. 
 
A look into the historic start-up situation of the firms shows immediate high levels of 
entrepreneurial behaviour by the owner-managers, even if the firms in question were 
initially focused on a limited set of competencies and product/markets. This may explain 
the aggressive company growth rates from the start. The first example below comes from 
owner-manager of a waste management firm (Firm 41), that started off as a waste 
collection agency and then opened up into bin retail, recycling and waste management 
consultancy. The initial proactive and innovative behaviour of the owner-managers can 
immediately be seen in the quote below: 
 
We looked at waste management as a concept, and saw that Malta was far behind 
here. We went for this system that is used outside the island… that of using skips 
for industrial waste. As a company our target has always been industrial waste. 
That’s how it all started. We did our marketing, and a one-to-one business 
meeting, with the clients… as this is a new concept. You have to see how to 
explain it, see how it will work via cost effectiveness, see how it will be attractive to 
them. In those steps, we were the first there.  
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Of interest to note is that the owner-managers in question had no real business 
experience in waste management, but did come from a family with strong business 
acumen. Also, risk was contained to an extent in the way the firm fought to gain valuable 
land rights to base the business on, and this without entering into any obligations with the 
stakeholders concerned. A similar example comes from Firm 13, one of the earliest 
supermarkets to be established on the Island and now being developed into one of the 
first shopping malls. Once again the initial proactive and innovative behaviour is most 
evident, particularly when considering that these investments were a first for the country. 
The present owner-manager described the earlier start-off as follows: 
 
More than difficult, the amount of work that Malta and Libya were doing together 
began declining. So, that was why... profits began going down, and one begins 
asking if one can do something else. And he diversified at those times in a radical 
way. (Was it his vision?). Yes, his, his.  He had gone to Australia, and he had seen 
the first hypermarkets over there, we could not go 'hyper', although these days this 
establishment is considered by the Italians as a hypermarket, due to the amount of 
products we have. 
 
A look into the strategic actions and reactions over time (MAXqda’s Text Retrieved 
Segments) shows more clearly what steps the owner-managers were taking to grow their 
businesses. Already argued in the previous chapter is that the firms were all in an evident 
growth stage of their life cycle, even if firm ages ranged substantially from 8 years to 33 
years. An urgency to branch out into new industries and markets before maturity could 
possibly sink in is most evident in the quote below from the owner-manager of Firm 6: 
 
Our core business areas in the Mediterranean and in Scandinavia were evolving to 
a level where they weren't necessarily new operations. So our consulting services 
were reaching a plateau in some respect, so we wanted the R&D company to help 
us evolve within our existing markets, and also to help us penetrate new ones 
whilst, at the same time, setting up the Arabian operations to try and penetrate into 
the Arab world and also East Africa and Asia.  
 
Once again the notion of accessing foreign markets is seen, allowing the firm to avoid a 
situation of limited market size. Even more aggressive in their drive to go global is the 
case of Firm 15, a business that was started off by two pharmacists who then used their 
MBA-based knowledge to help them diversify into inventory management, amongst other 
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activities. As demonstrated by the quote below the moves towards diversification were 
highly premeditated, and were strongly supported by the skills and entrepreneurial 
aptitude of the owner-managers: 
 
Five years ago we decided to internationalize our business, and we set a goal that 
by 2010, 70% of our personal wealth has to come from overseas businesses… 
When we started to see what we could do to target markets outside Malta. We say 
our strengths, were they were. We are very good retailers, we are very good at 
managing inventory.  
 
Not all the dynamic growth firms resorted to foreign markets, however, and firms such as 
13, 41 and 66 relied predominantly on local markets, limited they may be.  Chapter 6 has 
already described how the diversification activities of these (UDO) firms were directly 
dependent on the innovativeness, knowledge basis, entrepreneurial flair, and sheer hard 
work of the owner-managers. Care has been taken here to avoid repeating the 
descriptions provided in Chapter 6 on the resource and engineering implementations of 
these firms. The issues described so far allow for a first of three propositions (10, 11 and 
12) to be made for these dynamic growth firms: 
 
Proposition 10:  Highly professional firms will enter a dynamic growth trajectory that will 
leverage the vast skills, knowledge and experiences of the owner-manager teams to give 
the firms entrance into unrelated industries and markets. Owner-managers will be heavily 
involved in both creating and in sustaining the firms’ various value adding activities. 
 
An overview of the performance objectives of these firms is in order. Owner-managers 
discussed various performance-related criteria such as; a range of growth and expansion 
measures, successfully reinvesting into the company, aggressively marketing the firm, 
acquiring new competencies, various efficiency measures, profits, and acquiring larger 
market shares. If one is too add to these descriptions the general trend of the 
respondents’ descriptions as well as the information provided in the objective analysis of 
the financial records, then the performance of these firms can be summed up through a 
second proposition: 
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Proposition 11:  Firms following a dynamic growth trajectory will measure performance 
by way of two criteria; in the growth of the firm and in ways and means by which growth 
can be fuelled, measured, and sustained. These firms have the steepest growth and 
largest net asset value of all. 
 
One issue remains; it still must be understood if the trajectory of these firms is an end in 
itself or if it should be related to any other of the strategic trajectories. Put differently, are 
these firms destined to keep on growing, having no maturity or decline to their life cycle? 
The evidence so far points towards fairly young firms with energetic, ambitious and skilled 
owner-managers. It is also evident that the successful growth of these firms is heavily 
contingent upon the direct contribution of the owner-managers. The firms’ growth depends 
upon their coalition and its consequences… and this coalition will not last forever, at least 
not in its present form. A number of predictions can be made here; three in fact. The first 
one regards the boundaries of the firm, particularly with regards to firm size measured by 
employee count. It was this parameter that actually defined the boundaries of this 
research endeavor, with a decision to study small firms characterized by employing less 
than 50 full-time employees.  Referring to Figure 7.11, this would imply that the firms 
would continue to grow until their employee count reaches 50, at which point the small 
firm no longer exists as a small firm but as a medium-sized firm (50 – 250 employees). At 
this point the patterns of strategic behaviour for the small firms would no longer be evident 
in the form and fashion identified in this study. Arguably this means that the pattern shown 
in Figure 7.11 is final; small firms will follow the trajectory until they cease to be small 
firms.  
Two other possibilities exist, and have somewhat of a similar trajectory. The study has 
already shown that a repositioning trajectory exists, often followed when owner-managers 
diversify into different businesses and then employ professional management to run the 
separate business units in much of a functional efficiency orientation mode. The owner-
manager will want to focus her entrepreneurial drive elsewhere, and will ensure that the 
business unit is managed efficiently whilst providing the revenues and synergies that are 
needed. A third possibility comes as a further development to the second. Possibly the 
business units or firms that are re-starting off in FEO mode will themselves diversify and 
grow, causing a repeated loop to that shown for the repositioning strategy. Whichever of 
the three eventualities taken the trajectories identified in this study appear to be able to 
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describe effectively the ensuing patterns of strategic behaviour of the firm that is 
continuing to grow. This brings us to a third proposition for this trajectory: 
 
Proposition 12: Owner-managers adopting a dynamic growth trajectory will either drive 
the firm towards growth outside the remits of the small firm, or reposition the firms’ 
developing business units into a functional efficiency orientation mode.  
 
7.7    Small Firm Strategic Behaviour: A Retrenchment Trajectory 
 
A total of 14 firms followed what has been termed a retrenchment strategy. Appendix 9.5 
provides the individual trajectories of these firms whilst Figure 7.13 below visualizes the 
general trajectory. As shown in Figure 7.2 and Appendix 3, all but one of the 14 firms 
ended up in a small business orientation (SBO) state. The exception is Firm 16, a 
company that closed down whilst still in FEO mode. Again the focus here shall be on the 
implications to the trajectory as the previous chapter has discussed the SBO state in 
some detail. The word ‘retrenchment’ has been adopted as the term has a variety of 
similar meanings (i.e. to cut down, reduce, economize, curtail, limit) that aptly describe the 
evident behaviour of the firms in question. 
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Figure 7.13: Retrenchment Strategic Trajectory 
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The statistics of the 14 firms show a group that is amongst the oldest with an average age 
of 27, but with no firms below 15 years of age. These were the smallest firms by way of 
employee count (average 7.2) and the second smallest with respect to net asset value 
(€307,773). This is consistent with the literature on ‘traditional’ or ‘lifestyle’ SME’s 
(Mc.Mahon 2001).  The firms also had the smallest size of dominant coalition (average 
1.21) at usually one member, with only three of the firms utilizing two members. Average 
liquidity was one of the highest and gearing was moderate. An analysis of NAV 
fluctuations over the most recent five-year period confirmed fully the retrenchment 
strategy adopted by the firms. The firms’ NAV fluctuations, visualized in Figure 7.14, 
showed the lowest growth gradients of all groups, with a NAV contraction of 12.7% in the 
last year alone. 
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Figure 7.14a: NAV Fluctuations for the 
Retrenchment Trajectory 
  Figure 7.14b: Edited NAV Fluctuations for 
the Retrenchment Trajectory 
 
A quick review of the nature of these firms, as described in Chapter 6 for the SBO mode, 
is in order. A static view showed firms faced with increasing levels of competitiveness, 
with changing consumer patterns, and with supply often exceeding demand within the 
industries concerned. Firms often perceived an unfavourable playing field with little 
government support, and adverse economic conditions. The firms were usually in mature 
or decline stage, and were seen to be implementing actions towards retrenchment, 
efficiency maximization, cost reduction and control. Businesses were usually focused 
towards one core competency, one in which the owner-manager had an intrinsic 
knowledge and vast experience. Proactive behaviour and risk levels appeared to be low, 
resource bases were somewhat limited, and often opportunity costs for the businesses 
were high. The threat of technology obsolescence was always present, and owner-
managers were, on average, nearing retirement age. This does not mean to say that the 
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trajectory could not include younger firms that chose not to evolve beyond a small 
business orientation.  
 
As for previous trajectories the historic start-up situation shall be analyzed, as this 
provides important information on the origins of the firms. It had been previously argued 
that the management philosophy of the owner-managers of these firms would not 
necessarily reflect the static, conservative, nature of the firms. This is once again the 
unidirectional concept of management philosophy–business orientation alignment, where 
even highly entrepreneurial owner-managers could be seen managing a static firm. The 
information provided by respondents clearly demonstrates this concept. A first example 
comes from Firm 65; a manufacturing company specializing in making candles. The 
conservative nature of the owner-manager is most evident in this recollection of why the 
business was started 24 years before: 
 
I needed to… to do something!  To get in my wage. I did all the accounts myself. I 
said, there was a manufacturer in Rabat who had closed down, he had been there 
for ages, supporting his family. Candles have existed since before Christ. They 
should remain a necessity. I said, if they could do well if I worked hard, I should go 
well.  
 
A similar example comes from Firm 43, a manufacturing firm specializing in constructing 
and installing aluminium apertures and frames. The choice of the industry belies the 
conservative nature of the owner-manager, a gentle and easy going personality. Of 
interest in this case is the fact that the owner-manager had three incentives encouraging 
the firm to shrink towards an oncoming closure. Firstly, the industry was becoming overtly 
saturated with low-cost, smaller players. Secondly, the owner-manager was himself 
reaching retirement. Thirdly, the opportunity cost for the business, or more aptly for the 
land on which the business was lodged, was extremely high. The owner-manager clearly 
demonstrated his management philosophy in the behaviour that was enacted at start-up, 
as the following quote shows: 
 
Originally it was carpentry. It spent some 3, 4 years focused on wood, and then we 
turned to aluminium. (Any particular reason to go to aluminium?). it was something 
new those days. There was a demand for it. It is easier to work as a skill. Wood 
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demands more skilled employees. It was basically easier those days. Today it is 
more difficult to survive in this industry. (Why?). Easy to explain. Those days when 
we had started we were 4 companies in Malta. Today, listed, there are more than 
250, in Malta alone.  
 
However, as argued before, not all the owner-managers demonstrated this more 
conservative philosophical nature. Referring to Appendix 9.5, firms such as firm 16, 33, 
35, 38, 44, and 57 all portray a management philosophy that is more entrepreneurial than 
the evident behaviour of the firms. The start-up situation of Firm 57 is a case in point. The 
owner-manager had worked with some of the major auditing firms, building substantial 
expertise but also showing a strong drive to strike out on his own. The decision was taken 
even though the firm had to be very creative in devising ways of pulling clients away from 
the large HR trainers in the country. The following is a quote from the owner-manager of 
the firm in question: 
 
And I left. I went with an audit firm, and I spent 12 years working with audit firms, 
such as Ernst and Young, Pricewaterhouse, KPMG, Grant Thornton. In the 
meantime I was always on the go; my sideline was always on the go. The HRD 
sideline. Whilst I was initially in HRD I did this anyway, then one fine day I had 
decided to build it into a firm.  
 
In order to understand better the logic of this retrenchment trajectory a closer look must be 
placed on the strategic actions and reactions taken by the owner-managers over time. 
When looking into the firms’ behaviour individually, it was evident that there was not one 
but some five different situations for firms choosing to adopt a retrenchment strategy. 
Firstly there were two firms that appeared to have always wanted to perform in an SBO 
state with little additional ambitions, these being businesses 19 and 50. Firm 50 is a small 
family business, importing, roasting and selling coffee. The owner-manager professed that 
he would love to see the family’s younger generation coming into the business, seeing this 
as an important success factor. The following quote shows where the real company focus 
lies: 
 
And for standards, the client will establish this for me. And I need to make them 
(the client) happy, and I expect that the staff will work to make them happy like I 
do. If you want to keep on working with me. I am generous and I pay them well, I 
am not stingy. But I expect that every person that walks out of my shop feels 
satisfied and happy. The client, that is. And he will come back.  
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A second situation arose where there was a mistaken mismatch between the owner-
manager characteristics and the business. This was the situation of Firm 16, a company 
that was sold by the initial owner-manager to a new owner who knew nothing about the 
industry. The firm ultimately failed and was repurchased by the initial owner. The third 
situation is an individual case where there is a strong mismatch between the owner-
manager management philosophy and the firm entrepreneurial stance. This is a good 
example of where an entrepreneurial manager successfully manages a more conservative 
firm. The shareholders of Firm 33 are a German family who really see the business as no 
more than an extension to their family. The manager, a professional and dynamic 
engineer, does not agree with their business stance but adopts it loyally. He comments, 
however, as follows: 
 
My wish, and I have had this for some time although they do not necessarily agree 
with me… I would like to expand, yes. It has to be done carefully. In the sense 
that… I want to sell a more complete product. When we started here we 
were…(name of product mentioned). And if someone came and asked for a 
platform, I would say no… we do (name of product mentioned). Today I have 
changed that view. And argue my case. Because they (owners) have the 
perception that we should not compete with our customers. My argument is 
different, especially in Malta. If you can give a complete service… you do 
business.  
 
The fourth and fifth situations are where most of the companies in the group lie. The fourth 
situation is one where an organization – business environment mismatch has forced the 
firms to change their business approach and has pushed them, albeit reluctantly, all the 
way back into an SBO state. This can be said for seven firms; 23, 34, 38, 43, 47, 49 and 
65. To an extent the situation of these firms is a variant of the repositioning strategy; here 
firms are retracting from a functional efficiency orientation into a small business orientation 
(instead of from RDO/UDO to FEO). Once again the issue of environmental determinism 
comes into play, in fact five of the seven firms (23, 43, 47, 49 and 65) operate in 
increasingly hostile manufacturing environments. The remaining two service firms also 
operate in saturated and highly competitive industries; real estate and the confectionery 
industry. However, the conservative nature of the firms’ management philosophy (as 
visualized in Appendix 9.5) once again points to the concept argued in Chapter 7 of 
perceived environmental uncertainty. The question that needs to be asked is ‘why don’t 
the firms try to diversify and move out of the excessively competitive environment they are 
in and instead choose to perceive insurmountable odds for which retrenchment is the only 
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option?’ This concept of perceived environmental uncertainty goes a long way in 
explaining how the business environment is perceived and acted upon by the firms’ key 
players. It is not how munificent or hostile the business environments are… but how they 
are perceived to be (and ultimately acted upon) by the owner-manager. This means that 
the firm’s management philosophy has a dominant role in aligning the firm with the 
business environment. For example, take the following quote by the owner-manager of 
Firm 49, very much demonstrating a defeatist approach towards the competitive 
landscape: 
So, at the moment I am seeing the situation… in the sense that it is not 
manageable. You cannot manage it. I mean, I have a target, supposedly next 
Thursday I do so much work, and I am not on target at all. The things have 
become, in fact it is as though I am giving up. I can’t manage the company as it is.  
 
In similar vein the following quote comes from the owner-manager of manufacturing Firm 
23. By way of explanation the owner-manager was complaining how a government 
decision to privatize the national shipping line had contributed to the competitive downturn 
of the company: 
 
Let's say one thing, one blunt straightforward thing.  Before we had Sea Malta.  
Not politics, this is not politics. Before we had Sea Malta, and now we have 
Grimaldi. The prices have gone up, fuel has gone up, fair enough. Except, we 
used to get shipments on Monday morning, the ship would come in on Sunday. 
Now, Grimaldi comes in on Monday afternoon. So we get our goods on Tuesday!  
 
The fifth situation is essentially one of premeditated hibernation, that is, firms purposely 
choosing to slow down their business into an SBO mode for one reason or another. Firms 
35, 44 and 57 fall into this category, all three firms having a management philosophy that 
is more entrepreneurially oriented than the more static behaviour of the firm.  Owner-
managers of Firms 35 and 44 are in near retirement and appear to be holding on to their 
firms in anticipation to the induction of family members. The owner-manager of Firm 57 is 
younger, has just gone through a personal setback, and sees the firm to be waiting for a 
revitalization. The following quote from Firm 35 demonstrates this two-staged approach of 
first adopting an entrepreneurial, creative stand, and then easing back in anticipation:  
 
Over here I first started off with a small phase. On a smaller scale. In the beginning 
you need to take care of various things, such as where to put the compost, where 
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to pasteurize, and other things. Then I started to attend courses abroad. I was 
always adventurous, because to learn and to meet people was always 
something… I could have closed down this mushroom farm. But I have two kids 
and my principle is that they should be able to continue on this. Freedom to 
choose is good.   
 
One issue that remains outstanding regards the age bracket for the firms in retrenchment 
mode. The fact that all the firms were over 15 years old may be seen to imply that the 
trajectory is a follow-up of another set of strategic actions. In other words it is not a 
trajectory at all, but part of a larger trajectory, such as for firms repositioning all the way 
back to an SBO state. Whilst this may well happen, that is firms may well reposition 
towards an SBO state, the retrenchment strategy does not have to be solely part of a 
larger picture. The FEO state and the SBO state are two entirely different orientations, 
with different objectives, different contexts and different consequences. The retrenchment 
strategy would not only contain firms falling back from previous patterns, but also firms 
initially limiting themselves to an SBO orientation from the start. Many small businesses 
with part-time employees would follow this strategy, these firms still being limited liability 
companies fully in line with the parameters of this small business research. Objectives of 
these firms would often be more towards satisfaction and personal achievement than 
building an efficient organization with a highly focused intent. McMahon (2001) argues 
that these small ‘lifestyle’ businesses have few growth aspirations and exist primarily to 
provide their owner-managers with a source of employment and income. Runyan, Droge 
and Swinney (2008) describe small business orientation as firms run by owner-managers 
who are emotionally attached to the business, as a means of generating family income, 
more satisficing than maximizing. A way to see this visually would be to imagine the main 
loops shown in Figure 7.13 to be smaller, never really going beyond the SBO state (as 
has been illustrated with a smaller set of loops). This would also provide a similarly flat 
NAV pattern, in line with the trends illustrated in Figure 7.14. In this case a retrenchment 
strategy could be described as more of a ‘limiting’ strategy. Firms 19 and 50 would 
arguable fall into this category. This leads to the first of three propositions (13, 14 and 15) 
for firms following a retrenchment strategy: 
 
Proposition 13:  Older or less professional firms follow a retrenchment trajectory that will 
leverage all the existing skills and knowledge of the dominant coalition to allow them to 
limit their operations to an economic minimum, and direct their resources and efforts into 
one core area of business competency. 
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As for the previous trajectories a review of performance criteria, for this trajectory, is in 
order. Three main performance criteria were emphasized upon by the owner-managers, 
complementing the financial performance achievements discussed earlier. These were 
turnover or other output-related criteria; very survival in itself; and personal satisfaction. In 
summary, this leads us to two further propositions: 
 
Proposition 14:  Firms following a retrenchment trajectory will look towards turnover or 
firm output, survival, and personal satisfaction as key performance criteria. Firms have a 
low net asset value and flat, often negative net asset value fluctuations. 
 
Proposition 15: More entrepreneurial owner-managers will willingly follow the 
retrenchment trajectory as an interim strategy whilst more conservative owner-managers 
will be induced to follow the trajectory due to a perceived hostile environment or for 
personal satisfaction.  
 
7.8  Summary of Findings 
 
Mentioned earlier on was an observation by Corbin and Strauss (2008) that mapping out 
of both context and process together is a most challenging endeavor as the clusters of 
conditional and consequential variables change and covary with the actions, and 
reactions, taken over time.  The approach adopted to overcome this difficult challenge has 
been to first establish the various evident strategic states that small firms adopt (subject of 
Chapter 6), and then map out the trajectories that the firms follow over time as they retain 
or change their states. It has been argued that the resulting trajectory-based typology 
loses nothing of the cross-sectional picture of small firm strategic orientation, but adds 
meaning and a better understanding to the logic and conditions of the firms’ evolving 
strategic behaviour. In fact, this chapter has argued that a cross-sectional picture of small 
firm strategic orientation is correct, but is incomplete. This two-staged approach is not 
unique in mapping out trajectory typologies, although it is uncommon simply because 
trajectory-based typologies are uncommon in themselves. A noticeable example of this 
approach is one that all undergraduate marketing students are well aware of; Kotler’s 
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(1997 p. 346) product life cycle concept. Kotler first starts off by identifying four 
(sometimes six when new product development and shakeout are included) phases that a 
firm’s product will go through; the introduction, growth, maturity and decline phases. Each 
phase is in itself a ‘cluster’ of contextual and consequential conditions. Kotler then 
proceeds to map out these conditions using two dimensions; sales/growth (Y-axis) and 
time (X-axis). A typology of common trajectories is utilized, such as for products following 
a ‘growth-slump-maturity’ pattern, or ‘cycle-recycle’ pattern, or ‘scalloped’ pattern (other 
patterns are the style, fashion and fad). Both the stages themselves have important 
meaning as do the resulting patterns (trajectories) that the products follow. Take, for 
example, the maturity stage and how this is influenced by network effects. Take also the 
trajectory of a fad such as a fashion item, and the meaning portrayed by this trajectory. 
Figure 7.15 below summarizes the typology, showing the five different strategic 
trajectories that a small firm may opt to follow. Three propositions, a graphical description, 
and the NAV pattern for each trajectory type are outlined. 
 
 
Proposition 1: Younger, smaller firms 
often adopt a controlled focus strategy 
that looks towards competency building 
in one core activity/process, a strong 
owner-manager knowledge of the 
industry and skills in the firm’s key 
engineering processes, and a strong 
client dedication within a limited 
consumer market. 
 
Proposition 2: Firms that adopt a 
controlled focus trajectory view 
performance in terms of increase in 
financial criteria, such as achieving stable 
revenues, and non-financial criteria 
particularly customer satisfaction and 
quality of service provided. These firms 
have a very low growth and the lowest 
net asset value of all. 
 
Proposition 3: More entrepreneurial 
owner-managers will adopt the controlled 
focus strategy as a temporary state whilst 
more conservative owner-managers will 
permanently adopt a controlled focus 
strategy. 
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 Proposition 4: More professional firms 
often enter a contained growth strategy 
that consists of a two-staged approach of 
first specializing in a core competency and 
then diversifying into moderately related 
activities and markets. This allows for the 
creation of differentiated products/services 
and a more select consumer base. Owner-
managers are multi-skilled and exert strong 
control over the firms’ resources. 
 
Proposition 5:  Firms following a 
controlled growth strategy will look towards 
three performance criteria: enhancing the 
client portfolio; sustaining a strong 
customer base through a differentiated 
product and strong brand identity; and a 
varied range of financial measurements. 
Firms here have a moderately large net 
asset value and stable NAV growth.  
 
Proposition 6: More entrepreneurial 
owner-managers will adopt the contained 
growth strategy as a temporary state whilst 
more conservative owner-managers will 
permanently adopt a contained growth 
strategy. 
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Figure 7.15b:  The Contained Growth Strategic Trajectory 
 
 
 
Proposition 7: Firms will follow a 
repositioning trajectory when either 
organizational – environmental or individual 
conditioning factors will no longer allow the 
firms to compete in a more entrepreneurial, 
diversified fashion and instead force the 
firms to consolidate and refocus on core 
areas of business operation and niche 
markets.  
 
Proposition 8: Firms following a 
repositioning strategic trajectory will look 
towards building stability in revenues and 
sales, and in achieving adequate profits in 
line with shareholders’ expectations. Firms 
here have a large net asset value but 
fragmented net asset value growth. 
 
Proposition 9: More entrepreneurial 
owner-managers will be forced to follow a 
repositioning trajectory due to an 
increasingly adverse business environment 
whilst more conservative managers will be 
employed by owners of the business to 
follow the trajectory purposely. 
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Proposition 10: Highly professional firms 
will enter a dynamic growth trajectory that 
will leverage the vast skills, knowledge 
and experiences of the owner-manager 
teams to give the firms entrance into 
unrelated industries and markets. Owner-
managers will be heavily involved in both 
creating and in sustaining the firms’ 
various value adding activities. 
 
Proposition 11: Firms following a 
dynamic growth trajectory will measure 
performance by way of two criteria; in the 
growth of the firm and in ways and means 
by which growth can be fuelled, 
measured, and sustained. These firms 
have the steepest growth and largest net 
asset value of all.  
 
Proposition 12: Owner-managers 
adopting a dynamic growth trajectory will 
either drive the firm towards growth 
outside the remits of the small firm, or 
reposition the firms’ developing business 
units into a functional efficiency orientation 
mode. 
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Figure 7.15d:  The Dynamic Growth Strategic Trajectory 
 
 
 
Proposition 13: Older or less 
professional firms follow a retrenchment 
trajectory that will leverage all the existing 
skills and knowledge of the dominant 
coalition to allow them to limit their 
operations to an economic minimum, and 
direct their resources and efforts into one 
core area of business competency. 
 
Proposition 14: Firms following a 
retrenchment trajectory will look towards 
turnover or firm output, survival and 
personal satisfaction as key performance 
criteria. Firms have a low net asset value 
and flat, even negative net asset value 
fluctuations. 
 
Proposition 15: More entrepreneurial 
owner-managers will willingly follow the 
retrenchment trajectory as an interim 
strategy whilst more conservative owner-
managers will be induced to follow the 
trajectory due to a perceived hostile 
environment or for personal satisfaction. 
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Once again a reference has to be made to the methodological issues that influence this 
particular chapter. Two issues stand out in line with the grounded theory method of 
enquiry that has been adopted. These are the concepts of verification and of triangulation. 
As Strauss and Corbin would argue, verification is not a one-off activity but is a continuous 
process that takes place hand in hand with the activity of constant comparison. It has 
been no less so in this case, where the mapping out of the trajectories of the 67 firms also 
allowed for a repeated verification of the accuracy of the strategic states identified earlier. 
In other words, weaknesses in the strategic orientation model discussed in Chapter 6 
(SBO, FEO, RDO and UDO states) would have surfaced in the later, trajectory mapping 
exercise. Writing of descriptive memos allowed for confirmations, clarifications, and 
enhancements to the developing models. The inclusion of secondary, objective data by 
way of audited financial records allowed for additional verification, and for what Patton 
(2002) describes as methods triangulation. Comparing the financial fluctuations of the 
firms to the in-depth descriptions provided by respondents allowed for important 
clarifications and confirmations to be made. The financial data, particularly NAV 
fluctuations, confirmed and supported owner-manager descriptions and added strength to 
the understanding of small business performance. As agued by Patton (2002 p. 558); 
“qualitative and quantitative data can be fruitfully combined to elucidate complementary 
aspects of the same phenomenon”. 
 
7.9 Discussion and Implications 
 
The chapter has focused primarily on the logic of the trajectories in an attempt to answer 
more fully the questions what is happening? and why? Whilst Chapters 6 and 7 have 
collectively focused on answering both questions, a further discussion on the ‘why’ will 
assist in better understanding the rationale of the typology. In other words, why would the 
primary decision makers of the organization act the way they do to lead the organization 
in a particular strategic direction? A quick overview of the five strategic trajectories shall 
be carried out to highlight the issues of alignment between the owner-manager 
philosophy, the firm’s business stance, and the business environment (in a concept akin 
to Mintzberg and Waters’ [1985] realized versus deliberate strategy). The concept of the 
conditional lens had been adopted earlier on to visualize this alignment process.  Firstly, 
taking the firms following a controlled focus strategy. These firms chose to specialize and 
to achieve an expertise based on the knowledge and experiences of the owner-managers. 
Two general situations were noted. One situation regarded more entrepreneurial owner-
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managers being induced to operate in this focused mode by adverse competitive 
conditions. Arguably these firms could succeed in diversifying if these limitations were 
overcome. Older firms showed a stronger match between the management philosophy 
and the business stance. Owner-managers here were in their right element, doing the job 
they loved and having little motivation to change the trajectory of the firm in a different 
direction.  
 
Contained growth firms had a generally stronger match between the owner-manager 
philosophy and the business stance. These firms normally diversified cautiously from an 
FEO state to a RDO state, leveraging and building upon core competencies to provide a 
more complete product or service. Three situations, or levels, of strategic fit were evident 
between the management philosophy and the business orientation. There were those 
firms where the owner-manager philosophy was on par with the entrepreneurial stance of 
the firms, in these cases it is expected that the firms will maintain the strategy of contained 
growth indefinitely. There were also firms where the owner-managers exhibited a more 
entrepreneurial philosophy but the firms had built a certain strategic momentum in view of 
particular environmental conditions. In these cases the owner-managers could possibly 
change the organization’s trajectory, but additional and sometimes scarce resources 
would be required for this. Furthermore, there were firms where the owner-manager would 
have to overcome experience and expertise limitations to be able to adapt the 
organization towards a more dynamic trajectory. Skilling, obtaining further experience, and 
even enhancing the size/configuration of the dominant coalition would be required here. 
 
Firms following a repositioning trajectory had first grown through diversification but were 
later seen to be re-establishing their operations within a limited number of areas of core 
competencies. Two predominant situations induced this particular form of behaviour. One 
group of repositioning firms were being induced to consolidate by an increasingly 
competitive landscape, a situation that drove even the more entrepreneurial of owner-
managers to protect the business’s survival by re-establishing a focus on what the 
business did best. A second group of firms had a particularly unique situation where 
earlier owner-managers had expanded and diversified the business, and now had a 
different objective for the business units that were an outcome of the earlier aggressive 
diversification. These owners sought to place their focus elsewhere, and employed 
professional and loyal managers to run the business units for them, achieving stability, 
dedication and the various synergies that were required of the business units. Employed 
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managers here were seen to be more conservative, focusing on efficiency and continuity 
more than on new business creation. 
 
Firms that adopted a dynamic growth trajectory had the closest match between the owner-
manager philosophy and the business orientation. Put more simply, dynamic firms were 
being run by entrepreneurial owner-managers. Surprisingly, these owner-managers would 
also want to be heavily involved in the operational issues of the firms, hence the size of 
the dominant coalitions here was the largest of all. This would allow the owner-managers 
to focus on both creating new business opportunities and in sustaining those opportunities 
created. This strategic approach resulted in firms that were growing rapidly and that had 
the largest net asset value and NAV growth of all. Owner-managers were also the most 
qualified and skilled. The argument has also been placed that these owner-managers will 
not necessarily have a more munificent environment that provides for easier growth and 
competitive success. Rather, the concept of environmental uncertainty has been put 
forward, meaning that owner-manager strategic behaviour is influenced by the perception 
of how the environment can be reacted to. As argued by Palich and Bagby (1995), people 
who exploit opportunities tend to frame information more positively and then respond to 
these positive perceptions. 
 
Finally, a number of firms were observed to be following a retrenchment trajectory. These 
firms were in fact the oldest of all, and had the smallest size of dominant coalition. 
Retrenchment here meant shrinking into the smallest possible operating mode, without 
any real aggressive business objectives. A number of situations were seen to lead to this 
retrenchment. Some firms were run by a highly conservative owner-manager who had 
little other than survival and personal satisfaction as guiding objectives. Similarly to this 
case there was also the situation where the owners to the business saw the firm as no 
more than an extension of their family, and employed management to run the business in 
much that fashion. The two final situations are, however, where most of the retrenchment 
firms pertain. One group of firms was managed by owner-managers with a highly 
conservative nature and perceived an environmental hostility that they deemed to be 
insurmountable. The final group of retrenchment firms had an interesting situation where 
the owner-manager had a management philosophy that was evidently more innovative 
and creative than the static state of the firm. This appeared to be a premeditated case of 
hibernation where the owner-managers were awaiting a reason for revitalizing the firm, 
this often being the induction of a new family member. All in all the variations in owner-
manager philosophical behaviour for the different orientations can be summed by the 
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following quote by Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007 p. 674); “… organizations move through 
different stages over time, with each stage posing unique challenges to the organization 
and requiring different management philosophies and approaches”. While cross sectional 
studies invariably fail to observe these changing patterns, it is not the case for some of the 
more qualitative research thrusts such as McCarthy’s research, concluding that the “risk-
taking propensity of the charismatic entrepreneur changed over time” (2003 p. 169).  
 
A last observation is made on the concept of performance as applied to the small 
business. The typology has identified substantially different performance criteria for the 
different trajectories. Retrenchment firms will look towards survival or personal satisfaction 
whilst dynamic growth firms will look towards fuelling and sustaining growth, controlled 
focus firms will look towards customer satisfaction and quality of service… and so on. 
When understanding the logic of the trajectories, and just as importantly the philosophies 
of the owner-managers to the firms, these performance variations are most 
understandable indeed. The typology argues that different performance criteria matter for 
different owner-manager philosophical outlooks in different situations. This provides 
somewhat of a response to one of the most common criticisms placed in the direction of 
small firms at any conference on the topic; that small firm performance is extremely 
difficult to understand. It is… but only when the mistake is made up putting all the small 
firms into one static category. Try telling the semi-retired owner-manager of a 
retrenchment firm that he should look at profits and not long leisurely weekends, as his 
main performance measure!  A clear analogy can once again be made to marketing, but 
this time to the consumer life cycle model used to argue an economic perspective towards 
understanding consumer buying behaviour (as opposed to the socio-psychological and 
behavioural models). What the model states is that different achievement criteria matter to 
a family at different stages of development, such as home acquisition at the growth stage 
or health and leisure objectives towards the decline stage. It is no less so in this case. In 
conclusion, for the small firm a different approach towards understanding performance 
has to be taken, one that first understands where the firm wants to go before trying to 
measure if it has actually got there. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusions and Implications 
 
8.1 Outline of Chapter 
 
This final chapter of the thesis is segmented into three areas. The first section is a 
summary overview of the thesis, and describes three expected (and incremental) 
contributions to the academic literature in the field of small business strategy. The first 
contribution is the establishing of a framework of variables that act and interact to explain 
the phenomenon in question; that of small business strategic behaviour. The second 
contribution is the utilization of these variables to establish a set of life cycle states that 
portray the strategic positions that a small firm can adopt. The third contribution is the 
mapping of a typology of common trajectories (summarized in Appendix 10) that small 
firms follow over time, moving between different life cycle states as the owner-manager, 
the firm and the competitive environment coalign.  The thesis has been based on the 
premise, much recommended by Hambrick (2003), Mintzberg (2007) and Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985), of understanding strategy as a pattern of important decisions (or more 
aptly the evident actions resulting from these decisions) that guides the organization in its 
relation with the environment, affects the organization’s internal structure and processes, 
and influences the organization’s performance. This is a behavioural approach towards 
understanding strategy, and is based on the concept of understanding small business 
behaviour by looking at the strategic actions taken by the firm over time, the context and 
conditions to these actions, and the consequences and outcomes of these actions. It is an 
approach that is dependent on the application of a research methodology that can 
observe patterns, and by this meaning that the methodology can be used to build a picture 
that is based on both content and process. A behavioural model is appealing because 
behaviour is measurable (Mintzberg 2007) and is manageable (Covin and Slevin 1991).  
 
A substantive model for small business strategic behaviour has been put forward, at a 
level of mid-range theory that defines a phenomenon within a particular environment. In 
fact, Merton (1957) and Glaser and Strauss (1967) argue that theories of middle range 
and well grounded in empirical reality are likely to be the most fruitful kind, as opposed to 
very narrow or very grand theories. The environment is that of a restricted competitive 
setting, as the research has been carried out on small firms competing within a small 
island state.  Two further sections follow. The second section to this chapter is a summary 
of the implications that ensue from the learning gained, and from application of the 
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trajectory-based model for small firm strategic behaviour. Implications for academics, for 
policy makers, and for managers shall be explored. The third section is a discussion on 
limitations, challenges and the way forward. Arguments focusing on description, prediction 
and generalizability shall be made.  
 
8.2 Research Findings and Contribution to the Literature 
 
8.2.1   A Framework for Small Firm Strategic Behaviour 
 
The essential starting point of the research in question was a quest for a viable set of 
variables that could be applied to explain the phenomenon in question; that of the 
strategic behaviour of small firms. It has been argued in Chapter 5 that the identification of 
variables is indeed a challenge in itself, particularly due to the dynamic and often tacit 
nature of small businesses. To add to the difficulty, an argument has been maintained in 
the thesis that both structure (grounded theorists use this term instead of content) and 
process have to be included into the picture. For the more commonly applied research 
approaches that adopt a cross-sectional methodology, this is not an issue of debate; static 
pictures are obtained and the movements between these static snap-shots are 
subsequently inferred. The reluctance to include process into the equation is best 
explained by Corbin and Strauss (2008 p. 97), who note that “the relationship between 
structure and process is very complex, leading to infinite variation in the intensity, type, 
and timing of action/interaction/emotional responses”. An example is in order, one that 
aims to explain the structure – process interaction visualized in Figure 5.3.  Imagine, over 
the course of a morning, a queue of passengers waiting to buy tickets for continuously 
arriving trains at a station (Corbin and Strauss [2008] put forward an excellent example of 
a symphony of music being played to try and explain the concept). The station has 
provided attendants and a manned ticket booth to manage the ticketing and queuing 
process. Over the course of the morning the employees will be issuing tickets, controlling 
the queue, answering queries, monitoring progress, and so on. This is the process of 
‘actions’. A rush hour provides a sudden influx of customers, demanding a change in the 
urgency of actions being taken, moves to calm annoyed passengers, and a speeding up 
of the ticket issuing process. This rush hour gives an example of the changing context to 
the scene, as does the timeliness of arriving trains. The length of the queue, the satisfied 
or angry dispositions of customers, visual signs of motivation/despair of employees, all 
provide information on the consequences/outcomes to the picture. The context and the 
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consequences are what Strauss and Corbin call structure, the actions are the process. 
The interactions between structure and process are easy to imagine, such as the effect of 
a slowdown of arriving customers on the actions being taken (i.e. less urgency, a more 
leisurely pace) and shorter queue lengths, or a change in actions due to demotivated staff 
(or a change of staff) on the queue length and on potential customers veering off to find a 
different source of transport. Thus structure affects process, and process in turn affects 
structure.  One thus has a continuous flow of activity/actions, influenced by the context 
and in turn influencing the consequences, but with context and consequences also 
influencing subsequent activity/actions.  
 
The Framework that was compiled (Figure 5.2) thus had to incorporate both structure and 
process, such that a dynamic picture of small business strategic behaviour could be 
developed. It had to include structural variables that described both the business context 
(and all possible conditioning factors) and the resulting consequences/outcomes to the 
business’s actions. It also had to include process, that is, some form of measurement of 
the continuous actions/interactions taken by the business owner-managers. Reference is 
made to Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 that collectively attempt to explain the framework of 
variables, and their interactions. The variable set, established through the grounded 
theory method (detailed in Chapter 4), are batched into 3 categories; strategic 
actions/reactions, the context and conditions, and the consequences and outcomes. 
“Establishing” of variables means that they would appear consistently and persuasively in 
the data, providing the researcher with insights that are an integration of his own 
knowledge and what is conclusively evident in the data (the concept of abduction, as 
described in Chapters 4 and 5). As Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the 
variables (and their interactions) this discussion shall focus on the more salient issues, 
particularly where the Framework adds an element of innovativeness to the understanding 
of small business strategy. First of all, one must appreciate that the Framework of 
variables cannot be applied, as is, in cross-sectional research where snap shot 
relationships are sought between independent, moderating and dependent variables. The 
time dimension underlying the Framework will not allow for this. Figure 5.3 attempts to 
depict this dynamic process of changing structure – process over time. In the previous 
train station example, this would have been seen as changing patterns of 
actions/reactions by the staff in accordance to an evolving context, and in turn influencing 
the developing consequences. It is these patterns that are of interest to the researcher, 
and is essentially what grounded theorists look for (Charmaz 2006 p. 82). However, there 
is only one way that is feasibly possible to measure a continuous pattern of actions, and 
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that is to batch the actions into visibly consistent clusters. Time is of assistance here. In 
the train station example, this could be in early morning periods of slow queuing, then 
rush hour periods, and then, say, a later point when a bus load of mature, elderly travelers 
arrive. In each “phase” a different context would be seen, different patterns of actions, and 
different consequential outcomes. In the research in question this has been approached 
by “batching” the strategic actions of owner-managers into different periods of behaviour 
(initial, forming, mature…) that the research showed to be the most common, as depicted 
to the top of Figure 5.2.  
 
For each phase of behaviour the firm will be positioned in a particular context and will 
create a particular set of consequences. In theory (and with the vast variable set in 
question, as shown in Figure 5.2), this would mean going back to contingency theory and 
having a practically unique medley of variables for each behavioural state. In practice, the 
ensuing research showed that patterns are not at all haphazard, and do not deviate wildly. 
Figures 5.3 attempts to illustrate this.  Though actions/reactions were highly dynamic 
(simplified into five different phases of behaviour, each with their own strategic moves, 
actions, decisions…), the context and consequences were less so. This is visualized in 
Figure 5.3 by a more stable arrow (context, consequences) being acted upon by the more 
dynamic spiral of actions/reactions. The direction of the arrow would change, possibly 
move to a tangent, but not veer off wildly. An explanation for this comes by way of Figure 
2.2 (replicated in Figure 8.2 in the forthcoming pages), where the perceived environment 
acts as a buffer between the actual environment and the actions of the owner-managers. 
The business’s resource base would also act to condition the speed of reaction to 
environmental dynamics.  
 
In conclusion, context and consequences can be looked at as more of an evolving picture 
than a range of entirely different situations. This can be seen in the resulting contextual 
and consequential variables, referred to in grounded theory as sub-categories and 
corresponding properties. The context and conditions category was shown to consist of 5 
sub-categories with 25 distinct properties (reference Figure 5.2). Expectedly, owner-
managers placed a lot of emphasis on their particular industry, on the local/regional 
environment, and on the global environment. Of interest, and particular relevance to the 
small firm, is the importance placed on the historic start-up situation and the ongoing 
ramifications that this induced (Geroski, Mata and Portugal [2010] provide empirical 
evidence of this trait). Most important of all was the detail and significance placed on 
owner-manager characteristics, particularly the owner-manager philosophy, values and 
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behavioural traits. As established in the literature review and most evident in the research, 
these traits would be expected to be fairly stable over time. 
 
The consequences and outcomes category (lower part of Figure 5.2) is where major 
differences will be found from the usual models of small business strategic behaviour 
(examples given in Chapter 3 and Appendix 2). As expected, organizational performance 
features as a consequential outcome. Reverse causality is not an issue here, although it 
does exist, as the adopted methodology does not demand any rigid demarcation between 
dependent and independent variables. Performance was shown to be a multi-dimensional 
construct and of a dynamic nature, as shall soon be argued. In addition, three stances 
emanated from the research, providing different views of the observable nature of the 
organization. Applying the train station example, stances could be seen in the rigidity and 
tightness of the queue, in the urgent and mechanistic nature of the ticket processing, in 
the resource setup being deployed to manage the process. The very nature of small 
business behaviour demands this stance-based approach (Fulford and Rizzo 2009), that 
has only really taken off so far in the mapping out of strategic behaviours of public sector 
organizations (see the works of Boyne and Walker 2004; Andrews, Boyne and Walker 
2006).  
 
Three stances were observed in the research, providing three complementary viewpoints 
of the emerging competitive nature of the small business. The engineering stance 
provides a picture of the core transformation processes within the firm, that is, the 
processes of transforming inputs into outputs. This could be, for example, highly 
mechanized or entirely knowledge based. The resource-based stance gives a picture of 
the resource bundle (or asset stock) that the firm would build up, looking at human, 
physical and organizational resources. The business stance is essentially the 
conservative – entrepreneurial mindset that the firm would be seen to be adopting, in its 
actions towards risk management, innovativeness and proactive initiatives. The three 
stances give entirely different, but highly complementary, pictures of the business posture 
adopted by the small firm. They follow the argument that consequences/outcomes to the 
small business are more than just the performance achievements of that business. They 
add a vital link to the understanding of the strategic behaviour of the small firm simply 
because they put a face to the firm, allowing it to give expression to the outcome of 
actions taken, and to the reactions to context. 
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8.2.2     Applying the Life Cycle Concept 
 
Following the establishing of a framework of variables that act and interact to explain the 
strategic behaviour of small firms, two sequential tasks were carried out in this research, 
the second dependent on the first. Both adopt a typological basis, albeit in different forms 
and with different objectives. These two stages have been the focus of the preceding two 
chapters, and both aim to provide a knowledge contribution independently to the other. 
The first task, subject of Chapter 6, was to compile a typology of the most common 
strategic orientations being adopted by the 67 firms. The words strategic orientations and 
strategic states are used interchangeably in the chapter, and mean the same. The focus 
of Chapter 6 was to map the present strategic states of the firms, although obviously 
these were the result of previous actions and contexts (Figure 5.3 visualizes this). Once 
this “typology” of states was compiled, a study of firm movements between states could 
take place, and is the second task (the focus of Chapter 7) that aims to understand the 
strategic trajectories of the firms. The first task of identifying and explaining strategic 
states is actually no more than a life cycle analysis, the outcome of which is shown in the 
X-axis of the following Figure 8.1. A similar concept is used in the marketing literature on 
product life cycle (Kotler and Armstrong 2008), where a set of states exist (new product 
development, introduction, growth, shake-out, maturity and decline) as well as an 
established set of trajectories between states. In the present research four strategic states 
were evident; that of small business orientation (SBO), functional efficiency orientation 
(FEO), related diversification orientation (RDO), and unrelated diversification orientation 
(UDO). Table 6.1 outlines the predominant characteristics of the four states, summarizing 
the detail provided in Chapter 6. This is essentially a typological perspective, with firms 
falling into any one of the four strategic states at any particular point in time. 
 
Looking at these four states from a life cycle perspective brings with it strong implications. 
The literature review has shown that there is a problem here, with researchers often 
adopting a blind expectation that firms will progress rigidly through birth, growth, maturity 
and decline (Smith, Mitchell and Summer [1985] provide an excellent example of this). 
The early literature on the topic (e.g. Burgelman 1983; Chandler 1962), with its “structure 
follows strategy” debate and focus on large firms, is a main source of this misconception. 
Two authors, however, contribute to clarify the meaning of “life cycle” to the small firm. 
Hanks et al. (1993 p. 7) describe life cycle states as more than just birth-growth-maturity-
decline stages, but as a “unique configuration of variables relating to organization context 
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and structure”.  Miller and Friesen (1984 p. 1177) argue that “whilst the stages of the life 
cycle are internally coherent and very different from one another they are by no means 
connected to each other in any deterministic sequence”. In other words each state is a 
unique configuration of characteristics, and there is no prescribed sequence between the 
states. Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007) provide an excellent rendition of how business 
behaviour changes as a firm evolves through the different life cycle stages. 
 
Another point of importance is the relationship between the individual firm’s strategic 
actions (shown in Figure 5.2 to consist of initial behaviour, forming behaviour, mature 
behaviour…) and the four life cycle states already identified as small business orientation 
(SBO), functional efficiency orientation (FEO), related diversification orientation (RDO), 
and unrelated diversification orientation (UDO). The best way to understand this is by 
taking the four states to be a generalization of the individual firms’ behaviours. In other 
words, Firm 1 may, for example, be enacting mature behaviour and be in a FEO state 
whilst Firm 2 may be enacting growth behaviour and be in an SBO state. So no matter 
what behaviours the firms would be enacting (from initial value-building actions to mature, 
competitive moves), they would always fall into one of the four life cycle states at a 
particular time. This is no more than the strategic group theory discussed in Chapter 3, 
where generic strategies are a generalization of common behaviours that span industries 
and cater for different types and sizes of firms. 
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Figure 8.1: Strategic States and the Dynamic Trajectories of Small Firms 
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Of interest to note is how the four states pictured in Figure 8.1 (the X-axis) resemble the 
following four stages of (large) business growth described by Rumelt (1974): Stage 1, 
where a young business operates within a single industry and with a single product line; 
Stage 2, where the company diversifies into a range of product lines, becoming a 
dominant force in the particular industry; Stage 3, where the company diversifies into 
different industries but still within its core competencies; Stage 4, where the company 
diversifies further into industries and products that are unrelated to its earlier core 
competencies.  This is where the similarity ends however, as there are fundamental 
differences highlighted in Table 6.1, that are particular to the small firm. Each strategic 
state brings with it a fundamentally different competitive landscape, with unique firm – 
owner-manager characteristics and behaviours. This is to be expected, and authors such 
as Masurel and van Montfort (2006) and Miller and Friesen (1984) have argued that “as 
organizations proceed from one phase to another, they change a great many things – they 
undergo a highly multifaceted transition” (Miller and Friesen 1984 p. 1177). A quick 
overview of the states is in order. The small business orientation state (SBO) consists of 
firms with usually just one owner-manager in the dominant coalition, a person highly 
seasoned in the business and exhibiting highly conservative behaviour (at least at the 
time of being in this state). Competitive conditions are difficult and the firm has adopted 
actions towards efficiency maximization, cost reduction and specialization in a very limited 
field. Opportunity costs are often high, and performance is more about survival and 
personal satisfaction. Firms are the smallest of all here by way of employee count. Firms 
in a functional efficiency orientation (FEO) state have a slightly larger dominant coalition, 
on average between one to two members. Owner-manager behaviour is somewhat less 
conservative, focused more aggressively on a limited range of products/services and with 
a highly routinised/specialized engineering stance. Dedicated resources and niche 
markets allow the firms to proliferate in what they do best, and to focus on mainly financial 
achievements. Firms are second smallest by way of employee count. 
 
A more entrepreneurial firm behaviour is seen for firms in a related diversification 
orientation (RDO) state. Firms here cautiously diversify into technologies and 
products/markets that are related to the core areas of business operation. A two-staged 
strategy is adopted of first building core competencies and then leveraging these 
competencies to move into complementary areas that then provide additional synergies. 
Again the dominant coalition is on average one to two persons, with a higher level of 
entrepreneurial aptitude. High determination, drive and control characterize the owner-
manager behaviour. Performance is more diversified, with a stronger focus on building 
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and sustaining a strong consumer portfolio. Firms are second largest. The final state, that 
of unrelated diversification orientation (UDO), shows firms that are the largest by far, but 
are still young and vibrant and managed by the largest dominant coalition of all (on 
average 2.33 persons). Firms are working in the margin, diversifying into industries and 
product/markets alien to their areas of initial business expertise. Surprisingly, owner-
managers seek to retain a strong-hold on the daily operations of the firms, being reluctant 
to delegate any real management powers. Firms are more technological and owner-
managers are more academically qualified. These firms are the largest from all 
perspectives, and are highly focused on growth-related achievements.  
 
Two issues stand out in the argument in favour of looking at the four strategic states as 
important stages in a small firm’s life cycle. The first issue regards taking the firm as a unit 
of analysis and the owner-manager as a separate unit of analysis. The second issue looks 
at the coalignment of these two units of analysis, and with a third parameter; the 
competitive landscape. Taking the first issue, reference is made to the ongoing debate in 
the literature, as detailed in thesis sections 2.4 and 2.5. The small business literature 
places a strong argument in favour of looking at the firm as an entrepreneurial being, with 
innovative, proactive and risk oriented behaviours that range in a continuum from very low 
to very high. The literatures on Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) and Resource-based 
Theory support this thesis, as have the current research findings. The literature, however, 
also recommends looking at the behaviour of the owner-manager of the firm, and 
separately observing his/her entrepreneurial behaviour as ranging from highly 
conservative to highly entrepreneurial. The argument here is that owner-manager 
characteristics will significantly influence the behaviour of the small firm. However, these 
characteristics need to be understood, and consist of core values (or life issues) and 
psychological traits, that impact upon the owner-manager’s cognitive – heuristic 
behaviour, ultimately influencing the decision making process.  The research has 
observed much of what has been stated in the literature, both for the firm and for the 
owner-manager to the firm. However, a delicate balance between the two units of analysis 
(the firm and the owner-manager) was also observed, a balance that takes into 
consideration what Shane and Venkataraman (2002) would call the transitory nature of 
entrepreneurial behaviour. This is where the concept of coalignment comes in, an issue 
that has been inadequately tackled in the strategy literature on small firms.  
 
The research under discussion in this thesis has identified different owner-manager 
characteristics and configurations for the different strategic states. Firms in a UDO state 
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had a team of two or three owner-managers, with an integration of both high and low 
entrepreneurial philosophies. On the other side of the continuum, firms in a SBO state had 
one owner-manager acting in a conservative way, but who could also show signs of an 
entrepreneurial philosophy. FEO and RDO firms were somewhere in between, so the 
focus here shall be placed on the SBO – UDO extremes for discussion purposes. The 
argument has already been made in Chapter 2 and 6 that a manager with an 
entrepreneurial philosophy can adopt a conservative stance, but that the converse cannot 
happen (core values and psychological traits will not allow for this). Thesis Section 2.6 
and particularly Figure 2.2 adds an important part to the puzzle; the way in which the 
owner-manager interprets and acts towards the competitive environment. The tendency 
for small firm owner-managers to want to be in control, to avoid true management 
delegation, and to be involved in both strategizing and in implementation adds the last 
jigsaw piece to the puzzle. At the entrepreneurial side of the continuum, the owner-
manager team had the entrepreneurial characteristics to perceive positive opportunities in 
the competitive landscape, and to act upon these by forcefully implementing even the 
most aggressive of schemes. The entrepreneurial–conservative dichotomy within this 
UDO team allowed for an excellent balance between creating new value and in sustaining 
what was being created.  
 
In order to better understand the drivers behind this behaviour, a number of themes must 
be integrated; the owner-manager’s core values, her cognitive process of receiving and 
deciphering information, and the environment (both perceived and objective, reference 
made to Figure 2.2 that has been replicated in the following Figure 8.2 for convenience). 
Core values in at least one member of the UDO dominant coalition would contain strong 
entrepreneurial traits. Information gathered from the objective environment would be 
perceived in a positive light due to these traits, particularly since a component of this 
information (shown in Figure 8.2 as feedback from the ‘business outcomes’) contained the 
knowledge that there were additional strengths that the firm possessed to implement 
value-creating schemes. The source of these additional strengths would emanate mainly 
from the more conservative, dogmatic component of the dominant coalition. The dominant 
coalition would adopt a cognitive form of behaviour that perceives these positives, 
interprets them in a positive way, and acts upon them in a positive way. The strength of 
the multiple-member team in successfully applying the value-creating ventures would 
serve as a feedback loop, further strengthening perceptions and cognitive behaviours. 
This is no more than Meglino and Ravlin’s (1998) concept of value congruence, where 
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dynamic growth coalitions effectively perceive, and act upon, a different business 
environment. 
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Figure 8.2: The Perceived Environment, Owner-manager Characteristics, and Firm 
Behaviour 
 
At the other end of the continuum, an SBO owner-manager with a conservative 
philosophy would simply not perceive the same positive opportunities in the environment. 
The way Miller, Kets de Vries and Toulouse (1982 p. 238) put this is that “executives who 
are more given to feelings of helplessness and passivity will be more conservative, 
reactionary and risk averse”. An SBO owner-manager with more entrepreneurial 
tendencies would perceive the positive external environmental opportunities, but would 
also perceive internal weaknesses such as a lack of adequate dominant coalition structure 
to be able to act successfully on positive opportunities. In fact, in a number of cases, SBO 
owner-managers admitted to being in a state of waiting, that is, waiting for a new member 
to join the dominant coalition before attempting to regenerate the organization. A positive 
picture is still being seen, but in this case it is somewhat into the more distant future. This 
is an interesting and unexplored “time dimension” concept of small firm motivation and 
implies that entrepreneurial owner-managers are always motivated to take entrepreneurial 
actions, but that not all actions will be immediately apparent (or immediately taken). 
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Entrepreneurial owner-managers acting conservatively due to high opportunity costs 
elsewhere (or a highly deterministic objective environment) would also adopt this pattern 
of behaviour. Towards the middle of the SBO–UDO continuum, FEO and RDO owner-
managers would have moderate entrepreneurial philosophies, and, in consistency with the 
above arguments, would adopt efficiency or innovativeness behaviours in accordance to 
their perceptions and cognitive mind-sets. What is evident here is coalignment; dominant 
coalition characteristics successfully in line with the firm’s characteristics, that are, in turn, 
properly aligned with the competitive landscape. This is also the concept of equifinality, 
where different forms of successful coalignment can exist in parallel. 
 
In conclusion to this argument, Hanks et al. (1993 p. 25) provide an excellent rejoinder on 
the concept of life cycle evolvement: “A valid life-cycle model could be of great value to 
those managing emerging growth firms. It could provide a road map, identifying critical 
organizational transitions as well as pitfalls the organization should seek to avoid as it 
grows in size and complexity. An accurate life-cycle model could provide a timetable for 
adding levels of management, formalizing organization procedures and systems, and 
revising organization priorities. It could help management know when to let go of 
cherished past strategies and practices that will only hinder future growth”. The arguments 
put forward so far also go some way in resolving a recurring issue in the literature 
regarding omitting SBO firms from the equation (e.g. McCarthy 2003), simply because 
they taint the established field of entrepreneurial firm behaviour. This thesis has argued 
otherwise. SBO is seen to be a valid life cycle state, just as much as RDO or UDO states. 
The issue of coalignment, inadequately researched due to the predominance of cross-
sectional methodologies, explains how successful owner-manager – firm configurations 
can exist as different states within the SBO – UDO continuum.  
 
8.2.3      Adding the Trajectory Perspective 
 
The second of the two sequential tasks carried out in this research (the first being the 
establishing of life cycle states, shown as the X-axis of the following Figure 8.3) was to 
map out the common trajectories of strategic actions taken by the firms under study. This 
was the topic of Chapter 7, with a summary provided in Figure 7.15.  Figures 8.1 and 8.3 
depict the trajectories in a somewhat different format to that of Figure 7.15, using a spiral-
based approach to visualize the way in which the small firms appeared to oscillate within, 
or between strategic states. Three main issues stand out in this trajectory-based 
approach; that of motivation of owner-managers, performance implications, and 
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coalignment characteristics. These will be discussed in brief for the five predominant 
trajectories that were observed (individual firm trajectories are shown in Appendix 9). 
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Figure 8.3: Highlight on Two Trajectories; Controlled Focus and Repositioning 
 
The first trajectory under discussion, that of a controlled focus, is highlighted in blue in 
Figure 8.3 above (for all five trajectories see Appendix 10).  This is an “efficiency-oriented” 
form of strategic behaviour that was observed for 15 of the 67 firms under study, entering 
it from either an SBO or FEO life cycle state. Firms would thus oscillate within a final FEO 
state, changing in size as new projects came in and market shares grew or shrunk. Firms 
were predominantly service-based and operating in local markets, explaining the fact that 
these firms were amongst the smallest by way of net asset value (NAV), of NAV growth, 
and of employee count. Owner-managers would have created a business based on their 
core skills and experience, and would build and sustain barriers of entry through 
specialization, enhanced efficiency drives, and through controlled niche markets. These 
owner-managers were in their element, doing what they knew how to do best, and what 
they enjoyed doing. As competition increased, the owner-managers would look towards 
enhanced specialization and increased quality drives to win and sustain customers. Often, 
owner-managers would opt to lose customers that wanted a cheaper product than lose 
out on their established reputations for quality of service. An important statistic was the 
age of these firms, as they were the youngest of all (see Table 7.1 and Figure 7.4). Tying 
with this statistic was the fact that the oldest of these firms had the closest owner-
manager – firm strategic fit. In other words, for these firms, the moderately conservative 
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management philosophy matched this rather static FEO life cycle state; owner-managers 
had no motivation to move out of the state and into a state of further growth. Younger 
firms in the cohort sometimes had owner-managers with more entrepreneurial traits, this 
hinting that these firms could, in the future, adopt a different, growth oriented trajectory.  
 
The engineering and resource-based stances that were visible for the controlled focus 
firms supported this business stance. Routinised and specialized engineering functions 
were focused on a core process or activity, often the same activity that the owner-
manager would have specialized in, in the first place. Resource basis were 
complementary to the engineering function. Human resources were skilled, dedicated and 
experienced. Physical resources were geared towards efficiencies based on 
standardization and repetition. Structures were flat but centralized. Organizational 
resources showed mechanized procedures and a culture based upon a belief of providing 
a high level of customer service. Subjective performance measures quoted were mainly 
the achieving of a satisfactory turnover and achieving customer satisfaction. Objective 
performance measures complemented these, and showed firms with a very low NAV 
growth and an average NAV that was by far the smallest for all firm trajectories (see Table 
7.1 and Figure 7.15 for a comparison).  In conclusion, these were firms with a mission; 
that of proliferating in what they did best, even if this meant stagnation in growth. A recipe 
for growth was also evident in the firms that had a mismatch between the management 
philosophy and the firm’s conservative stance. In other words, moving out of the FEO life 
cycle state and into a RDO or UDO state was indeed possible (if so desired, that is). Two 
growth trajectories, to be discussed, will explore this scenario.    
 
The second trajectory to be discussed is one of the two growth trajectories; that of 
contained growth. In Figure 8.3 this would be seen by firms gradually moving out of SBO 
and FEO life cycle states, and into an RDO life cycle state. 13 of the 67 firms followed this 
trajectory. Firms would then maintain their position by cycling within this moderately 
entrepreneurial RDO state. Contained growth firms were usually run by one owner-
manager, sometimes two. Firm age, as well as NAV, were average for the complete 
sample of firms (at 21 years and €0.6M, see Table 7.1). NAV growth was positive (+33% 
over a 5-year period), yet tapering off towards the final years (see Figure 7.7). The 
strategy adopted by owner-managers was to first ground the firm in a core engineering 
process/activity (whilst in the FEO state), and then launch additional but related activities 
that were complementary to this core process. This approach also served to build and 
sustain a loyal customer base due to the synergies that the related activities/products 
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brought about, and actually allowed the firms to be more selective in their choice of 
customers. The experience and skills of these owner-managers were seen to be in excess 
to those of the previously described controlled focus cohort. There was a greater level of 
strategic fit between the management philosophy and the firm’s entrepreneurial stance. 
This meant that more entrepreneurial owner-managers were managing these moderately 
more entrepreneurial firms. However, similarly to the case of the previous controlled focus 
trajectory, there were also owner-managers that demonstrated entrepreneurial traits in 
excess to the RDO life cycle state that these firms had entered. The small size of the 
dominant coalition (more often one person than two) made two major growth constraints 
somewhat difficult to overcome. These were organizational momentum and owner-
manager skills/knowledge limitations. A larger dominant coalition shall be shown to be an 
effective way of circumnavigating these difficulties. 
 
Again, and as expected, the engineering and resource stances supported the business 
stance adopted by these firms. Often the engineering stance showed firms that were 
capable of moving up and down the industry value chain, vertically integrating to an 
extent. This allowed them to provide products/services that were complementary to the 
initial, core area of expertise. There would be a wider range of complementary resource 
endowments, such as multi-skilling of human resources, more professionally set up 
physical resources, and more synergies in the organizational resources. Customer-based 
performance measures became more important, such as building up and sustaining a 
loyal customer base through a differentiated product and strong brand identity. More 
select customers demanded a more inclusive or specialized product, and were ready to 
pay a premium for this. Positive NAV growth supported this approach, and demonstrated 
how the firms could successfully thrive by adopting this particular trajectory. To 
summarize, firms following this trajectory had found a formula that served them well. The 
modest diversification was a risk mitigating measure, yet allowed for access to niche 
markets that required a more complete, diversified product. Firms could survive 
indefinitely in this trajectory, constantly expanding upon related activities and 
products/services. They could also move into a more aggressive trajectory, or backwards 
through a more conservative trajectory, as will be discussed. 
 
The third trajectory that firms adopted is the repositioning trajectory, shown in green in 
Figure 8.3. The largest cohort of firms (19 in all, see Table 7.1) followed this expansion – 
contraction trajectory, that is a good demonstration of how the life cycle states (SBO, 
RDO, etc) cannot be used in isolation to describe the dynamics of small firm strategic 
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behaviour. Firms would have started their journey in a more conservative FEO state, 
moving into a more entrepreneurial RDO state (or even a highly entrepreneurial UDO 
state), only to reposition themselves in a FEO state. So although the final state is the 
same as that of firms following a controlled focus trajectory, the repositioning trajectory 
(and the motivators behind it) are widely different.  Repositioning firms were the oldest of 
all and had built the second highest net asset value (average age at 28 with an average 
NAV of €0.66M, see Table 7.1). The firms were run by either one or two owner-managers 
(average of 1.53).  The logic of the trajectory is one of an initially focused competitiveness, 
with subsequent drives to expand and diversify into either related or unrelated 
products/services and industries, but then an even later decision to contract back into a 
functional efficiency state. The obvious question is why would a small firm dedicate 
precious resources and expose itself to a higher risk scenario, only to revert back to its 
initial competitive state? Analysis of the firms in question showed three distinct reasons. A 
few of the firms had acted entrepreneurially, but beyond the more conservative philosophy 
of their owner-managers. The strategic mismatch was felt, and owner-managers hastily 
re-focused on their core competencies. Arguably firms may fail here due to the exposure 
to harsh competition and a difficulty to operate at this heightened entrepreneurial state 
with a limited dominant coalition. A second situation existed; highly entrepreneurial owner-
managers that were being faced with very adverse competitive conditions, and saw no 
alternative but to (temporarily) refocus on their initial, core competencies. The third 
situation was unexpected, but most interesting. The persons managing this third sub-
group were no longer owner-managers, but professional managers pulled in to run the 
business in an efficient, albeit systematic, manner. The entrepreneurial persons that had 
created the firms in the first place were now refocusing elsewhere, and required stability in 
the initial business and the benefits that this would provide towards their new incentives. 
 
As evident, there were a number of different motivators for the repositioning firms to act 
the way they did, inducing them to redirect their engineering and resource-based stances 
to their initial configuration. Subjective performance descriptions provided by owner-
managers were somewhat generic, looking towards stability measured by sales/turnover, 
efficiency in operations, and effectiveness in launching projects. The objective NAV 
figures provided a more in-depth picture. The high average NAV and age of the firms 
showed businesses that had accumulated wealth over time, and now were retracting to a 
form of competition that they felt secure in. NAV growth took on two distinct patterns, as 
shown in Figure 7.10. The firms that were forced into repositioning due to competitive 
conditions had a lower NAV growth, at 34% over a five-year period. Firms that had 
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professional managers pulled in were experiencing more scattered, but steeper NAV 
growths, at an average increase of 50% over a five-year period. Possibly this was a 
motivator for the initial entrepreneur of these firms to apply his/her skills elsewhere, whilst 
seeking a guaranteed continuation, stability and financial support from the initial firm.  
 
The fourth trajectory is that of dynamic growth, a path taken by only 6 of the 67 firms. 
Most dynamic growth firms started off from a FEO state, passing through the RDO state, 
and into a dynamic UDO state. This meant that the firms were competing in industries and 
product/markets that were unrelated to their initial areas of expertise. Firms were the 
second youngest, but the largest by far by way of employee count and NAV (Table 7.1 
shows an average age of 18 years and an average NAV at over double that of any other 
trajectory). The firms also had the largest dominant coalition (average 2.33 persons), and 
it has previously been argued that it is this coalition size that allows firms in a UDO state 
to compete so aggressively and effectively. Owner-managers were highly skilled, 
experienced, and academically qualified, and the businesses were generally in mid to 
high-technology industries. The dominant coalition team would be heavily focused 
towards creating value and then aggressively maintaining the engineering stance and 
resource base required to sustain that value. This is also the trajectory that boasted the 
best level of strategic fit between the owner-manager philosophy, the entrepreneurial 
behaviour of the firm, and the competitive environment. In fact, Thomas and Ramaswamy 
(1996) empirically observe that a strategy – manager match provides a greater impact on 
performance than a host of other variables such as firm age, size and industry conditions.  
Figure 8.3 shows the dynamic growth trajectory to oscillate from any prior strategic state, 
ending up in the largest trajectory loop. Firms could take on two possible alternatives from 
this point onwards. They could either grow beyond the remits of a small business (i.e. 
employing more than 49 employees, thus effectively looping out of the window shown in 
Figure 8.3). Alternatively, firms could be directed by their owner-managers to adopt a 
subsequent repositioning trajectory, either due to a refocus by the initial entrepreneur, or 
as a temporary measure due to increasingly adverse competitive conditions.  
 
The final, fifth trajectory is the complete opposite of the above dynamic growth trajectory, 
and has been named the retrenchment trajectory. As shown in Figure 8.3, the 14 firms 
following this trajectory either entered a SBO state from an earlier FEO state, or 
alternatively would always have existed within this SBO state. These firms were amongst 
the smallest by way of employee count and NAV (average of 7 employees and an 
average NAV of around €0.3M, see Table 7.1), but nearly the oldest with an average age 
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of 27 years. The firms also had the smallest size of dominant coalition, with usually just 
one member. NAV growth was the lowest of all, even negative for some firms. Subjective 
performance targets mentioned were the obtaining of stable revenues, survival and 
personal satisfaction. These were the kind of firms entering the “contaminated” lifestyle 
state, a competitive stance that is often looked upon by researchers as a failed, or 
inconsequential, form of entrepreneurial behaviour. The grounded theory research, 
however, uncovered some interesting nuances for this strategic trajectory. There were, in 
fact, three predominant situations inducing a firm to follow a retrenchment trajectory (five 
are mentioned in Chapter 7, the main three being discussed here). Firstly, there were a 
few firms that purposely chose to exist within a SBO state, here one would find a close 
match between the static SBO state and the highly conservative nature of the owner-
manager. Owner-managers that operated small firms on a part-time basis would be 
expected to fall within this category. There would also be situations where a more 
entrepreneurial owner-manager would be faced with a competitive environment of 
(perceived) insurmountable odds. Even the conceptual model in Figure 8.2 would allow a 
highly negative objective environment to sway the more optimistic behaviour of an 
entrepreneur into a retrenched, conservative behaviour (visualized through the dotted 
line). The third situation is one of hibernation, where more entrepreneurial owner-
managers were easing back in the anticipation of inducting a new owner-manager (often a 
family member) into the business. The SBO state was, in this case, a temporary life cycle 
state. The various rationales for following a retrenchment trajectory demonstrate why this 
form of strategic behaviour should not be taken as a separate “hobby-oriented” form of 
business behaviour, or as Miller (1983) would call it; that of a “simple” firm.  
 
8.2.4 Methodological Implications 
 
There appears to be one reason alone for the paucity of conclusive empirical work on the 
strategic behaviour of small businesses; that of methodology. Reference is made to 
Figure 4.2 that compares fine and coarse grained research methodologies, and includes 
the hybrid methodology. Coarse grained methodologies using cross-sectional, multivariate 
techniques are most commonly deployed in small business strategy research (e.g. 
Aragón-Sánchez and Sánchez-Marín 2005). They will give an excellent snap-shot of what 
is going on, are strong on the important requisites of prediction and generalizability, but 
fundamentally weak in description… at least the form of description that merges content 
with process to explain “why” what is happening is actually happening. One again quoting 
from Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 127); “process and structure are inextricably linked, and 
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unless one understands the nature of their relationship (both to each other and to the 
phenomenon in question), it is difficult to truly grasp what is going on”.  At best the 
methodology, through common use of factor/cluster analysis, can create a sequence of 
cross-sectional pictures of a dynamic phenomenon, and infer the changes that occur 
between (Desarbo, Grewal and Wang 2009).  Due to the predominant use of quantitative 
research techniques, many of the nuances particular to the small firm have gone 
unnoticed. A good example of this is the cross-sectional research by Entrialgo (2002) on 
SME’s, concluding that a positive relationship could be seen between entrepreneurial 
managers, entrepreneurial firms and performance, but that an understanding of what was 
going on was lost at the conservative end of the continuum where there was a more 
complex interaction of both entrepreneurial and conservative owner-managers. A similar 
example is that of Barkham et al. (1996), in a study of small business growth in the U.K. 
The authors excluded ‘soft data’ such as owner-manager motivations from the final 
analysis, arguing that it would be difficult to quantify this kind of data.  Cross-sectional 
studies also suffer from another, more fundamental problem; that of bias due to the 
application of conceptual frameworks based on pre-defined variable sets.  As Ketchen et 
al. (1997) put it, by adopting this approach you will get exactly what you are looking for (or 
a confirmation that what you are looking for is not there), thus limiting truly innovative 
learning that is urgently required for an understanding of small business strategy. 
 
On the other side of the continuum we have the fine grained methodologies, such as case 
and longitudinal studies. The amount of time and resources required for such studies, 
particularly those that span a wide time period, often make them a distant preference to 
quantitative studies. The focus is usually a single unit, such as a firm, an entrepreneur, or 
a small grouping of like units. As argued by Kisfalvi (2002), these longitudinal studies are 
an excellent tool for observing and combining the evolving process over time with the 
content of a firm’s situation. One has but to see Mintzberg and Water’s (1982) seminal 
paper that maps the processes and content of a retail chain’s strategic behaviour over a 
60-year period.  The methodology is extremely strong in description, somewhat limited in 
prediction but intrinsically weak in generalizability. Typologies rarely emanate from these 
studies, making them difficult to infer to larger populations.  
 
The third option, that of a hybrid methodology (not to be confused with mixed methods), is 
somewhat of a merge of the two prior methods. It involves a select number of cases (often 
between 20 to 30), far fewer than that of a cross-sectional study but substantially more 
than a single case/longitudinal study. It is usually qualitative and inductive in design, but 
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may pull in quantitative data for triangulation purposes. Hybrid methodologies such as the 
one adopted in this research (grounded theory, that is) look at content and also look at 
process. They are predominantly interview-based and, if implemented correctly, will solicit 
details from the respondent regarding what happened over time, why, what were the 
influencing factors, and what were the outcomes. The empirical literature, in fact, provides 
few examples of the use of grounded theory to map out patterns of business-related 
behaviour, although the method of enquiry is ideal for doing just that; mapping out 
patterns (Charmaz 2006). One noticeable exception is the study of Dainty, Bagilhole and 
Neale (2000) on the career paths of women in the UK construction industry. A similar 
trajectory-based approach to the present one was used, in which respondents highlighted 
significant career stages and sketched a graphical representation of their careers as they 
moved between stages, showing distinct and important differences in male and female 
career trajectories. Schwarz and Nandhakumar (2002) provide another good example 
relating to strategy. Furthermore, a constructivist grounded theory approach such as that 
adopted in the present research provides additional value, as “constructivist research 
imbues strategy with an important sensitivity to context, history and perspective, and 
offers us insights that are not possible from realist or empiricist research” (Mir and Watson 
2001 p. 1172).  In conclusion, it is being argued that dynamic patterns of strategic 
behaviour can only be observed if the right research methodology is applied, otherwise 
the academic community will continue seeing more and more of the same.  
 
8.2.5    General Comments on the Concept of Strategic Trajectories 
 
The trajectories that have been observed point towards a new perspective of small 
business coalignment, one contingent upon the dominant coalition composition and 
philosophy, the state and behaviour of the firm, and the environmental conditions. On the 
argument of why people with evident entrepreneurial traits will engage in different levels of 
entrepreneurial behaviour, Shane and Venkataraman (2000 p. 223) come up with a 
response. They argue that entrepreneurial behaviour is situational, that an entrepreneur’s 
“decision to exploit an opportunity involves weighing the value of the opportunity against 
the costs to generate that value and the costs to generate value in other ways”. 
Opportunity costs come in here, such as the opportunity cost of leisure, or of achieving 
more valuable returns than may be offered by the firm, or of simply waiting for a more 
advantageous competitive situation to emerge. The previous discussion has put forward 
one particular argument; that there will be different motivators, and different perceptions of 
the internal/external competitive environment, that will induce owner-managers to behave 
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in different ways. Each life cycle state is, indeed, a totally unique coalignment situation, 
with different motivators, different performance objectives, different internal and external 
competitive conditions, and so on. By moving in a trajectory between life cycle states, 
owner-managers would be following a pattern, one of five possible patterns to be exact. 
Each pattern is an established flow of movement between life cycle states, with 
established conditions and established consequences. Actions being taken by the firm 
can now be better understood by looking at their direct outcome, visible in the engineering 
stance and the resource-based stance. Reference is made to Mintzberg’s (2007) realized 
versus intended strategies, that argue that a firm’s strategy can be derailed by emerging 
outcomes. Having a typology of trajectories at hand allows the owner-manager to 
understand the possible change in strategic direction, to pre-empt the consequences, and 
to even attempt to moderate the conditions, if so desired.  
 
The five identified trajectories can be looked at as five main templates that a small 
business owner-manager may adopt. Other trajectories may be taken that are a 
compilation of these principal templates. However, in a bid to be as parsimonious as 
possible an argument is placed in favour of a typological approach to understanding the 
trajectories. For example, firms going through contained growth and then repositioning 
into a functional efficiency orientation would be classified alongside firms going through 
dynamic growth and also repositioning into a functional efficiency orientation; both firms 
would be classified as following the ‘repositioning’ trajectory. Also, it is important to note 
that three of the five strategic trajectories do not lead to growth, and the fourth to only 
moderate growth. This goes against fundamental economic theory that argues that the 
objective of a firm is profit. However, the results are in no way unique. In a similarly 
conducted qualitative study of small businesses to the south of the United Kingdom (90 
manufacturing firms, mostly at below 20 employees) it was observed that few firms were 
prepared to grow further. In fact, “the small firms under review appeared to ignore and 
even avoid opportunities for improved financial performance” (Hankinson 2000 p. 98). The 
long hours of work coupled with a determination to minimize delegation appeared to be 
more important for the owner-managers concerned. On small business research, Curran 
and Blackburn (2001 p. 45) in fact observe that “it is common in economic studies of small 
business performance to assume owner-managers are profit maximizers reflecting the 
assumptions fundamental to classical economic theory. However, studies of real-life small 
business owners show that profit maximization is rarely a prime motivation in the way they 
operate their businesses”.  
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A comparison of the trajectories uncovered can also be made with a study with similar 
objectives (on SME’s in Australia; McMahon 2001), also looking into strategic trajectories 
albeit using more rigid quantitative techniques. The study concluded that 70% of the 
sample demonstrated a low growth pathway, 25% a moderate growth pathway, and 5% a 
high growth pathway. McMahon (2001 p. 209) argues that the small quantity of high 
growth SME’s is “in accord with the observed rarity of substantial growth amongst SME’s 
world-wide”. The present research has similarly seen 72% of the small firms 
demonstrating low growth (the controlled focus firms, repositioning firms and retrenchment 
firms), 19% demonstrating moderate growth (the contained growth firms), and 9% 
demonstrating high growth (the dynamic growth firms). The methodological differences 
between the two studies are, however, significant, as the McMahon study is based upon 
panel data and the application of multivariate techniques, primarily cluster analysis. Pre-
defined attributes were applied to study snap-shots of longitudinal data, and strategic 
pathways were inferred to confirm the existence of expected life-cycle patterns. The 
present study has no urgency to prove or confirm pre-established theoretical models. 
Whilst it is interesting, even important, to compare the findings with existing (albeit rare) 
empirical literature, the present study is not dependent on the literature with an aim to 
prove or disprove what is already established. Grounded theory has a different objective; 
that of integrating (and enhancing) the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon 
with what is convincingly apparent in the data. The four life cycle states, and the five 
common trajectories between these states, were not an attempt to confirm what is already 
known, but a bid to explain what was truly happening in the substantive area of enquiry. A 
parsimonious model describing small firm strategic behaviour was sought. 
 
8.3 Implications to the Various Stakeholders 
 
One of the major problems relating to small firms regards perception; perception that 
small firms are simple firms, that small firms are price takers working in near perfect 
competition, that for the small firm there is no strategy, only the whims and actions of the 
owner-manager, that conclusions applicable to large firms can also be proportioned to 
small firms, and so on. On researching small firms, Curran and Blackburn (2001 p. 5) sum 
up the common sentiment very well; “Small does not mean simple. Neither is a small 
business a scaled-down version of a large business. A small number of human beings 
engaged in a common endeavour can create very complex, subtle interactions. 
Unravelling the underlying meanings and patterns of these interactions can be far from 
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straightforward”. One could go as far as argue that understanding small business strategy, 
with its dynamic implications, is in fact far more difficult than in visualizing the strategy of a 
larger, more bureaucratic organization. Formal planning, such as strategic or business 
planning, is of little help here, and is rarely utilized by small businesses other than for fund 
acquisition purposes. Evident structures of the business may very well explain the 
strategies of larger businesses (this is where Chandler actually started off his strategy 
quest!), but will divulge little for the small business that often operates through a flat, 
centralized configuration. Assuming that the strategy of the small business is the same 
strategy that is in the mind of the owner-manager is another fallacy. In a bid to cater for 
these weaknesses and misconceptions, a model for small firm strategic behaviour has 
been proposed (Figure 8.1), one that looks at patterns in the form of common trajectories 
passing through a limited set of life cycle states. Implications for the application of this 
model are discussed below, with a focus on four important audiences for small business 
research: 
 
8.3.1    Implications for Academics and Researchers: 
 
Description, prediction and generalizability of findings would allow academics to 
understand the phenomenon and to apply the learning through teaching materials, 
consultancies and further research. Practically all academic courses on strategy adopt 
one of two bases; that of industrial organization economics (focusing on a few large 
oligopolies) or that of strategic management (which is a more practical derivative of the 
first school, and incorporates many of Michael Porter’s teachings). Both schools are 
based on one underlying concept; that of strategic momentum. The small firm, although 
catering for over 90% of the population of businesses in most industries, is relegated to 
the backbench and is looked at as a “simple” or “lifestyle” establishment. The job creation, 
value adding, innovation providing functions of the small business are so quickly 
overlooked. Academics need a tool to overcome this inertia, and the tool needs to be 
easily understood and applicable. Typologies are the ideal solution to this, and are used 
almost religiously in all social science fields. Anyone who has studied even basic strategy 
will quote Porter’s Generic Strategies, even though Porter (1980 p. 34) himself highlights 
the weaknesses in the generalizations provided. Typologies will be found in marketing 
(the five marketing orientations), in economics (groupings of firms based upon industry 
concentration), in organizational behaviour (the various classical and neo-classical 
schools), and so on. The model provided for small business strategic behaviour (Figure 
8.1) should hopefully provide academics with a tool to explain how small businesses act 
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strategically, why the actions are taken, and what would be the consequences of the 
actions. A major issue on consequences is that of organizational performance. The 
argument that has been placed in this thesis is that the performance of the small firm is 
not (as repeatedly stated in conferences on SME’s) almost impossible to measure. The 
logic is that only by understanding where the small firm is trying to go, can one measure if 
it has actually got there. 
 
There is also the issue of applying the learning provided by the model for future research 
purposes. The Framework developed in Chapter 5 is a framework of strategy variables, a 
variable set particular to the small firm and emanating from the grounded theory research 
on small firms. It can, however, be extended to allow for additional “strategy-oriented” 
research. For example, various attempts are made by researchers to study functional 
level (as opposed to business level) strategies, such as a firm’s human resource 
management strategy or its I.T. strategy. The same Framework can be applied, but with 
grounded theory now focusing more intensely on sub-categories to the engineering 
stance, or on the resource-based stance, that relate to the new phenomenon under 
observation. Coalignment once again comes in (and arguably cannot be avoided), such 
as the dynamic coalignment between the small firm’s strategic behaviour and the firm’s 
more functional I.T. strategy. Simplifying what is obviously a complex scenario; imagine a 
firm attempting to adopt a dynamic growth trajectory within a high-tech industry, yet visibly 
deploying I.T. initiatives that do not allow for flexibility or expansion.  Various other 
strategic alignment initiatives could be studied in this way. Again, the argument that 
structure and process both have to be integrated into the research approach is made.  
 
8.3.2 Implications for Policy Makers and Other Governmental Stakeholders 
 
Policy makers would consist of government bodies, or legally appointed institutions, that 
have an interest in the behaviours, successes and failures of small businesses. Public 
educational departments, regulatory institutions, funding bodies, and policy making offices 
are all stakeholders to the small business. The interests of these stakeholders are far 
more complex than a simple brief to maximize the benefits to small businesses. Funds are 
always scarce, business operating space is limited, political pressures to support the 
“more important industries” will always be there, and so on. Governmental stakeholders 
will always end up satisficing, as maximizing is not generally possible. Policy makers do 
not need assistance to distinguish high growth industries from low growth industries, they 
will already have this information. They do, however, need to be able to understand what 
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characteristics allow a small firm to survive, to grow, and to provide a return on support 
measures provided. To expand upon this theme, take the actions that most governments 
adopt to group like industries within select industrial estates. In Malta one will see high-
tech businesses placed in the Mosta techno-park, I.T. firms situated in SmartCity, small 
carpentry businesses positioned at the low-technology Handaq industrial estate, and so 
on. The objective is to encourage similar cognitive processes within like-minded business 
people, who can learn by emulation and imitation (Industry Strategy for Malta: 2007-2010 
p. 45). Little attempt is made to see if the business has the correct strategy profile. In fact, 
national clustering initiatives are based on entirely different criteria, such as sectorial 
clustering. Taking an example; imagine two highly entrepreneurial brothers that have 
started up a small carpentry business and have the potential of taking this all the way to a 
multinational enterprise. A close look at the firm’s strategic profile indicates a business 
moving into dynamic growth. Governmental mechanisms will, unfortunately, not see this, 
and will do little by way of support towards the business. Much of the potential is lost in 
this way, and the business will be located in a low-priority industrial zone. 
 
As another example, take an engineering firm that has shown high innovativeness and 
has expanded rapidly over just a few years. Governmental support is in full swing here, 
providing low interest finance, free training schemes, subsidized business space at a top 
techno-park, and so on. The dominant coalition has, however, collapsed, with the 
entrepreneurial component leaving the firm, and the more conservative component eying 
an increasingly competitive environment with the intention of repositioning towards a few 
established products. Much of government’s assistance here will be misdirected. Or 
alternatively a manufacturing firm that has adopted a controlled focus trajectory and is 
seeking assistance to enhance a key assembly line. Government support is denied as the 
application is marked as “devoid of any innovative component”. These examples go to 
show that a profiling of the strategic trajectories adopted by a firm would give vital 
information to policy making and policy implementation bodies run by government. There 
is also, once again, the issue of equifinality. The five trajectories are all success stories, 
albeit in different ways. Even the part-time owner-manager of a firm following a 
retrenchment trajectory is succeeding in providing motivation for himself or herself, some 
minute component of value added activity for the nation, some level of innovativeness and 
creativeness, and so on. Unfortunately, Kimberly (1979 p. 446) sums it up when the 
author states that “rapid growth is often equated with success. There is a value embedded 
deeply in our culture that places a strong positive evaluation on evidence of growth, and a 
negative evaluation on steady state and, particularly, on decline”.  
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8.3.3 Implications for Private Support Bodies 
 
Private support bodies and business sponsors are also important stakeholders to the 
small firm. Banks, venture capitalists, trade associations, private educational institutions, 
and various other service providers will have a vested interest in the success of the small 
businesses. As in the case of governmental bodies, these private players will have limited 
resources at their disposition, and their own survival may depend on understanding the 
behaviours of these businesses. Small local banks could go out of business with too many 
loan defaults over a sustained period. Trade associations could misinterpret the 
behaviours of small businesses and petition for legislation that is detrimental to the 
businesses over the long term. Private educational institutions could provide the wrong 
forms of education that produce inadequate results, and so on. Once again, having a 
template of small business strategies at hand can be a useful tool to help private industry 
understand the very behaviours, and corresponding motivators, of these small 
businesses. 
 
8.3.4 Implications for Small Business Owners 
 
As posited by Curran and Blackburn (2001), small business owner-managers are usually 
the people with the least time to follow the outcomes of small business research. Their 
general absorption of the research is through its partial application or influence in 
developing governmental regulations and support schemes. This does not mean that 
small business owner-managers are not interested in acquiring knowledge, only that they 
will generally place their focus on what appear to be more urgent matters. It is the larger 
firm executives that would be expected to read into the ensuing research developments in 
their areas of interest. However, businesses, both large and small, should be expected to 
try and observe where they are trying to go, what they are trying to achieve. Mintzberg 
and Waters (1985 p. 272) expect a manager to purposely search for patterns in streams 
of organizational actions, arguing that “pattern recognition is likely to prove a crucial ability 
of effective managers”.  By understanding the implications of the different trajectories, 
more informed decisions can be made.  
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 8.4 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Development 
 
For each of the three main areas of research focus, detailed sequentially in Chapters 5, 6 
and 7, the chapters have included discussions on the various challenges and limitations 
particular to the area being described. This final section shall provide an overview of the 
main, salient issues relating to the research project. In particular, three main issues will be 
discussed. Recommendations shall be put forward in a bid to provide alternatives, or 
solutions, to the limiting factors that are to be described. Before looking into these three 
issues, however, a quick reference must be made to the main criticism leveled at 
grounded theory research studies, and how attempts have been made to counteract this 
criticism. Curran and Blackburn observe that “despite the frequent claims by later 
researchers (and even more commonly, by research students) that their work was 
inspired by grounded theory, there are few examples in small business research which 
clearly show, stage by stage, the approach at work and how the final theoretical result 
emerged from the analytical strategy” (2001 p. 107).  
 
In a bid to demonstrate the adequacy of the analytic strategy deployed, two main 
approaches have been used in the research and in the subsequent thesis writing. The first 
of these is demonstrated in the Methodology chapter that has aimed to provide detailed 
descriptions of the knowledge claim adopted, the width and depth of the research, the 
sampling strategy adopted, the coding strategy applied, the data management and 
analysis techniques utilized, the quality criteria targeted, and so on. The second approach 
has been in the segmentation of the research descriptions and findings into three 
sequential, and individually described, stages. In each of these stages further clarifications 
on the application of the method have been made, detailed descriptions and 
interpretations on the findings have been provided, and discussions on how the stage 
provided an important contribution to the final objective put forward.  The definition of a 
framework of strategy variables, the application of this framework to establish a life cycle 
of strategic states, and the study of business trajectories as small firms competed 
dynamically within different states, are these three sequential research stages. The 
approach of staging the research has hopefully added clarity to the work, both to its 
application and to its interpretation, and has responded to Curran and Blackburn’s 
criticism. The following three issues look towards limitations within the present research, 
and to possible avenues for further development.   
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8.4.1 Issue 1: Generalizability of Findings 
 
This first issue regards the challenge of description, prediction and generalizability of the 
research findings. The method of enquiry adopted, that of grounded theory, allowed for an 
understanding on the phenomenon to emerge that was extremely rich in description. 
Quantity wise, the 67 participants provided over 292,000 words of transcribed data, and 
adding to this were numerous memos that linked, described and theorized on the 
phenomenon in question. The thesis itself is but a summary of this detail. On the concept 
of prediction, a typology-based approach has been adopted due to the benefits it provides 
in this regard. Chapter 6 defines a typology of life cycle states, with firms falling into any 
one of four states at a particular point in time. Chapter 7 builds upon this life cycle 
concept, and identifies five possible trajectories of strategic behaviour that small firms will 
inevitably follow. This “typology” of pathways is strongly advocated by Hambrick (1983) for 
understanding how firms change their strategic behaviour over time, and Mintzberg (2007) 
argues that studies of changing patterns are really the only way to understand the 
dynamics of business strategy. Trajectories of strategic behaviour resolve the prediction 
issue, as they dictate the conditions and consequences of strategic actions taken over 
time.  
 
The main weakness of the study in question (and arguably for all qualitative studies) is not 
in description or prediction, but in generalizability. The substantive area of enquiry has 
been that of a small island state, signifying a restricted geographical area. Whilst many 
small firms around the globe are faced with some form of geographical challenges and 
limitations (added costs of supply, delivery, labour market issues, etc.), the difficulties 
faced by small island states may be somewhat particular. There will always be more 
challenges to access foreign markets, particular problems regarding port expenses and 
efficiencies, difficulties to regularly interact with suppliers and customers, and so on. This 
factor should not impact upon the framework of strategy variables established in Chapter 
5 (see Figure 5.2), but could influence the  composition and positioning of the life cycle 
states identified in Chapter 6 (see Figure 8.1, X-axis). Firms moving into a functional 
efficiency orientation were observed to be smaller than firms opting for a related 
diversification orientation (unless they were retrenching and bringing with them a previous 
resource base). This is understandable for firms in a small island state; growth was more 
easily achieved through diversification than through focusing on core products and aiming 
for size and economies of scale. However, in environments with lesser geographical 
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limitations, firms could more easily grow and still retain a focus on a few core products or 
services. Possibly this could be a larger growth stage than that of moderate diversification, 
changing the patterns shown in Figure 8.1. The research in question does not conclude 
upon this issue, and a similar study would have to take place in a different, and less 
restricted, geographical setting to establish whether the life cycle states still apply without 
need for modification. 
 
Still on the issue of generalizability, this time for small island states, is one of regional 
culture. The question that needs to be asked is whether firms in similar competitive 
environments, but with different national/regional cultures, would behave in essentially the 
same way. For example, in the present study an Anglo culture was observed, one low on 
uncertainty avoidance and high on individualism. This was seen to influence the cognitive 
behaviours of the owner-managers to the extent that true delegation of responsibilities 
was at a minimum, resulting in a larger dominant coalition required for the more 
entrepreneurial firms. Again, the study would have to be replicated in other small island 
states to see if these trends were common enough to be generalized across geographical 
settings. In other words, would all small island states have firms with generally similar 
cultural dispositions? If not, what enhancements to the model would be required to make it 
more generalizable across different competitive landscapes.  As it stands the research 
can only be deemed to be a substantive study. This is not unexpected, and Charmaz 
(2006 p. 8) would argue that “most grounded theories are substantive theories because 
they address delimited problems in specific substantive areas”. Conversely, an opposing 
argument can be placed. Possibly the cultural groupings proposed by Hofstede (2001 p. 
41), when studying large IBM units around the world, are irrelevant and inapplicable to the 
small firm. Findings of the present study appear to correlate strongly with those of 
Hankinson (2000) in the United Kingdom and McMahon (2001) in Australia. The 
conservative-entrepreneurial continuum shown in Figure 8.2 may possibly go some way in 
explaining the cultural divergences of different owner-managers. Still, to respond 
adequately to the generalizability issue, the present study would have to be replicated in 
different competitive landscapes.  A final issue on generalizability has been to include 
small businesses coming from a range of different industries, and thus different 
competitive settings, within the present study. Curran and Blackburn (2001 p. 17) warn 
that this may come at a cost, as it is “to ignore a wide range of sector characteristics that 
make them very different from each other”. Glaser and Strauss (1967 p. 57) conversely 
argue that this is in fact advantageous, allowing for the maximization of differences by 
widening the scope of research.  
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8.4.2 Issue 2: Researching the Failed Firm 
 
A common difficulty found by many researchers is in attempting to study failed firms. Few, 
if any, owner-managers will avail themselves to discuss the failure of a business, as they 
will associate this with their own personal failure. The five trajectories uncovered were all, 
to some extent, successful trajectories of small firm strategic behaviour. There were no 
“failed” trajectories, and no firms available, or willing, to provide the data that might allow 
such a trajectory to be created (possibly with the exception of Firm 16). Hambrick (1984 p. 
39) actually sees this to be an advantage, as “if the low-performing businesses do not 
have integrated, cohesive strategies then these businesses introduce a substantial 
amount of noise into the clustering process”.  In other words, a clearer picture can be 
gained of successful strategic behaviour due to the natural omission of failed or failing 
firms. An argument that can be placed here is that failed strategies do not exist, only the 
failed implementation of a potentially successful strategy. Many possible situations could 
lead to this, such as a conservative owner/manager investing too heavily in unrelated 
business areas, or a change in coalition formation resulting in a firm – owner-manager – 
context  misalignment. Another example of failed coalignment could be a situation where 
attempts to diversify are not adequately supported by the necessary build-up of excess 
resources (Gary 2005). The five successful strategic trajectories may not fall into Tang’s 
and Liou’s (2010) definition of sustainable competitive advantage through unique 
resource-management-environment alignment, but arguably do look at “sustainable 
competitiveness” for the small firm as it adopts different coalignment characteristics at 
different life cycle stages.  
 
8.4.3 Issue 3: Parsimony and the Study of Patterns within Patterns 
 
A final limitation that needs to be articulated regards the failure of the research to focus 
more specifically on a number of important criteria, this due to the objective set out to 
study patterns (being, in itself, a generic task with parsimony as a main objective). An 
example of this would be entrepreneurial learning, such as double-loop versus single-loop 
learning, and how this changes an owner-manager’s cognitive behaviour.  The research 
setting would have been ideal to uncover more of the dynamics, the context and the 
consequences, of this important phenomenon.  
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Another example would be studying “patterns within patterns”, such as how firms following 
a dynamic growth trajectory would align their more functional strategies to complement 
this aggressive strategic approach. The framework of variables (Figure 5.2) has provided 
a range of categories, sub-categories and properties that allow for rich studies to be 
carried out on business actions, be they strategic, functional or tactical. For example, the 
engineering stance sub-category includes 4 different properties, with many more sub-
elements, making it possible to map out the fine detail of processes and value adding 
activities that take place at any level of the firm. The resource-based stance could then be 
used to observe the complex medley of resources applied by the firm, the functional unit, 
or a single particular operation. Two examples of this possible approach shall be given on 
two entirely different concepts; globalization and workplace stress. Taking the 
globalization concept and focusing on one strategic trajectory; that of controlled focus 
(one of the lesser growth oriented strategies where, arguably, less of a focus on 
globalization would be expected). Two issues immediately stand out that have been given 
prominence by various authors (e.g. Soriano and Dobon 2009). These are the level of 
understanding that an owner-manager would require of the globalization concept, of its 
implementation, and of its perceived benefits to the firm’s expansion and survival, as well 
as the resourcing that would be required to successfully implement a globalization 
strategy. Profiling the strategy of the small business (i.e. relating to the template of 
trajectories; Figure 8.1) would immediately give the observer an advantage, as it would 
establish the strategic mindset of the owner-manager and the particular coalignment of 
characteristics that make the controlled focus firm what it is. The controlled focus firm is 
successful, in its own right, due to the conservative and highly focused mechanisms that 
define its functional efficiency orientation. Treating it as a firm ready for dynamic growth 
would be a recipe for disaster.  
 
However, there may be two approaches that an observer, or consultant, could provide to 
the controlled focus owner-manager. A first step would be to establish whether the owner-
manager was on par, or in excess to, the relatively conservative state of the firm. For a 
conservative owner-manager philosophy the consultant could prescribe a low-profile 
approach of indirect globalization, as Matlay and Fletcher (2000 p. 441) describe it, where 
assistance would be given to direct the firm’s established goods/services towards foreign 
niche markets. For a more entrepreneurial, growth oriented management philosophy the 
consultant would start by using the trajectory template to demonstrate to the owner-
manager the different strategic trajectories available, and their consequences. If 
willingness was shown to grow through, say, a contained growth trajectory, then steps 
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could be taken to assist the owner-manager build the knowledge and resource capacities 
necessary to apply a more aggressive direct globalization strategy, in a number of 
complementary areas within the particular industry value chain.  
 
Taking a second example, that of workplace stress and its negative implications on the 
small firm.  Also, for argument purposes, let us take a small firm that has been profiled to 
be following a dynamic growth trajectory. This implies a dynamic firm with some 30 
employees, with owner-managers heavily involved in value creation and in hands-on 
implementation, and aggressive diversification into unrelated, high-technology industries. 
Workplace stress is a key human resource management issue, leading to job 
dissatisfaction, premature burnout, increased turnover, and a lowering of performance. 
For the owner-manager who has understood the dynamic growth trajectory that the firm is 
following (and its implications), two actions can be taken. One would regard employee 
resourcing, both for recruitment and for career progression. Steps could be taken to 
identify employees whose aptitudes and attitudes were congruent with the dynamic nature 
of the firm. As “people suffer stress when they believe they lack the resources to deal with 
difficult events” (Avey, Luthans and Jensen 2009 p. 680), aligning the employee’s profile 
with the established dynamic profile of the firm would be imperative. The second action 
regards existing employees, and motivating them through techniques such as positive 
psychological capital (Luthans et al. 2008). The technique argues that employees need to 
build the confidence to take on challenges, to build optimism in their capabilities of 
success, and to be able to react and redirect their efforts when the need demands. The 
coalition characteristics of the dynamic growth owner-manager team would, if properly 
directed, be well suited to assist employees to build these characteristics. The more 
dogmatic component of the dominant coalition could take on the task of building up the 
skills of the employees, whilst the more entrepreneurial component could focus on 
continuously enhancing employee knowledge and awareness of the dynamic challenges 
facing the organization. Alternatively, an H.R. consultant could assist in directing the firm 
in this fashion, once he/she is aware of the particular characteristics that a firm following a 
dynamic growth trajectory will have. Both the globalization and the workplace stress 
examples demonstrate how the research can be taken further by looking at the alignment 
of small business strategy with various functional strategies that the firm may want to 
embark on. 
 
A concluding comment is made by reviewing the three themes that have been seen to be 
cardinal to the understanding of small business strategy. The first is that of the dynamic 
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nature of small business strategy, best understood through the mapping of patterns that 
depict the various strategic paths, or trajectories, that small firms will follow as they 
change strategic states. A methodology that incorporates both structure and process is 
required to be able to map out these patterns. The grounded theory method of enquiry 
has been applied for this purpose. On small business research Curran and Blackburn 
(2001 p. 103) argue that the use of qualitative techniques ”forces the researcher to think 
harder and, hopefully, to be more creative when generating interpretations”, building a 
better understanding of the “why” of what is happening. The second is that of coalignment; 
dynamic coalignment, that is. Changing relationships were observed between the owner-
manager, the firm, and the competitive landscape. Only by understanding this dynamic 
coalignment could sense be made of the visible trajectories of strategic behaviour. This 
logic is out of tune with that of earlier proponents of strategic momentum (e.g. Miller and 
Friesen 1980), but very much in line with recent arguments on strategic consistency (e.g. 
Lamberg et al. 2009) and on strategic flexibility (e.g. Zhou and Wu 2010). Strategic 
consistency looks at the alignment of a firm’s actions, its historical behaviour, and its 
competitive environment. Strategic flexibility places less importance on historic behaviour, 
but does emphasize the dynamic alignment of a firm’s resources, its processes and its 
strategies, to adapt to environmental change. 
 
The third theme is that of organizational performance particular to the small business. The 
argument that has been put forward in this research is that one has to understand where 
the small firm is trying to get to, to be able to measure if it has actually got there. The five 
different trajectories each had clearly distinguishable performance outcomes in terms of 
subjective measures, and of objective measures such as growth and size (both financially 
and in employee count). Relating strategic trajectories to performance gives the academic 
and practitioner alike a range of goals to target, and a choice of pathways for getting to 
the different goals. The research has thus attempted to study common strategic pathways 
for the small firm as observed from visible patterns of long-range actions taken, as well as 
the rewards to be reaped for following a chosen pathway. The study has sought to 
achieve the three objectives of grounded theory research established in the methodology 
chapter (Section 4.1): It has aimed to build a parsimonious model (shown in Appendix 10) 
and summarized in the fifteen propositions in Figure 7.15) that allows for a theoretical 
representation and explanation of the phenomenon in question, and that is rigorously 
grounded in the data. Repeating the words of the distinguished author Henry Mintzberg; 
“what better way to study strategies, and the processes by which they develop, than to 
uncover patterns in organizations and investigate their origins” (Mintzberg 2007 p. 1).  
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8.4.4   Issue 4: Recommendations for Further Research  
 
Two further research streams are foreseen as possible continuations to the present 
research project.  The first relates to the concept of ‘patterns within patterns’ mentioned 
earlier on.  It involves the application of grounded theory techniques to build upon the 
existing research model in order to study functional strategies, as well as the important 
requisite of strategic fit. This would be carried out by the present research student, 
populating existing categories with more dense data relating to a particular area of 
functional significance, such as a firm’s marketing strategy. Categories such as the 
resource-based stance and the engineering stance would be enhanced with additional 
properties/dimensions, and the strategic actions/reactions category would focus on both 
business level actions and on functional actions. This would allow for an in-depth study of 
how the firm’s functional strategies align with its more integrative business strategy.  
 
A second alternative research stream would aim at the important requisite of 
generalizability; that is, making the model summarized in Appendix 10 more widely 
applicable. This would be carried out through quantitative, multivariate analytic 
techniques, effectively closing off the research cycle by testing out the model in different 
settings and refining as necessary. Two approaches could be adopted by future 
researchers. The first approach would be in line with the technique used by Hanks et al. 
(1993) to study strategic life cycle states using a cross sectional, static approach. As 
indicated in Chapter 6, the four life cycle states that were observed (the SBO, FEO, RDO, 
UDO states) were primarily explained through the structural variables (the contextual and 
consequential categories) of the Framework (see Figure 5.2). This would exclude the 
process-level variables (the strategic actions and reactions category), as well as the 
subtle interactions of process with structure. The focus would, instead, be placed on 
operationalizing the structural variables using a multi-dimensional approach and the use 
of multiple item scales to better capture the meaning of the various themes. Dynamic 
pathways of strategic behaviour would then be inferred from the static life cycle states. A 
more rigorous approach would follow on the lines of McMahon (2001), where repeated 
snap shots of longitudinal data are taken and strategic pathways subsequently inferred. In 
both cases the objective would be the same; confirming/refining the five pathways 
summarized in Appendix 10 in different research settings to gradually elevate the theory 
from one of mid-range to one of wide-range application.  Moving the theory from a 
substantive one to that of a grand theory would give researchers and practitioners a much 
sought after generic model for small business strategic behaviour. 
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Appendix 1: Overview of the Four Contributing Fields to Strategic 
Group Theory 
 
Appendix 1.1: Industrial Organization Theory and its Later 
Developments 
 
The focus of business policy and earlier strategic management has been on what makes 
a particular firm exceptional or unique, and thus what might provide the basis for a unique 
strategy. Industrial Organization theory (IO) offers a start towards a systematic 
understanding of the industry environment. IO theory is essentially a ‘contingency’ theory, 
whereby the environment influences organizational behaviour, which in turn influences 
economic performance (Rouleau and Seguin 1995). The traditional Industrial Organization 
paradigm of the 1950’s and 60’s (Bain 1968) held one main belief; that a firm’s 
performance in the marketplace depends critically on the characteristics of the industry 
environment in which it competed. This was depicted through the standard structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) model whereby industry structure determines the conduct of 
firms, whose joint conduct determines the collective performance of the industry in 
question. Essentially firm behaviour is treated here as a ‘black box’ (Thomas and Pollock 
1999). As conduct is a firm’s choice of pricing, advertising, production and quality, this 
dimension is akin to strategy for policy practitioners. Newman (1978) postulates that 
strategic groups – firms highly symmetrical in their strategies – are a stable and 
observable element of market structure. For example, an industry with a more complex 
structure of strategic groups would display more rivalrous and turbulent conduct.  
 
However, the concept of firms acting without any real power of choice began to be queried 
in the early 1980’s. A main contender to this IO framework was Michael Porter (Porter 
1979a, 1979b) who observed that the current SCP paradigm, seeing all firms within an 
industry as being homogeneous and sharing profits in equal proportion to their sales 
volumes, as being out of tune with a growing body of systematic empirical studies. Studies 
were increasingly providing the evidence for firm heterogeneity within single industries. 
The older IO explanations of what provided for market power within a single industry were 
seen to be inadequate at best.  Porter notes that “the structure within an industry consists 
of its configuration of strategic groups, including their mobility barriers, size and 
composition, strategic distance and the market interdependence relative to each other. 
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The firm will have higher profits if it is located in a group with the best combination of high 
mobility barriers, insulation from intergroup rivalry and substitute products, bargaining 
power with adjacent industries, the fewest other members and suitability to the firm’s 
execution ability” (1979b p. 219). Porter (1981) in fact notes that more recent IO work had 
shifted the unit of analysis from solely the industry to both the firm and the industry. Caves 
(1980) observes, in a similar train of thought, that IO economics had only just begun to 
incorporate the concept of an organization’s strategic choice into the analysis of market 
structure, conduct and performance. Caves recommends that performance associated 
with particular organizational strategies should be investigated more effectively, and not 
solely within the confines of allocative market efficiency. Caves makes an early reference 
to Resource-based Theory, observing that whilst prevalent IO theory assumes that under 
perfect competition equally successful firms would be identical, in fact these firms might 
deploy quite different resource bundles to achieve similar performances. Thomas and 
Pollock (1999) observe that the strategic group concept effectively turns SCP theory on its 
head, and argue that it is the strategic behaviour of firms that influences the structure of 
the market, and hence the performance of the industry. 
 
The concept of mobility barriers, an important ‘strategic group’ concept, was first 
introduced by Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1979, 1980, 1981). Mobility barriers 
are described as deterrents to a shift in strategic position of firms within an industry that 
give some firms an advantage over others. The larger the mobility barrier for a particular 
group, the more chance an organization within that strategic group has of making above-
normal profit (Porter 1980 p. 134). Causes for mobility barriers are possibly economies of 
scale, product differentiation, proprietary knowledge, cost and quality advantages, etc. 
This concept is seen to also build upon Porter’s identification of strengths and 
weaknesses for different firms within an industry. The strategic group/mobility barrier 
concept is seen by Porter to be a logical extension of the earlier Industrial Organization 
economics. Empirical studies on strategic grouping as a result of mobility barriers, and 
within the context of strategic management research, have been effectively implemented 
by authors such as Fombrun and Zajac (1987).  
 
Appendix 1.2:   Organizational Systematics School of Thought 
 
Moving on from the later Industrial Organization theory, one finds a little explored field, but 
one that provided for fundamental theory on strategic grouping in organizations; 
Organizational Systematics (McKelvey 1975, 1978). Organizational Systematics is seen 
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by McKelvey to be a necessary prerequisite to studies aiming to identify generalizable 
principles of organizational content and process. Systematics is essentially a science of 
diversity, aiming to classify organizations as members of homogeneous sub-populations. 
McKelvey looks towards biology to derive theory applicable to the science of 
Organizational Systematics. The author theorizes that there is a strong analogy between 
organizations and biological organisms; both are purposeful systems that adapt 
responsively to their environment and both can bring about changes to their environment. 
Hambrick (1984) supports this school of thought, postulating that the biological sciences 
have relied on taxonomies for a long time, in their ongoing search for discrete species. 
Thomas and Venkatraman (1988) provide further support, arguing that McKelvey’s theory 
provided valid arguments as to why groups form and remain stable over time. The two 
biological theories that McKelvey relates to Organizational Systematics are: a) Empiricism 
and numerical taxonomy and; b) Evolution and phyletics. Theory on empiricism and 
numerical taxonomy postulates that there are naturally occurring groupings and that 
adequate analysis, through techniques such as cluster and discriminant analysis, will 
reveal these groupings. Theory on evolution and phyletics traces out the development of 
species and attempts to understand how organisms adapt to environments and 
descended into natural, present-day groupings. McKelvey theorizes that both theories, in 
conjunction, are applicable to the field of Organizational Systematics. 
 
Appendix 1.3: The Strategic Choice – Environmental Determinism 
School of Thought 
 
A third school of thought that adds clarification to the argument being formulated, and 
provides for a healthy integration of a number of key issues highlighted in the previous 
three schools of thought is Strategic Choice – Environmental Determinism theory. 
Environmental determinism is essentially an offshoot of the earlier contingency theories 
that reasoned that an organization’s performance is contingent of environmental 
constraints and conditions. The organization itself is void of strategic choice, and will 
perform in accordance with environmental conditions or else be selected out. 
Environmental determinism is essentially fuelled by earlier Industrial Organization theory, 
contingency theory and population ecology. A limited number of authors (Astley and Van 
de Ven 1983; Bourgeois 1984; Chandler 1962; Child 1972; Hrebiniak and Joyce 1985; 
Snow and Hrebiniak 1980) provide for enhancement to the theory through integration of 
strategic choice and environmental determinism. Chandler’s (1962) seminal text makes a 
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first and unique (at the time) reference to the concepts of structure following strategy, of 
strategic growth resulting from an awareness of opportunities and needs, and of 
entrepreneurial management creating unique resource configurations to proactively act 
upon this awareness and create unique structural configurations. Child (1972 p. 15) is 
more direct in his text, arguing that “Chandler’s analysis, and that presented in this paper, 
leads to the conclusion that strategic choice is the critical variable in a theory of 
organizations”. Child argues that the strategic choice of the dominant coalition extends to 
the environmental context within which the organization is operating, to expectations in 
the firm’s performance standards, and to the very design of the organizational structure. 
The strategy – structure debate is taken one step further in the seminal texts of 
Burgelman (1983a, 1983b). The author takes on two perspectives; induced and 
autonomous strategic behaviour. Induced strategic behaviour (more relevant to the large 
firm) occurs when a formalized strategic direction will result in substantial resource 
deployments that then condition further strategic direction. In this case strategy will 
subsequently follow structure. However in the case of smaller firms, autonomous 
entrepreneurial behaviour will influence strategy formation as there will be little or no 
resource stocks to moderate this ‘structure-follows-strategy’ scenario. This entrepreneurial 
style of behaviour is more relevant to the small firm (Dess, Lumpkin and McGee 1999). 
 
Both Hrebiniak and Joyce and Astley and Van de Ven conclude that the strategic choice – 
environmental determinism dichotomy is essentially a theory of adaptation, whereby an 
organization adapts, through choice, to the external environment. The logic behind the 
integrated theory is, in essence, open system theory; organizations are in equilibrium with 
their environment through a constant exchange of materials, data and energy. The 
strategic choice – environmental determinism school adds a healthy clarification to the 
framework supporting strategic groups, providing a renewed focus to the importance of 
the environment and the core competencies that allow an organization to operate 
effectively within that environment. An important concept relating to the theory is the issue 
of equifinality, in that similar results may be achieved with different initial conditions and in 
different ways. A further strength of the theory is its inclusion of behavioural philosophy as 
the rationale behind the theory. The concept of strategic choice is supported by later 
developments in Industrial Organization Economics (Porter 1981) and the Resource-
based Theory of the firm (Penrose 1959; Barney 1986; Peteraf 1993). Essentially the firm 
here is no longer a black box and can build unique bundles of resources in order to create 
and sustain competitive advantage. An interesting integration of the choice – determinism 
literature with strategic group theory comes from Bourgeois (1984 p. 589), who reasons 
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that “the strategic decisions made by managers cannot be assumed to be the product of 
deterministic forces in their environment” but also that “it was found that strategies were 
not homogeneous but tended to occur in clusters or ‘strategic groups’ of companies”.  
 
Appendix 1.4:   Resource-based Theory 
 
The fourth theory that provides support and understanding to the concept of strategic 
groups is that of the Resource-based Theory of the firm. Starting off with the early writings 
of Penrose (1959), Richardson (1972), Porter (1979, 1980), Caves (1980), Wernerfelt 
(1984), Teece (1984) and Cool and Schendel (1987) amongst many others, the early 
economic theory defined concepts such as a unique resource base, resource position 
barriers due to uncertain imitability and causal ambiguity, and resource bundles formed by 
combinations of physical and human resources. The theory was enhanced with the 
writings of Barney (1986, 1991), Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988, 1991), Dierickx and 
Cool (1989) and Peteraf (1993) to include later concepts such as strategic factor markets, 
asset stock accumulation, resources as physical, human and organizational capital, and 
resources as valuable, rare, inimitable and unsubstitutable. Still later literature divides 
Resource-based Theory into three complementary views; the modern resource-based 
view (Armstrong 1999; Barney 2001; Mahoney 2001; Matthews 2002), the competence 
and dynamic capabilities view (Hodgson 1998; Montresor 2004; Teece 1984; Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen 2001), and the knowledge-based view (Conner and Prahalad 1996; 
Foss 1997; Pitelis and Pseiridis 1999; Peteraf and Barney 2003). The various theoretical 
thrusts all hold one issue in common, that an organization’s strategic choices should flow 
mainly from an analysis of its unique skills and capabilities (these resulting from its unique 
resource bundles) rather than from solely a reaction to the competitive environment at 
play.  
 
Following the initial writings of Penrose, Porter (1979) may be deemed to be one of the 
earlier authors who related firm resources to the field of organizational strategy. Without 
developing the concept of resource heterogeneity, Porter essentially formulated a theory 
of corporate strategy whereby firm resources would create conditions of strengths and 
weaknesses within the organization, as well as open it up for opportunities and threats 
within the industry in which it operates. The organization will thus be geared to operate 
successfully within the industry, notwithstanding the forces of competition, putting the 
organization in a position of competitive advantage. In essence, Porter’s innovative (at the 
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time) theories of SWOT analysis, five forces of competition and barriers of entry evolve 
around the resources that an organization has at its disposal. Whilst Porter did elaborate 
on the product of resource bundles such as economies of scale, product differentiation, 
access to distribution channels and so on, very little was said on the content or creation of 
the resources themselves. 
 
The earlier concept of core and distinctive competencies was later developed into that of 
‘dynamic capabilities’ of a firm by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (2001). This development, or 
evolvement, of the resource-based view focuses more intently on a firm’s strategy for 
exploiting internally developed firm-specific assets. In fact the focus of the authors is on 
asset structures for which no ready market exists (i.e. these assets must be built), since 
these are seen to be the only real source of sustainable competitive advantage. The 
empirical studies of Snow and Hrebiniak (1980) provide an important link between 
strategic groups and distinctive competencies, researched over a range of industries. 
McGee, Thomas and Pruett (1995) place an emphasis on the dynamic and individualistic 
approach by which organizations invest in resources, build an asset base, strengthen their 
competencies, and create mobility barriers with organizations that have different resource 
bundles. Indeed, the authors see the key to understanding industry evolution as being 
through the mechanisms through which organizations change their asset structures. The 
authors also provided for the elusive link between Resource-based Theory and strategic 
groups (1995 p. 257): “The strategic group concept directs attention to those groups of 
firms within an industry which may actively compete with each other by virtue of their 
investment in apparently similar distinctive assets, strategic resources and core 
competences”. Thomas and Pollock (1999 p. 129) provide for a further clarification of the 
contribution of Resource-based Theory towards strategic group membership: “At its most 
basic level, strategic-groups theory argues that within an industry firms with similar asset 
configurations will pursue similar competitive strategies with similar performance results. 
Firms may therefore be clustered together into groups based upon their similarities in 
asset configuration.” An integration of Resource-based Theory and strategic groups can 
also be seen in Borch, Huse and Senneseth’s (1999) taxonomy of small firms, clustered 
into Technological, Managerial, Impoverished and Traditional firms, based upon different 
resource configurations.  
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Appendix 2:   Examples of Business Typologies  
 
Appendix 2.1:   Typologies Based on Stances 
 
A common argument within the strategy literature is whether to study content, or process, 
or both. To avoid the many issues of contention that cloud this debate, a common 
understanding shall be extracted from the literature on the meanings of both terms, and of 
their application. In fact, an integration of two research streams shall be attempted; the 
general research on strategy typologies and the more direct literature on grounded theory. 
Process research looks at the activities leading to and supporting strategic decisions, the 
examining of “how” strategy is formed (Ketchen, Thomas and McDaniel 1996). In similar 
vein, Strauss and Corbin (1998) see process as the implementation of actions/interactions 
over time by persons or organizations in response to certain problems and issues. Strauss 
and Corbin agree that by studying process one will understand “how” organizations 
act/interact (although not so much the “why”).  Ketchen, Thomas and McDaniel see 
content research to focus on the subject of a strategic decision; the “what” has been 
decided. Boyne and Walker (2004) similarly posit that content is the outcome of process, 
describing the organization’s position and how it interacts with its environment. Jemison 
(1981 p. 602) distinguishes between “what should be done (the content of a firm’s 
strategy) and how it is accomplished (the processes of strategy formulation and 
implementation)”. Over here Strauss and Corbin deviate to a small extent, applying the 
concept of structure instead of content. Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 127) argue that 
“structure or conditions set the stage, that is, create the circumstances in which problems, 
issues, happenings, or events pertaining to a phenomenon are situated or arise”. 
Structure incorporates both conditions and consequences to a phenomenon, meaning not 
only “what” has been decided, but also “what” were the conditions or reasons for the 
decision. Arguably Strauss and Corbin’s concept of structure is more complete as it looks 
at a position, or stance, being taken but also looks at the particular situation within which it 
was taken. Thus, as a first step, a review of a number of select content (or what Strauss 
and Corbin call ‘structure’) based typologies shall be carried out to see what learning 
these provide to the field of business strategy, and particularly to that of the small 
business. Three ‘stance-based’ typologies shall be looked at, each taking on a unique 
(and vastly different) perspective in an attempt to understand and explain the strategy 
phenomenon. These are as follows: 
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Chandler’s Type I, Type II, Type III Organizational Classification 
 
The contribution of Chandler’s (1962) seminal text, ‘Strategy and Structure: Chapters in 
the History of the American Industrial Enterprise’ is often contributed to the understanding 
of organizational strategy outside the confines of earlier Industrial Organization 
Economics (where a rigid SCP paradigm dictated that organizations acted mechanistically 
according to the industry). What is less well known is that Chandler’s motives were far 
away from that of researching strategy, in fact his main objective was to carry out a 
historical study on how large organizations adapted their structures over time. The end 
result was a groundbreaking (at the time) correlation between strategy, structure and 
management-led processes. Chandler’s in-depth studies on early American organization 
strategies were subsequently translated into a parsimonious typology through the works of 
Fouraker and Stopford (1968). Main behavioural patterns were seen to result in structures 
that were a single division, multidivisional, diversified, and vertically integrated. Fouraker 
and Stopford proceeded to group the organizations researched by Chandler into a 3-
category classification; the Type I, Type II and Type III organization. Fouraker and 
Stopford define the Type I organization as the earliest design, and one that in fact forms 
the backbone of modern organizational structures. Within this organizational setup the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is directly and solely in control of a functionally structured 
architecture, mainly consisting of only one product or product line. Usually the CEO will 
also be the owner of the organization and would demand absolute top-down control. This 
type of organization reflects the early industrial revolution covering the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, where manufacturing organizations evolved from the skills and 
resources available from the earlier agricultural industry. The design is essentially that of a 
single autocratic ‘problem-solver’ directing (and dictating) a structure and technological 
setup of limited width and complexity, and with mainly technical skills. Of interest to note is 
that this form of organizational design will often be seen in small firms today, particularly 
those carrying out a mechanistic or routinised core activity.  
 
The Type II Organization is an extension of the Type I organization. The structure is still 
functional in nature, usually limited to a few product lines and a core technological 
process. The organization will be vertically integrated, both into sources of supply and into 
sales. Management will be well-trained in relevant areas of technology, and will direct their 
attention towards resource efficiency and functional processes.  However, management 
training and expertise will be narrow in focus, thus limiting the width of expansion of the 
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organization. True multidisciplinary management will not be present in this type of 
organization, making it the most efficient in the more simple products and services. As in 
the Type I firm, small businesses that retrench or focus on a limited range of product lines 
(or services) will also operate in a similar Type II fashion. The third type, the Type III 
Organization, is used for diversified organizations and for organizations decentralized into 
business units. The evolvement of Type III organizations came as a result of post-world 
war II problems to manage organizations that were increasing in size, resource strength 
and scope, and could no longer be managed in Type II fashion. Multiple products, each 
with their own product life cycle and core technology, would complement each other and 
would give the organization greater flexibility and competitiveness. The existence of 
different divisions within the organization also has an impact upon management 
competencies, now management could be trained within the various divisions and also 
multi-skilled through cross-divisional training. This is largely where the applicability of the 
typology towards the small business reaches an end. Understanding the basis of the 
typology (that of connecting structure to strategy) exposes the reason; small firms have 
less of a formal strategy-structure relationship as their more limited resource base allows 
for added flexibility in configuring physical resource layouts. In other words the structure of 
a small firm provides less information towards the firm’s strategic intent than does that of a 
large firm. The typology, that has its usefulness to understand large firms, is thus of 
restricted use to small businesses that often employ less than 10 full-time employees.  
 
Mintzberg’s (2007) Classification of the Machine Organization, the 
Entrepreneurial Organization, the Professional Organization and the 
Adhocracy Organization 
 
Mintzberg provides an overview of eleven in-depth studies of the strategies pursued by 
various different firms to put forward a general theory of strategy formulation. Mintzberg 
(2007 p. 340) concludes that “the organizations studied, and the strategy processes they 
used, seemed to fall roughly into four distinct groupings, or configurations”. The Machine 
Organization produces mass, standardized products/services with predominantly unskilled 
labour, is usually large, and functions best in stable environmental conditions. The 
Entrepreneurial Organization is controlled by a small dominant coalition, is usually found in 
small or start-up firms, and functions in a competitive, dynamic environment.  The 
Professional Organization functions through professional, autonomous and highly skilled 
employees, and provides standardized products/services in stable environmental settings. 
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The Adhocracy Organization operates in a highly dynamic environment, using teams of 
experts working on projects to create innovative solutions. Of interest to note is that this 
recent text by Mintzberg also prescribes a normative approach for researching strategy 
formation, an approach that is similar to the stages of implementation of this present 
research. The first stage is access to firms’ strategy-related data; conducting interviews, 
gathering secondary data, listing strategic areas, environmental considerations, and so on. 
The second stage is the determination of strategy patterns by mapping out patterns in 
action streams for the firms in question and over the entire period of study. The third stage 
is an analysis of each major period, understanding the underlying forces, relationships, 
outcomes of each main period. The final, fourth stage is theory building, using diagrams 
and patterns to map out various theoretical and symbolic underpinnings. Mintzberg argues 
that strategy formation for a firm is a dynamic phenomenon, and advises that the 
researcher should ultimately shift from the configurations described above to the 
movements between configurations; “by considering the findings of these studies in a 
different way: as stages in the life cycles of organizations, as they appear, develop, falter, 
and are renewed” (2007 p. 361). 
 
A Taxonomic Study of Growth Stage Considerations (Hanks et al. 1993) 
 
 Whilst the previous two typologies were initially created with the larger, more bureaucratic 
organization in mind, Hanks et al. (1993) seek to develop a strategy-based typology more 
relevant to the smaller firm. The study in question looks at firms with a mean size of 125 
employees, and classified as high-technology organizations. The authors attempt here to 
integrate content with process by inferring process from a cross-sectional model that was 
developed.  The focus of the study was based on business life cycle stages, with each life 
cycle stage consisting of a unique configuration of variables describing the firms’ strategic 
orientation at that stage. Hanks et al. (1993 p. 25) reason that by understanding the 
different life cycle stages one can predict growth patterns and “provide a road map, 
identifying critical organizational transitions as well as pitfalls the organization should seek 
to avoid as it grows in size and complexity”. In fact, as argued by Hambrick (1984 p. 32); 
“businesses differ by life cycle stage in what strategies they can and should pursue”. The 
study proceeded by first identifying key clustering variables from the literature, and then 
applying cluster analysis to differentiate the firms into separate groups. The resulting 
taxonomy provided four main clusters that, when mapped onto the axis of dynamism (Y-
axis) and complexity (X-axis), provided a typical birth-growth-maturity-decline life cycle. 
Each cluster provided insights into the characteristics of the firms, such as age, functional 
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basis, revenues, growth rate, specialization, organizational design, and so on. Although the 
four clusters provide clear strategic stances, or orientations, for the different firms and from 
these a life cycle trend can be (and was) inferred, the authors do admit that “the cross-
sectional nature of this study limits our ability to reach definitive conclusions as to the 
sequencing of stages” (Hanks et al. 1993 p. 18). Miller and Friesen (1984 p. 1161) argue 
that this is an issue of concern, as the patterns inferred “are not based upon any strong 
empirical evidence gathered from longitudinal studies. Typically, researchers have 
identified static characteristics of different organizations in various stages… rather than 
tracing their evolutionary sequences”. Once again the issue of “how” versus “what” arises, 
highlighting the limitations that static pictures of small business strategy bring with them. 
 
Appendix 2.2:   Typologies Based on Actions 
 
One typology shall be reviewed here; that of Porter’s generic competitive strategies. 
Porter’s (1980) seminal text, aptly named ‘Competitive Strategy’ is more widely known for 
its introduction of the five forces of competition (a re-definition of the industry value chain), 
a typology of generic strategies, the SWOT analysis, and the concept of strategic groups 
and mobility barriers as a means of industry competitiveness. Less known are the 
underlying motivators for the text and for Porter’s divergence from traditional industrial 
organization (IO) economic theory. Porter, amongst others, had become increasingly 
dissatisfied with earlier IO theory that prescribed a unidirectional Industry Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) relationship. This school worked on the premise that industry 
structure conditioned firm conduct (strategy) to result in a particular industry performance. 
One could practically remove the conduct parameter and study the effect of industry 
structure directly on performance. Porter (1980, 1981) signaled a new way of economic 
thinking by introducing firm competitiveness (via strategic groups, with firms clustered 
according to their strategies) and the way this would conversely affect the industry 
structure. Resource-based Theory now had more applicability in that firms with similar 
asset configurations could be seen to be competing within groups of similar resource 
bundles (Thomas and Pollock 1999), moving the question away from “what do firms do?” to 
“how do they do what they do in order to build/sustain competitive advantage?” It is, in fact, 
this question of “how” that Porter attempts to answer with his somewhat simplistic typology 
of generic strategies, that illustrates what actions a firm can take to capitalize upon 
resource strengths.  
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Whilst Porter (1980 p. 34) posits that “the best strategy for a given firm is ultimately a 
unique construction reflecting its particular circumstances”, the author simplifies the 
competitive arena by defining three generic strategies of Overall Cost Leadership, 
Differentiation and Focus. Overall Cost Leadership is a strategy by which organizations 
utilize a variety of actions to drive down costs whilst maintaining reasonable quality. 
Actions adopted are economies of scale, the experience curve, favourable access to raw 
materials and aggressive cost control, commonly followed by aggressive pricing. The 
ultimate aim is to achieve a high market share and to utilize above-average returns to 
reinvest in the organization. Porter concedes that the initial price to pay for cost leadership 
is often a high initial capital investment, possibly with start-up losses. Porter’s second 
generic strategy is that of Differentiation, this implying a product or service that boasts 
unique attributes in some fashion or another. The most common of attributes are in the 
product design, brand image, technological features, product quality, customer service, 
dealer networks, or indeed several combined attributes. A Differentiation-oriented 
organization will not ignore costs, but these will not be the organization’s main priority. 
Similarly to Cost Leadership, Differentiation provides the organization with a weapon to 
defend against the forces of competition within the industry concerned. Due to the extra 
costs that are inherent to a differentiation strategy, the organization will often forfeit a high 
market share, although above-average returns can still be made. Higher costs are usually 
a result of actions such as quality incentives, research and design investments, and 
enhanced customer support. 
 
Porter’s third generic strategy is that of Focus, a strategy that aims at serving a particular 
(and often niche) target market very well. One or a combination of three approaches can 
be adopted; focus on a particular buyer group, focus on a particular segment of a product 
line, and focus on a particular geographical market. The specific needs of the particular 
target are met by either low cost or by differentiation, or by a combination of both. The 
strategy is also defendable against the forces of industry, as a Focus-oriented 
organization shall be particular in its choice of markets and products. A fourth generic 
strategy, or more precisely a lack of strategy, was defined by Porter as ‘Stuck in the 
Middle’. This position denotes an organization that has neither Low Cost, nor 
Differentiation, nor Focus as a strategic approach. The organization may jump from 
strategy to strategy, possibly as a result of lack of vision from top executives or a weak 
corporate culture. Porter utilized the concept of strategic group mapping to typify his 
generic strategies. 
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Although the typology above is based on strategic actions, one can infer the state (or 
orientation) an organization will adopt if the actions are carried out in a systematic manner. 
The actions taken will capitalize on resource configurations and will contribute towards 
additional resource inflows to create a privileged asset position for the firm in question. 
Various empirical studies (e.g. Miller and Friesen 1986) have built taxonomies to support 
Porter’s typology, that can arguably be applied to both large and small firms. 
 
Appendix 2.3: Combination and Integration Typologies 
 
The stance-based and action-based typologies look at business strategy from a somewhat 
different perspective, each with their own strengths and limitations. Typologies that can 
successfully integrate both perspectives have an obvious advantage, although this 
integration is not common and does come with its own weaknesses. In fact, “the effective 
integration of findings from process and content research is inhibited by a variety of 
method-related factors” (Jemison 1981 p. 603), as shall be seen. Possibly the most 
common of all strategy typologies is in fact an integrated one, and is that of Miles and Snow 
(Miles and Snow 1978; Miles et al. 1978; Snow and Hrebiniak 1980). Miles and Snow’s 
typology is a grouping of organizational strategies into a parsimonious set of four 
categories, based upon the conditions found, or created, within a business environment. 
The authors adopt a two-tier conceptual framework (following Figure A2.1) to explain the 
concept of organizational adaptation. The first tier is the ‘adaptive cycle’, describing three 
types of strategic decision making actions that an organization would repeatedly go through 
to align itself with the environment. These three stages are the entrepreneurial problem 
solving (a decision on which products/markets to choose), the engineering problem solving 
(the technological process of turning inputs into outputs), and the administrative problem 
solving (the structures, processes and procedures deployed). The second tier represented 
alternative ways of moving through this adaptive cycle, conceptualized through an 
organizational typology portraying four possible categories of organizational behaviour.  
These four categories, or strategic groups, are Defenders, Prospectors, Analyzers and 
Reactors. Each category describes a particular pattern of behaviour (that is, a strategy 
stance) that an organization may adopt in accordance to how the environment is perceived. 
Defenders are seen to be organizations that react to a stable environment, that build a 
limited market of established products, that utilize a mechanistic organizational structure, 
and that utilize cost advantage to defend aggressively what market share they already 
have. Prospectors are innovators who strive to find new products and market opportunities, 
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that create an organic organizational structure, that are dynamic in nature, and that strive to 
create change as a tool to alter the environmental balance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1: Miles and Snow’s (1978) Strategic Typology 
 
Analyzers attempt to achieve an ideal balance between the Prospector and Defender 
approaches. They would attempt, primarily by imitation, to exploit new product/market 
opportunities that appear most viable (thus copying Prospectors), whilst at the same time 
maintaining a core base of existing products and customers (thus imitating Defenders). 
Whilst all three typologies can be proactive and successful with respect to their 
environment, the Reactor organization is inconsistent and unstable, responding 
inadequately to environmental change and uncertainty, being out of synchronization with 
market and environmental conditions.  
 
The Miles and Snow (1978) typology is commonly applied in empirical research on small, 
medium and large businesses alike, as shown in Table A2.1 for some of the more recent 
studies. The qualitative research carried out by the authors was directed towards medium 
sized organizations in a number of industries, and is easily applicable to smaller or larger 
firms. The typology integrates actions (adaptive cycle) and stances (the four orientations) to 
explain how the businesses go about building and sustaining competitive advantage. There 
is one weakness to the typology, albeit one of significance; the model assumes strategic 
momentum. Whilst the authors put forward a “dynamic model of the adaptive process” 
(Miles and Snow 1978 p. 9), the underlying assumption is that the adaptive actions being 
taken are persistent (and consistent) over time. So much so that “adaptive decisions made 
today tend to harden and become aspects of tomorrow’s structure” (Miles and Snow 1978 
External 
Environment
Entrepreneurial 
Problem Solving
Engineering 
Problem Solving
Administrative 
Problem Solving
The Adaptive Cycle Strategic Patterns 
of Behaviour
Strategic Patterns 
of Behaviour
Defender:
Focus upon efficiency in 
existing operations.                
A conservative outlook.  
Strong in core activities.    
Only adopting tried and 
tested products/services.
Analyzer:
Dual ‘prospector’ and 
‘defender’ stance.           
Core activities and 
processes well maintained.   
Carefully following 
prospectors into more 
innovative ventures.
Prospector:
Outward looking. 
Continuously searching for 
new market opportunities.    
Innovative organizations.   
Risk taking, new products & 
processes.                     
Ready to experiment with 
new responses to emerging 
environmental trends.
Reactor:
No particular stance.   
Controlled by regulators, 
oversight agencies.        
Not geared to ‘prospect’ or 
‘defend’ efficiently when 
forced to do so.                                   
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p. 28). The smaller the firm, however, the less this assumption holds. Thus, unfortunately, 
the potential that the adaptive cycle has to map out the dynamics of small firm strategic 
behaviour is largely lost.        
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Author and 
Date 
Research Aim 
 
Industry 
 
Research Design 
 
Strength of 
Relationship 
 
Performance of 
Strategic Types                        
P=Prospector      
D=Defender 
A=Analyzer        
R=Reactor 
O’Regan and 
Ghobadian 
(2006) 
Research into strategy 
orientation and 
performance of SME’s 
SME’s 
Cross Sectional/Self-
Typing/Single 
Informants/Multiple items 
Significantly 
strong 
relationship 
P>D>A 
Aragón-
Sánchez and 
Sánchez-Marín 
(2005) 
Research into strategy 
orientation of SME’s 
 
      SME’s 
Cross Sectional/Self-
Typing/Single 
Informants/Multiple items 
Significantly 
strong 
relationship 
P>A>D 
Parnell and 
Hershey 
(2005) 
Research into a 
combination strategy 
Multiple 
Industries 
Cross Sectional/Self-
Typing/Single 
Informants/Multiple Items 
Significant, but 
moderate 
relationship 
P>A>R 
Gimenez 
(2000) 
Research into small firm 
strategy SME’s 
Cross Sectional/Self-
Typing/Single 
Informants/Multiple items 
Significantly 
strong 
relationship 
P>A>D>R 
Woodside, 
Sullivan and 
Trappey 
(1999) 
Relating strategic types to 
marketing competencies to 
organizational performance 
Multiple 
Industries 
Cross Sectional/Self-
Typing/Single 
Informants/Multiple Items 
Significant, but 
moderate 
relationship 
P>A>D>>R 
Thomas and 
Ramaswamy 
(1996) 
Testing of the validity of 
Miles & Snow typology 
Multiple 
Industries Longitudinal/Secondary Data 
Significantly 
strong 
relationship 
P=D>>R 
   
 Table A2.1:  Taxonomic Studies based upon the Miles and Snow (1978) Typology 
 
Ketchen and Shook (1996 p. 442) add a further criticism to quantitative studies, such as 
those of Table A2.1 that “confirm” the Miles and Snow classification, by arguing that “cluster 
analysis has the potential not only to offer inaccurate descriptions of the groupings in a 
sample but also to impose groupings where none exist”. In other words if you look for 
prospectors and defenders, all you will see are prospectors and defenders.  McKelvey 
(1975 p. 514) warns against this pre-classification bias, advising that in building strategy 
taxonomies researchers must avoid, as much as possible, the use of previous 
classifications of attributes. Today (in 2010) cluster analysis, based upon pre-classified 
attributes, is still the predominant technique being utilized by researchers. 
 
Other authors have sought to create what is known as a combination typology in an attempt 
to integrate the most salient components of the two approaches.  In fact, “the combination 
strategy is particularly useful in that it affords the researcher the possibility of identifying 
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strategies-in-practice that may demonstrate features of either school…” (Parnell and 
Hershey 2005 p. 21). One such combination typology that attempts to integrate a stance-
based with an action-based typology is that of Boyne and Walker (2004) who posit that an 
organization’s strategy is essentially a mix of both stance and actions. The authors 
integrated Miles and Snow (1978) and Porter’s (1980) works into a single action – stance 
typology shown in Figure A2.2 below. The authors subsequently go on to build a taxonomy 
based upon this model, and to empirically test it on 119 UK local authorities (Andrews, 
Boyne and Walker 2006). The rationale behind Boyne and Walker’s typology is that an 
organization may have a mixture and combination of the different strategic options that 
make up the matrix boxes, and that no option is mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, an 
organization may be formed of a combination of 40% of A1, 25% of A4, 20% of A13 and 
15% of A15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Boyne and Walker’s (2004) Combination Typology 
 
 
The main difficulty with combination typologies, such as the one above, is that they 
somewhat force the integration of actions with stances without allowing for a true 
understanding of how these dimensions interact and interplay as the organization evolves 
in its patterns of strategic behaviour. They are an application by quantitative mindsets to 
build a cross-sectional picture of two concepts, one of which (process) is far from static in 
nature. 
 
Appendix 2.4: The Trajectory-based Typology 
 
The trajectory-based, or longitudinal, typology is arguably the furthest one can go to map 
out both stances and actions over time to understand the dynamics of small firm strategic 
 
A3 A4 A5 
A6 
A2 
A7 A8 A9 A10 
A1 
A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
             Strategic Action 
       (adapted from Porter; 1980) 
 
  Change         Change          Seeking         External         Internal 
 Markets         Services       Revenues    Organization  Organization  
 Prospector 
 
Defender 
 
Reactor 
 
Strategic 
Stance 
(adapted from 
Miles & Snow; 
1978) 
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behaviour. Zajac and Shortell (1989) have demonstrated empirically how organizations, 
even large ones, tend to change their strategic direction over time. Hambrick (1984 p. 33) 
argues that “since strategy is by essence a dynamic phenomenon, it would seem fruitful, 
even essential, for researchers to emphasize the classification of strategic pathways”. 
One of the very few longitudinal studies that map out a range of strategic pathways that 
firms (albeit large organizations) progress through is that of Miller and Friesen (1984). The 
authors observed no less than 125 transitional paths that the firms adopted as they 
oscillated between five different strategic states of birth, growth, maturity, revival and 
decline. Miller and Friesen conclude that there is far from a linear path between the five 
states. A more recent taxonomic study, this time on small manufacturing organizations, is 
that of McMahon (2001).  
 
Although the McMahon study follows the general trend of using cross-sectional cluster 
analysis, it does utilize a longitudinal database to analyze the changing patterns of the 
firms being researched over a period of four years. For each of the four years a separate 
cluster analysis revealed up to 7 identifiable clusters of firms with different growth, size 
and age characteristics. A study of the pathways of the firms under review, using the 
clusters as markers or signposts over time, revealed a typology of three relatively stable 
pathways. These were a low growth pathway, a moderate growth pathway and a high 
growth pathway. The pathways highlighted the actions being taken by the firms to 
act/react to the business environment, whilst the cluster signposts provided the 
information on the strategic stances that the firms would adopt at different time intervals. 
Once again, due to the underlying cross-sectional nature of the study, the author refers to 
“the acknowledged limitations of the research method used” (McMahon 2001 p. 202). 
However, the stage is set, with the trajectory-based typology providing a merged and 
more informative static-dynamic picture of strategic behaviour. 
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Appendix 3: Database of Small Business Research Participants 
 
Company 
Code Business Activity General Type 
Employee 
Count
Age of 
Firm
Size of 
Dominant 
Coalition
Final 
Strategic 
State                                 
(SBO; FEO;         
RDO; UDO)
Strategic 
Trajectory
Normalized NAV 
Final Year 
Normalized NAV 
Preceeding Year 
Normalized NAV 
5 Years Prior
1 Electrical Systems Consultants Services 9 5 1 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 1.00 0.10
7 Software Systems Integrators Services 9 16 1 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 0.97 0.73
8 Architectural Firm Services 14 33 3 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
9 Quality Control Firm Manufacture 45 3 1 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
10 Perfume Retail Retail 20 10 2 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 0.99 0.58
12 Car Park Services Services 6 11 1 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 0.19 0.86
22 Electrical Systems Consultants Services 10 19 2 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
30 Printing Press Services 22 16 2 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 0.81 0.57
36 Laboratory Services Services 2 4 1 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
42 Tax Consultants Services 6 4 1 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
45 Tool Importation and Retail Services 9 35 1 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 1.66 1.60
53 Steel Door Manufacture Manufacture 15 34 1 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 1.34 1.40
55 Software Development Firm Services 6 2 1 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
62 Events Management and Interpreters Services 2 3 2 FEO Controlled Focus NA NA NA
64 Paint Manufacturer Manufacture 5 13 3 FEO Controlled Focus 1.00 0.86 -0.26
3 Heavy Engineering Supplier Retail 6 50 1 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.95 0.57
14 IT Equipment Provider Retail/Services 6 16 2 RDO Contained Growth NA NA NA
18 Quality Control Firm Manufacture/            Services 40 3 2 RDO Contained Growth NA NA NA
20 IT Equipment/System Provider Retail/Services 17 20 2 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.97 0.86
32 Architectural Firm Services 12 14 1 RDO Contained Growth NA NA NA
39 Stone Masons Manufacture 14 14 2 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.96 0.75
40 Steel Component Manufacture Manufacture 17 24 1 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 1.01 0.82
48 Tool Importation and Calibration Retail 6 15 1 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.76 0.76
54 IT Equipment/System Provider Retail/Services 5 12 1 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.95 0.69
56 Seamless Flooring Services Services 15 13 2 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.68 0.10
59 Audio Visual Services Services 48 31 1 RDO Contained Growth 1.00 0.97 0.79
61 Manufacture of Ornamental Glass Manufacture 39 41 1 RDO Contained Growth NA NA NA
63 Boat Refurbishment Services/Retail 11 26 1 RDO Contained Growth NA NA NA
2 Electronics Components Manufacture Manufacture 47 10 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.95 0.53
4 Aperture Manufacture and Installation Services 25 60 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.96 0.75
5 Electrical and Electronics Systems Retail 30 30 3 FEO Repositioning 1.00 1.00 0.65
11 Household Family Goods Retail 40 40 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.94 0.81
17 Engineering Services Services 19 19 3 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.90 0.59
21 Manufacture of Wastewater Product Manufacture 8 10 2 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.58 0.66
24 Stainless Steel Manufacture Manufacture 37 16 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 1.03 1.07
25 Maintenance Service Provider Services 49 4 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.46 0.06
26 Software Provider Services 2 3 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 -3.09 3.38
27 IT Service Provider Retail/Services 3 5 1 FEO Repositioning NA NA NA
28 PC Rental Services Retail/Services 10 5 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.98 0.25
31 Cigar Manufacture Manufacture 9 10 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.92 0.61
37 Accounting and Marketing Services Services 2 12 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.89 0.33
46 Recording Studio Services 1 9 1 FEO Repositioning NA NA NA
51 Accounting and Auditing Services Services 3 7 1 FEO Repositioning 1.00 1.18 1.18
52 Pottery Manufacture and Retail Retail/                Manufacture 20 38 2 RDO Repositioning 1.00 1.08 1.03
58 Ship Registration Firm Services 15 36 2 FEO Repositioning 1.00 1.32 0.72
60 Provision of Ship Supplies Services 25 149 3 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.54 0.31
67 Instrumentation/Equipment Services Retail/Services 8 62 2 FEO Repositioning 1.00 0.66 0.67
6 Aquaculture Services 25 11 3 UDO Dynamic Growth NA NA NA
13 Supermarket Retail 49 26 3 UDO Dynamic Growth 1.00 0.82 0.41
15 Pharmacy and Inventory Management Retail/Services 27 10 2 UDO Dynamic Growth 1.00 0.28 -0.03
29 Sensor Manufacture Manufacture 49 8 2 UDO Dynamic Growth 1.00 0.81 0.47
41 Waste Management Services 14 17 2 UDO Dynamic Growth 1.00 0.89 0.81
66 Yacht Paints and Equipment Supplies Retail/Services 42 33 2 UDO Dynamic Growth 1.00 0.96 0.86
16 IT Import and Retail Retail 8 15 1 FEO Retrenchment NA NA NA
19 Carpenter Manufacture/             Services 1 20 1 SBO Retrenchment NA NA NA
23 Manufacture of Saddles Manufacture 20 20 1 SBO Retrenchment NA NA NA
33 Sensor Manufacture Manufacture 5 40 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 2.81 -7.18
34 Confectionary Foodstuffs Retail 12 75 2 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 0.85 0.50
35 Mushroom Grower Manufacture 18 35 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 1.07 1.06
38 Real Estate Agency Services 7 20 2 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 0.00 -0.62
43 Aluminium Works Manufacture 6 35 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 1.00 1.00
44 Wood Import/Retail Retail 5 24 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 0.90 0.66
47 Shoe Manufacture Manufacture 2 18 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 1.57 1.41
49 Manufacture of Plastic Sheets Manufacture 6 15 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 1.20 0.93
50 Coffee Import/Manufacture/Retail Retail/                Manufacture 6 19 2 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 0.97 1.02
57 Human Resource Management Services 2 15 1 SBO Retrenchment NA NA NA
65 Candle Manufacture Manufacture 3 24 1 SBO Retrenchment 1.00 0.98 1.37
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Appendix 4: Interview Prompt Sheet 
 
Start off with a general overview of company, its history, growth, vision, values, competencies, 
specific challenges, etc. 
 
Prompt 1) Organizational Structure: complexity, organic-mechanistic, centralized, formalized. 
 
Prompt 2) History of Company; existence, growth, beliefs, orientation/focus. 
 
Prompt 3) Value Added Processes: 
      Range of products. Diversity of products. 
      Routineness-standardization of processes/services 
     Interdependence between units of organization. 
 
Prompt 4) Business Behaviour:  
Level of Autonomy: a) self-direction in pursuit of goals, b) bottom-up autonomy 
Innovativeness: New ideas, processes, products, technologies, markets. 
Risk Taking: Bold actions, risky ventures. 
Proactiveness: First-mover. New opportunities, markets. Aggressive moves. 
 
Prompt 5) External Environment: 
Attractiveness-hostility, growth of industry. 
Environmental stability-dynamism, uncertainty. Rate of technological change. 
Knowledge of industry, technologies, products, competitors. 
Stage of industry life cycle. Product life cycles. 
Threats of substitutes, new firms, overseas competition. 
 
Prompt 6) Direct Environmental Influences: 
     Government: Excessive regulations, difficult to comply with. 
    Competitive: Difficulty in monitoring local/foreign competition. 
    Technology: High rate of development of technology, products, processes. 
     Finance: Difficulty in dealing with public/private money lenders. 
 
Prompt 7) Management Style: 
         Professional values. Qualifications. Experience/background. Knowledge of industry. 
      Top-down vs. bottom-up empowerment, delegation, integration of decisions. 
         Structured, orderly and systematic style. Centralized vs decentralized control. 
        Personal disposition towards risk, uncertainty. 
        Strategies carefully planned out, high on analysis or on intuition. 
         Personal beliefs re: market share, being an industry leader, diversifying, profits. 
 
Prompt 8) Strategic Actions, Moves: 
             Latest projects, moves. Large, bold decisions. Actions with long range intent. 
            Attempts to control networks, markets. 
           Attempts to build barriers, insulation from competitors. 
         New products/services launched over recent years. 
         Commitment to R&D, technological investments, modern equipment, ICT. 
  
Prompt 9) Performance over Last 3 Years: 
    Sales/revenue growth. Profit growth. 
     Employee growth. 
     Asset growth. 
     Market value growth. 
 Any other performance measures deemed relevant. 
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Appendix 5: Interview Covering Letter 
 
 
21st August 2007 
Dear Mr/Ms __________ 
Company Name       
 
 
 
 I am presently reading for a Doctorate in Business Administration with the 
Robert Gordon University of Scotland, UK. The title of my research is “Strategic 
Orientation and Organizational Performance: The Case of Small Firms in 
Malta”. The research aims to map out, and explain, how various forms of strategic 
behaviour of small firms relate to organizational performance. 
 
 I thank you for taking your time for a brief interview. If acceptable to you I would 
kindly like to record and transcribe the interview, as the research is qualitative in 
nature. The research shall be carried out under strict ethical standards 
recommended by Robert Gordon University. At no point in time will the published 
research make reference to any information that you deem confidential, and your 
anonymity shall be maintained.  Also, no questions will be made relating to 
confidential details of products/services that you are competing with. 
 
 Whilst once again thanking you for your time, I would like to offer to keep you 
informed on the developments and results of the research. 
 
Yours Sincerely 
 
Alex Rizzo 
 
Mob. No. XXXX XXXX 
Email: a.rizzo@rgu.ac.uk 
Robert Gordon University Student Number 0615656 
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Appendix 6: Category Schema 
 
Context and Conditions 
 
 Stake/Shareholder Influence 
 Historic Start-Up Situation 
 Local Environment/Malta Scenario 
  Temporal Events 
  The Customer/Client 
  Sources of Finance 
  Government Intervention/Actions 
  Local Trends/Attributes 
  Local Economy/Stability 
 
 Global/Regional Environment 
  Technological/Environmental Trends 
  Foreign Competition 
  Global Economy/Stability 
  Foreign Investment/Markets 
  Cost: Energy & Materials 
 
 Industry/Competition  
  Particular Attributes 
  Labour Market 
  Seasonality 
  Technological Trends/Change 
  Attractiveness/Competitors 
  The Client/Market 
 
 Owner/Manager Characteristics 
  Owner/Manager Task 
  Knowledge of Industry 
  Work/Life Experiences 
  Qualifications/Skills 
  Philosophy/Values/Behaviour 
 
Strategic Actions & Reactions 
 
 Initial/Birth Stage:  Behaviour/Moves 
  Changing Responsibilities 
  Planning & Scanning 
  Products 
  Strategic Moves/Position 
 
 Growth Stage: Behaviour/Moves 
  Changing Responsibilities 
  Planning & Scanning 
  Products 
  Strategic Moves/Position 
 
 Mature Stage: Behaviour/Moves 
  Changing Responsibilities 
  Planning & Scanning 
  Products 
  Strategic Moves/Position 
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 Decline/Refocus Stage: Behaviour/Moves 
 Loop within Loop Behaviour/Moves 
 
 
Consequences and Outcomes 
 
 Resource-Based Stance 
  Organizational Resources 
  Physical Resources/Setup 
  Human Resources 
 
 Business Stance 
  Unrelated Diversification Orientation 
  Related Diversification Orientation 
  Functional Efficiency Orientation 
  Small Business Orientation 
 
 Engineering Stance 
  Technology/Rationale 
  Permutations/Product Details 
  Routineness/Innovativeness 
  Mode of Operation/Description 
 
 Organizational Performance 
  Competencies 
  Stakeholder Satisfaction 
  Brand Name/Growth 
  Efficiency/Costs 
  Quality Standards 
  Targets Reached (Various)/KPI's 
  Employee Count 
  Revenues/Profits/Sales 
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Appendix 7:  Coding Example using MAXqda2007 
  
 
 
The above screen shot depicts the coding of one sample incident. Coding of events, themes, 
important characteristics, concepts, etc, takes place throughout the research. The two 
underlying criteria for coding are ‘fit’ and ‘relevance’ (Charmaz 2006 p. 54). The code must fit 
the empirical world under review and provide insights into a corresponding category. It must 
have relevance in that it adds interpretation to a growing understanding of the phenomenon in 
question. Five ellipses are highlighted in the example above, and are described briefly below: 
Ellipse 1: This demonstrates which business case has been selected for analysis. In this 
example it is business case 3. 
Ellipse 2: This demonstrates the category, or property, relating to the selected code. In this 
example it is the ‘Strategic Moves’ property relating to the ‘Mature Behaviour’ sub-category. 
Ellipse 3: This is the actual segment of coded text, nesting within the complete transcript. 
Ellipse 4: This is a coding icon, indicating the category name and colour, and code position. 
Ellipse 5: This shows the same coded segment filtered out through the ‘Text Retrieved 
Segments’ function. 
272 
 
Appendix 8: Categories and Properties of the Framework 
 
Appendix 8.1    The Context and Conditions Category 
 
  
As the name implies, this first of the three categories (see Figure 5.2 for a complete 
overview) is content-based, and looks at the situation of the firm from a multidimensional 
perspective that is relevant to the context of the small firm. Whilst one may delineate 
context from conditions, macro environmental influences from the micro, causes from 
contingencies, this is not the real purpose of grounded theory research and may stifle the 
emergence of substantive theory. “The important issue is not so much one of identifying 
and listing which conditions are causal, intervening, or contextual. Rather, what the 
analyst should focus on is the complex interweaving of events (conditions) leading up to a 
problem, an issue, or a happening to which persons are responding through some form of 
action/interaction, with some sort of consequences” (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 132).  
Likewise, Corbin and Strauss (2008 p. 91) argue that most situations are really a 
combination of micro and macro conditions, with the distinction between the two being an 
artificial one. Of interest to the research at hand is the interplay between the micro and 
macro conditions, how they influence actions, and how they ultimately relate to the 
outcomes and consequences.  
 
Figure 5.2 identifies five distinct components, or sub-categories, to the main 
Context/Conditions category. These sub-categories are seen to be distinct conceptual 
renderings of different phenomena, although they will inevitably covary and interact to 
some degree or another (dotted line visualizes this). The objectives of grounded theory 
are far different from quantitative techniques such as multivariate regression, where the 
covariance of variables may lead to multicollinearity problems. In fact, Charmaz (2006 p. 
120) argues that it is this integration of categories is what will really reflect what is 
happening in the real world. The five sub-categories that emerged from the research are 
described in more detail below, and relate to both micro and macro conditions of the 
phenomenon under study. Placing these sub-categories in a micro–macro continuum we 
would see the following sequence; owner-manager characteristics, historic start-up 
situation, relevant industry, local environment, and global environment. More will be said 
on the interplay between these variables in the forthcoming Chapters 6 and 7 on small 
firm strategic behaviour. A description of the sub-categories follows: 
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 Appendix 8.1.1 The Historic Start-Up Situation 
 
This sub-category looks towards the particular start-up situation of the small firm. Owner-
managers frequently referred to the start-up point (98 references) when trying to explain 
the rationale of the firm and its path towards achieving some form of competitive 
advantage.  It has been argued that this earlier start-up situation will have ongoing 
ramifications towards the firm’s ongoing strategic behaviour (Fulford and Rizzo 2009). For 
example, in a family owned business, the initial vision and values of the founder will still 
cause ripple effects many years on. Alternatively, the situation of a young engineer 
opening up a firm that takes on the work previously carried out by this engineer as an 
employee, will influence how the company operates for many years after. A shortage of 
wood wholesalers in the 1950’s was the underlying reason for an importer firm to open up, 
this firm still heavily involved in wholesale import today even if the complete management 
team has changed. A technician starting off as an expert in refrigeration could now be 
seen running a business in cold stores. And so on.  
 
Understanding how start up took place, and in what context, helps understand present 
behaviour and possibly even prescribe future behaviour. The ‘Historic Start-Up Situation’ 
emerged with three properties: resource advantage; positional advantage; and combined 
resource and positional advantage. Companies with a resource advantage would have 
acquired a viable resource base in days where costs were low and the price of land and 
plant relatively cheap. Examples of these would be investments in farm land, quarries, 
prime office/plant locations, and even the less tangible resources such as the acquisition 
of glass and clay manufacturing skills. Positional advantage was obtained by individuals 
capitalizing on building an early brand name, establishing important networks and 
business channels, and taking up a prominent position in a seedling industry where 
practically no competition would yet exist. Many firms had a combined positional and 
resource-based advantage that could be seen to be influencing the firm many years later. 
An example is a perfumery that had established a brand name and central location some 
150 years ago as one of the very few businesses in this industry, and to this day 
benefiting from this particular historic situation and prime location. 
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Appendix 8.1.2 The Relevant Industry 
 
This sub-category looks towards the specific industry within which the company operates. 
Participants made 637 references to this component due to the significance of its effect on 
the ultimate strategic behaviour of the firm. Six independent properties were identified for 
this sub-category, enhancing its descriptive and conceptualization power. These 
properties are depicted in Figure 5.2 and outlined below: 
 
Particular Attributes  (100 references) 
This property describes the particular characteristics that are idiosyncratic to the industry 
in question. Particular situations, constraints, and conditions to the industry, as well as the 
rationale, or value adding properties, of the industry would be exemplified by participants. 
Cash flow problems, tax payment/avoidance patterns, industry concentration, 
standardization in certain materials/processes/policies, are some of the many attributes 
that would be seen to be particular to an industry. 
 
Labour Market (26 References) 
The labour market was seen by respondents to be specific to, and influential on, the 
industry in question. Attributes included the impact of the labour market on the 
competitiveness of the industry, wage expectations and fluctuations in these, the 
availability of labour and skills-levels available, and the attitudes and behaviours of newly 
recruited employees. Various issues and competitive problems were outlined by 
respondents, such as the difficulty in finding skilled I.T. labour, the cultural clashes 
between temporary employees being supplied by the local employment agency, and the 
problems being faced with increasingly egoistic attitudes of available skilled labour. 
 
Seasonality (9 References) 
Whilst this property was not a commonly cited one, it was an important one for a number 
of businesses that operated in an industry influenced by seasonal fluctuations. One 
example was a perfumery that would make profits only at the Christmas period, and was 
nearly made bankrupt when a particular season saw the entrance of low cost mobile 
phones, with consumers purchasing these instead of the usual perfumes to be used for 
Christmas presents. Another example was a roof waterproofing company that would rely 
on pre-winter and pre-summer periods to carry out most of its activities.  
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Technology Trends and Changes (11 References) 
The technology property relates to fluctuations in technology use or development, as 
opposed to details of technologies adopted, which would be exemplified in the 
Consequences and Outcomes category (to be described further on). Fluctuations in 
materials used, manufacturing processes, and emergence of new technologies were 
referred to by participants. Respondents even gave prominence to situations where 
technology had failed to provide additional solutions, such as in the case of a quality 
sorting company that lamented the unavailability of a technology to replace manual testing 
processes. 
 
Industry Attractiveness and Competitors (233 References) 
This important property looked towards a number of characteristics, such as; the 
attractiveness/unattractiveness, stability, dynamism or munificence of the particular 
industry, the quantity and characteristics of competitors, particular industry barriers of 
entry, competitors within different levels of the value chain such as suppliers, new entrants 
and substitute products, particular competitor behaviours and attitudes, and comparisons 
of the company to that of competitors.  
 
The Client and the Market (258 References) 
The client specifically, and the market generally, relate to another prominent property as 
identified by respondents. Attributes to this property were particularities of the client within 
the specific industry, market characteristics, segmentation, trends, fluctuations, details of 
the client such as type, style, attitudes, behaviours and needs. Other attributes were client 
demographics, significant clients acquired by the business and the type of relationship, 
and problems, issues and challenges relating to the client. Owner-managers showed a 
great knowledge of clients and their behaviour, particularly so because of the close links 
and interaction that would be built as a consequence of the small size of the firm. 
 
Appendix 8.1.3 The Local Environment 
 
The third sub-category that relates to the firm’s context/conditions looks towards the local 
environment that is external to the relevant industry. This local environment describes the 
more immediate, regional context of the small firm, as opposed to the ‘global environment’ 
that will be described later on. Respondent focus on this sub-category was evident, with 
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204 references made. A breakdown of the six properties pertaining to this sub-category is 
as follows: 
 
Temporal Events (23 References) 
This property would include particular temporal events, problems, happenings within the 
local scenario, critical events such as a recent major increase in water and electricity bills, 
sudden political moves that would cause shock waves in many industries, and 
developments by key players in the local environment that could impact upon the 
business. 
 
The Customer (10 References) 
The customer property refers to general consumer trends and behaviours tying down to 
the culture of the region, as opposed to the specific business consumers and markets 
mentioned earlier. Participants referred to generic customer needs, loyalties, 
expectations, behaviours, changing lifestyles and attitudes, and particular attributes of the 
Maltese consumer that spill over onto the industry, impacting upon the business in 
question. 
 
Sources of Finance (25 References) 
An important property to the participants was the source of capital and operational 
finance, be it from governmental agencies or from banking organizations or private 
institutions. Availability of finance, the ease of this availability, and the lending conditions, 
were frequently referred to by owner-managers. The way businesses used financing often 
described a lot into their behaviour and management philosophy. Ease of access to 
finance would condition the business’s propensity to invest and to grow, and in some 
cases, simply to survive.  
 
Government Actions and Interventions (75 References) 
In a small island state the effect of governmental actions and decisions will have strong 
ramifications on the small business. Owner-managers referred to this property from a 
number of perspectives, such as government incentives, schemes, regulations and 
decisions that impact upon the business, actions of government owned subsidiaries, 
organizations and institutions, government funded support and the mechanisms for this, 
regulator actions and attitudes, and government actions or lack of actions, such as in not 
controlling unlicensed businesses or allowing for illegal operations.  
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Local Trends and Attributes (47 References) 
This property can be seen to relate somewhat strongly to the culture of the country. 
Participants referred to a wide array of characteristics such as favoritism, clickism, local 
patterns of behaviour and lifestyles, various peculiarities of the local environment, 
particular situations and conditions to be found, local environmental factors such as the 
weather, and local factors and changes that impact directly upon the company's short/long 
term operations.  An example of this last factor was a local drive to commission a number 
of bypasses linking various villages and business hubs. This increased the value of 
properties adjacent to each bypass tremendously, influencing the strategic direction of any 
business owning the property.  
 
Local Economy and Stability (24 References) 
Small businesses would be the first to feel the effect of local economic fluctuations, 
although being in the euro zone somewhat buffered the effect. Owner-managers cited 
factors such as money in hand, the feel-good-factor, local generation of employment, and 
large local projects and investments that had spill-overs onto various industries. Owner-
managers would often look at the economic situation from a longitudinal perspective, tying 
down strategic actions taken to particular changes in the economic climate of the time.  
 
Appendix 8.1.4 The Global Environment 
 
The global environment is a Context/Conditions sub-category (93 references) that looks at 
macro environmental factors such as global technological trends, global competition, the 
cost of fuel/energy, foreign investment, and the effect of the global economy on the local 
economy. Five properties deemed to be important by owner-managers were the following: 
 
Technological and Environmental Trends (21 References) 
Owner-managers looked here towards global technological and telecommunication 
developments, environmental issues, and communication/transportation trends such as 
the advent of low cost airlines and the increasing use of renewable energy systems in 
replacement of fossil fuels. Global developments had strong implications on local 
business operations, such as the falling cost of technology, the enhancements in 
processing and data transmission speeds, the uncertainties and risks perceived to relate 
to globalization, and the advantages/disadvantages associated with a global commodity 
chain now made more easily accessible. 
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Foreign Competition (36 References) 
For this property owner-managers referred to concepts of global competitiveness such as 
low cost labour, threats of entry of global competitors into the Maltese scenario, threat of 
work being taken outside the Island, and the importation of low cost/cheap products. 
Observations were made regarding spiraling labour costs pushing business towards low-
cost countries, the increasing quality of low-cost competitors, ease with which foreign 
competitors could enter the local market as an outcome of low cost transportation, and so 
on. 
 
Global Economy and Stability (18 References) 
Although the global economic recession of 2008-2009 took place in the middle of the 
research period, focus by owner-managers on the global economic climate was somewhat 
less than expected. References were made to the global economy, regional (European 
Union) economy, stability, exchange rates, changes in the global economic climate that 
affect the company, and situations with international clients that impacted upon the 
company. A number of companies actually argued that although the economic crisis was 
indeed being felt, the real challenge that had already filtered out the weak and 
strengthened the surviving was the need to survive competition from low-cost countries 
such as China and India. 
 
Foreign Investments and Foreign Markets (4 References) 
This property looked towards both inputs into and outputs from the local economy. Owner-
managers referred here to foreign or global markets that bought from the local firm, and 
foreign investments into local firms. 
 
The Cost of Energy and Materials (14 References) 
This property was used to make reference to the price of natural resources and raw 
materials, such as the price of oil, energy, materials and minerals. The property relates to 
many others such as the impact of fuel costs on voyaging and transportation, referred to 
when mentioning the technological and environmental trends property.  
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Appendix 8.1.5 Owner-manager Characteristics 
 
The fifth and final sub-category tying down to the Context and Conditions category (again, 
Figure 5.2 provides a complete overview) relates to the characteristics of the owner-
manager of the small firm. Such importance was placed on this sub-category by 
participants that no less than 485 references were made to it. Notwithstanding its central 
role, this sub-category is not seen to be a core category as it does not define the 
phenomenon in question and does not take on a pivotal role for the other categories. To 
signify its importance however, it has been highlighted within the framework shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
Five particular characteristics are seen to be of importance to respondents. The values, 
vision and particular work attitude of the owner-manager are possibly the most important 
property. Qualifications, skills and knowledge base are a second important factor. 
Previous work and social life experiences, both inside and outside the firm, are another 
property that determines the owner-manager’s mind set. An intrinsic knowledge of the 
particular industry will also be a characteristic of importance. Finally, the exact details of 
the owner-managers task, that is what she does within the firm, can explain a lot by way 
of her philosophy. These psychological (e.g. values, work attitude) and observable (e.g. 
experience, education) characteristics determine the management philosophy of the 
owner-manager (Hambrick and Mason 1984). The five properties are outlined in more 
detail below: 
 
Owner-manager Task (45 References) 
This property refers to the parameters of exactly what the owner-manager does within the 
organization, as well as her personal and professional circumstances impacting upon the 
organization. The property looks at the range of activities and responsibilities that the 
owner-manager will take on at various stages of the organization’s life cycle. The 
participants would freely describe their various roles within the business, often taking on 
multitasking activities spanning across the entire business, such as quality control, 
marketing and general administration. 
 
Knowledge of Industry (14 References) 
Most owner-managers would have an intrinsic knowledge of the business and of the 
industry that they would be competing in. The knowledge of industry property looks at a 
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knowledge of the industry in question, of the particular business, its products and 
services. It refers to knowledge of the value adding processes and mechanisms within the 
industry. The property also includes knowledge of expected employee operations, and 
contributions to core business activities. 
 
Work/Life Experiences (72 References) 
Tying down with the previous property and with the historic start-up situation, the work/life 
experiences property was given prominence by respondents.  This refers to work and life 
experiences that create a certain mindset within the owner-manager. It also looks into the 
history of the individual, how she got to know the job, her ongoing learning and training, 
and her life status, both within the owner-manager post and outside the organization. 
 
Qualifications and Skills (31 References) 
The acquired qualifications and skills of the owner-manager were a further property of 
importance. Difficulty was found here in getting participants to directly refer to their 
academic or professional qualifications (hence the lower reference count), although within 
the interviews a clear picture would ultimately emerge. The main reason for this was that 
the owner-managers that did not have particular qualifications would not want to state this, 
and the owner-managers that were substantially qualified would often also, out of humility, 
bypass attempts to map out their qualifications and skills. 
 
Philosophy, Values and Behaviour (323 References) 
As evident from the large reference count, this property had the highest amount of 
references of all the properties pertaining to the framework in question. The property 
attempts to map out the strategic mindset of the owner-manager, that is, her underlying 
management philosophy. Fulford and Rizzo (2009) have argued that owner-managers 
adopt one of a limited number of management philosophies and retain this philosophy 
consistently with time. Attributes to this property are the values, beliefs, vision, foresight, 
work attitude, competencies and behavioural patterns of the owner-managers. In a few 
cases it was apparent that the firm was being run by a dominant coalition as opposed to a 
single owner-manager, this coalition being usually two or three dominant personalities 
within the business, sometimes family members. In these cases the management 
philosophy refers to that of the coalition instead of the individual, but other to that there 
would be little difference as still a dominant philosophy would be evident.  
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In conclusion to the Context/Conditions category, one has to appreciate the interaction 
between the sub-categories and properties described above to understand the true 
context to the business, and the conditions within which it operates. Characteristics of the 
client, demographics, loyalty, buying behaviour (such as seasonality), particular needs, 
are all issues of importance. Attractiveness of the industry, its dynamism or munificence, 
will explain the ease in which the firm operates and in which new competition will appear. 
Technological trends particular to the industry will affect the very nature of the firm’s work 
task. The situation within the relevant labour market will explain the availability of skilled 
personnel that can be employed by the firm. Finally, due to the size and resource strength 
of the small firm, any particular attributes or peculiarities of the particular industry may be 
of significance. For example, in a small contained economy, an attribute of importance 
would be the limited lead time after which competitors would copy a good idea. Another 
example would be a collective approach by customers in a particularly hostile industry 
where a deliberate approach to delay payments for goods/services rendered seriously 
affects cash flows, and thus survival, of the small firms. It is argued that every industry has 
its own set of particular traits that condition the way the small firm behaves. 
 
Appendix 8.2    The Strategic Actions and Reactions Category 
 
Various authors advocate including process as a means of building a more complete 
understanding of organizational behaviour (Hofer 1975; Corbin and Strauss 2008). This 
approach is uncommon, although not new in the field of research on typologies of 
strategic behaviour. An example is Miller and Friesen’s (1978) ten archetypes of strategy 
making, in which content-based variables (e.g. product innovation) and process-based 
variables (e.g. stages of centralization) were applied. Strauss and Corbin (1998 p. 168) 
argue that “examining data for how action/interaction changes over time and space and in 
response to contingencies forces an analyst to look for patterns”. The following Figure 
A8.1 attempts to illustrate how process intertwines with context and consequences to 
result in an evolving pattern of strategic behaviour. This is possibly a more realistic 
interpretation of the complex interactions than the multivariate relationship shown in 
Figure 5.2, where a simplistic argument is being made that actions have a direct 
relationship with outcomes, moderated by the context in question. 
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Gradually evolving CONTEXT and CONSEQUENCES to 
the business
Strategic  ACTIONS and REACTIONS taken by the firm
 
Figure A8.1: Illustration of the Interaction of Content with Process  
 
It has already been proposed (d’Amboise and Muldowney 1988; Kroeger 1974) that the 
management process in small firms is dynamic, with management practices depending on 
the stages of growth, size, age and expertise-experiences of the owner-manager. As put 
by Ling, Zhao and Baron (2007 p. 689), for the small firm different managerial values 
matter at different times, and the best way to understand this dynamism is to take the 
organizational life cycle into account. This is in agreement with Hambrick’s (1984 p. 32) 
observation that “businesses differ by life cycle stage in what strategies they can and 
should pursue”. 
 
Patterns of behaviour thus exist that take on various development stages, through the 
birth, growth, maturity and decline – refocus phases of the small firm (although a linear 
passage is not expected here). This is essentially a processual approach, where process 
demonstrates the ability of organizations to respond to and shape the situations in which 
they find themselves. Process can be examined in terms of sequence or shifts in the 
nature of actions and interactions (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 166). Empirical evidence 
has shown that, as a firm grows in size and age, managerial behaviour needs to change if 
the firm is to continue building upon its performance. As an example, Ling, Zhao and 
Baron (2007) demonstrate that whilst an innovative, entrepreneurial approach is shown to 
be best suited for the first stages of the life cycle, a collectivistic and integrative 
management style better suites the maturing organization. Dodge and Robbins (1992) 
observe empirically that the particular challenges faced by small firm management change 
and evolve over the life cycle. This does not necessarily mean that values of the owner-
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manager would change with time, possibly some values may matter more at certain 
stages whilst other values would become prominent at later stages.  Alternatively, a 
maturing firm may deploy a management team that functions on a philosophy different to 
that of the initial owner-manager. In the logic of Nadler and Tushman (1980), a business 
should be looked at as a transformation process made up of a number of distinct, 
interdependent components. In other words, a small firm that starts off with a particular 
pattern of strategic fit may well evolve into a different, equally successful pattern of 
strategic behaviour.  
 
The grounded theory research identified five different stages, or situations of particular 
behaviour, that the small business would go through. Each stage has been mapped out as 
a sub-category within the Strategic Actions and Reactions category, as depicted in Figure 
5.2. The first four stages have been named the traditional birth (77 references), forming or 
growth (226 references), maturity (283 references), decline/refocus (70 references) stages 
proposed within common strategy literature on the small firm (e.g. Baldwin and Gellatly 
2003; Dodge and Robbins 1992). The fifth situation falls outside the usual birth, growth, 
maturity, decline/refocus cycle common to the literature.  It is also more relevant to the 
small firm that may have its very existence depending on one particular product or project. 
Consider a firm that is in any of the traditional four life cycle stages, but with one or more 
products/services going through their own particular life cycle.  The length, contribution 
and overlap of the limited number of product life cycles will determine the success, and 
possibly the survival, of the small firm. This situation has been defined as a loop within a 
loop (37 references), that is a product or project life cycle within a particular stage of a 
company life cycle.  Small firms that are highly dependent on one venture or one 
investment will fall into this particular category. An example would be a service-based IT 
firm that has based its complete but limited resource base on one particular contract, and 
will only be in a position to take on further projects if and when the contact is successful 
and revenues are collected.  Each of these life cycle stages is seen to be a multi-
dimensional measure of a particular processual situation, of a particular medley of actions 
and reactions. Four properties were identified for each behavioural stage that the firm 
would go through.  These are outlined below (Figure 5.2 provides the complete overview): 
 
Changing Management Responsibilities (7 References) 
This property regards shifts taking place within the dominant coalition, such as actions 
being taken to re-establish the members of the dominant coalition or a move to employ a 
new senior manager. A low level of focus was placed on this property by participants, as 
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most owner-managers would look at their status in the organization from a present tense 
perspective. The major evidence of changing management responsibilities was the moves 
and efforts being made by senior owner-managers to mould new management into a 
position in line with the present or future expectations of the organization. 
 
Planning and Scanning Activities (34 References) 
This property regards actions taken towards planning, both financial and strategic, as well 
as scanning activities towards the environment. Few companies had a formal planning 
mechanism, and practically none were in a position to demonstrate documented plans 
such as business plans, strategic plans or marketing plans. However, many owner-
managers actively planned in what Steiner (1979) would describe to be more of a thought 
process then a prescribed set of processes, structures and techniques. This could be 
seen in the amount of industry scanning and business review exercises that owner-
managers would carry out. 
 
Actions Regarding Products and Services (30 References) 
The property regards particular actions and moves taken regarding new or enhanced 
products and services, as well as steps towards product diversification. Owner-managers 
would describe strategic actions taken to add a new brand to the company portfolio, to 
attempt to elongate the life cycle of an existing brand, or to develop a new product or 
service in-house. 
 
Strategic Moves and Positions Adopted (513 References) 
This property looks at strategic moves and actions taken within a particular life cycle 
stage, and includes marketing moves, networking actions, suppliers/customers adopted, 
and particular projects, investments and expansions made. Strategic moves and actions 
that owner-managers carried out varied tremendously. Moves would be taken to penetrate 
international markets, to change focus to a different or changing consumer segment, or to 
build up a particular resource base or technical expertise. Owner managers would 
describe how they were going about implementing strategic activities such as setting up a 
major fair, or closing off a key project, or taking action to acquire a much-needed 
overdraft. Moves would be taken to build up a resource base, to enhance an existing 
base, or to replace assets that were no longer providing for competitive advantage. And 
so on. Often linkages would be made between this property and that of the owner-
manager characteristics, as strategic moves of the firm would be very much in tune with 
the management philosophy of the owner-manager. 
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An important point to emphasize is that the Strategic Actions/Reactions category is far 
from a static, or cross-sectional, one. Reference is made to the illustration in Figure A8.1, 
particularly the spiral that illustrates the continuous motion of strategic actions and 
reactions being taken. Owner-managers would describe actions being taken, both past, 
present and even planned future moves. Equating this to the spiral, this means that 
information would be provided relating to the four properties described above, but for 
various different points (or stages) along the spiral. For example, an owner-manager 
would describe particular investment moves at start up, how actions were taken to take on 
a new product whilst the company was growing, how environment scanning activities were 
being deployed at the present state of the company’s maturity, and how the business 
intended to diversify into the future. One way to imagine this is by taking the centre arrow 
of Figure A8.1 to move in a fairly consistent direction, being guided or molded into a new 
tangent by strategic actions/reactions (the spiral) that are deployed by the owner-
manager. 
 
Appendix 8.3    The Consequences and Outcomes Category 
 
The Consequences/Outcomes category is the last of the three main categories (again, 
Figure 5.2 provides the complete overview), and shall be shown to consist of four sub-
categories, with their various properties and dimensions. As argued by Fulford and Rizzo 
(2009) and authors such as Andrews, Boyne and Walker (2006), organizations build 
positions, or stances, that reflect their being, their very nature. These stances can be 
described as an established mindset of the business, a created setup and organizational 
structure, a well-developed and engrained set of value adding processes within the firm. 
Once again, this is not a static picture and the various stances that the firm will deploy will 
adapt and evolve as the firm changes with time. This stance-based approach to map out 
the strategic behaviour of small firms is, admittedly, an uncommon one. However, as 
argued by Curran and Blackburn (2001 p. 30); “research on the small enterprise is about 
creative, new ways of thinking about the small enterprise that will enhance our 
understanding of how it functions”.  Boyne and Walker (2004 p. 232) describe a firm’s 
strategic stance as “a general approach that describes the organization’s position and 
how it interacts with its environment”.  Three stances have been identified through the 
research, looking at the organizations’ personification from three different, although inter-
related, angles. These are the Engineering Stance, the Resource-Based Stance, and the 
Business Stance. Together with these three strategic stances, organizational performance 
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shall be shown to form the fourth sub-category depicting the consequences and outcomes 
of the strategic behaviour of the small firm. The four sub-categories, together with their 
properties and dimensions, are described in more detail in the following sections. 
 
Appendix 8.3.1 Organizational Performance 
 
The first sub-category to be described is that of the performance of the small firm (84 
references). It has been reasoned that “if strategic groups are to be truly useful for theory 
construction in strategic management, then there should be a relationship between 
strategic group membership and performance criteria” (Thomas & Venkatraman 1988 p. 
541). Various authors (e.g. Fahey and Christensen 1986; Wiklund 1999; Wiklund and 
Shepherd 2005) have contended that performance is a multidimensional construct, and 
must be treated as such. Also, the issue of causality between strategic actions and 
performance must not be overlooked. As noted by Covin and Slevin (1989, 1991), high 
performance may be a result of specific strategic behaviour, but may likewise be the 
cause for adopting certain behaviour. This covariance between the categories is depicted 
in Figure 5.1. One problem tying down to the low reference count (the 84 references) is 
that “small firms are notorious for their inability and unwillingness to provide desired 
information on their performance”, (Covin and Slevin 1989 p. 80). This is not to say that 
performance was not measurable for the small firms in the study, but that the detailed 
descriptions provided by participants gave far more insights into the firms’ performance 
than did direct references to performance achievements. As argued by Lumpkin and Dess 
(1996), performance was indeed shown to be a multi-dimensional concept, and various 
tangible and intangible performance criteria were identified by the respondents. These are 
outlined in the eight properties described below: 
 
Competencies (4 References) 
This property relates to competencies and capabilities acquired by the firm. Owner-
managers would identify competency achievements as a successful performance-related 
endeavor. Aspects such as building an effective after-sales service or a low manufacture 
failure rate would be deemed to be successful performance criteria.  
 
Stakeholder Satisfaction (1 Reference) 
Stakeholder satisfaction was referred to as a means of gauging successful performance. 
This was not a common performance measure, as often the owner and the manager of 
the firm were one and the same. 
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Brand Name/Growth (9 References) 
This property relates to brand names acquired, products ‘owned’ by the firm, new 
products launched after internal development, and dominance in a particular field or 
market. Small businesses would see brand acquisition and representation to be an 
important strategic achievement. 
 
Efficiency/Costs (5 References) 
Owner-managers would refer to efficiency achievements and cost reductions/controls as 
vital productivity and performance measures.  
 
Quality Standards Achieved (1 Reference) 
This property was not directly referred to often, although in many interview discussions the 
owner-managers would demonstrate their focus on quality achievements as an important 
organizational objective. 
 
Targets and KPI’s Achieved (13 References) 
Key performance indicators and other strategic or operational targets were often 
mentioned by respondents. Having a steady workload throughout the year, increasing the 
client base, adding on a new brand, opening a further outlet, even survival itself, were 
deemed to be important performance-related targets. 
 
Employee Count (2 References) 
The number of employees on the payroll, and fluctuations in employee count, were 
referred to by owner-managers as visible signs of a performing organization. 
 
Revenues/Profits/Sales (49 References) 
This property was the most cited, and consisted of tangible measures in turnover, profits, 
and asset valuation. Revenue fluctuations, profit values, return on investment and balance 
sheet values were mainly referred to as a viable measure of a year’s performance. 
Secondary data obtained on the financial records of companies served to add information 
to this property, and provided a vital source for methods triangulation (to be described in 
detail in Chapter 7). 
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Appendix 8.3.2 The Engineering Stance 
 
The first of three stances identified within the research is the engineering stance adopted 
by the organization, a concept that is ignored in much of the academic literature on 
strategic behaviour. The engineering stance looks at the organizational process of 
transforming inputs into outputs, of creating a value-adding mechanism (Fry 1982), and 
the various combinations and permutations by which the organization carries out its 
business. The engineering stance can thus be described as the “work being performed by 
the organization and encompasses many qualities beyond how the work is structured and 
facilitated, including the skills and knowledge of workers, the characteristics of the objects 
on which work is performed, and even the  cause-and-effect relation between actions and 
outcomes” (Hendrick 2003 p. 500). Mintzberg (2007 p. 388) defines the construct as the 
“technical system” of the organization. The engineering stance thus consists of the mode 
of operation, technology, complexity, dimensions and level of standardization of the work 
task. It is thus understandable how this dimension can contribute significantly to 
describing the strategic behaviour of an organization.  A number of studies (e.g. Miller et 
al. 1991; Yasai-Ardekani and Haug 1997) have looked at the relationship between the 
engineering stance and other organizational variables such as structure and process, 
generally with consistent results. For example, a mechanistic mentality of the owner-
manager will result in a likewise mechanistic structure that will, in turn, support an 
inflexible, routine transformation process. The engineering stance is especially relevant to 
the small firm, and the input-transformation-output process will exemplify the management 
philosophy, and will correlate strongly with the structures and processes that are 
deployed. Owner-managers made 542 references to this engineering stance within the 
research, relating this sub-category to four distinct properties, as detailed below: 
 
The Mode of Operation (238 References) 
This main engineering stance property addresses exactly how the firm translates inputs 
into outputs. It looks at the key engineering/manufacturing/servicing processes within the 
business’s internal value chain. The property addresses the mode of operation, 
complexity, definition, description and dimensions of the business task. It looks at how the 
client is involved in the work design and its implementation. It looks at the product or 
business unit portfolios, identifying key activities and core processes. The property also 
addresses cost approaches associated with the engineering stance. In summary, the 
property answers the question “what do we do that allows us to compete successfully?” 
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Whilst most small businesses will have a range of value adding activities, firms would 
inevitably describe a certain core activity or a related set of core activities that gave the 
firm its particular competitive advantage. The relationship between content and process is 
most evident here, with firms acting strategically to develop and sustain competitive 
positions in line with contextual factors and conditions being placed upon the firm. 
 
A number of examples serve to highlight the mode of operation property. A local car park 
facility defined how the major task of the business was to efficiently squeeze as many cars 
as possible into a limited parking foot print by using technology to map out consumer 
parking trends. An architectural firm described how it had specialized on a particular blend 
of activities including structural design, civil engineering, quantity surveying and interior 
design. A marine biotechnology firm identified a highly correlated set of activities that it 
had specialized upon, including aquaculture, fisheries and aquarium design.  An 
established retailer explained how his focus was on the household, specializing in textiles 
for interior use, home furnishings, and baby/children appliances. An electrical system 
retailer and service provider described how she had branched off into six complementary 
areas of expertise, including low voltage switchgear, automation and control systems, and 
lighting. There were, however, some firms that were going against the grain and 
diversifying into unrelated areas of expertise.  
 
Technology/Rationale (142 References) 
The technology/rationale property builds upon the mode of operation property, and relates 
to a number of common and integrative concepts, such as: The detail, level and 
complexity of technology or engineering adopted; The underlying core competencies of 
the firm; The main sources of competitiveness, use of particular technologies and 
equipment/systems; The rationale underlying the technology or engineering process or 
business model; The rationale underlying the way inputs are translated into outputs within 
the firm; And the paradigm being applied by the business to add value to its products or 
services. The descriptions given towards this property showed owner-managers being 
very skilled at creating sustainable sources of competitive advantage, even if the markets 
being accessed were often niche markets. Strategic behaviour was constantly being 
directed towards enhancing the engineering stance, in line with the context and conditions 
being faced by the firm. 
 
A number of examples serve to clarify the property in question. For example, one quality 
sorting firm established a manually-oriented quality testing process by which employees 
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would be pulled in for short shifts to carry out physical checks on large numbers of 
automobile washers and seals. The manual nature of the tests and the mechanisms 
deployed to ensure a quality test each time allowed the firm to achieve a very high quality 
standard, one that was not easily displaced by companies with higher levels of 
automation. One particular retailer developed an ICT infrastructure that allowed him to 
monitor sales, customer trends, stock fluctuations, cash flows and so on in a near real-
time basis, allowing him to react speedily to the market, often buying stock in advance of 
competitors, and giving him the facility to pre-empt the market. A translation and 
interpreting service established itself as a flexible firm, subcontracting translation work 
through the internet to established translators, the proof reading to other parties, with the 
core team managing network interaction and controlling for quality as their main functions. 
A ship registration company maintained a 24-hour office with excellent communication 
channels to shipping lines, local regulators, local and foreign administrative offices, 
allowing it to provide a smooth and efficient service at the shortest of notices. A point-of-
sale software provider established a mechanism for automatically and freely updating all 
his clients with software updates whenever these took place, allowing clients to have 
extremely low running and maintenance costs for their system. The examples are endless 
and demonstrate the core rationale and technology or engineering process behind the 
firm’s value added activities. 
 
Permutations and Product Details (120 References) 
This property adds detail and description to the engineering stance sub-category, and 
complements the first two properties described above.  The property looks towards the 
range or permutations of products and services, the different work configurations and 
work options, different models, styles, colours of products, product differentiation, product 
and service specifications, and materials used in the product/process input stages. An 
example of the application of this property is a quality control company that described how 
the same quality control procedures used for physical component checks could be applied 
in an entirely different industry to check documents, texts and contracts. A studio 
company described how the studio facilities could be used for a range of purposes such 
as films, television programs, documentaries, adverts, as well as equipment rentals. A 
ship supply service described how the firm was geared up to service small ships and 
yachts, providing a wide portfolio of services including storage, food supply and 
maintenance. A real estate agent outlined how he had some 4,000 properties on his 
books, catering for sale and lease for a wide number of consumer segments and 
particular needs. 
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Routineness and Innovativeness (42 References) 
This final property adds further descriptive depth to the engineering stance by addressing 
the level of routineness, or standardization, of the key activities carried out by the firm. For 
example, one engineering firm defined how diversity was their strong point, allowing them 
to create unique engineering solutions for each individual design project that came their 
way. A wood importer and wholesaler described how he had established a range of wood 
products, and specialized in the importation of these. An ornamental glass blower outlined 
how he had built the firm’s popularity on a particular colour blend that was associated with 
the culture and ambient of the Island, but had drastically changed the manufacturing 
processes and material content over the years. An aluminium assembly firm described 
how the business was highly innovative when designing, building and installing apertures, 
seeing no aperture to be the same, each with its own distinctive properties and client 
expectations. 
 
In conclusion to this sub-category, the engineering stance is the first of three stances that 
aim to describe the resulting position deployed by the firm when competing within its 
particular environment. The stance is just that; a position taken by the firm, and enhanced, 
adapted and fine tuned by the strategic actions deployed by the firm over time and in 
accordance to external conditions. As visualized in Figure A8.1, the engineering stance 
will be expected to be fairly consistent over a specific time period, and a significant 
change in this stance would identify a significant change in the strategic direction of the 
business. Once again, the issue of reverse causality must be addressed here. Is the 
engineering stance an outcome of the business’s strategic actions, or is it a precursor to 
these actions? Again it is argued that reverse causality does indeed exist, but that it does 
not detract from the explanatory power of the framework depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
The engineering stance is seen to be the result of a continuous pattern of strategic 
actions. It embodies the small firm’s resulting attitude towards how resources are 
deployed to add value within the firm. This stance will also influence strategic actions, 
possibly to no small extent. Actions would be expected to occur that are dictated by the 
firm’s engineering stance and that, in turn, complement the stance and possibly alter and 
refine its configuration.  
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Appendix 8.3.3 The Resource-based Stance 
 
The second sub-category that identifies a further behavioural stance of the firm is termed 
the resource-based stance.  This stance looks at the ensuing organizational design and 
setup, particularly the organization’s resource bundle consisting of human, physical and 
organizational resources (Barney 1986, 1991). This resource-based setup has been 
described as the structures and processes deployed by a firm to reduce environmental 
uncertainty (Kotter 1979). In other words the organizational design is a reaction to how the 
external environment is perceived, with the small firm being shaped by the environment, 
the characteristics of the owner-manager, and the various strategic actions taken. The 
resource-based stance emerged within the research to be a multi-dimensional construct 
that consists of three properties. The first, the human resource base, looks into employee 
qualifications, skills, education, autonomy, the particular management style, and the 
organizational structures deployed. The second property, the physical resource base, 
consists of the tangible, intangible and financial resources owned by the small firm. The 
third property is the organizational resource base, consisting of systems, processes, 
standards, level of service, the more intangible aspects such as the organization’s culture, 
as well as networks, associations, company – supplier, and company – client liaisons that 
are formed. A total of 350 references were made by owner-managers to this particular 
stance. The three properties are described in more detail below: 
 
The Human Resource Base (214 References) 
This property relates to the various aspects of human resource deployment within the firm, 
with many attributes referred to by participants such as the quantity and skills base of 
existing employees, organizational structure adopted, the particular management style of 
the dominant coalition, human resource strategies and incentives predominant within the 
firm, autonomy and empowerment/delegation at different management levels, and 
particular attributes of key members such as attributes, behaviours and characteristics of 
key employees within the firm. Owner-manager descriptions of the human resource base 
were very vivid, clearly depicting the outcomes of actions being taken to build a 
sustainable and cost-effective resource setup. Descriptions would be given of the 
challenges and costs relating to training schemes, levels of staff turnover and reasons for 
these, successes in increasing resource quantities or in levels of specialization, diversity 
of trades and issues of motivation  and flexibility, balances achieved between full timers 
and part timers, structures and levels of empowerment and flexibility deployed, and so on. 
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Many descriptions bordered on the personal level, with owner-managers often talking 
about their employees as if they were family, showing a strong attachment and loyalty 
towards the workforces in question. Most organizational structures described were flat and 
centralized, although one could easily see the tendency of firms to increase in structure 
and bureaucracy as firms grew larger and more complex.  
 
The Physical Resource Base (86 References) 
Participants looked towards their physical resource base as a tangible bundle of assets 
that they had gradually acquired, and that allowed them to compete in a particular way. 
The property was somewhat generic, looking into the following: The range of a tangible 
assets such as the plant, equipment, buildings, land, instrumentation and infrastructures 
owned or utilized by the firm; The organizational setup with respect to equity and capital 
deployed and share distribution among various members; Ownership of the firm whether a 
limited liability, sole trader, partnership or trust; Liabilities and third party sources of 
finance; And details of the cost base that the company had developed relating to its value 
adding activities. Owner-managers were very explicit in their descriptions of both how the 
physical resource base had been built, and how this allowed them to carve out a unique 
position within their particular industry. One firm detailed how the purchase of a costly 
printing mechanical setup allowed it to be the only competitive provider of book prints that 
could be printed in any number, even just a single print. Another firm explained how the 
acquisition of cold stores and a fleet of vehicles allowed the firm to compete more 
aggressively in the ship supply industry. A small laboratory firm detailed how the company 
had had to buy back a number of shares from an uncooperative shareholder, in a bid to 
regain control and direction of the firm. A ship repair company explained how the 
investment in a large workshop at the local freeport had given them a strategic advantage 
in servicing large ocean vessels. And so on. The descriptions provided by participants 
were not only rich in detail, but clearly showed the interaction of content with process. 
Reasons for investing, described in conjunction with actions taken to invest, would be 
shown to result in particular resource bundles that provided the firm with a unique position 
within an industry. 
 
The Organizational Resource Base (50 References) 
This property was utilized to capture the more tacit and intangible resource components 
referred to by participants. References were made to a wide array of resource 
components such as systems, processes and standards adopted by the firm, the key 
networks developed and maintained, partners and supporting agencies interacting with 
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the firm, knowledge-based resources developed by the firm, brand identity acquired by the 
firm, and the embodiment of the company’s culture, its unique way of doing things. In 
many cases the organizational resource was seen by owner-managers to be a vital asset, 
due to its inimitable and unsubstitutable nature that made it a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. One company described how their relationship with the local 
environmental regulator had been built after years of successful interaction, now paying 
dividends in assistance and support. A tax advisory firm detailed how they had joined part 
of a leading international tax consultancy network, this providing them both with clients 
and with an ongoing knowledge transfer. A perfume wholesale firm outlined how their 
dynamic yet informal and friendly culture allowed them to interact easily and with flexibility 
to clients’ needs. And so on. Again, the content – process relationship emerged clearly in 
the detailed descriptions given, with respondents demonstrating the context, and the 
actions, that led them to create particular organizational resource bundles.  
 
 
Appendix 8.3.4 The Business Stance 
 
Together with the first two stances (the engineering stance and the resource-based 
stance) a third positional stance was adopted by small firms, illustrated in Figure 5.1 as 
being of major prominence. This is the business stance adopted by the small firm, a sub-
category referred to 169 times by participants. Small firms were seen to show a certain 
behavioural trait that indentified their propensity towards more, or possibly less, 
entrepreneurial inclinations. Three predominant entrepreneurial traits were observed, not 
inconsistent with the literature on the subject (e.g. Kets de Vries 1977; Miller 1983; Rauch 
et al. 2009; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005). These three properties were risk acceptance, 
proactiveness, and innovative behaviour towards competition. As defined by Baldwin and 
Gellatly (2003), for the small firm innovation embodies the entrepreneurial spirit, acting as 
the lifeblood of a market economy, increasing product ranges whilst lowering prices, and 
creating wealth whilst rewarding risk taking. Innovation is all about new ideas and creative 
processes, aiming at the creation of new products, services and processes. Innovation is 
usually looked at from two angles; product-market innovation and technological 
innovation. Proactiveness refers to the taking of new initiatives by anticipating and 
pursuing new opportunities and markets. It relates to first-mover advantage and to the 
aggressiveness through which an entrepreneurial organization competes. Risk-taking 
consists of an organization’s willingness to engage in risky ventures, as well as 
management’s propensity to adopt bold, as opposed to cautious behaviour. 
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A somewhat different coding strategy was adopted for this particular sub-category. In the 
previous text, coding has been centred around properties, allowing for a build-up of 
conceptual depth for the categories represented by these properties. In the early research 
stages this same approach was adopted for the three properties (risk, proactiveness and 
innovativeness) relating to the business stance sub-category. As research unfolded and it 
became more and more clear how the properties were defining a limited number of unique 
strategic stances, the coding schema within MAXqda was altered to allow the unfolding 
stances to be positioned in replacement of the three properties. Constant comparison and 
verification fine tuned the process, emanating in four distinct business stances (outlined 
below and described in more detail in Chapter 6). This actually moved the analytic and 
interpretive stages of the research further into the earlier research stages, as businesses 
could be matched to the business stance that they were most closely oriented to. As an 
example, if a business (or more accurately the respondent) constantly made reference to 
risk averse, non–proactive, low innovative behaviour, then the firm would be classified as 
having a small business orientation (described below). Each text reference mentioning 
these conservative behaviours would be coded into the small business orientation sub-
category. And so on. 
 
Small Business Orientation (26 References) 
This classification describes firms that have a low risk propensity, low levels of 
innovativeness, and little if any proactive behaviour. 13 firms demonstrated small business 
orientation traits. The owner-managers were often emotionally attached to the business, 
seeing it as an extension of their personality or life status. The business was often 
deemed to be a means of generating family income, with no additional ambitions or 
aspirations. Sometimes businesses were part-time ventures, starting off this way in their 
early induction phase. There was often an approach towards satisficing and not 
maximizing, where the firm was a means with which the owner-manager could enjoy more 
leisure time, or as a means of providing personal satisfaction and a sense of achievement. 
In some cases the owner-manager was in or near retirement age, and was happy to have 
the firm operating as it was. In a number of situations the business was a means of 
passing something onto a younger generation, and the owner-manager had no urgent 
need to develop the firm, only to preserve it as it was until new blood arrived. The term 
‘small business orientation’ has been adopted from the text of Runyan, Droge and 
Swinney (2008) who describe very well this particular category of business behaviour.  
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Functional Efficiency Orientation (71 References) 
Firms here were observed to have a particular approach towards competitiveness, best 
explained as an efficiency or productivity-oriented philosophy. Innovativeness and 
proactiveness drives were limited towards a narrow product range and a specialization 
within this range. Risk was contained by the lack of diversification of the firm, and by 
building up a resource-based stance and engineering stance focused directly towards the 
product range. Operational efficiency was often achieved through routinization of 
processes and repetition of core activities. For more project-oriented firms such as the 
various engineering companies, project efficiency was achieved through repetitive 
applications and modifications within a similar line of expertise or business. Companies 
were often observed to be geared towards cost control and efficiency maximization. From 
the owner-manager statements there appeared to be two motives for this stance; no real 
objective of increasing the existing product/service/market base, or fighting to survive and 
cutting costs and marketing efforts in the process. 34 firms demonstrated functional 
efficiency orientation traits.  
 
Related Diversification Orientation (32 References) 
As the name implies, owner-managers referred to this classification when describing an 
organizational stance that was somewhat cautiously diversifying into technologies and 
product markets that were related to, or direct offshoots of, the core areas of business 
operation. Risk approaches were higher than the two orientations mentioned before, and 
innovative approaches were being adopted to allow the firm to branch out, albeit 
cautiously. The firms relating to this classification were observed to be proactively creating 
a competitive advantage by capitalizing on existing resource and engineering 
configurations and expertise. One example of this was a first-mover firm in waste 
management that subsequently opened up a new business unit in waste consultancy 
services. Another example is a wholesale/retail firm that had started off as a supplier of 
farm products and equipment but had eventually expanded into fire control systems, water 
piping systems, water purification and control systems and wastewater. The areas were 
all offshoots of the initial area of expertise, but allowed the firm to tap new industries and 
new markets. Generally speaking, companies relating to this classification appeared 
willing to grow, but were cautious about going into truly innovative and new areas of 
expertise. So much so that one can argue that the approach was one of moderate risk, 
and based on capitalizing upon existing competencies. 14 firms demonstrated related 
diversification orientation traits. 
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Unrelated Diversification Orientation (40 References) 
References were made to this classification by firms that were branching off from the 
industries and markets that they had initially started out in. As the name implies, the 
stance looks towards unrelated diversification where firms were going into new avenues, 
areas of expertise, new products and services. Owner-managers of firms relating to this 
stance described taking strategic actions to diversify into new industries, markets and 
consumer segments, often through internationalization. One example is an engineering 
firm that gradually diversified into three entirely different industries; that of 
telecommunications project integration, laboratory supplies of analysis equipment, and 
medical suppliers of gases and fuels used within the hospital environment. The owner-
manager here admitted that having three of the four board members as engineers was 
one of the main instigators of this proactive entrance into different industries. Another firm 
started off as the owners and managers of some half dozen pharmacies on the Island, but 
subsequently diversified into running a call centre and help desk for a large global firm, as 
well as a holding centre for goods at the local freeport. This business had actually set a 
goal that by 2010 at least 70% of their turnover had to come from overseas business. 
Companies referring to this stance demonstrated the least aversion to risk, higher levels 
of innovation, and proactiveness towards competition and competitors alike. 6 firms 
demonstrated unrelated diversification orientation traits. 
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Appendix 9: Individual Firm Trajectories 
 
Appendix 9.1: Firms Following a Controlled Focus Trajectory 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 1: Services, 9 employees
Electrical Systems Consultants
A good level of alignment between the 
management philosophy and the 
conditional lens.  The company has 
developed from a part time business 
where the owner was solely involved, 
to a small limited liability firm with 
some 9 professional employees, 
mainly electrical and civil engineers. 
The firm Is now in functional efficiency, 
and in its maturity stage. It functions as 
a flexible firm, pulling in additional 
employees and projects as the need 
arises. The focus has been, and still is 
on electrical services and design, and 
the firm has become highly competent 
in this area.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 7: Services, 9 employees
Software/system integration/POS 
A small company that works as a flexible 
firm in functional efficiency, expanding and 
shrinking as workloads fluctuate.
The company is being faced with an 
increasingly dynamic and competitive 
industry, and a clientele with less liquidity 
and more choice.
The major factors limiting further expansion 
into other IT areas are twofold:
1) The industry has become increasingly 
competitive, with new companies freely 
entering and established firms fighting for 
the retention of market share.
2) The owner/manager, although highly 
entrepreneurial in innovativeness, 
demands that he is involved with all 
clients and in all projects, not really 
trusting his employees to far.
Company really in a loop-within-a-loop form 
of behaviour, expanding and contracting 
as new projects come in and old close 
down.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 8: Services, 14 employees
Architectural Firm
A small company that works as a 
flexible firm in functional efficiency, 
expanding and shrinking as 
workloads fluctuate.
The standard architectural firm that 
is fairly large in size, with 17 
employees. 
A strong and conservative focus on 
a range of architectural activities that 
are too closely related to be deemed 
diversification. These are; structural 
design, civil engineering, quantity 
surveying, environmental impact 
assessments…
The main concept is simple; capture 
as much work as possible in boom 
periods, and then work towards 
sustaining the client base in lull 
periods.
Financial Performance:
Partnership, hence unavailable
3 members in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 9:  Manufacture, 45 employees
Quality testing/sorting firm
A large engineering firm that has reached 
maturity and has settled to an ideal size 
of just under 50 employees. One notes 
here that although the size is large 
(employee wise), there is a low 
propensity for growth.
The firm carries out one basic, low 
technology task; sorting. This involves 
the manual checking of components for 
possible flaws. Very little change. In fact, 
one can relate propensity for growth with 
propensity for change.
The firm is constrained in growth/change 
by two factors; a mechanized industry 
that is based upon economies of scale, 
and a very rigid, quality oriented and 
fairly conservative owner/manager.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 10:  Retail, 20 employees
Perfume importation/retail
This 20 man company acts as the retail 
and marketing branch to a well 
established perfume importation house.
The director/manager is an extremely 
dynamic and heuristic individual, very 
passionate about the job and full of ideas 
on how to do business in a more 
innovative way.
Having said this, she admits that the 
business, in fact the whole industry, is in 
maturity. The ease with which 
competitors can parallel trade, pull in 
competing perfumes with equally enticing 
bottles and names, and import small 
quantities, makes all innovative 
marketing moves easy to copy. Barriers 
of entry into this industry are low, 
Also, the availability of information to the 
client; internet and magazines, makes 
the client more informed, practically 
moving the industry into perfect 
competition and making marketing 
moves less effective.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 12:  Services, 6 employees
Car Park Service
Essentially a car park management 
company, six employees. Started off as 
a partnership between two investors 
and developed into a company by the 
owner/manager , the son of one of the 
partners.
The entrepreneurial behaviour of the 
owner/manager is evident, he would like 
to add a second storey to the car park, 
add shops and other revenue 
generating activities (such as 
sponsoring conferences). However, the 
actual park is owned by a larger 
adjacent complex, and the 
owner/manager has little say on the 
final behaviour of the business. This 
explains the segregation of the firm 
behaviour from the management 
philosophy.
A stable business and industry, 
punctuated by small changes as 
allowed by the larger site owner.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 22:  Services, 10 employees
Electrical services consultants
A ten-man electrical services company, very 
functionally oriented, focused solely on 
providing electrical design schemes to large 
construction projects, going a bit further than 
most in two regards:
1) A stronger resource base than the 
smaller competitors, meaning that they 
can take on large jobs that come up at 
short notice. This seems to happen 
often.
2) Controlling as much of the contract as 
possible. This means managing the 
services contract as a turn-key, and 
sourcing out work to, say, architectural 
firms instead of being pulled in by the 
architectural firm.
An excellent level of strategic fit. A dynamic 
environment with more and more small 
service-provider firms coming in and 
more difficult legislation and complex 
design criteria. This matches very well 
with the owner/manager’s mechanistic 
and focused engineering approach.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 30:  Services, 22 employees
Printing Firm
The firm boasts 22 employees, but has 
been that way for a number of years, and 
has been in existence for 16 years. The 
business is at the high end of functional 
efficiency, and has had a very moderate 
diversification from printing into graphics 
design, marketing and advertising. The 
firm is well suited for the FEO stance, as 
it has one of the half dozen flexographic 
printers in Europe.
There seems to be a good level of 
strategic fit between the environment and 
the management philosophy of one of 
the two owner/managers.
The industry conditions are rather hostile, 
with advertising investment down in 
related industries such as the automobile 
industry. This matches the 
owner/manager’s rather conservative, 
focused approach, where he wants to be 
involved and in control of all daily 
operations.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 36: Services, 2 employees
Laboratory Services
The owner/manager has exhibited 
strong signs of entrepreneurial 
behaviour that do not match the 
evident FEO situation of the 
organization.
It appears to be the case that his 
philosophy is conditioned by his 
knowledge of the industry and how 
to manage his firm within the various 
industry constraints.
Apparently aware of this constraint, 
this owner/manager is actually 
reading for a degree in 
management, even though he is 
already academically qualified . The 
idea is that he will gradually 
overcome the experience and 
knowledge limitations that are 
impeding him from achieving his 
ultimate goals.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 42:  Services, 6 
employees
Tax Consultants
Clearly a functional efficiency 
orientation with no interest in 
moving out of this stance and no 
aim of increasing the company 
size beyond a certain limit.
All the attributes of the strategy 
point in the same direction… 
focus on tax expertise, choice 
clients, high level locality, top 
employees…
This all ties down with the 
strategic mindset of the 
owner/manager.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 45:  Services, 9 employees
Tool importation and retail
What looks to be a functional efficiency 
orientation with a bit of a difference. There 
is a routinised way being adopted, but 
each project is tackled exactly as that... as 
a project and not an operation. This 
means that it is unique in the 
workmanship, materials, objectives. Also 
means that firm expands and contracts 
according to the projects at hand. Major 
focus on marine engineering.
This clarifies the concept that FEO can be 
seen to apply to both projects and 
operations. Nothing inconsistent here, 
merely a clarification that FEO doesn't 
solely have to apply to routinised 
operations.
The owner/manager's characteristics and 
philosophy have come out most strongly 
in this interview. He is the owner and 
driving force behind the company. Soon to 
retire, he is a highly experienced and 
disciplined tradesman. His philosophy is to 
do an excellent job, pulling in vast 
mechanical engineering expertise into the 
company, using top quality materials 
imported by his company.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 53:  Manufacture, 15 employees
Steel Door Manufacturer
The owner/manager is a humble but 
determined character, very focused but risk 
averse. An example of this is her 
reluctance to take on an ERDF loan to 
expand or innovate, as she firm would 
have to fork out 50% of the cost. The 
approach taken is a cautious, efficiency 
oriented one, based upon mechanized 
operations and standardized materials and 
processes.
The firm is competing in a highly 
aggressive steel door manufacturing 
industry, where the large number of players 
and standardized product severely reduce 
profitability. It is fairly easy to enter this 
market and share a part of the limited 
market share. The firm has a small 
advantage in automation and size, allowing 
it to reduce somewhat its costs.
Although these are hard times and the firm 
is limited spending, both the management 
philosophy and the conditional cloud limit 
the business stance to FEO. Possibly the 
model can also show a shrinking FEO 
ellipse to indicate the market and state of 
this particular industry.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 55:  Services, 6 employees
Maintenance Software Providers
Company focused on one core product, maintenance 
software . The company does other tasks, such as 
maintaining client ICT systems, but this is really just as 
a support mechanism  for cash flows, and does not 
indicate attempts at true diversification.
The owner/manager has a clearly entrepreneurial form 
of management philosophy. He has been the first 
mover in applying a number of technologies locally, 
and has attempted to open up a successful business 
more than once. Risk taking, innovativeness and 
proactiveness are all there.
Notwithstanding his attempts, he is dealing with a very 
dynamic and aggressive environment, particularly the 
global industry. Three main setbacks within the 
conditional lens:
1) The local customer is not used to investing in 
proactive maintenance. Using local work as a 
showcase is being found problematic.
2) Free maintenance software packages are available 
on the international market, mainly as incentives by 
new competitors.
3) The owner/manager has limited marketing 
knowledge, and has, so far relied on web 
advertising. The fundamental changes that 
maintenance software bring about in a business 
require a much more personalized form of 
marketing, at least until brand recognition is 
achieved.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 62: Services, 2 employees
Events Management and Interpretation
A small company that works as a flexible firm in 
functional efficiency, expanding and shrinking as 
workloads fluctuate, where translators are sub-
contracted in according to the languages and expertise 
required. There is a very moderate level of RDO as two 
complementary areas of focus are targeted; translation 
and PR, although the industries and markets are really 
the same. So much so that the owner/manager sees 
interpreting as a spill-off of PV, i.e. a consequence of 
their work in organizing events.
PR => Events management
Translations => Interpretation
Another loop-within-a-loop example. Not the typical B-
G-M-D lifecyle, but a firm that was always the same 
size, and grows or shrinks according to the work load 
and by this outsourcing of tasks in a ‘flexible firm’ 
fashion.
The owner/manager is a gentle and focused person who 
loves doing a job in detail and thoroughly. The firm is 
very inflexible about quality, going as far as having all 
translated documents proof read. Company is limited by 
the conservative nature of the owner/manager, so much 
so that in the large global market for translations, the 
firm is not even evident when searching the net for a 
Maltese translator. 
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 64:  Manufacture, 5 employees
Manufacture/Retail of Paints
A  five man company dedicated to the 
manufacture and wholesale of paints, 
evidently in maturity and operating a in 
functional efficiency stance. No real 
ambitions of the owners to move beyond 
this stance, and they are happy with  
contending with a product designed for 
the local market (plastic and water 
emulsions, graffiato, compounds).
There is a lot of congruency between the 
environment in question and the 
management philosophy. The owners 
have come from a background 
supportive to the industry, and are 
largely uneducated any further. They are 
content to market by word of mouth, 
sustain an existing market share, and 
control for cost efficiencies.
The firm is only entrepreneurial, in a 
contained way, in its actions and 
activities to come up with innovative 
paint colours for interior decorating, as 
their speciality in internal water paints 
that compete with gloss paints. 
3 members in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 3:  Retail, 6 employees
Retailer/wholesaler of 
agricultural/heavy engineering industry 
goods
A company that has evolved from a small 
agriculture retail business to a related 
diversification orientation that now focuses 
on retail within agriculture, the building 
industry and the heavy engineering 
industry (water and wastewater). Various 
competency and market overlaps make 
one consider the diversification related, as 
opposed to unrelated.
Not a large firm, with 6 employees, but 
driven by an entrepreneurial 
owner/manager who considers himself 
akin to a ‘libero’ in a football game. The 
firm’s growth is stunted by a very 
aggressive industry where more and more 
small local firms are entering into retail.
Over here one must challenge the term 
‘growth’, as the firm in question is set on 
acquiring more and more product lines, 
even though the employee count of the 
firm has not increased much over the last 
5 years.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 14:  Retail/Services, 6 employees
Import/retail/services in IT equipment
An innovative firm, branching into export and 
opening up a new block for retail, repair and 
administration. The business started off by the 
father but then taken over by the sons, who are 
engineers. Although there is a lot of industry 
competition, the brothers have managed to tap 
into promising North African markets.
The firm had initially started off in mainly PC 
repair, but have diversified into UPS’s, 
printer/toners, CCTV, and security systems. 
Fuelled by a tiny local market, the brothers have 
acted most aggressively in their expansion 
efforts, penetrating markets that were not theirs 
initially.
High focus on customer satisfaction, such that 
the phone in the office was only allowed to ring 
so many times. The brothers use the concept of 
red and blue; red is when a firm fights to survive 
in a saturated industry, a blue ocean is when the 
firm taps into new markets with innovative 
products. The brothers pride themselves on 
taking the blue approach.
2 members in dominant coalition
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 18:  Manufacture/Services, 40 
employees
Quality Control/Sorting Company
Previously in FEO although fast becoming an 
RDO. A company that has managed to grow 
fast, becoming one of the few quality/sorting 
companies on the Island. The business seems 
to have reached a plateau with a limited local 
market of manufacturing firms that require 
quality sorting.  
However the owner/manager (one of two) is a 
highly entrepreneurial individual, and does not 
want to accept a company in maturity. He has 
already taken steps to try to open up in China, 
carrying out similar quality testing works. 
The owner/manager sees some serious 
limitations to the local industry, particularly 
forthcoming changes to company tax for 
manufacturing firms. 
The flexible working style and innovative 
working processes show his attempts at 
creating innovation within what would normally 
be considered as a standardized engineering 
task.
2 members in dominant coalition
RDO
FEO
 
 
304 
 
 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 20:  Retail/Services, 17 employees
IT equipment and system provider
A company in existence for 20 years, 
which is a long time period for an IT firm in 
Malta. One of the two owner/managers is 
an engineer by profession, and is very 
thorough and systematic in his approach 
and mindset, somewhat risk averse.
The company has moderately diversified 
into export of reconditioned equipment to 
North Africa, leasing of PC systems to the 
local government, servicing high end 
corporate clients (i.e. gaming), tendering, 
and PC assembly/sales.
The core belief of the firm is in building a 
quality relationship with clients, and in 
sustaining that relationship. The main 
objectives are revenue generation through 
quantity + quality in the various areas of 
operation.
A high level of synergy between the 
aggressive environment and the 
moderately entrepreneurial philosophy of 
the owners.
2 members in dominant coalition
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 32:  Services, 12 employees
Architectural Firm
A company that has evolved from a one-
man architectural firm to a 12-man 
diversified firm dealing in four related areas; 
architecture and civil engineering, structures, 
EIA’s and master planning. The firm has just 
added new employees, is looking for more, 
and has moved into a new, larger office.
The driving force behind the firm is the 
owner/manager who is an extremely hard 
working architect and entrepreneur, who 
admits that it is a good thing that he has his 
accountant to hold him back! He is still in his 
early 40’s, but has done a lot of work 
abroad, and know the architectural industry 
and international legislation by heart.
This owner/manager feels that the only way 
to grow further is not to expand into other 
areas (i.e. unrelated), but to go abroad into 
larger markets. He sees the local market as 
saturated, and that little more can be done 
by his firm locally to grow further. He 
reasons ‘grow or die’, as he sees an 
increasingly competitive local scenario with 
the large firms and new one-man firms 
eating up on market share.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 39:  Manufacture, 14 
employees
Stone Masons
The owner/manager is an 
entrepreneurial person, and is 
also highly skilled and 
knowledgeable of the industry. 
The combination of 
entrepreneurial  aptitude 
coupled with the industry 
knowledge and skills, as well 
as very good leadership skills, 
have allowed him to diversify 
and grow not withstanding a 
small and dynamic market.
2 members in dominant 
coalition
FEO
RDO
SBO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 40: Manufacture, 
17employees
Wire and Steel 
Manufacture/Commissioning
An excellent example of how a 
dominant firm within a small, 
contained industry has succeeded 
in molding his environment such 
that the conditional lens now holds 
practically no local industry 
competitors.
The firm does not need to move 
out of RDO as it has all the 
capabilities required to compete 
there, and is highly specialized in 
metal-based manufacturing. New 
products have been added on (at 
the expense of competitors), but 
always in the same industry that 
the owner knows so well.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 48:  Retail, 6 employees
Tool Importation and Calibration
An interesting concept regarding diversification. 
The owner/manager practices related 
diversification, as opposed to unrelated 
diversification. The new product lines are all 
within the same general business area, such as 
in the automobile industry or the industrial 
calibration industry. However, there is an evident 
limit when it comes to any high risk unrelated 
diversification.
The owner/manager is gradually enhancing 
existing product lines with additional services and 
products, such as commissioning and calibration. 
He is also adding new product lines but only in 
related areas. After 15 years the business is still 
in gradual growth. Virtually unaffected by the 
economic situation, if not positively so as weaker 
companies fail and more work comes in. 
One of the clearest cases of related 
diversification orientation (RDO). The company 
wholesales/retails quality precision tools. Local 
agents for a range of mostly German originated 
tools and equipment. Top brands. The 
owner/manager is a seasoned business person, 
previously and still in the textile business. Very 
good business acumen, a risk taker though 
evidently a contained risk taker. Believes in 
providing high quality tools and service. Lifetime 
guarantee.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 54:  Retail/Services, 5 employees
IT/System Retail and Services
Predominantly RDO. The owner/manager describes 
how he embarks upon different lifecycle curves every 
time he takes on a new product line or service. The 
firm moved from cash registers to home PC’s, to 
commercial PC’s, to point-of-sale systems… always 
using previous experience to build on a new focus. 
This is an interesting concept where every related 
diversification effort is seen to be a loop or cycle 
around the continuous effort to cautiously diversify. It 
does not appear that the environment is the main 
conditioning factor towards limited diversification, more 
the management philosophy of the owner/manager, 
who is a technical person and is cautious about more 
entrepreneurial activities such as marketing.
Again, here the all important link between FEO and 
RDO becomes apparent. There is still one core activity 
for the firm; the stock control point-of-sale system. The 
expertise of the owner, coupled with his experience 
and knowledge of the industry, has allowed him to 
carefully diversify into the industrial PC market, 
equipment recycling, point-of-sale equipment, and 
different IT related applications. Another interesting 
point mentioned by the owner/manager; the shifting 
environment that necessitates changes in the choice 
of functional strategies. One can look at this as a 
shifting conditional lens, inducing different constraints 
at different times.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
 
 
306 
 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 56:  Services, 15 employees
Seamless Flooring and Waterproofing 
Services
A good level of alignment between the 
management philosophy and the conditional 
lens.  The technical director is focused on 
creating alterations to a basic waterproofing 
compound, in accordance to what the market 
needs. The company has moderately 
diversified into two areas, seamless flooring 
and roof/wall waterproofing. Fairly innovative 
but in a focused way. The second director is 
responsible for management. The two have a 
cautious approach towards developing the 
business, and actually admit that they never 
really wanted the company to grow the size it 
is.
The management philosophy of the directors 
is really that of a cautiously expanding family 
business; care for the employees, very 
customer focused and practically paranoid 
about excellent quality. The market/industry 
does appear to have scope for further 
expansion, but this is not really a main priority 
for the directors.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 59:  Services, 48 employees
Audio Visual Services Firm
A company growing to nearly 50 full time employees. The 
founder/owner is the visionary behind the organization, 
creating it and guiding it in a very focused, clear fashion 
over the years. He is now chairman, with his children 
acting as executive management. A very influential start-
up situation, all due to  the owner/manager’s youth in his 
father’s video shop. He was exposed to filming, editing, 
and also the artistic side; learning art and piano. A highly 
multi skilled and entrepreneurial individual, now nearing 
retirement.
The firm is one of the large audio-visual companies on 
the island. Looks like a high level of related 
diversification, arguably going into unrelated 
diversification; stand design/construction, digital satellite 
communication, electronics, etc. One would argue that 
the focus is on two close industries; conferencing and 
exhibitions/fairs. A diverse workforce, from carpenters to 
electricians, electronics, labourers…
The owner/manager sees the future in the local scene, 
but fed through international clients coming to Malta for 
conference/fair needs. Issue of national support towards 
creating a conferencing industry of international level. 
Major conditional factor is a lack of vision and support 
from local infrastructure ‘keepers’. Interview concluded 
when the president of Malta turned up to visit the firm!
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 61:  Manufacture, 39 employees
Ornamental Glass Manufacturer
A company that has moderately relatedly diversified 
from glass blowing and into two additional areas of 
specialization; fused glass and lamp work. The three 
areas of specialization utilize different manufacturing 
techniques, materials and skills. The firm has taken 
the opportunity, in the global recession, to refine and 
enhance the efficiencies and effectiveness of its 
operations. 
A number of major strategic moves have been 
deployed over the years. First, the firm has gone to 
world experts to develop a moldable glass product 
that allows for easy and flexible working. Then they 
have reduced dependency on a few large buyers, and 
in a few countries. Then they have focused on home 
buyers as opposed to just tourists, opening up more 
the local market. They have also done away with 
agents, dealing predominantly with retail outlets. Less 
dependency on large buyers,  a stronger home 
market and an enhanced product range. 
Looking at the external environment, it is interesting 
to see how the firm has counteracted threats from 
China and losses in large consumers with alterations 
to the product base and changing focus on different 
market segments. For example, as Chinese imports 
were low quality products, the counter move was 
towards high quality home decorative glass, moving 
towards uniqueness and added value.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 63:  Services/Retail, 11 employees
Boat Refurbishment/Maintenance Services
A company in existence for 25 years, that has increased 
marginally in employee count but significantly in plant size 
since moving away from fiberglass manufacture and into 
the marine industry. A clear picture of a functional 
efficiency firm (low end fiberglass manufacture) expanding 
into related diversification (RDO), and focusing on three 
complementary high-end areas: boat sales/agency; 
mechanical maintenance; and boat refurbishment. The 
diverse skills and competencies of the firm support this 
diversification.
A number of factors limit the firm to where it is (RDO). The 
owner/manager wants to be involved in all processes, and 
finds the present labour force size controllable. He does 
not want to go into truly undiversified areas which are not 
his core competencies and where competition is strong. 
Complementary to the above, his distinctive capability lies 
in a strong quality-related after sales service. 
Furthermore, the environment for new boats is shrinking 
whilst that of servicing existing craft is still strong… 
competition in this area is relatively weak.  The 
owner/manager has many overlapping competencies, 
such as employee soft skills, technical knowledge, a 
strong customer focus…  He mentioned that he directly 
liaises with consumers, who are all diverse and have 
different needs and approaches/attitudes. He will then use 
this ‘consumer picture’ to build up his product and after 
sales. With respect to after-sales, he is only interested in 
a boat sale as this will provide him with a possible lifetime 
of after sales revenues. This is the core business model, 
having a strong boat agency helps.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
 
 
308 
 
Appendix 9.3: Firms Following a Repositioning Trajectory 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 2:  Manufacture, 47 employees
Electronics Component Manufacturer
The owner/manager has created a small 
manufacturing company from virtually nothing, 
and notwithstanding his educational limitations 
shows a strong entrepreneurial spirit. Attempts 
have been made by the owner/manager to open 
up his product range and to diversify into 
complementary product areas, but with limited 
success. This is so much so that he has now 
decided to focus on one core product (higher 
end) that has been designed in house and will be 
manufactured  to client specifications. Limitations 
induced by competitive lens:
1. Local industry has started to outsource all 
main sub-contracting of electronics 
development/testing/manufacture to plants in 
Asia. Very little quality work left available 
locally.
2. Investment assistance and equipment 
purchase/lease conditions are not at all 
favorable locally. Coupled to this is the fact 
that technology change is very rapid in this 
small scale electronics industry.
3. Local companies hold no loyalties, and if the 
firm cannot adopt, say, the ISO standards 
they require they will simply go elsewhere. 
Foreign companies find suppliers with larger 
economies of scale so will hesitate to look at 
this firm.
4. Local costs, such as electricity, are 
increasing, whilst customers are fighting for 
price reductions.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 4:  Services, 25 employees
Aperture Manufacture/Installation
A company that has gradually expanded 
and branched out from a small family 
business to a group of 8 companies that 
go into unrelated diversified areas such as 
motor school, aluminum, wood 
importation, furniture, etc.
The group now functions in a typical style 
of having the head office/administration 
taking care of the management and 
administration, and the 8 business units 
working in a functional efficiency mode, 
doing the best to survive in an increasingly 
competitive local climate.
Whilst the business is trying to penetrate 
foreign markets, it is more focused on 
sustaining existing market shares, and on 
cutting costs. Labour is largely unskilled or 
semi skilled, and the business looks 
towards maintaining a quality level with a 
blend of innovativeness and 
standardization.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 5:  Retail/Services, 30 employees
Import/retail and commissioning of 
electrical/electronic/lighting systems
The main driving force behind this firm is 
the owner/manager,  who, from my 
personal knowledge  of her as well as the 
interview, is by all counts an 
entrepreneurial individual. The company 
has, over recent years, carried out related 
diversification into some six areas all to do 
with electrical/electronics systems.
The increasingly aggressive industry has, 
however, forced the company to 
consolidate and to retrench, still remaining 
in related diversification, but working more 
now towards efficiency and cost control 
within each business unit. Arguably now 
more in an FEO mindset.
Interestingly the clarity of the strategy –
performance link is most visible in the 
owner/manager comments. Her main 
performance measure is the balance sheet, 
by which she can measure growth of the 
company. This ties down well to the FE 
orientation.
3 members in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 11:  Retail, 40 employees
Importation/retail of household/family 
goods
A company that has made a name on the 
island for its success in penetrating a 
number of industries, the baby line market, 
the textile market and the household goods 
market. The firm had successfully gone into 
unrelated diversification in these three 
business areas, largely driven by the 
entrepreneurial  management philosophy of 
the owner/manager.
In all three areas, the firm is retrenching, 
making each business unit  enhance 
efficiencies, cut costs, fight off the increasing 
competition.  Can be seen to be a firm that 
has created business units that now are 
each operating in functional efficiency. Little 
overlapping competencies and synergies. 
Best looked at as a firm that has diversified 
into 3 FEO business units. The environment 
has provided more than just increased 
industry competition. People’s  consumption 
habits have changed. Family sizes have 
decreased, changing spending habit s on 
baby line products (more quality, less 
quantity). Textiles is seen to be a dying 
industry with people no longer buying 
materials for sewing clothes. Competition in 
the household goods sector has also 
increased drastically.  
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 17:  Services, 19 employees
Engineering Services
A company that had diversified into 
unrelated areas in its early days, but 
is now being forced to consolidate 
and retrench as the relevant 
industries become increasingly 
competitive.
The firm initially diversified into the 
three areas of telecommunications, 
laboratory equipment and medical 
gases, working in both services and 
retail.
Attempts to open up to foreign 
markets have been partially 
successful, with a contained 
penetration in Libya.
Other to that this is a typical case of a 
business that managed to diversify in 
better times, but is now fighting to 
retain market share. Now really in 
FEO mode more than anything else.
3 members in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 21:  Manufacture, 8 employees
Manufacture of commercial 
drainage systems
A company set up in Malta by an 
international firm to carry out the 
manufacture and sale of drainage 
systems of various designs, from small 
standardized to large customized.
The objectives of this firm are simple; 
to act as an outreach branch to the 
mother company, create a value added 
product for which the local skills and 
engineering costs are affordable. In 
fact, the local firm now carries out 
most of the manufacture required by 
the mother company.
A high level of synergy between the 
conditional lens and the management 
philosophy. The engineering manager 
is focused, knowledgeable, but risk 
averse to a substantial extent. 
Similarly, the conditional situation is 
that of an industry and mother 
company that require a quality, reliable 
and obedient business unit.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 24:  Manufacture, 37 employees
Manufacture of stainless steel structures
A business that has gone through the traditional business 
life cycle, initially expanding into unrelated diversification 
by going into different areas of expertise, but now 
contracting back in size.  The general manager is a very 
focused and thorough engineer, low on entrepreneurial 
behaviour but excellent at implementing procedure, cost 
cutting and efficiency enhancements. This is exactly what 
the shareholders want as the business  faces an 
enormous amount of local and foreign competition, and is 
fighting for survival.
The company’s brand name was bought from an earlier  
branded company (situated outside Malta) that was going 
bankrupt. The firm is rather large, with 37 full time 
employees and having been in existence for just over 15 
years. Company is shrinking in size and output due to the 
increased competitive forces.
Company manufactures customized stainless steel 
fabrications, such as staircases, pressure vessels, tanks, 
tops…
One notes the relation between the management 
philosophy and the increased competitive conditions. The 
manager was handpicked by the shareholders to spear 
drive the efficiency enhancements badly needed. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 25:  Services, 49 employees
Maintenance Service Provider
A service provider to the Malta Freeport, 
carrying out manually intensive tasks 
such as maintenance, installations, 
repairs, overhauls. The business grew 
very fast but is now in its maturity stage, 
although the manager would like to see 
the same business approach replicated 
abroad.
One notes the relation between the 
management philosophy and the 
increased competitive conditions. The 
manager was chosen by the 
shareholders to spear drive the 
efficiency enhancements that were 
badly needed due to the increasingly 
adverse competitive climate. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 26:  Services, 2 employees
Security Software Provider
A small, two man business, moving 
from FEO first into UDO, but 
subsequently towards SBO and in a 
possible decline stage. Selling 
security software in a foreign 
country, and trying to branch into 
sales of Microsoft software systems. 
One notes the relation between the 
management philosophy and the 
increased competitive conditions. 
The manager was handpicked by 
the shareholders to spear drive the 
efficiency enhancements needed. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 27:  Retail/Services, 3 employees
IT Service Provider
A company initially diversifying, but then 
moving from FEO to SBO or to closure. 
The firm is a local IT provider that has 
only a few (some 40) clients in the 
hospitality industry. It is a bad industry to 
service, it itself in decline and with a very 
poor paying track record. Using three 
employees to provide workstation 
support. A company openly stating that 
the main objective is survival. 
One notes the relation between the 
management philosophy and the 
increased competitive conditions. The 
owner/manager was identified by the 
shareholders to implement the efficiency 
enhancements badly needed. 
1 member in dominant coalition 
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 28:  Retail/Services, 10 employees
PC Rental Services
A company that is now most effectively 
positioned in the functional efficiency 
mode, after retracting from a UDO state. 
The ten-man company provides PC rental 
and related support, mainly to 
Government departments. Very low risk 
and innovativeness, very stable industry.
One notes the relation between the 
management philosophy and the 
increased competitive conditions. This 
owner was chosen by the shareholders to 
implement the efficiency enhancements 
that were needed. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 31:  Manufacture, 9 employees
Manufacturer of Cigars
A company that has diversified over the years into a 
number of unrelated areas such as into cigar manufacture, 
refrigeration, blending/epoxy paint manufacture, tampo 
printing…
The owner/manager is a highly energetic entrepreneur, 
although at retirement age. He has managed a number of 
companies abroad, and has used his vast engineering 
skills to go into a number of profitable lines of business. 
He is presently inducting a young family member into the 
business, who is also an engineer and has just completed 
a number of years training at a high-tech industry.
The local environment is seen to be negatively affecting 
the firm, particularly the rising energy and labour costs, 
together with facility rental and park maintenance. He finds 
these negatives frustrating, and feels that more can be 
done by local decision makers.
The result  has been an outsourcing of much of the 
mechanical manufacturing procedures (such as tobacco 
leaf preparation) to low cost firms outside the island, with 
the local wing carrying out the high value added processes 
only, and this with a fraction of staff that once were 
deployed. Stabilizing at FEO with fixed output quotas.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 37:  Services, 2 employees
Accounting/Marketing/Importation
The owner/manager is an 
entrepreneurial person, skilled in both 
accountancy and marketing.
The company started off (initially part-
time) as a consultancy/accountancy 
firm, but then the owner/manager 
added non-diversified functions to the 
extent that two additional companies 
were opened (now going outside the 
sphere of a business unit; into 
construction and energy drinks). In 
order to focus on these new 
businesses, the initial firm was used as 
a cash cow and was operated at FEO.
As the new companies are now 
reaching maturity, the owner/manager 
is now re-focusing on the initial 
business, possibly to re-energize the 
business and diversify somewhat.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
UDO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 46:  Services, 1 employee
Recording Studio
An evident case where a small 
business has started off in 
functional efficiency, attempted to 
diversify into related diversification 
(audio + video editing) and failed, 
and then retrenched into just 
audio. Very close to SBO 
behaviour.
The limited entrepreneurial 
behaviour  of the individual is 
evident in his philosophy towards 
risk and innovativeness. 
Understandably, the dynamic 
industry and particular manager 
mindset induce the firm to settle to 
an FEO orientation. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 51: Services, 3 employees
Accounting/Auditing Services
A good example of a functional efficiency 
(FEO) orientation for a service firm. The 
owner/manager sees growth being tied 
down to two things; employee count and 
diversification in areas of expertise. In 
other words, as you pull in more 
employees you will diversify into related 
and complementary areas of tax, vat, 
auditing…
The owner/manager has a very 
conservative personality, wanting to be 
the front line for all the clients and being 
informed/involved in all the doings of his 
employees. Actually admits to employing 
female staff as they are less likely to 
poach his clients to build up their own 
business.
This owner/manager had gone through 
one failed attempt at growth and related 
diversification by pulling in a partner. This 
failed, and he is now focusing heavily on 
audit related activities. Does not want to 
grow too much further.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 52:  Retail/Manufacture, 20 
employees
Pottery Makers
Predominantly RDO with a hint of UDO behaviour 
(diversifying into the restaurant business). This 
particular case highlights the processual nature of 
the business stance. 
Company has always been managed by an 
entrepreneur who would go all round the world 
seeking the best competitive approach for the 
firm. The business may have started off as FEO, 
in the early days when the sales were highest and 
barriers to import were high. In later years the 
owner/manager re-built the company, going into 
retail of other products (wines, honey, etc.), but 
still within his pottery business. Even later the 
restaurant industry was branched into. Looking at 
the firm at this point, it is consolidating its core 
activities, curtailing investment (say in marketing), 
retrenching into what it does best, and waiting for 
tourism to pick up again.  Seems to be 
retrenching in RDO by focusing on cost cutting 
and efficiency in the main areas diversified into.
Forces provided by the conditional lens (both 
macro and micro) are very strong here.
2 members in dominant coalition
RDO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 58:  Services, 15 employees
Ship Registration Firm
A company that has grown over the years, and 
under the direction of the initial founder/owner, 
diversifying into a number of separate limited 
liability companies focusing on shipping, 
insurance,  travel agency, etc. The focus of 
research here is on one of these companies; 
managed by an employed manager. This is a 
very evidently functional efficiency orientation, 
with one core function,  that of acting as agents 
for ship registration in Malta, and assisting ships 
to hold the Maltese flag as their base of 
registration.
Interestingly, the model seems to apply very well 
to this situation of a highly entrepreneurial 
owner/manager now having very little time to do 
more than the high level marketing/networking 
for this business.  The business is still a major 
player in the local shipping industry, but has been 
swamped by many new players, and is sharing 
the market more than ever before. Moreover, the 
manager is a very quiet, focused and 
conservative person, ideal for maximizing 
efficiency in an industry focused on quality and 
standards. This is probably an ideal strategic 
situation, with one difficulty; the founder has not 
yet started inducting a successor, meaning that 
the all-important networking/marketing task has 
no planned future. He may be stretching his 
contribution to the many businesses a bit too 
fine.  
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 60:  Services, 25 employees
Provision of Ship Services
A company group that has an interesting strategy 
of: diversifying through growth and specialization; 
unrelated diversification through partnerships (thus 
spreading capital/risk and building into 
complementary areas of expertise. It also shares 
into the pools of expertise of the companies being 
partnered with); getting hold of the individual 
business units and focusing them on a functional 
area with an experienced, professional manager. 
To complement the strategy, the functional  
managers are not highly qualified, but have moved 
up the organization gradually and are very loyal to 
the firm. This particular business, part of the larger 
group, services the shipping industry.
This firm is not so much affected, within the 
conditional lens, by the local conditions and direct 
industry, but by the global environment. An 
example is the price of oil, that affects shipping, 
consumption… The company is very strong in the 
local industry, and local environmental factors are 
stable. The functional growth of  the firm is curtailed 
by a certain reluctance of the directors/owners to 
delegate, as they want to be hands on and 
involved. Thus the final functional design of the 
business unit is a premeditated one, and fits into 
the corporate strategy. One cannot really 
appreciate the functional strategy without first 
seeing the larger picture.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 67:  Retail/Services, 8 employees
Instrumentation Import/Services
A company that has gone through the traditional 
business lifecycle, expanding into unrelated 
diversification by going into three largely different 
industries: construction support materials; electronic 
instrumentation; and generics. The owner/managers 
were able to expand into these areas in the younger 
years, but are not so capable of holding onto them in 
these later years where all the owner/managers are at 
retirement age. The generics branch has been closed 
down completely, although the generics industry in Malta 
is doing particularly well. On the construction support 
materials side the firm is holding its ground, although 
barely. In the electronics instrumentation, the firm is the 
local agent to a large, branded multinational.
On the instrumentation side, the company deals mainly 
with large governmental bids, and this matches their 
‘maturity’ situation, where a consistent, patient and ‘slow, 
slogging’ style is required. One of the owner/managers 
explains that the main issue is the time and monetary 
losses accrued by having to work with Government. It 
appears to be the case that Government has a few, well 
branded firms working in near perfect competition, with 
Government as the client pulling the strings, dictating 
how things should go, and enjoying much of the potential 
industry earnings. Making things worse, the multinational 
supplier is also highly bureaucratic, and is very stingy 
with its dealings with the agents on the ground. Thus, the 
company is effectively being squeezed from both sides!
Another example of how an entrepreneurial management 
philosophy can also function in conservative mode.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
UDO
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Appendix 9.4: Firms Following a Dynamic Growth Trajectory 
 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 6:  Services, 25 employees
Aquaculture, bio-marine activities
A company that is essentially moving out 
of the realms of a small business, so 
much so that the business had to leave 
the Government incubation centre during 
the research period and effectively has 
now also left the island.
The business has expanded into a 
number of areas of unrelated 
diversification, although one can see 
some common threads in the competency 
base that supports the different areas. The 
ambitious nature of the owner/manager, 
together with his impatience with local 
government bureaucracy, are the driving 
force behind this expansion.
Areas of diversification include GIS, 
aquaculture, bio research, aquariums, EIA 
studies, shrimp farming…
The firm also, so far, works as a flexible 
firm, pulling in a range of highly skilled 
professionals from a large portfolio.
3 members in dominant coalition
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 13:  Retail, 49 employees
Supermarket/Mall
A company that has opened up one of the first 
shopping malls on the Island. Started off as a 
small local supermarket and now boasting 
telecoms shops, clothes, confectionary, 
parking, toys. For a retail business is Malta this 
is an uncommon level of diversification. Only 
the supermarket business has been 
considered here, not the whole group.
The company is still in growth, aiming to join 
two complexes, and adding to its services. 
They owners have a big advantage, the mall is 
in one of the largest towns on the Island, and 
other supermarkets are rather far away.
The director/manager sees the opening of new 
foreign-owned supermarkets such as Lidl and 
Pavi as no more than a challenge, one to be 
overcome with an aggressive and innovative 
approach. A lot of synergy between the 
business behaviour and the management 
philosophy.
3 members in dominant coalition
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 15:  Retail/Services, 27 employees
Pharmacy Centre/Call Centre/Inventory
A company that has moved from a small 
tendering business (on pharmaceuticals for the 
local government) to an internationalized 
organization focusing on foreign business and 
expansion. Moving out of UDO and into a group 
of companies.
The two owners are pharmacists with 
management qualifications, and have realized the 
potential of diversification and expanding into 
non-local markets. Areas of diversification 
include:
•Pharmacy retail, the firm owns a number of 
pharmacies and has an exit strategy for buying, 
revamping and selling pharmacies.
• A call centre.
• Inventory management for foreign companies at 
the local shipping industry. Mainly medical and 
pharmaceutical goods.
• Local pharmacy management for third party 
pharmacy owners.
The firm ultimately sees revenues and profits as 
the ultimate performance measure.
2 members in dominant coalition
UDO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 29:  Manufacture, 49 employees
Manufacturer of Sensors
A company in growth, both in product range 
and in employee size. The firm initially was 
focused on energy-related sensors, but has 
now diversified into the water industry (and a 
particular type of water valve). The firm is in 
transition from RDO and has become an  
UDO.
The company is managed by an extremely 
aggressive and proactive CEO.  The CEO has 
revitalized the firm to operate with a dynamic 
R&D unit that feeds the manufacturing arm 
with new innovations and enhancements. The 
firm re-invests practically all its profits back 
into the company, and into the research arm.
To fuel its growth, the CEO is constantly 
looking outside the firm for new markets, and 
has a number of marketing firms in different 
parts of the world contracted out and being 
paid with a percentage of sales.  The search 
for new markets allows the firm to alter the 
conditional lens.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 41:  Services, 14 employees
Waste Management Firm 
An interesting observation of the boundaries 
between related and unrelated diversification, 
and when the firm stops being a single firm.
The owner/manager of this waste reuse 
company started the company off as a launch-
off from an existing business base (may be 
deemed SBO start-off). The next stage of the 
lifecycle was a basic operation with the use of 
one vehicle and some 40 skips (FEO). Further 
diversifications took place into waste 
management and controls, sale of bins 
(RDO). When the company finally diversified 
further into recycling it saw fit to open up this 
activity under a new limited liability setup, 
separate from the main business. This step 
can be compared to that of a firm that is 
opening up a new business unit and wants the 
unit to be self financed and managed.
The owner/manager appears to be a born 
entrepreneur, bred into the particular mindset 
from the times of his father’s business.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
RDO
UDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 66:  Retail/Services, 42 employees
Yacht Paints, Machinery & Construction Industry
A  group of companies that has started off in the import of paints 
and varnish.  The company eventually branched into 
equipment/retailing, paint manufacturing, and servicing mainly on 
the application of paints. There are now some half-dozen 
companies working in these three main areas of focus.
Of the three areas, retail seems to barely break even, the paint 
manufacture is on hold as they move to a new facility, but the paint 
application is booming such that the group is now expanding to 
North Africa. In fact, this appears to be why they are working to 
revamp the manufacturing side. Also, the equipment/retailing side, 
including the skills base that this commands, provides an important 
support to the paint industry. They are also local agents to a large 
international paint/shipping consortium that refers large ship paint 
sales to them.
If one is to look at the 3 stances one can see a very logical synergy 
in the final company setup. The business stance defines the 
group’s mindset of going into unrelated diversification and the risks 
and innovative/proactive mindsets conducive to the stance. The 
engineering stance looks at the value adding transformation 
processes within the three complementary areas. The resource-
based stance looks at the human, physical and organizational 
setups that have, or are, being setup to support the business 
stance. 
The owner/manager admits that if they were in another country, 
they would have become far larger and more profitable, being 
curtailed by local market limitations to remain a small business.
2 members in dominant coalition
UDO
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Appendix 9.5: Firms Following a Retrenchment Trajectory 
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 16:  Retail, 8 employees
IT/PC Import and Retail
A  failed firm and failed industry –
owner/manager alignment, as 
described by the previous owner of this 
small IT company.
The previous owner describes how he 
sold this business to the new owner, 
who had no real IT or business 
knowledge, notwithstanding that she 
had the drive and motivation required. 
A sequence of bad mistakes, poor 
decisions, bad investments and weak 
management skills ultimately sunk the 
company. Possibly the new owner may 
have been very successful in a 
different business… but not in this one!
The firm was eventually re-bought by 
the previous owner, who is now trying 
to build it up to its original state. Quite 
a bit of damage to the  brand name 
has been done in the meantime, 
though.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 19:  Manufacturing/Services, 
1 employee
Carpenter
A clear cut case of a business in 
SBO, having attempted to double 
the company size (1 to 2 
employees) in a bit to take on more 
work, but with the owner/manager 
realizing that this was not what he 
really wanted.
The  owner/manager is near 
retirement and sees the business as 
an extension of his life situation and 
personality. He does not want to go 
into the hassle of having employees, 
and is satisfied with clients that are 
pulled in by word-of-mouth, and that 
want a diversified product to the low 
quality imports of furniture. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 23:  Manufacture, 20 
employees
Manufacturer of a Leather 
Product
A clear cut case of a business in the 
last remnants of functional efficiency, 
moving or having already arrived at 
a small business orientation state.
The industry; cost of material and 
labour, competition with cheaper 
substitutes, has put the firm into a 
position of decline. The general 
manager himself is a conservative 
man, moving towards retirement, 
and seeing sales fall and costs rise. 
A certain amount of bitterness 
towards the local environment and 
the lack of support and spiraling 
costs.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 33:  Manufacture, 5 employees
Manufacturer of Sensors
This is a small, 5-man company 
specializing in one electronic core product. 
The company has downsized recently due 
to the increased competition from Asia. The 
firm has one major client that are also the 
shareholders, its mother company in 
Germany. The general manager would like 
to diversify into service provision; providing 
a complete measurement-management 
service to industry.
However, when one looks carefully at the 
owner’s (German shareholders, a family) 
personal attention to the firm, literally like 
parents looking after a child, one can see 
very strong SBO implications. The German 
family, practically into retirement, treat the 
firm like family, and show no signs of 
wanting expansion or added revenues.
The indications of a wish to do more are 
more the personal initiative of the manager 
who is a seasoned and respected engineer, 
although close to retirement himself. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 34:  Retail, 12 employees
Import/Resale of Confectionary 
Foodstuffs
This is a confectionary import, sales 
based firm that is a family business and 
into late maturity. The firm specializes in 
the importation of cake and pasta based 
goods, such as cherries, nuts and such.
The firm is facing increased competition 
from a number of sources, pushing them 
into a reluctant SBO orientation. Local 
firms have increased and clients 
(particularly larger hospitality clients) can 
now import their own products on small 
scales. More so, in the present economic 
conditions, consumption has gone down, 
and clients are also looking for cheaper 
and lower quality products.
It is highly possible that the firm will settle 
down into this SBO orientation due to the 
synergy between the conservative stance 
of the owners and the aggressive 
industry conditions. 
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversification
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 35:  Manufacture, 18 employees
Mushroom Grower
A clear picture of how the particular 
innovative/entrepreneurial behavior of the 
owner/manager allowed him to transgress 
through various business orientations over 
the years: The firm had achieved a 
situation of related diversification (RDO) in 
the late 80s and 90s, when the 
owner/manager had achieved an excellent 
blend of the use of compost and 
mushroom growing.
Then, as the farm reached late maturity 
he focused more on his personal interests 
and sustaining the efficiency of the farm 
(FEO).
Now, in his semi retirement days he is 
content to let the farm run with minimum 
problems, whilst he enjoys the benefits 
together with his family (SBO).
This scenario complements the concept 
that the high level of entrepreneurial 
aptitude allowed the owner/manager to 
transgress between the business states.
1 member in dominant coalition
RDO
SBO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 38:  Services, 7 employees
Real Estate Agency
The owner/manager of this real 
estate agency appears to be 
heavily focused on providing a 
core function and doing it well, 
ensuring complete client 
satisfaction.
Maybe a limited amount of 
diversified entrepreneurial 
behavior, but really is a FEO 
approach.
In the present local industry crisis, 
firm has shrunk to a SBO 
orientation, but will probably 
expand once again if the industry 
picks up.
2 members in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 43:  Manufacture, 6 
employees
Aluminum Works
he firm appears to be operating as a 
small business orientation. There was 
never any real diversification in the 
firm’s heyday, at best the integration 
of aluminum works with importation of 
aluminum material. Evidently in 
functional efficiency in earlier years, 
focused and competitive.
Three important factors have driven 
the firm from FEO to SBO. These are 
the ageing workforce (including the 
owners), the industry operating in 
near perfect competition, and the 
massive increase in value of the 
property of the firm. The property 
increase means that the firm could 
actually make more money by leasing 
out the land and closing shop. 
1 member in dominant coalition
FEOSBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 44:  Retail, 5 employees
Wood Import and Retail
One of the clearest examples of 
small business orientation to date. 
The owner/manager is in his mid 
retirement years, he has made his 
money and is in semi retirement, 
and has no real needs apart from 
job satisfaction and to end out his 
working days in a comfortable, 
pleasant work environment. 
Company imports and retails 
wood.
The owner/manager actually 
works a 3 ½ day week, sending 
staff home early and going to 
spend long weekends with his 
family. 
1 member in dominant coalition
SBO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 47:  Manufacture, 2 employees
Shoe Manufacturer
An evident case where a small 
business has built up a functional 
efficiency stance over its main years, 
but has gradually, and in late maturity, 
moved clearly into the small business 
orientation mode.
As in previous cases, the management 
philosophy of the owner/manager is 
conservative, and this matches the 
stance of the firm.
Furthermore, the conditional lens has 
thrown forward two main factors that 
impede anything but  SBO. These are 
the cheap import of low cost shoes, 
and the particular employee problems 
that the owner/manager appears to 
have encountered.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 49:  Manufacture, 6 employees
Manufacturer of Plastic Sheets
A number of factors simply impede this 
manufacturer from diversifying from the 
present industry concerned to another 
consumer market. These factors are so 
powerful that the director/manager of 
the firm has all but given up and sees 
the firm’s closure as inevitable. Factors 
are:
-The management philosophy of the 
owner/manager. He is a pure 
conservative, with a functional, technical 
mindset.
-The existing strategic momentum of 
the firm. Moving away from the existing 
stances will be most difficult.
- The industry conditions. High cost of 
fuels coupled with diminishing sales 
make this a bad choice of time for 
attempted diversification.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 50:  Retail/Manufacture, 6 
employees
Coffee Manufacturers/Retailers
Notwithstanding a largely munificent 
environment, where there appears to be 
room for expansion into additional retail and 
possibly a more diversified product base, the 
company appears to be firmly placed at 
SBO mode. 
There appears to be no real limit to 
expansion from part of the conditional lens, 
but a very strong match between the family-
style management of the owner/manager 
and the firm’s SBO.
The owner/manager is content running the 
business as a family affair, and the fact that 
she likes having family joining in the work, 
indicates her conservative approach. It is not 
that there is no ambition in the firm, just that 
they have found a good formula (hard work 
and customer dedication), and prefer to 
keep it that way. One of the most content 
owner/managers I interviewed! 
2 members in dominant coalition
SBO
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Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 57:  Services, 2 employees
Human Resource Services
Quite a unique situation where the 
owner/manager of the business has purposely 
reduced the company in operations and 
statute, seemingly after a serious health 
incident that has changed his outlook 
somewhat. 
The owner/manager sees the business to be 
in a ‘forced’ state of temporary retirement. His 
argument is that ‘I have reached maturity, my 
firm has not’. The business started off as a 
limited liability, and then was changed to a 
partnership after the owner/manager went 
through a personal setback. This is a similar 
example to that of Firm 36 where the 
experiences of the dominant coalition have 
modified or moderated the effect of the 
management philosophy on the business 
orientation adopted. 
Once again it is difficult to model out the 
strategic behaviour of the firm without adding 
the conditional lens as a separate dimension 
to the management philosophy. 
1 member in dominant coalition
SBO
RDO
 
Management Philosophy 
Practiced by Dominant Coalition EntrepreneurialConservative
The conditional Lens: Consisting of global, regional and industry-related  
competitive factors; the experiences , skills, knowledge of the dominant 
coalition; and the strategic inertia of the firm.
Propensity 
for Growth
High
Growth
HighLow
Survival
Firm Innovation, Proactiveness 
and Risk Acceptance 
Small 
Business 
Orientation
13 Firms
Functional 
Efficiency
Orientation
34 Firms
Related 
Diversification
Orientation
14 Firms
Unrelated 
Diversif ication
Orientation
6 Firms
Firm 65:  Manufacture, 3 employees
Manufacturer of Candles
Company manufactures candles, both machine 
manufactured and hand made. A company in decline 
stages, having downsized to the smallest possible 
layout. The firm has settled into a SBO configuration, 
with the owner/manager waiting for his retirement to 
come along, and openly saying that he sees no future 
for this form of micro manufacturing business.
A number of reasons for this decline:
• Firm used to sell to wholesalers, who are now 
importing and competing with the firm.
• Cost of imports is cheaper than the local product.
• Market dictates the selling price, so the firm can only 
survive on the profits made through hand made candles 
of large size.
• Firm is no longer trying to be innovative in its 
approach (used to export wax filler), and the owner is 
taking a conservative approach towards the firm.
• Owner is a pensioner, and feels that he has nothing 
left in him to proactively direct the company. No time for 
him to sew the seeds of innovation and nurture them 
into growth. 
• Firm cannot compete even in high quantity export, 
due to the high local labour and shipping costs.
1 member in dominant coalition
FEO
SBO
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Appendix 10:   The Five Strategic Pathways for Small Businesses 
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Abstract 
Objectives: Malta is classified as a country that is making a transition from an investment-driven 
economy to an innovation-driven economy, ranking 39th out of 125 countries measured in the year 
2006 Global Competitiveness Index. A key player in the Maltese economy is the small firm, 
consisting of below 50 full-time employees and providing for over 60% of private sector 
employment. The current paper investigates the various dimensions of strategic behaviour for small 
firms in Malta, and focuses upon the key dimensions that appear to be providing for competitive 
advantage. 
Prior work: The paper is based upon configurational theory and the concept of strategic fit. Various 
authors contend that firms will only perform well if there exists a correct configuration of a number 
of factors of strategic behaviour, and if these factors are in tune with the relevant environment. 
These concepts of strategic fit, of the adaptive cycle, and of equifinality have been shown to apply 
also for small firms. 
Approach: The paper is empirical and qualitative in nature. Small firms were identified within the 
three predominant industries in Malta; manufacturing, services and retail. Expert interviews were 
carried out. Firms were chosen according to their relevance to the study, as well as their capability 
to provide information that was rich in content. 
Results: The organizations studied were all firms that had survived Malta’s entry into the European 
Union in 2004. In all, ten dimensions of strategic behaviour were identified, generally falling into the 
three main categories of the adaptive cycle. Of these ten dimensions, three appeared to bear more 
weight on the small firms in question. Consistent with the concept of equifinality, there appeared to 
be a number of strategic configurations that allowed for effective performance. 
Implications: The findings suggest the need for a larger study on the patterns of strategic 
behaviour. Particularly, the study hints that a strong entrepreneurial orientation, when referring to 
new products and markets, is not an imperative quality for small firms, and its contribution towards 
performance depends on the prevalence of other strategic factors. 
Value: The study moves away from the more common coarse-grained methodologies for research 
on strategic behaviour, that are rich in prediction and generalizability but poor in description. Also, 
the study questions popular universalist theories that assume that certain characteristics of small 
firm behaviour are automatically advantageous. 
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The study of patterns of small firm strategic behavior, or strategic orientation, is gradually 
gaining prominence in the literature. Strategic behavior is a consequence of various 
antecedents, such as the prevalent management philosophy and environmental 
dynamism. It, in turn, determines the particular engineering stance adopted, structures and 
processes deployed, and ultimately, organizational performance. 
The purpose of this paper is to critique, enhance and extend a model proposed by 
Aloulou and Fayolle (2005) that is focused particularly on the entrepreneurial orientation of 
small firms. A model is proposed for small firm strategic orientation that is based on a 
configurational approach, and applies the concepts of the adaptive cycle and the firm’s 
lifecycle. The rationale for, and the various dimensions of the proposed model are 
described, and recommendations made for future research on small firm strategic 
behavior. 
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